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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Reflecting on his fieldwork among the Malagasy speakers of Mayotte 
in the Indian Ocean, Canadian anthropologist Michael Lambek 
questions why the West has a “blind spot” when it comes to the 
human activity of trance.  Immersed in his subject’s trance practices, 
he questions why such a fundamental aspect of the Malagasy culture, 
and many other cultures he has studied around the world, is absent 
from his own. 
   
This research addresses the West’s preoccupation with trance in 
ethnographic research and simultaneous disinclination to attribute or 
situate trance within its own indigenous dance practices.  From a 
Western perspective, the practice and application of research 
suggests a paradigm that locates trance according to an imperialist 
West/non-West agenda.  If the accumulated knowledge and data 
about trance is a by-product of the colonialist project, then trance may 
be perceived as an attribute or characteristic of the Other.  As a 
means of investigating this imbalance, I propose that trance could be 
reconceived as an attribute or characteristic of the Self, as exemplified 
by dancers engaged in Western dance practices within traditional 
anthropology’s “own backyard.”  In doing so, I examine the degree to 
which trance can be a meaningful construct within the cultural analysis 
of contemporary dance creation and performance.  
  
Through case studies with four dancer/choreographers active in 
Canada, Margie Gillis, Zab Maboungou, Brian Webb and Vincent 
Sekwati Mantsoe, this research explores the cultural parameters and 
framing of transformative states in contemporary dance.  I argue that 
trance functions discursively and is rooted in a cultural and rhetorical 
context which is collaboratively constructed as both an embodied state 
or process, and as an artefact.   
 
As a discourse, trance problematizes issues of multiculturalism, 
decolonization, migration, embodiment, authenticity, neo-
expressionism and the commodification of trance practice in a post-
modern, transnational, economically globalized world.  The West’s 
bias exists due to its investment in maintaining philosophical authority 
over the non-West and its attachment to notions of “high” culture.  By 
expanding the range of possible sites for trance experience and by 
investing in previously unapplied theories such as flow, the potential 
exists to situate and to regard trance as other than Other to the West. 
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INTRODUCTION The West’s blind spot 
 
Reflecting on his fieldwork among of the Malagasy speakers of Mayotte in the 
western Indian Ocean, Canadian anthropologist Michael Lambek questions why the 
West has such a “blind spot” when it comes to the human activity of trance.  
Immersed in his subject’s trance practices, he questions why such a fundamental 
aspect of the Malagasy culture, and many other cultures he has studied around the 
world, is absent from his own (1981, p 7).   
 
Lambek is not the only Western anthropologist to question this potential anomaly: 
Margaret Thompson Drewal (1975), Kathy Foley (1985), and Faith Simpson (1997) 
likewise comment directly on the absence of a trance tradition in the West.  Drewal in 
her study of movement and regalia in an Anago-Yoruba ceremony in West Africa 
states that the trance phenomenon  
 
can perhaps be considered comparable to performing artists in 
Western societies where training ideally produces a very disciplined 
power of concentration yet acute awareness of the surroundings. To 
that extent, a performing artist [in the West] may be said to alter his 
normal state of consciousness on stage.  
 
(italics mine) Drewal, 1975, p 18.  
 
Foley, in her study of trance dance and theatrical performance in West Java, states, 
“in Western theatre we talk of actors becoming so enraptured that for a moment or an 
hour they “live the part.”  But on the whole, Western acting is perceived as an elegant 
mode of artifice.  Actors impersonate but never lose perspective on who they 
themselves are” (Foley, 1981, p 28).  Here, both Drewal and Foley draw a 
comparison between their non-Western subjects and Western actors and performing 
artists.  Taken together, they suggest that training in Western performing arts 
disciplines may produce a “very disciplined power of concentration” that allows them 
to “live the part” on stage.  It is clear from their assessments that whatever it is that 
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Western performing artists do on stage, it is not the same as and perhaps even 
inferior to what their subjects are experiencing in the field.  Even if the two situations 
bear sufficient resemblance from which to draw comparison, Drewal and Foley are 
not prepared to question the inferred binary.  Their message is clear:  what their 
subjects in the field do is trance and what performing artists do in the West is not.   
 
Lambek provides the jumping-off point for this research into the West’s 
preoccupation with trance in ethnographic research and simultaneous disinclination 
to attribute or situate trance within its own imagined borders.  In Lambek’s own 
words, “the question for the West becomes one of understanding why trance has 
been so rigidly excluded or ignored” (1981, p 7).  Querying the West’s blind spot and 
ascertaining trance’s application to dance studies is the focus of this project. 
 
The foundation for my research into trance lies in my interest in the stories dancers 
tell about their performance experiences:  stories about epiphanic, flow or zone-like 
physiological experiences that can punctuate a dancer’s performance career.  When 
I began to look at these experiences in a larger context, beyond their appearance in 
interviews and as anecdotes in casual conversations, I began to see some 
interesting parallels in the extensive body of ethnographic literature on trance.  Yet 
unlike ballet and contemporary dancers, the subjects of ethnographic trance research 
do not reside in the anthropologist’s country of origin; they live “in the field” – in lands 
annexed and occupied by European powers, in smaller, less overtly exploitable areas 
on the peripheries of the civilized world, or in enclaves of indigenous peoples still 
holding on after the onslaught of colonization.  
 
It became clear that, in dialectic terms, one could construct a paradigm of trance 
research that problematized its practice and application based on which side of the 
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West/non-West divide the subjects happened to reside.  This led me to propose that 
trance research has been directed exclusively at what, in post-colonial theory, has 
been termed the Other.  If the accumulated knowledge and data about trance is a by-
product of the colonialist project, then trance may be perceived as an attribute or 
characteristic of the Other.  As a means of investigating this imbalance, I propose 
that trance could be regarded as an attribute or characteristic of the Self, as 
exemplified by dancers engaged in Western dance practices within traditional 
anthropology’s “own backyard.”  In suggesting that trance has been miscast, I 
endeavour to explore the cultural history of trance in the West.  In doing so, I 
examine the degree to which trance can be a meaningful construct within the cultural 
analysis of contemporary dance creation and performance when, as a culture, the 
West does not acknowledge trance as an indigenous practice.  Through interviews, 
watching live and recorded performances and moderating public discussions, and 
with support and application to dance studies and cultural studies, in particular post-
colonialtheory, I trace how trance is implicated within the aforementioned fields and 
attempt to construct a cultural model for trance behaviour in the West.  
  
Like Lambek, Foley and Drewal, British dance studies MA student Faith Simpson, in 
her auto-ethnography of initiation into a whirling dervish sect in London, England, 
also draws parallels between cultural approaches to trance.  Unlike Foley and 
Drewal, her focus is to compare and contrast the meaning and significance of trance 
practice both within and outside her fieldwork.  In approaching her subject in this 
way, she perceives that trance  
 
from a western [sic] perspective, is an activity most commonly 
attributed to the ‘other’; whether that be peoples of relatively 
uncharted cultures or those on the fringes of our own.  Trance 
conjures up media portrayed images of tribal communities dancing or 
drumming themselves into hallucinatory states or taken over by spirits 
in ‘possession’ dances … In the main, trance is not part of everyday 
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life in the West.  We recognize its existence but very few have 
experienced it and even less have integrated it into their lives.  
 
Simpson, 1997, p 54. 
 
  
Though she suggests that there are places in the West where trance is a factor, the 
people who practice trance are themselves “other,” “uncharted” and on “the fringes.”  
Such adjectives are likewise applicable to the subjects of her fieldwork despite being 
located in a Western metropolis.  In doing so, Simpson suggests that the Other need 
not exist on the other side of the world; the Other can exist even in close proximity to 
a dominant or “mainstream” community.  Simpson also addresses how trance is 
Other to the West and “not part of everyday life,” she believes this can be linked to 
portrayals of trance in the media and to the grip trance holds on Western imagination.  
Finally for Simpson, trance is “tribal,” suggestive not only of the primitive but also of 
cohesion within and insulation from other tribes.  By becoming an initiate in the 
whirling dervish sect Simpson confronts commonly held taboos about trance, 
breaking down barriers yet still maintaining the sect’s secrecy and peripheral status 
by not divulging the location of the sect’s headquarters or the full names of many of 
its members.  Simpson’s choice of fieldwork presents the opportunity for this 
particular manifestation of trance practice to be secularised yet allows her objectivity 
to be compromised by her indoctrination into the sect and into the practice of 
whirling.  In the end she succeeds in keeping trance resolutely Other. 
 
In contrast, by maintaining his distance from his subjects, Lambek unequivocally 
brings trance’s anomalous status in the West into focus and opens the way to 
deconstructing trance’s exotic status.  Like Simpson, he does this by placing the 
point of reference, the source for this anomaly, firmly in the West: 
 
we must be wary of possible biases introduced by our own cultural 
models of trance.  In point of fact, trance holds a particular and 
extreme position in contemporary mainstream Western culture.  With 
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the significant exception of certain subcultures (or “peripheral cults”), 
the West of the present day is quite unusual by world standards … 
Because there is no positive cultural model for trance behaviour…[t]he 
trance state is thus often frightening and extremely perplexing to 
members of mainstream Western society, appearing to run counter to 
basic assumptions concerning the nature of human experience.  The 
occurrence of trance in other societies is considered exotic, crying out 
for “rational explanation.” … But in point of fact, the unusual society in 
this case is the West.   
Lambek, 1981, p 7. 
 
 
If, according to Lambek, the West is the unusual society by world standards in its 
relationship to trance, how has this come to pass?  What are the “cultural models for 
trance?”  If, as Lambek suggests, the West does not have positive cultural models for 
trance, does it have negative cultural models for trance instead?  Is Simpson alluding 
to these negative cultural models when she discusses trance’s tribal, exotic and 
Othered connotations, and if so, how have these connotations developed?  It is also 
important to note that Lambek is not speaking of one cultural model – positive or 
negative – but of multiple models.  He introduces the potential for a diversity of 
perspective and opinion and also, as is evident with these examples, of contradiction.  
For Drewal and Foley, trance does not exist in the West, yet according to Lambek 
and Simpson it does, though Simpson’s choice of fieldwork maintains trance’s 
position on the fringe of society.  Lambek is not as specific as Simpson in locating 
trance and, in his ambiguity, allows trance to exist both within and outside of the 
mainstream.  Finally, the example set by Simpson illustrates how studying an aspect 
of one’s own culture, presumably with the intention of breaking down barriers, carries 
the potential to sustain Otherness. 
 
If trance does exist in the Western mainstream, it becomes possible to examine to 
what degree it resembles its “exotic” cousin outside the West and whether it is 
equally deserving of “rational explanation.”  For Drewal and Foley, the potential 
examples of trance behaviour that Western performing artists provide is neither 
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sufficiently exotic nor Other, nor appropriate to merit detailed discussion.  They open 
the door, and then firmly close it.  Yet if Drewal and Foley suggest the basis for 
comparison, then Simpson and Lambek present the possibility of ascertaining where 
and to what extent trance exists in the West.  This turn offers the potential for 
theorizing possible cultural models for trance and for exposing the dialogue that 
exists between points of reference or stakeholders.  In this sense, trance – its 
meaning, action and significance - is not something that is static but is negotiated.  
  
When something is Othered the tendency has been to isolate the object or idea in 
time and space, and insulate it from change.  An example of this appears in the work 
of anthropologist Margaret Mead who expressed considerable surprise and 
indignation when one of her informants from her fieldwork among the Arapesh, wrote 
to her years later, in English, to tell her that he had travelled abroad and pursued a 
law degree with the intention of returning to his homeland to advocate on behalf of 
his people (1971, xi).  Mead’s surprise that one of the Arapesh could have come so 
far is indicative of a certain tendency to “fix” subjects without recourse for 
transformation or evolution.   
 
Until the middle of the 20th century, few researchers were – by the today’s standards 
– sufficiently aware of how anthropological knowledge was produced, seldom 
reflecting on the delicate relationship between the fieldwork and the resulting 
ethnography nor the impact of the field on either the researcher or subject (Rubel & 
Rosman, 1994, p 335).  The ethnographic method “discovered” by Frank Cushing, 
Franz Boas and W. H. R. Rivers and “consolidated” by Mead and Bronislaw 
Malinowski (Sanjek, 1991, p 617), gave way to anthropologists such as Victor Turner, 
Karl Barth and Clifford Geertz who began to “question the dominant structural-
functionalist theoretical frameworks.”  Their work explored issues of social change 
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and individual and collective agency and heralded the changes that were to come 
(Harper, 2003, p 3).1  
 
From the 1960s onwards, reflexivity, foregrounded by the concern that ethnography 
was “closely identified and entwined with colonialism and imperialism” (Jordan & 
Yeomans, 1995, p 389), emerged as a central caveat as anthropologists were 
enjoined to question their position as “experts” representing other people’s cultures.  
This came partly from a post-colonial awareness of the neglect by earlier generations 
of anthropologists of the effects of colonialism both on the people they had studied, 
and the process of the research itself, and an ethical concern with the possible role 
that anthropologists may have played in perpetuating colonial oppression.  As 
American anthropologist Annie Harper explains “the turning of the lens onto the 
anthropologists themselves … was part of a broader postmodern movement taking 
place … [where] an increasingly globalized world was making it more and more 
difficult to even think about discrete cultures” separated by political geography 
(Harper, 2003, p 2).   
 
By the 1980s, the movement towards reflexivity of earlier decades, gave rise to an 
intensive debate and questioning of the nature of ethnography (Sanjek, 1991, p 609).  
James Clifford and George Marcus where among the anthropologists who pioneered 
this ethical and hence theoretical shift (Clifford 1983; Clifford & Marcus 1988; Marcus 
& Cushman 1982; Marcus & Fischer 1986) as well as Stephen A. Tyler, Vincent 
Crapanzano, and James A. Boon (Crapanzano, 1980; Boon, 1982; Tyler, 1987).   
Their theories and calls for reform inspired supporters and detractors in equal 
measure (Foulks & Schwartz, 1982; Abrahams, 1983; Runyan, 1986; Jackson 1987; 
Strathern, 1987a, 1987b; Caplan, 1988; Geertz, 1988; Kapferer, 1988; Sangren, 
1988; Shokeid, 1988; Whitten, 1988; Barth, 1989; Beidelman, 1989; Leach, 1989; 
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Mascia-Lees et al, 1989; Spencer, 1989; Birth, 1990; Fardon, 1990; Brady, 1991; 
Krech, 1991).  James’ critique of ethnography redirected the reflexive gaze by noting 
issues raised by African anthropologists such as Asmarom Legesse (1973) that 
exposed methodological weaknesses and philosophical prejudices that were in place 
‘in order to save and justify the enquiry itself (Sanjek, 1990, p 127).  Meanwhile, Tyler 
(1986) brought into question the ethnographer’s aim through fieldwork for 
“representation” of other cultures.  Instead, he argued, “postmodernists” should 
advocate “evocation” where “evocation” frees one from resorting to “the inappropriate 
mode of scientific rhetoric.”  (Tyler in Rubel & Rosman, 1994, p 338-339).   
 
In Britain, two conferences in the late 1980s also stand out as turning points in the 
epistemological debate.  “Localizing Strategies,” a conference convened at the 
University of St. Andrews in 1987, sought to “assess the weight of regional 
ethnographic traditions and writings,” proposing that “caution” was required in order 
that anthropologists “be aware of and work through the accretions of regional 
ethnographic traditions.”  A second conference, this time in Manchester in 1988, 
witnessed a debate over “anthropology as science.”  British anthropologist Judith 
Okely, renowned for her “local” fieldwork with Romani communities, clearly indicated 
her position on the matter, stating that science was “contaminated by positivism” 
(Okely in Sanjek, 1991, p 610-611).    
 
It is clear from these debates that leaders within the field believed that the 
“postmodern condition” required a postmodern ethnography.  Still mindful of the 
colonial shadow that hung over the field, the new postmodern ethnography aimed for 
the creation of a “polyphonic text” which “engaged [with] relativism” and “restored and 
constantly adapted to the changing conditions of the world” (Jordan & Yeomans, 
1995, p 394).  The period was arguably a time of “crisis” that fostered an 
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experimental shift within the discipline.   Collectively these rumblings led to the 
exploration of new ethnographic modes of enquiry focussed not only upon evocation 
but on “performative notions” such as “poetics” and new styles of sensibility and 
writing which positioned ethnography as always “caught up in the invention, not the 
representation of cultures.”  “Culture” itself became a contested site and 
anthropologists and sociologists engaged in reconceptualizing both its definition and 
application (Appadurai, 1981; Barth, 1989; Comaroff, 1984; Geertz, 1988, p 129-149; 
Hannerz, 1987a, 1987b, 1989; Moore, 1987; Peel, 1984, 1987; and Smith 1989).  
 
While the hegemonic divisions between the colonizer and the colonized were 
beginning to erode, Clifford was quick to counter any sense of utopian aspirations for 
the field, stating that “however monological, dialogical or polyphonic their form, 
[ethnographies remain] hierarchical arrangements of discourses” (1988, p 17).  Yet 
by the early 1990s, some ethnographers were intent on expanding the scope of self-
reflexivity in the field, certain that the notion of dialogue had not been sufficiently 
applied.  As American anthropologist Luke Eric Lassiter explains, many 
anthropologists have  
 
taken to heart the critiques of those such as Clifford, Rosaldo or 
Crapazano and accordingly replaced “reading over the shoulders of 
natives” with “reading alongside natives.”  They have thus sought to 
develop ethnography along dialogical lines and have in their own 
individual accounts shifted the dominant style of writing from 
authoritative monologue to involved dialogue between ethnographer 
and interlocutor. 
 
Lassiter, 2001, p 137. 
 
 
Echoing Lévi-Strauss’ account of Quesalid (1963), Lassiter advocates for the 
collaborative reading and interpretation (between the ethnographer and his or her 
“informants”) of the very ethnographic text itself.  He explores the political and ethical 
implications of a collaborative and reciprocal ethnography, in particular, how a 
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collaborative practice can further “narrow the gap between the academy and the 
communities in which ethnographers work” (Lassiter, 2001, p 137).  In addition to his 
own work and that of Crapanzano, Lassiter cites folklorist and ethnographer Elaine 
Lawless’ article “I was Afraid Someone like You…An Outsider…would 
Misunderstand” (1992) extracted from Handmaidens of the Lord (1988) and Holy 
Women, Wholly Women (1993).  Lawless offers an example of how not involving 
one’s respondents in the interpretation of the ethnographer’s interpretation can 
compromise the resulting monograph.  With more success, Johannes Fabian, most 
famous for his 1983 book, Time and the Other, produced a work in 1996 in which a 
Zairean artist, Tshibumba, is given the space to present the history of Zaire in his 
own words, both through his art and his commentary on the events that the art 
represents.  In response, Fabian provides an “official’ history alongside Tshibumba’s 
in footnotes.  Despite his withdrawal from the text, Fabian acknowledges that his 
presence in the work remains profound, from his decision to produce such a work in 
the first place, to the line of questioning between he and Tshibumba that inspired 
Tshibumba's commentary (Fabian, 1996).2   
 
Combined, the calls to organize ethnographic research around the tenets of agency, 
reflexivity, localization, evocation, collaboration and shared dialogue – ever mindful of 
an overriding post-colonial consciousness – reinvigorated the field, accommodating 
the postmodern challenges of transnationalism and globalization.  While the goals of 
this research are premised on these advances, trance as a discourse harbours 
traces of a less progessive anthropological rhetoric.  While it may be construed in the 
ethnographic context as non-Western, foreign, discrete, Other and exotic, trance is 
simultaneously familiar, compelling, and grounds for commentary such as that 
expressed by Drewal and Foley.  At the same time, in each of the anthropologists’ 
statements, what is not said is as important as what is said.  In none of these 
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statements is the subject’s experience of trance reported nor is the subject given an 
opportunity to agree or disagree with the anthropologist’s observations and 
assessments.   
 
Despite the efforts of the collaborative ethnographers discussed earlier, the subject’s 
silenced voice remains one of the criticisms of feminist ethnography in the 20th and 
21st centuries (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999; Minh-ha 1989; Spivak, 1999) that is relevant to 
this research.  Recognizing this silence opens up the possibility that the subject may 
not be in a state of trance as is often interpreted by the anthropologist.  If this is a 
possible conclusion, that the anthropologist is mistaken about the state that his or her 
subjects are displaying in the field, then it can also be postulated that the 
anthropologist may be mistaken about performing artists outside the field.  As 
specialists in their chosen fieldwork, Drewal and Foley have done the necessary 
research to acquaint themselves with their subject’s belief systems, vocabulary and 
cultural models in order to reflect on the events and experiences they describe.  But if 
this is the case, it brings into question whether Drewal and Foley can likewise be 
specialists in the performing experiences of artists in the West.  While their work 
presumably reflects as accurately as possible the depth and breadth of their subject’s 
reality that an outsider can construct, the conclusions they draw in regards to 
performing artists in the West may not be as equally reflective of a solid grounding in 
Western theatrical practice. 
 
On the importance of what is not said, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of 
habitus also merits discussion.  Habitus refers to the total ideational environment of a 
person.  This includes the person's beliefs and dispositions, and prefigures 
everything that person may choose to do.  The concept of habitus brings attention to 
the fact that there are limitless options for action that a person would never think of, 
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and therefore those options do not present themselves as possibilities.  In normal 
social situations, a person relies upon a large store of scripts and a vast store of 
knowledge, which present that person with a certain picture of the world and how she 
or he thinks to behave within it (Bourdieu, 1977).  As dance anthropologist Sally Ann 
Ness points out in her research on sinulog dance in the Philippines, many of her 
informants denied that certain movements had any significance or meaning as the 
meanings were so “fundamental and obvious that they went without saying” (1992, p 
118).  If pressed, Western ballet and contemporary dancers may concede that they 
sometimes experience trance-like symptoms and qualities in performance, but 
without prompting, they do not even consider it a possibility.  Trance does not exist 
within their store of scripts because the habitus of Western ballet and contemporary 
dance – its total ideational environment – does not support trance.  Understanding 
how the habitus of contemporary dance practice and practitioners in Canada 
contributes to the exclusion of trance as a factor in describing performative 
experiences is one of the goals of this research. 
 
In addition to inserting the subject’s voice and opening a discussion about trance’s 
potential, I am also interested in ascertaining the degree to which trance has been 
implicated in colonialism.  It is through post-colonial studies that the senses of Other 
and exotic have acquired such complex resonances.  American anthropologist 
Michael Taussig (1993) applies the notion of mimesis to the conceptualisation and 
reification of the notions of Self and Other.  As a pedagogical process, mimesis 
implies both the embodiment of knowledge and projection of knowledge.  Taussig 
argues that “We are all mimetic actors” and, as such, do not lack agency.  Mimesis – 
mimicking or imitating – is the way in which the habitus is learned and made Self and 
that social convention acquires its quotidian naturalness (1993, p xvi – xiii).  Taussig 
suggests that mimesis is a two-layered notion, “a copying, or imitation, and a 
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palpable, sensuous, connection between the very body of the perceiver and the 
perceived” (1993, p 21).  Thus, knowing thyself is at once an intimate corporeal act, 
the ability to “yield into and become Other,” and an ideational activity, a trying out of 
perceptions (1993, p xiii, 246).  Mimesis is dependent on alterity, on the existence of 
an Other.  Hence, there always exists the possibility of what Taussig calls second 
contact, seeing one’s own ethnic group, material objects, and personal traits, in the 
images produced by others.  In this instance I am querying the positioning of trance – 
trying it on as it were – because I recognize it simultaneously in the Self and the 
Other.  This is not intended as an act of assimilation but is in fact an act of mirroring 
or reflecting and then appreciating the results. 
 
Furthermore, if trance is Other and exotic, then it may be a contributing factor in the 
construction of the colonizer’s identity as rational, civilized and contained through 
naming and distinguishing an irrational, uncivilized and disordered Other.  Analysing 
trance from different angles presents a means of deconstructing the ongoing impact 
of colonialism and of seeing how the notions of Other and primitive are still pervasive 
within “post-" colonial society. 
 
Necessitated by the dearth of literature addressing trance within dance studies, my 
literature search within ethnographic studies of trance practices yielded a rich and 
varied text from which to draw comparison.  Lambek’s relativist speculations on the 
subject of trance were a significant discovery as they presented a means of bridging 
experiences of trance documented in ethnography with those reported by non-
traditional subjects in the West. 
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In 1902, pioneering American psychologist and philosopher William James published 
The Varieties of Religious Experience.  On the subject of “altered states of 
consciousness” he writes: 
 
Our normal waking consciousness, natural consciousness, as we call 
it, is but one special type of consciousness … we may go through life 
without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, 
and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types 
of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application 
and adaptation. 
 
James, [1902] 1985, p 16. 
 
 
A decade earlier in an article titled “The Hidden Self” published in Scribner’s  
Magazine, James states that the “trance-condition is an immensely complex and 
fluctuating thing, into the understanding of which we have hardly begun to penetrate, 
and concerning which any sweeping generalization is sure to be premature” (1890, p 
363).  In more than a century, very little has changed.  In the 1960s, when American 
experimental psychologist Charles Tart went looking for a definition of trance for his 
book States of Consciousness, he soon discovered that for every definite 
characteristic of trance mentioned by an “authority,” he found another source that 
contradicted it (Tart in Inglis, 1989, p 7).  “Even within trancing communities,” 
American ethnomusicologist Judith Becker explains, “the very ambiguity of trance 
leads to conflicting interpretations “ (Becker, 2004, p 30), supporting the suggestion 
that tendering any definition of trance is “contentious”  (Howard, 2000, p 363).  While 
transparency is still very much an issue, the wealth of literature on trance – and 
related subjects of ecstasy, possession and shamanism – demonstrates a plethora of 
activity and interest across a number of disciplines. 
 
Reminiscent of James’ work, Finnish cultural researcher Anna-Leena Siikala defines 
trance as a “form of behaviour deviating from what is normal in a wakened state.”  
She continues to describe that the “typical features” include “modifications to the 
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grasp of reality and the self-concept, with the intensity of change varying from slight 
alteration to complete loss of consciousness” (Siikala, 1978, p 39).  Helmut 
Wautischer, writing on the philosophy of anthropology, argues that in a state of 
trance, “perception of reality appears to extend beyond the usual spatial ands 
temporal boundaries that are normally perceived by the sense organs” (1989, p 35).  
Interestingly, he adds that trance is “generally considered a passage into another 
state of consciousness,” rather than a state in and of itself (ital. mine, 1989, p 40).  
Dennis Wier, the author of two books on trance, believes that trance has “something 
to do with energy utilization and the potentiation of creativity,” where awareness is 
“focussed” and “broad awareness” inhibited (1996, p 23).   
 
Some researchers discuss trance in symbolist, existential terms such as “the space 
of death” (Taussig, 1987, p 448) or “symbolic death” (Eliade, 1964), or in neo-pagan 
terms as in the “renewal and awareness of ancient tribal practices” (Partridge, 2004, 
p 169).  Psychopspiritual aspects emerge as “ruptures in planes” (Eliade, 1964), 
and/or “a kind of syncope, an absence, a lapse, a cerebral eclipse …viewed as a 
manifestation of a divine blessing, or a demonic possession” (Becker, 2004, p 25).  
Analyses of trance draw on the field of neuroscience (Lex 1979; D’Aquili, 1979; 
Wright, 1989; D’Aquili & Newberg 1999; D’Aquili, Newberg & Rause, 2001; Bressan 
& Crippa, 2005; Boso et al, 2006) where the experience is described in terms of  
“chemical changes” in “the brain’s functioning” and the “automatic nervous system” 
(Howard, 2000, p 364).  Descriptions of trance drawn from the ethnographic literature 
often appear as catalogues of symptoms including amnesia, depersonalisation, 
derealization and identity shifts, (Suryani & Jensen, 1993; Cardẽna, 1989: Saxena & 
Prasad, 1989; Steinburg, 1991); a range of alterations in qualitative functioning 
including, but not limited to, a disturbed sense of time, changes in body image, 
change in emotional expression, a sense of the ineffable, feelings of rejuvenation, 
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increased motor skills, hypersuggestibility and the deferral of pain (Belo, 1960; 
Ludwig, 1966; Laski, 1968; Courlander, 1972; Kartomi, 1973; Bourguignon 1973, 
1976; Drewal, 1975; Hetherington, 1975; Knoll, 1979; Newman, 1979; Peters & 
Price-Williams, 1980; Lambek, 1981; Prince, 1982; Foley, 1985; Locke & Kelly, 1985; 
Rouget, 1985; Heinze, 1988; Suryani, 1993; Simpson, 1997; Averbuch, 1998; Stuart 
& Hu, 1998; Tessler, 1998; Coldiron, 2004); and, “emotional arousal, loss of sense of 
self, cessation of inner language, and an extraordinary ability to withstand fatigue” 
combined with the “loss of sense of time” and “trance amnesia” or the “inability to 
recall what transpired during trance” (Becker, 2004, p 29).   These symptoms may be 
“recognized subjectively by the individual himself (or by an objective observer) as 
representing a sufficient deviation from subject experience or psychological 
functioning from certain norms” (Ludwig, 1969, p 9-10). 
 
Moving away from trance specifically, one finds more inclusive definitions associated 
with “altered states of consciousness” or ASC.  ASC are correlated with OSC 
(“Ordinary States of Consciousness”) and share commonalities with SSC (“Shamanic 
States of Consciousness”) (Ludwig, 1968; Ornstein, 1975; Harner, 1982; Walsh, 
1993).  The advantage of dealing in the broader field of ASC is that they allow for 
much broader definitions such as that provided by A. M. Ludwig (1969, p 9-10).  Yet 
breadth, in this instance, clouds the issue of trance avoidance in Western culture. 
 
Similarly much has been made of the connections between trance, ecstasy and 
possession.  Scholars, such as Eliade, use trance and ecstasy interchangeably 
(1964), while ethnographers Larry G. Peters and Douglass Price-Williams, use the 
hybridized “possession-trance” (1980).  Finnish religious studies professor Nils G. 
Holm, citing William Ralph Inge, suggests that ecstasy is “almost equivalent to 
trance” (Holm, 1982a, p 7).  In the same volume, Goran Ogen states that ecstasy 
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“denotes a state in which the ecstatic is aware of being outside himself, or in an 
abnormal state of consciousness” (1982, p 226).  Ogen’s assessment agrees with 
the Oxford English Dictionary, though definitions for ecstasy include trance and vice 
versa.3  Siikala suggests that justification for choosing one term over another is 
reflective of the discipline – where anthropologists tend to speak of trance, students 
of religion choose ecstasy (1978, p 39).  Such a distinction aligns with definitions 
provided by Laski (1968), Arbman (1963), Sarbin & Allen (1968) and Ogen (1982), 
though this list is by no means exhaustive.  French ethnomusicologist Rouget draws 
the distinction somewhat differently.  He argues that “trance is attained by means of 
noise, sonic events, agitation, and in the presence of others, while ecstasy is attained 
through silence, immobility and solitude” (1985, p 7).  With regard to possession, a 
term favoured by ethnographers I.M. Lewis (1966, 1971, 1981, 1986, 1991) and T.K. 
Oesterreich (1966, 1974), the term is culture-specific as opposed to discipline-
specific.  As psychiatric anthropologist Erika Bourguignon explains, “where belief in 
possession exists,” then possession is the appropriate term (1976, p 7-8).  Since this 
study is framed within an ethnographic methodology, the kinds of altered states of 
consciousness achieved by contemporary dancers fit the criteria of Rouget’s initial 
definition, and belief in possession is not a part of the habitus of either contemporary 
dance or dancers, though a sense of being possessed may be used metaphorically, I 
am electing to employ the term trance. 
 
In 1986, anthropologist Michael Winkelman published his findings on the 
“psychophysiological effects of different techniques and procedures” used for “trance 
induction” and found that trance response was mitigated by auditory stimulation, 
fasting and nutrition, social isolation and sensory deprivation, meditation, sleep 
patterns, sexual abstinence or prolonged stimulation, increased motor behaviour, and 
the ingestion of stimulants such as opiates, hallucinogens and alcohol (1986, p 178-
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183).  The connections between trance and auditory stimulation have been explored 
through the vehicle of rave culture (Weil & Rosen, 1993, 2004; Saunders, 1996, 
1997; Collin, 1997; Gore, 1997; Reynolds, 1998; Brewster & Broughton, 1999; Fritz, 
1999; Malbon, 1999; Measham et al, 2001; Fatone, 2001; Regan, 2001, Shapiro, 
2005), with reference to medicine and healing (Schadewaldt, 1971; McClellan, 1991; 
Gouk, 2000; Horden, 2000; Howard, 2000; Becker, 2004; Aldridge & Fachner, 2006; 
Schneck & Berger, 2006), alternative spiritualities (Inglis, 1989; Partridge, 2004; 
Sylvan, 2005),  glossolalia and pentecostalism (Goodman, 1972; Kelsey, 1981; 
Holm, 1987; Cartledge, 2002), and as part of electronic music culture (Prendergast, 
2000).  Collectively, these works effectively demonstrate the presence of trance in 
Western culture of the 20th and 21st centuries and its manifestation through the 
combination of music and dancing (as forms of “increased motor behaviour”) often, 
but not exclusively, in concert with recreational drug use.  Yet nowhere have these 
same principles been applied to contemporary art dance practice. 
 
In the introduction to his book Trance: A natural history of altered states of mind, 
British journalist and historian Brian Inglis writes: 
 
Colloquially, trance has a range of meanings, particularly in 
connection with sport … commonly used about somebody who is in 
full possession of his faculties, but in a frame of mind that makes him 
oblivious to his surroundings … [Trance has also] been employed to 
describe a condition when a player feels taken over, almost 
possessed, by a force which seems to play through him and for him, 
better than he could hope to play himself. 
 
Inglis, 1989, p 9. 
 
 
Understanding dance as a form of high performance athleticism (Patrick, 1978; 
Arnold, 1990; Reed, 1998; Dyck, 2003; Hargreaves, 2007), taken together with some 
of Winkelman’s techniques such as auditory stimulation, fasting and nutrition, social 
isolation and increased motor behaviour, one begins to recognize how trance could 
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be an appropriate appellation in respect to contemporary dancers and contemporary 
dance practice.  Yet again, as American medical anthropologist and specialist in 
transcultural psychiatry, Arthur Kleinman argues, “only the modern, secular, West 
seems to [in certain circumstances] have blocked individual’s access to these 
otherwise pan-human dimensions of the self” (1988, p 50).  It would appear, then, 
that West’s blind spot is curiously selective. 
 
The experiences reported by ballet and contemporary dancers, characterized most 
commonly by shifts in sense of time and duration, a sense of the ineffable and 
heightened pain tolerance, could be described as trance-like. Yet despite the 
similarities, observers of these qualitative shifts – either those who receive the 
descriptions from dancers (fellow dancers, teachers, trainers, journalists etc.) or the 
dancers themselves – are hesitant to label such experiences “trance.”  This 
predicament was made clear to me in a casual conversation with Canadian 
contemporary dancer Jessica Runge, who, in learning the general premise of my 
thesis, reacted with an incredulous “You mean I’m in a state of trance when I go on 
stage???” (personal conversation, 2003). 
 
In embarking on a research design that seeks to address why trance has been rigidly 
excluded and ignored, it was necessary to confront a clear and present bias towards 
trance.  Runge’s reaction addresses whether Western contemporary dancers’ 
experiences can be called trance at all if the practitioners themselves do not attribute 
that particular term or meaning to their own activities.  Paying attention to this 
dilemma is integral to this research as it necessitates a critique of the ethnocentric 
bias that trance engenders to ascertain whether or not it can be attributed to 
contemporary dance.  This is a necessary aspect of constructing a cultural model. 
 
19 
Through this research, I am responding to Lambek’s question by asking first from 
where trance has been or continues to be “rigidly excluded”; and second, by whom 
and for what purpose it has been “ignored in the West.”  I am proposing that this is 
partially an issue of high versus low culture.  Dance scholar Cynthia Novack, in her 
analysis of gender in ballet, writes that the dance form “is considered the premier art 
dance form by governments of Europe, North America, Australia and the former 
Soviet Union, and enjoys popularity in many other parts of the world.”  As a result, 
ballet is regarded as a cultural institution where “ballet’s ideas and practices gain 
cultural power” (Novack, 1993, p 39).  In turn, this sense of power underscores a very 
specific reading of ballet vis-à-vis other dance forms and other cultures.  Novack 
argues that ballet’s aesthetic has developed as an esteemed artistic tradition that is 
simultaneously linked to an upper-class, white audience and through the medium of 
television with a more general audience.  As a result, ballet is both an “elite art form 
connoting bourgeois respectability and an art accessible to large numbers of people.”  
Combined with the emphasis on technical precision, these factors contribute to an 
impression of ballet as something that transcends cultural boundaries, a dance that is 
“not ethnic” (Novack, 1993, p 39). 
 
“Bourgeois respectability” is politically and economically beneficial for ballet as it 
situates the art form at a place where it is most likely to benefit from cultural hierarchy 
and governmental support.  At the same time, placing ballet on a pedestal suggests 
that it exists in a state of suspended animation where, until recently, with publications 
such as those by Foster (1996), Garafola (1997) and Banes (1998), it existed beyond 
deconstruction.  In her reading of ballet concurs, dance scholar Rachel Fensham.  
Ballet is a “dominant discourse” signifying imperial, colonial, wealth and social status.  
Furthermore, ballet has always been associated with “civilised white bodies as 
opposed to savage bodies” and as such functions as both “an imperial institution and 
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a colonising force” (Fensham, 2002, p 66-67).  Combining the two, reading ballet’s 
apparent civility and trance’s apparent savagery, make it an unlikely pairing. 
 
The association of low culture (trance) to high culture (ballet and contemporary 
dance) seems to have been disregarded or perhaps never regarded in the first place 
because of the alleged incongruities.  Yet the potential to deconstruct this parallelism 
was broached many years ago by dance anthropologist Joanne Kealiinohomoku in 
re-reading ballet as “ethnic.”  Kealiinohomoku pioneered a shift in perception with her 
anti-establishment article “An Anthropologist Looks at Ballet as a Form of Ethnic 
Dance” first published in 1969.  In the article, Kealiinohomoku registers the failure to 
regard Western dance forms as ethnic.  Stating that “it is good anthropology to think 
of ballet as a form of ethnic dance” (1984, p 533), Kealiinohomoku argues that 
ballet’s omission from treatment within both anthropology and dance anthropology is 
due to ingrained ethnocentricity on the part of scholars in both fields who seek to 
define and catalogue non-Western dance forms.  It is the word “ethnic” itself that she 
argues is responsible for the exclusion, explaining that Western scholars have “not 
used the word ethnic in its objective sense,” but have used it in its pejorative sense 
equivalent to terms such as “heathen,” “pagan,” “savage” and more recently “exotic” 
(Kealiinohomoku, 1984, p 546).  Kealiinohomoku advocates that anthropologists 
resituate themselves and use ethnic to refer to “a dance form of a given group of 
people who share common genetic, linguistic and cultural ties” (1984, p 547).  Such a 
distinction places ballet – and by extension contemporary dance – firmly within the 
purview of Western anthropology.  Yet even as recently as 1993, dance scholar 
Susanna Glasser writes that “while the notion of ‘primitive’ in contemporary 
anthropological thinking is regarded with extreme circumspection and largely seen as 
a fossil of 19th and early 20th century construction,” Western dance scholarship 
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seems to have been “largely oblivious of the developments that caused 
anthropologists to change their minds” (1993, p 186).   
 
British dance anthropologist Theresa Buckland is likewise engaged in seeing where 
the juncture of anthropology and dance studies presents opportunities for poor or 
misguided scholarship.  Her concerns, as detailed in “All Dances are Ethnic, but 
Some are more Ethnic than Others” (1999), are with dance anthropologists who 
borrow tools and theories from anthropology proper and fail to apply them in a 
judicious or rigorous manner.  With examples from recent dance anthropology, 
Buckland describes tendencies such as performing interviews and enacting case 
studies without intensive participant observation and calling it “ethnography,” 
collapsing theoretical frameworks without sufficient knowledge of their development 
or critique, and performing analysis without sufficient rigour or attention to detail, as 
increasingly problematic (1999, p 3-5).  Additionally Buckland offers a critique of 
Kealiinohomoku’s concept of ethnicity, specifically her inclusion of genetics in her 
definition and the treatment of ethnicity as an essence as opposed to “a deployable 
construct” dependent on historical and social criteria.  Despite her criticism, Buckland 
concedes that Kealiinihomoku presented an “authoritative and pioneering statement 
for the future” (1999, p 9).  In conducting this research, I make appropriate use of 
anthropological tools and theories and also employ ethnicity in its objective sense 
without essentializing either the subject or the subject matter. 
 
In carrying out this project, it was likewise important to assess the appropriateness of 
trance as a term within the contemporary dance milieu without exoticizing either 
ballet and contemporary dance or dancers.  Setting out to portray contemporary 
dancers as Other in order to justify the attribution of trance would only serve to 
uphold the tenets of the colonialist project and would serve to preserve trance’s 
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exotic connotations.  The acknowledgement that the subjects of traditional 
anthropological investigation have been oppressed by the very same mechanisms 
that sought to liberate them from obscurity would be forfeited in endeavouring to 
invert the colonialist gaze in this manner.  Highly influential works within anthropology 
such as Dick Hebdige’s Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979), a study of youth 
subculture and the punk movement in 1970s Britain, and Esther Newton’s Mother 
camp: female impersonators in America (1972), a study of American drag queens, 
opened the door for research into pockets of Western subculture.  Yet with regard to 
both of these works – like Simpson’s auto-ethnography of the whirling dervish sect – 
the object of study remained exotic and Other.  Though significant and 
groundbreaking, the formula is transparent.  The subjects could be absorbed and 
adapted to the traditional anthropological framework because they were elements 
that have been marginalized and exoticized by the larger cultures.  The subjects of 
these works could have been transported to faraway lands – a rare tribe of 
indigenous cross-dressing men living in seclusion in the Amazon rain forest, or 
pierced, mohawk-sporting, leather-clad youth disturbing the status quo in Papua New 
Guinea.  The setting may have changed but the criteria by which to define and 
categorize the anthropological subject remain intact and resolutely foreign.   
In her book Dance and Stress: Resistance, Reduction and Euphoria (1988), dance 
ethnologist Judith Lynne Hanna provides the one example within dance studies that 
explores explicitly dance and trance.  Hanna focuses on the feelings that vigorous 
movement and dancing can elicit.  Hanna employs a broad use of the word dance – 
she does not distinguish between Western and non-Western dance, primitive or 
otherwise, it is simply “dancing” that can cause these qualitative shifts.  She 
reinforces her observations with ethnographic accounts of non-Western dance forms.  
In her book she includes chapters on the trance dance practices of the !Kung 
Bushmen of Namibia, Balinese kecak and Coast Salish spirit dancing from western 
23 
Canada.  Where Hanna does discuss trance in a Western context is in relation to the 
practice of “terpsichoreotrancetherapy” or group “healing rituals” where vigorous 
dancing is the prescription for men and women seeking enlightenment under the 
guidance of a therapist cum shaman; and in relation to tarantism, where rural 
dwellers inflicted with the venom of a tarantula dance ecstatically to various melodies 
to rid themselves of the poison.  Both are legitimate examples of Western trance 
practice but neither is regarded as a high art form.  One has healing and ritualistic 
connotations and the second is regarded as bucolic and profane.  What is inferred by 
Hanna’s treatment of the subject is that the “natural” or indigenous setting for liminal 
experience is either outside the West or when it does enter into a Western setting, it 
must be artificially imposed through association with non-Western healing practices 
or with mysterious quasi-religious folk traditions.  Hanna’s examples pose the 
question whether trance can be indigenously produced in North America.  In the end, 
Hanna’s research does nothing to dispel the belief that non-Western cultures have 
trance, and the West does not. 
 
In addition to avoiding the potential hazards of applying trance where it does not 
natively pertain, exoticizing contemporary dancers, employing anthropological tools 
without sufficient rigour and working against trance’s accepted positioning, another 
salient issue is the problematic context in which this inquiry into the cultural models of 
trance is framed, i.e. in the West.  At its core, anthropology is premised on and 
largely preoccupied with the study of Other cultures, i.e. non-Western cultures, and 
the attribution of ethnicity from a Western perspective.  As a result, contemporary 
dance, as a practice associated with the dominant culture, has been regarded as 
lacking in ethnicity and thus largely excluded from anthropological consideration.  Yet 
increasingly since the 1970s, anthropology – particularly in Britain and Scandinavia 
but also in the United States – has been at work in the “home counties” (Okely, 
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1984).  Urban and anthropology, though some would argue it has been practised 
since the 1930s, gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s, and was reconsidered 
in the 1980s to accommodate the removal of biases towards class, gender, sexual 
orientation, age, spirituality and social cohesion (Sanjek, 1990).  Urban anthropology 
has produced a vast quantity of important literature that provides a foothold for 
explorations of trance in contemporary dance – which is, by and large, an urban 
phenomena.4   
 
Understanding why contemporary dance has been excluded from anthropological 
consideration involves understanding how the creation of the West and the 
formalization of anthropology are implicated in maintaining dominant and dominating 
ideologies that sustain an ethnic/non-ethnic divide.  In this era of the “global village” 
and “world culture” it would be conceivable – perhaps even progressive – to forego 
the attributions of Western and non-Western, ethnic and non-ethnic.  Yet in doing so, 
one could ignore the theoretical basis for the construction of the anthropological 
subject that is still active today. 
 
What is meant by “the West” or “the Western world” is constantly under debate. 
Originally defined as Europe, most modern uses of the term refer to the societies of 
Europe and their genealogical, colonial, and allied descendants, typically also 
including those countries whose ethnic identity and dominant culture derive from 
European culture.  More typically, the term "the West" designates wealthy and 
politically dominant societies who position themselves to subjugate poorer ones by 
economic, military and philosophical means.  "The West" thus becomes a term that 
denotes affluent, colonial (formerly slave-holding), European-descended (or allied) 
societies that influence world order and/or who seek domination over Others and 
their lands.  
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 To see the Western world in terms of geographical relationships and positioning begs 
the question “West of what?”  By definition, to speak of the “Western hemisphere” 
excludes Australia, a nation which was created and fuelled by Great Britain’s colonial 
enterprise and as such, remains part of the Commonwealth.  Likewise, many 
developing countries – another binary construction defined in opposition to 
developed countries – were former colonies and/or trade partners with European 
nations who still identify themselves culturally and institutionally with Western 
countries though they are situated outside the West.  Politically, one could restrict 
inclusion to countries who are G8 nations – France, the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada and Russia – but this configuration differs from First, 
Second and Third World principles that relegate the former Soviet Union to the 
Second World and again, are in place to imply dominion and strategic primacy over 
other countries.  Traditional distinctions based on either relative affluence and/or 
European descent no longer hold true for nations such as China, India, Japan and 
Korea.  Perhaps the notion, like Occident and Orient, is becoming antiquated – such 
a reading is suggested by American Marxist sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
essay "Does the Western World Still Exist?" wherein he questions the central tenets 
of contemporary geopolitics.  “From 1945-2001,” Wallerstein begins 
 
few persons doubted that there was something in the world political 
arena we could call the "West" or the "the Western world."  To be 
sure, there were some quibbles about who was included in it … But 
since the Bush regime embarked on its unilateral and macho march 
through the planet … the world's politicians and media have come to 
recognize that the geopolitical unity of the "West" is no longer a self-
evident proposition”  
 
     Wallerstein, website, 2003. 
 
   
Yet many would argue that the self-evident proposition of the West disintegrated long 
before the advent of the second Gulf War. 
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 A self-proclaimed subaltern post-colonial scholar, Arjun Appadurai argues that the 
dissolution of traditional boundaries such as West/non-West are imposed and upheld 
by those in power has been heralded by the progress of a burgeoning capitalist 
economy.  Appadurai argues against the homogenizing forces of a global village 
mentality and sees instead the ultimately heterogenizing forces of global “scapes.”  
Identified as ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes and 
ideoscapes, they characterize the constant flow of people, media, technology, 
commerce and images to and from all parts of the globe with fewer and fewer claims 
to notions of origin or authenticity.  Thinking in terms of a continuous exchange of 
information, people and commodities, it becomes less viable to speak of 
appropriation or ownership of ideas or practices.  Yet with the interplay of scapes 
comes post-modern issues of displacement, deterritorialization, extremism and 
fundamentalism when connections to place and order are lost.  But Appadurai’s 
theories allow for exchange at a level of equality that is unprecedented in models that 
see Western capitalism and a global economy driven by the “superpowers” to the 
exclusion and detriment of “lesser” nations (1999). 
 
Whether one chooses to see the world as divided or not, power and access to power 
remain salient issues – the power to establish trade, to impose religious and/or 
institutional order, to name allies and protectorates, to suppress cultural expression 
and nationalist sentiment, to distinguish “us” from “them” or to define a pluralist 
umbrella that shelters all.  As literary theorist Edward Said explains in his article 
“Intellectuals in a Post-Colonial World”, the “first thing to be noticed about the form of 
this kind of discourse is how totalizing it is, how all-enveloping its attitudes and 
gestures, how much it shuts out even as it includes, compresses and asserts a great 
deal.”  Furthermore, however well-intentioned, demarcating the West is neither “an 
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attractive [nor] edifying role for the post-colonial intellectual” (Said, 1986, p 48, 51).  
Yet the foundations of anthropological research are clearly implicated in the creation 
and maintenance of a pervasive Westerncentric bias.  As a result, avoiding 
acknowledgement of the boundary for the sake of appearances does little to 
deconstruct its influence.  
 
Post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha – an ardent critic of Said’s earlier ground-
breaking work Orientalism – takes this line of reasoning a step further by questioning 
the extent to which anthropology is implicated.  He asks “what is at stake in the 
naming of critical theory as “Western?”: 
 
it is, obviously, a designation of institutional power and ideological 
Eurocentricity.  Critical theory often engages with texts within the 
familiar traditions and conditions of colonial anthropology either to 
universalise their meaning within in its own cultural and academic 
discourse, or to sharpen its internal critique of the Western logocentric 
sign, the idealist subject, or indeed the illusions and delusions of civil 
society. 
  
Bhabha, 1994, p 31. 
 
 
Bhabha’s reading of anthropology places the discipline in a position not simply to 
expose, mediate and ratify the degrees of difference perceived to exist between the 
West and the non-West but to create or infer difference to ensure the West’s identity 
as separate and superior.  Anthropology is a tool of the West to “contain the effects 
of difference” wherein difference and Otherness are the “fantasy of a certain cultural 
space” (Bhabha, 1994, p 31).  While Said believes that one can no longer speak of a 
“monolithic West” in the same way that one can no longer speak convincingly of the 
entire ex-colonial world in one sweeping generalization, Bhabha sees that the 
monolithic West still has a tremendous psychological and political hold on the non-
West even if it is unfashionable or distasteful to acknowledge.  According to Said – 
and perhaps here Bhabha might agree – the post-colonial West has re-fashioned 
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itself to include “an imagined history of one-way Western endowments and free 
hand-outs followed by a reprehensible sequence of ungrateful bitings of that grandly 
giving “Western” hand” (1986, p 47-48).  Gazing back from the side of post-
colonialism can just as easily become an exercise in revisionist history without 
destabilising colonialism.  Bhabha’s sense of the West’s psychological and political 
control appears to be implicated in approaches to and interpretations of trance. 
 
As practitioners of high art forms in the West, contemporary dancers are traditionally 
not subjects of anthropological study and their trance-like experiences are regarded – 
if at all – as poetic accoutrements of their vocation.  If the dancers lived either outside 
of the West, were members of aboriginal groups within the West, or participated in 
Western subcultures, their experiences would, by default, fall under the rubric of 
“ethnicity.”  An anthropologist studying contemporary dancers who claim to have 
trance-like experiences might be inclined to exoticize his or her subjects in order to 
bring them in line with a traditional anthropological framework.  Applying such a 
model might lead an anthropologist to question how the dancers’ experiences figure 
in their religious or devotional beliefs, how they manifest in their training or 
indoctrination processes or how such experiences set them apart within their cultures 
– whether others look to them for spiritual guidance or counsel about future 
prosperity.   Such questions are derived from anthropology’s chronicles on “trance” 
experiences and behaviour in non-Western cultures.  
 
Countless anthropologists have travelled to observe Other cultures and communities, 
returning to the West with detailed descriptions of trance behaviour and trance 
rituals.  Because of ethnographic diligence in this regard, the West is familiar with, for 
example, the trance-inducing practices of the !Kung, the Trobriand Islanders, the 
Hausa bori cult of West Africa, voodoo practitioners of Haiti and the Haida of Western 
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Canada.  Combined, these accounts create a rich tapestry of trance lore – fact and 
fiction – that is an accepted component of both anthropological and mainstream 
portrayals of non-Western cultures.  
  
In the West, trance is an Other subject since it has both little relevance in day-to-day 
life and is the subject of intensive scrutiny in non-Western cultures.  Westerners are 
accustomed to existing in a state of knowing vis a vis their prejudiced sense of 
dominance over the rest of the world.  The constant stream of images and 
information available through all forms of mass media contributes to the false sense 
of armchair omniscience.  But if trance is unfamiliar and unsettling to Westerners, is it 
even possible to read trance as anything but Other?  In questioning how non-
Western practitioners view trance, in providing material that humanizes trance 
practitioners, and in questioning whether trance is entirely absent in Western culture, 
it may be possible to de-Other trance.  Traditionally anthropology attaches Otherness 
to cultures that exist apart from its own yet, at the same time, isolates pockets of 
Otherness where it natively co-exists in the form of aboriginal cultures, nomadic 
groups such as the Romany or subcultures such as rave.  By expanding the range of 
possible sites for trance experience, the potential exists to regard and portray trance 
as other than Other in the West. 
 
The framing of this research hinges on Clifford’s analysis of the West’s preoccupation 
with collecting.  In “On Collecting Art and Culture” (1988), Clifford describes how the 
value of collections or items within a collection either ameliorate or decrease in value 
according to shifts in aesthetic taste, political trends or beliefs about authenticity.  
The act of collecting, Clifford argues, plays a role in ”Western identity formation” and 
as such is simultaneously a means of validating the West’s revered image of Self as 
owner, and of distinguishing in geopolitical terms, “us” from “them” and in historical 
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terms, ”now” from “then.”  Collecting in this manner finds equal expression in Mead’s 
aims to “complete” a culture (1971), in a museum installation of Native American art 
removed from the indigenous landscape, or in the jars of shells and other detritus 
collected, labelled and displayed after a summer holiday.  While Clifford speaks 
mainly of physical artefacts – works of art, indigenous crafts and tourist knick-knacks 
– his theorization of collecting holds true for intangible objects as well (1998, p 59-60, 
66).   
 
It is with this in mind that I propose trance as an artefact: a cultural “thing” or relic that 
has been exclusively situated as non-Western and subsequently observed, 
reproduced and coveted for its exotic Otherliness.  Collecting trance takes the form of 
ethnographic filmmaking as in Maya Deren’s Divine Horsemen, the Living Gods of 
Haiti (1985), traditional ethnographic treatments such as Richard Lee’s work on 
!Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari (1979), or in fact, a conversation between tourists 
after “happening” upon a whirling dervish “ceremony” on a recent excursion to 
Istanbul (Cauthery, personal conversation, 2002).  In each instance, trance functions 
to delineate the Self from the Other: a delineation based on an extension of the 
Self/Other dichotomy that, from the perspective of the West, separates those who 
trance from those who do not.  
 
My goal for this research is to decipher the cultural history of trance within the West 
in order to postulate its application and its attendant ideologies.  It is integral that this 
is accomplished without alienating, exoticizing, essentializing or naturalizing dancers 
and their experiences.  Trance may not be an appropriate term in this context, but 
understanding why it is or is not appropriate is the crux of this research.  While this 
thesis is not an ethnography, it lays the theoretical groundwork to frame and inform 
an ethnographic study of ballet and contemporary dancers’ experiences of trance.  
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My approach reflects what dance scholar Cynthia Novack, borrowing from 
anthropologists Victor Turner (1957) and Clifford Geertz (1973), terms “processual 
analysis.”  This research was inspired by my own performance experiences and by 
conversations I have had with fellow dancers over the years.  My own insights led me 
to look for textural support in the fields of dance and anthropology, specifically 
ethnographies of indigenous trance practices in world cultures.  Drawing from this 
body of literature, from dance studies and cultural studies, in particular post-colonial 
theory, I demonstrate how an “individual’s particular institutional and ideological 
experiences necessarily raise issues which are shared and which can serve as the 
basis for larger commentary” (Novack, 1993, p 34). 
 
In approaching this work, it is necessary to keep in mind that trance, from the 
perspective of Western, European-derived, 21st century culture, manifests as a 
cluster of practices or ideas – a collection of reference points – predicated on socio-
cultural and geo-political constructs (where one comes from, what one believes, what 
one has been taught, observed or absorbed through one’s life about trance).5  These 
constructs beget cultural models for trance knowledge, lore and practice that are 
fixed but also malleable.  Such an approach recognizes how meaning and the 
expression of meaning are simultaneously conceived individually and collectively, 
wherein one’s ideas about trance may have much in common with the ideas of one’s 
habitus but also differ in subtle or extreme ways between peers.  In another way, the 
place of one’s response to trance – what one brings to bear in encountering, 
enacting, authenticating and/or refuting trance – is culturally relative.   
 
With this in mind, it is necessary to conceive of trance as functioning in two distinct 
ways within this multifarious cluster of practices and ideas:  trance as an experiential 
state or process, and trance as an object.  The first function relates to a kinaesthetic, 
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psychobiological experience that exists in space and time where a person or persons 
achieve an altered state of consciousness (however named or defined) that may or 
may not be corroborated by those present and/or the larger sphere.  In this form 
trance is an active but highly subjective, ephemeral, embodied process.  This is the 
form that to some degree is familiar to a general audience.   
 
In the second instance, trance is a tangible, tradable artefact.  I argue that the 
objectification of trance is a result of the joint and parallel aims of anthropology in its 
classical imperialist form and colonialism where trance is a discourse – a system of 
ideas or knowledge – associated exclusively with non-Western, non-European-
derived, pre-21st century cultures as defined by its Western counterparts.  The 
transfer of knowledge concerning trance – how and under what circumstances it 
manifests itself, by whom and for what purpose – and the power embedded in the 
acquisition of that knowledge renders trance an artefact – a trophy, relic or souvenir 
of contact with and containment of Other cultures.  While these two approaches are 
effective for the purposes of furthering my exploration they do not supplant the first 
point that trance is an indeterminate cluster of practices and ideas.  In establishing 
this framework, I am acknowledging that trance remains unstable whether as a 
concept, state, word and/or entity.  There is an inherent tension in trying to conceive 
of trance as both subjective and objective, ephemeral and tangible, embodied and 
potentially disembodied, that cannot be overlooked.   
 
This thesis is divided two parts predicated on the distinction between theory and 
practice.  The first section explores a number of meanings and expressions of trance 
from historical, linguistic, psychological and socio-cultural perspectives within a 
framework of anthropology and post-colonial theory, to indicate the breadth of 
material on trance that circulates within Western culture.  In establishing a lexicon of 
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images, ideas and folklore and a theoretical basis from which to preface meaning 
and significance, Part I provides a context for the case studies in Part II.  The trance 
examples in Part I are neither exhaustive nor consistently relevant to the material 
presented in the case studies yet, nevertheless, they form a backdrop from which 
concepts and language may be sourced and connected. 
 
Part I, subtitled Locating Trance, is divided into three chapters.  Chapter One 
examines the etymology and semantics of trance as well as its polysemous 
relationship to a multiplicity of other terms and concepts.  This chapter concludes 
with a discussion of Wittgenstein’s theories of Language Games and Family 
Resemblances to account for the interrelatedness of this diverse range of trance 
terminology and metaphor.  Chapter Two addresses trance in Western subcultures.  
Discussed in chronological order, descriptions of dance manias, Shakerism, new age 
ecstatic dance rituals and rave focus on both historical events and socio-cultural 
factors and on the physical characteristics of trance behaviour associated with each 
form.  Chapter Three begins with a literature review of some of the key theories and 
theorists in the correlated developments of anthropology and post-colonial studies 
and moves on to discuss the treatment of trance in five examples from dance 
ethnography.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of dancers’ testimonies and 
body therapies and how these instances of trance-like behaviour could be addressed 
in an ethnographic manner.   
 
Part II, subtitled Trance as Artefact, comprises case studies of four contemporary 
dancer/choreographers active in Canada.  Trance as a contested site is explored 
through examples that have been selected to invigorate discussions of ethnicity, 
gender and modern/post-modern and colonial/neo-colonial tensions.  Implicit 
throughout this thesis are the issues of race, ethnicity and religion.  The degree to 
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which each is examined explicitly was determined by the importance placed on them 
by the participants in the case studies, by their connection to post-colonial theory, 
and by their centrality to the theorizing of trance behaviour in Western culture.  The 
four subjects are all senior contemporary artists with established careers, audiences 
and infrastructures, who are regular recipients of public arts funding.  They are all 
primarily solo performers and each chapter begins with a movement description of a 
signature piece from their repertoire.  Each is deeply invested in and mindful of his or 
her individual creative process and practice and, through their approach to 
movement, choreography and the situating of their practice, provide opportunities for 
exploring how, when and to what degree trance functions as a state and/or object.  
 
Beginning with Chapter Four, the performance practice of Canadian-Congolese 
dance artist Zab Maboungou provides an illustration of trance as an artefact.  A 
deconstruction of Canadian multiculturalist policy suggests an analysis of 
Maboungou’s particular relationship to trance problematized through the colonialist 
gaze.  Dance theorist Anne Cooper Albright’s theories of slippages and double 
representations in performing difference are addressed, as well as feminist and 
cultural theorists Ien Ang’s and Rita Felski ‘s analyses of incommensurability and 
hybridity.  Ang and Felski introduce important themes concerning Maboungou’s 
positionality and the construction and implication of difference in her work.   
Additionally, Ang’s work serves both to situate and critique my own place as 
researcher in relation to Maboungou.   
 
In Chapter Five, I argue that Margie Gillis, “Canada’s Isadora Duncan,” channels the 
expressionist tendencies typical of the early modern dancers while maintaining overt 
connections to a post-modern present.  Following an examination of some of the 
tenets of expressionism and their connection to Gillis’ work, I introduce dance critic 
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John Martin’s concept of metakinesis and philosopher John Dewey’s theories on the 
relationship between artist and spectator to suggest alternative options for 
contextualizing the significant impact Gillis has on her audience.   Additionally, 
readings of Gillis as a shaman and/or charismatic are also explored.  Finally, after 
sharing my reflections on Gillis’ participation in a post-show dance dialogue, I turn to 
Canadian dance critic and historian Max Wyman’s views on Gillis’ relationship to her 
audience. Wyman’s analysis filters all potential readings of Gillis through her capacity 
to anticipate her audience’s needs.  Trance, which plays a central role in Gillis’ 
choreographic and performance processes, becomes an other entry point for 
interpreting both her role as a performer and her performing body. 
  
In Chapter Six, Canadian choreographer and performer Brian Webb’s experience of 
Authentic Movement offers another perspective from which to examine 
transformative experience in Canadian contemporary dance.  Through his work with 
key mentors and theories in performance art practice, including Anna Halprin and 
techniques of improvisation, Webb’s belief that what he experiences during Authentic 
Movement sessions is not trance, offers a valuable perspective on its cultural 
framing.  A detailed examination of Authentic Movement’s foundation in Jungian 
psychoanalysis and development as a form of dance therapy follows, encompassing 
aspects of witnessing, direct experience, collective consciousness and mysticism.   
 
Engaging specifically with the work of Appadurai and his theories of commodification 
in cultural practice (1986), Chapter Seven addresses the ways in which trance 
functions as an object, an artefact and as a traded commodity in a globalized 
economy.  Vincent Sekwati Mantsoe, a consummate performer and the son and 
grandson of traditional sangoma healers, has positioned himself to convey trance 
personally to the West.  In this scenario, Mantsoe is not an object of ethnographic 
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classification and fascination from whom trance is procured without compensation 
but an active agent in the transaction.  In working with Western dancers, companies 
and festivals, Mantsoe is participating in a process that subverts and potentially 
decolonizes the traditional flow of contact and information between West and non-
West. 
 
In Chapter Eight, I examine the conceptualization of flow in the work of Hungarian-
American psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and Austrian-British movement 
theorist Rudolf Laban.  Individually and complementarily, Csikszentmihalyi and 
Laban’s theories of Flow offer significant possibilities for extrapolation and for the 
cultural analysis of trance in contemporary dance practice in the West in the present.  
This chapter addresses each theorist’s work and their contribution to dance 
scholarship in depth, touching on points of comparison and departure, before 
considering their relevance to the case studies under discussion as well as their 
potential application to studies of trance in the future. 
 
 
                                                
1 See also Appadurai 1981, Carmack 1972, Cohn 1980, Diamond 1964, Hudson 
1973, Sahlins 1985, Smith 1989, and Sturtevant 1968, as well as Peel 1984/1987, 
for their overviews of the confluences of history and anthropology. 
 
2 Other examples of collaborative ethnographies include Behar (1993), Erikson 
(1994) and Shostak (1981). 
 
3 “trance, n.1, v.1” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd edition. 1989. OED Online. 
Oxford University Press. April 4, 2000 
http://dictionary.oed.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/cgi/entry/00181778.; 
“ecstasy, ecstasy, v.1” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd edition. 1989. OED 
Online. Oxford University Press. April 4, 2000 
http://dictionary.oed.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/cgi/entry/00181778. 
 
4 See Sanjek (1990) for an extensive review of urban anthropology in the 1980s – a 
total of 334 works are listed in the bibliography including scholarship from Great 
Britain including Wallman (1982, 1984); Wulff (1988); Cohen 1980, also in 
Frankenberg, 1982; Westwood (1984); Bhachu, 1985; Burghart, 1987; Goody, 
1982; Talai, 1986; Tambs-Lyche, 1980; Werbner, 1986.  For additional sources see 
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Okely (1984) and Cohen (1986).  American anthropologist Setha M. Low carries 
the review of urban anthropology forward from where Sanjek left off until 1995. Low 
questions why the city as a site has had so little theoretical impact on the field 
(1996). 
 
5 For discussions of cultural relativity in relation to the discernment and evocation of 
trance and altered states of consciousness see Bourguignon, 1973, p 12; Kartomi, 
1973, 166; Siiikala,1978, p 39; Rouget, 1985, p 67; Winkelman, 1989, p 23; 
Howard, 2000, p 363; Friedson, 2000, p 68; and Becker, 2004, p 25, 29.  For 
discussions of cultural relativity as they pertain to ethnography in general see Boas 
(1911); Benedict (1934); Kroeber (1923); Hartung (1954); Schmidt (1955); 
Herskovitz (1956); Frankena (1973) Diamond (1974); Cook (1978); Geertz (1984); 
Marcus & Fisher (1986); Washburn (1987, 1998); Di Leonardo (1998); Cowan 
(2007); and Hunt (2007). 
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PART I Locating Trance 
 
CHAPTER ONE Trance, Semantics and Polysemy 
 
Trance, first and foremost, is a loaded term.  With it comes a history of connotation 
and controversy that stretches back many centuries through a variety of eras of 
thought and aesthetics.  Trance’s place in the modern vernacular comes as the result 
of shifts in meaning expressed in literature, folk traditions, mass media and popular 
culture.  Drawing from sources that were intended for and reflect a Eurocentric 
perspective, this discussion touches on semantics but also theories within semiotics 
and post-structuralism.  Beginning with its etymology, literary references, and 
connections to colonialism and early ethnography, the discussion proceeds with the 
treatment of trance in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s theories of Language Games and Family Resemblances 
in an attempt to account for the polysemous nature of trance with its diverse range of 
meanings and applications. 
 
1.1 Semantics 
From a literary perspective, the English word “trance” is descended etymologically 
from the Latin transire, “to go over or across,” and this root is retained in the word 
“transient.”  Trance appeared as “traunce” in Middle English borrowing from the Old 
French “transe” from the verb transir meaning “to pass away or swoon,” “to be 
chilled” or “shiver” or in fact, “to die” or “to be numb with fear,” bringing with it notions 
of death-like states or symptoms and the notion of symbolic death.  In its present 
spelling, trance first came into use in the 14th century.1  But since the “life of words is 
not governed solely by the logic of their etymologies” (Rouget, 1985, p 7), and “a 
writer on semantics has to … play many parts not only linguist, but philosopher, 
anthropologist, psychologist, even perhaps social reformer and literary critic” (Leech, 
1974, p vii), a multi-focal approach to the history of the meaning and use of trance is 
required. 
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 French ethnomusicologist Gilbert Rouget has written a comprehensive work on the 
history, manifestations and theories of trance in music.  Rouget points to classical 
Greek origins for the modern concept of trance beginning with the Platonic concept of 
mania that was translated via Latin into French both as fureur (“frenzy” or “fury”) and 
folie (“madness”).  Alongside mania, Plato used enthusiamos (“enthusiasm”), 
katakoche (“possession”) and epipnoia (“inspiration”).  The sense of “mania” is 
derived from Plato’s Timaeus and Phaedrus texts where madness takes the form of 
inspiration: “mantic” inspiration yielding divination, ruled by Apollo, “poetic” inspiration 
yielding poetry, ruled by the Muses, “erotic” inspiration yielding passion or romantic 
love ruled by Eros and Aphrodite, and “telestic” inspiration yielding ritual madness, 
ruled by Dionysus.  These four types of inspiration were purported by the Greeks to 
induce states of heightened enthusiasm leading to madness or trance.  Hence these 
four words – madness, possession, inspiration and enthusiasm – and their 
association with artistic, philosophical and ritual pursuits came into modern literary 
usage associated with trance. (Rouget, 1985, p 191, 199, 232).  
 
The resurgence of interest in the classics that began during the Renaissance from 
the 14th to 16th centuries witnessed new invocations of Plato’s mania in music, art 
and literature.  In this period, trance retained its meanings of both physical and 
figurative passage yet attained a stronger sense of trance as pathology.  Literary 
evidence to this effect survives in Chaucer (“He fell down in a trance”), and Spenser 
(“My soul was ravished quite as in a trance”).  Also at this time, the verb “to entrance” 
came into usage, as evidenced in Shakespeare (“And I left him tranced”).  Such use 
and understanding of trance continued into the 18th and 19th centuries finding voice 
in Tennyson’s “When the thickest dark did trance the sky.” Contemporaneous to 
these literary examples were instances of trance behaviour across Western Europe – 
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tarantism in Spain and Italy, “epidemics” of St. Vitus’ dance and cases of demonic 
possession such as those recorded at Loudun in the 1630s – which are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Two (Rouget, 1985, p 241).2 3 4  Although these literary and 
historic examples of trance demonstrate the breadth of meaning trance acquired from 
the Middle Ages to the early 19th century, they do not account for the evolution of 
trance in its entirety.  Additional clues exist within the confluent histories of 
colonialism and ethnology. 
 
While many of the major contributors to anthropology of the 20th century contend 
that “modern” anthropology and its sub-field ethnology were products of the 19th 
century, others see a direct path leading from antiquity to the present.  German 
anthropologist Franz Boas, best known for his work with the Kwakuitl Indians of 
northern British Columbia, wrote an essay first published in 1904 on the roots of 
anthropology.  He was very clear in distancing himself from the “speculative” 
anthropology of the 18th and early 19th centuries, preferring to place the birth of his 
profession in a modern, late 19th century setting (Boas, 1974, p 262).  British 
ethnographer Edward Evans-Pritchard is willing to go back a little further into the mid-
to-late 18th century, surmising that anthropology is a “child of the Enlightenment” 
citing the work of Montesquieu, d’Alembert, Condorcet, Turgot and fellow 
“Encyclopaedists” in its nascent stages who were in turn inspired by Bacon, Newton, 
Locke and Descartes (1973, p 358-359).  Both Boas and Evans-Pritchard connect 
the “professionalization” of anthropology – its inclusion in the curriculum of respected 
universities where anthropologists could be trained and the establishment of 
professional associations – with its beginnings as a subject worthy of “scientific 
treatment.”  Observations made in an anthropological vein prior to these advances 
were thus “only and remained curiosities” (Boas, 1974, p 261).  If this is so, then a 
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significant legacy within the development of ethnology, and the development of 
commonly held beliefs about trance, is excluded from consideration.  
Margaret Hodgen meticulously details a history of ethnology that, she argues, dates 
back to Herodotus of Halicarnassus in 5th century B.C., author of the influential 
Histories.  Hodgen then follows the trail from Pliny the Elder’s (23-79 A.D.) Historia 
naturalis, Pomponius Mela’s (1st century A.D.) De situ orbis (translated into English in 
the 16th century), and Solinus’ (3rd century A.D.) De mirabilibus mundi (translated 
into English in 1587), to Isidore’s Etymologies written between 622 and 623.  She 
picks up the trail again with the Travels of Benjamin of Tudela in A.D. 1160-1173, 
published following the Crusades at a time when traffic in papal emissaries to the 
East was on the rise, Bartholomew of England’s “ambitious encyclopaedia” published 
between 1240 and 1260, Marco Polo’s tales of the court of Genghis Khan in the late 
13th and early 14th centuries, Sir John Mandeville’s Travels published in 1356 drawn 
from “classical sources” but largely the work of a late medieval imagination, François 
Rabelais’s Gargantua (1535) and Pantagruel (1553) that fed the works of Bacon, 
Shakespeare and Ben Jonson, and ending with explorers such as John Cabot 
bringing captured natives from the New World to Europe through much of the 16th 
century (Hodgen,1964).  While the quality and veracity of these works is certainly to 
be questioned, the trail is, quite literally, littered with works of an ethnographic nature.  
And though the extant literature – much of it copied, reprinted and read over many 
centuries – has been dismissed by critics in favour of a history that honours Auguste 
Comte and Sir Edward Burnett Tylor as “fathers” of anthropology (Hodgen, 1964, p 
7), its influence on the European psyche is undeniable.  While individual works may 
be of a dubious nature, the body of literature as a whole remains significant – 
especially as regards the legacy of distrust, wonder and xenophobic curiosity that the 
modern field of ethnographic literature, regardless of where one places its birth, has 
by and large inherited. 
 42
 It is this same cultural and linguistic heritage, constructed of a simultaneous 
xenophobia and an unrelenting curiosity about how “Other” people live, that underlies 
the modern perception of trance.  To trace the semantic development of trance in the 
modern period, the Encyclopaedia Britannica – the oldest English-language general 
encyclopaedia, first published in the 18th century – offers particular insight.  Drawing 
from a number of authoritative works on spirituality and psychosocial behaviour, 
trance received its first extended treatment in the eleventh edition of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica published in 1911. 5  Prior to this, “trance” made its first 
appearance in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia published in 1891/1892 where 
readers were advised to turn to “sleep, and magnetism, animal.”6  The same edition 
also included entries for “mesmer, mesmerism” but likewise directed readers to 
“sleep, and magnetism, animal.”  The very first edition of Encyclopaedia, published in 
1768 with subsequent revisions beginning in 1771, makes note of “mania” but points 
readers to a detailed section on medicine where allusions to trance can be seen in 
sub-sections on “St. Vitus’ dance” (p 99-100) and “catalepsy, catochus or catoche” (p 
146).  The fifth edition in 1817 has an entry for “mania,” defined as “madness,” but is 
cross-referenced once again to “medicine.”  The 1817 edition also has an entry for 
“possession, daemonical” and makes lengthy note of a particular case in 1788 
involving exorcism in Bristol, United Kingdom.  While there are neither entries for 
mania nor possession in the ninth edition, the inclusion of trance would indicate its 
increased usage at this time.  
 
In 1911, the author of the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry defines trance as: 
 
a term used very loosely in popular speech to denote any kind of 
sleeplike state that seems to present obvious differences from normal 
sleep; in medical and scientific literature the meaning is but little better 
defined. In its original usage the word no doubt implied that the soul of 
the entranced person was temporarily withdrawn or passed away from 
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the body, in accordance with the belief almost universally held by 
uncultured peoples in the possibility of such withdrawal … The 
cataleptic state the ecstasy of religious enthusiasts the self induced 
dream-like condition of the medicine-men, wizards or priests of many 
savage and barbarous peoples, and the abnormal.7
 
From this entry, the associations between trance and an exotic, paranormal Other 
are clear.  While the unnamed author dismisses medical and scientific research, s/he 
writes with relish on trance’s supernatural and barbarous connotations, conjuring 
images of Jules Verne-esque proportions.  The author continues his treatment by 
bringing the notion of trance closer to home: 
 
but in recent years a new interest has been given to the study of the 
mediumistic trance by careful investigations (made with a competence 
that commands respect) which tend to re-establish the old savage 
theory of possession, just when it seemed to have become merely an 
anthropological curiosity.  
 
S/he then goes on to praise the work of the Society for Psychical Research, and the 
“striking results” that have been obtained by the “prolonged study of the automatic 
speech and writing of the American medium, Mrs Piper.”  The results of the study, 
published in 1909, impressed the author sufficiently to include the findings in his 
essay and to state that the research “constitutes a body of evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis of possession which no impartial and unprejudiced mind can lightly set 
aside.”  The author paints a clear picture of trance in the early 20th century as 
characterized, on one hand, by barbarous heathens performing acts of magic and 
demonic possession beyond the edges of the civilized world, and on the other, the 
wide-eyed parlour séances in the homes of the upper classes. 
 
The fourteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia, first published in 1934, is still based on 
the same sources as the ninth edition published more than twenty years previously 
with the addition of Morton Prince’s The Dissociation of a Personality published in 
1906 and the American proceedings of the Doris Fischer Case involving an incidence 
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of multiple personality disorder in Germany around 1911.  An overall change in 
attitude towards trance as a subject is apparent in this edition.  References to 
wizards, priests and parlour séances have been replaced by a scientific reserve and 
rational analysis entirely absent from previous editions.  The author discusses 
physical signs and symptoms of trance, going so far as to distinguish between two 
different types of trance: “the ecstatic trance” and “the trance of mediumship.”  The 
author also distinguishes between “popular thought” and “modern science,” aligning 
interpretations to modes of thought that equate the rational with the scientific.  The 
entry is cross-referenced to both “hypnotism” and “hallucination,” subjects of serious 
medical investigation by the likes of Freud and others at this time.  The author 
concludes that though modern science is seeking to elevate the status of trance 
research, there remains a tendency to “re-establish the old theory of external 
possession, just when it had seemed to have become merely an anthropological 
curiosity.”  
 
It is interesting to compare the two entries, written a little over two decades apart.  
The first bears resemblance to much of the ethnographic literature detailed by 
Hodgen.  While the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry is most certainly a product of its 
time it still speaks of a ghoulish curiosity and fascination with the occult and the 
supernatural reminiscent of Sir John Mandeville’s 14th century Travels.  The entry 
maintains a strict dichotomy of uncivilized heathen and civilized bourgeois: one 
man’s abnormal hedonistic dream-state is another man’s perfectly acceptable social 
pastime.  One is fascinating taboo and the other is the subject of scientific 
investigation.  The two “types” of trance exist in the same volume but they do not 
exist in the same world.  
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The 1934 entry is also very like Boas’ or Evans-Pritchard’s version of the history of 
anthropology – factual, scientific and appealing to learned audience.  The approach 
sets trance and trance research very much apart from its uncivilized forebearers, just 
as Boas and Evans-Pritchard sought to distance themselves from the “speculative” 
and amateurish dabblings in anthropology of previous eras.  Trance and 
anthropology are presented as subjects of scientific importance not to be taken 
lightly. Yet the author of the entry is quite accurate in predicting that despite his best 
efforts to educate the ignorant, “popular thought” on trance was destined to prevail. 
 
Thus a picture develops in which trance is conceived of and also plays a role in the 
West’s preoccupation with the differentiation and stratification of its own and Other 
cultures.  Trance is a common subject within the interplay of West versus non-West 
yet it is only accorded value in very specific instances:  in literary terms denoting 
dreamlike states and romantic death; in quasi-heretical acts such as séances and 
demon possession; and in ethnographic writing which posits and maintains the 
duality of “us” and “them.”  To this range of meaning and application in the West in 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries may be added trance as an art form, as 
witnessed in an “automatic trance writing” art installation at the Arnolfini Gallery in 
Bristol, United Kingdom in the fall of 2002, trance as exercise, as in the Let’s Trance! 
home exercise video whose benefits include weight loss, relaxation, fitness, 
awareness and healing, and trance as a marketing tool used to promote 
performances by whirling dervishes from Turkey and Vincent Sekwati Mantsoe 
whose work has been influenced by the trance practices of the Bushmen of South 
Africa.8  In these last instances, trance is a motif or fad employed to garner attention 
and to heighten the profile of the artists or purveyors who know, regardless of the 
sincerity of their intention, that trance “sells.” 
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1.2 Wittgenstein & Polysemy 
20th-century Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) approached the 
process of ascertaining and attributing meaning in language as an exercise in 
determining the sum of a word’s parts.  His approach to making sense of the world 
and, in particular, his views on language – the primary but ultimately inadequate tool 
used to communicate a sense of the world – aimed to resist essentializing.  Though 
he stumbles from this path a few times along the way, Wittgenstein maintains that 
essentialism is a “contemptuous attitude towards [a] particular case,” based on a 
misguided “craving for generality” (1969, p 17-18).9  He argues that there are 
alternative ways of explaining and understanding, ways that defy analytic definitions 
that “lay down necessary and sufficient conditions,” and make explanations by 
reference adequate (Glock, 1996, p 120).  These aims led Wittgenstein in the second 
phase of his career to develop his mutually dependent theories of Language Games 
and Family Resemblances.  These theories, though grounded in earlier publications, 
were fully realized in his Philosophical Investigations, a compilation of writings 
published posthumously and regarded as the “substance of his mature thought” 
(Glock, 1996, p i).  
 
In his early work Wittgenstein attempts to provide an analytical definition of all words.  
To this end, he proposes that the relationship between language and the world may 
be expressed by “the picture theory of meaning.”  Wittgenstein claims that 
propositions are pictures of reality.  Initially this concept was satisfactory to 
Wittgenstein and indeed, he was so convinced that he had dissolved the problems of 
philosophy that he left the field to devote himself to other pursuits.  The picture theory 
of meaning and his book the Tractatus had, in his estimation, made redundant all 
those things which philosophers were inclined to debate.  As time went by however, 
Wittgenstein became less sure of the invulnerability of his conclusions.  Philosophy of 
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science professor George Kampis summarizes the basis for Wittgenstein’s doubts as 
follows: 
a word is uniform in its appearance and pronunciation, a person may 
assume that it refers to an invariable concept or entity.  But the same 
word can have many different functions.  All language is clouded by 
ambiguity … We realise the sense in which the word is meant from the 
context of the sentence.  
Kampis, website, 2002. 
 
Kampis concludes that, in Wittgenstein’s estimation, “language is full of minefields” 
that can lead to “bewitchment of the intellect by means of language.”   
 
Based on these concerns, Wittgenstein eventually denounced his former view that 
language is analogous to a picture of reality.  His view had worked at some levels but 
had failed entirely at others.  For instance, his theory could not give a satisfactory 
explanation of body language, gestures or multi-purpose words.  When language 
was relatively straightforward, the picture theory of meaning worked well.  Yet since 
most of the time language is frequently ambiguous and entirely subjective, 
Wittgenstein began to reconsider how best to account for the ambiguities.  It was 
these kinds of observations that led Wittgenstein to develop his theory of Language 
Games. 
 
A Language Game is an everyday occurrence in language, where seemingly simple 
concepts have diverse meanings depending on the context in which they are used 
and/or the associations that individuals attribute to them.  Such diversity of meaning 
frequently leads to misunderstanding and an awareness of the precarious role that 
precision plays in communication.  Wittgenstein offers his oft-quoted example of the 
concept of “games” to illustrate the complexity and lack of perspicuity in language 
(1963, §65-67, p 31-32).  An alternative example – the concept of “God” – is offered 
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by Project Aristotle contributor Joe Dobzynski as part of his treatment of essentialism 
and definitions of art: 
 
for instance, those that believe in some higher deity attribute the term, 
and therefore concept, of God. The use of the word God is multi-
faceted in our language. We can refer to God as the head of any of 
the three major monotheistic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). 
We can use it to refer to a mythological deity, such as Apollo, a god. 
We can use it as a qualifier for things that appear super-human, such 
as the god-like strength of someone. All of these meanings for the 
concept of God are summed up in a single word: God. The usage of 
that term by every individual is assumed to be common to everyone 
else, though in reality the concept that we have formed in our minds 
as to what God is varies from person to person. Yet, we still persist in 
using the simple term, God. This is an example of a language-game. 
 
Dobzynski, website, 2003.  
 
In the context of my own research, Wittgenstein’s theory of Language Games is 
relevant.  For example, the word “flow” could be construed in a number of possible 
ways:  as a metaphor for movement that suggests the unhindered going-ness of 
some thing such as the physical flow of electric current and water, or the 
metaphysical flow of thought and conversation; the quality of fluidity discernible in the 
flow of a moving body; Flow, the name given by Hungarian-American psychologist 
Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi to the achievement of the experience of “optimal 
experience”; or Flow, an Effort factor, characterized by the qualities of Bound and 
Free as articulated by Austrian-British movement theorist Rudolf Laban in Laban 
Movement Analysis.  Another example is the concept of “trance.”  Trances may be 
drug-induced, attained by repetitive bodily movement for long periods and stimulation 
in the absence or presence of drugs, initiated with or without a shaman or medium, or 
used as a metaphor to describe a person acting in way that would suggest a degree 
of dissociation inappropriate to the environment as in “he was acting as though he 
were in a trance.”  Trance also fits the criterion of a Language Game. 
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To better appreciate Language Games, the concepts of God, Flow/flow and trance 
may be represented as linear charts (see Figures 1a, 1b and 1c).  A linear 
representation suggests an infinite continuum of meaning.  It may be read from left to 
right or right to left or from the middle outwards in either direction without imposing a 
hierarchy of meaning.  A linear representation may also be modified without 
disrupting the continuity, added on to as concepts overlap or when new concepts 
subsume others.  All this is represented without implying a closed discourse.  For 
example, upon closer investigation, Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of Flow could also be 
described as possessing “trance-like” qualities.  If this is so, then Figures 1b and 1c 
may be joined at the point where Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of Flow and trance as a 
metaphor intersect (as in figure 1d).   
 
These charts corroborate Wittgenstein’s belief that there is neither a hierarchy of 
meaning, a core truth that represents the pinnacle of meaning, nor a fixed end to the 
number of interpretations.  While the essentialist would seek to dispense with 
connotations he/she regards as irrelevant to establish how each of these terms are 
ultimately and exactly defined, Wittgenstein argues that seeing Flow, for instance, as 
all of these related ideas simultaneously is relevant.  Multiplicity of meaning does not 
negate implicit meaning nor does it infer that a concept is inconstant.   
 
Wittgenstein argues that the prevalence of Language Games is due to certain 
tendencies in human nature:  
 
first, we tend to look for something in common in items under a 
general term or concept. Second, we tend to assume that once a 
person has the concept of a general term that a general picture is 
formed in their mind of that term. Third, we confuse the term with a 
mental state of usage and consciousness. Fourth, we are preoccupied 
with the scientific method. These four tendencies lead us to constantly 
persist in language games, and leads to confusion in the usage of 
terms. 
Wittgenstein, 1969, p 17-18. 
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Wittgenstein suggests the needs for homogeny and definitiveness in discourse are 
rooted in cultural imperatives that prize one over many and reject ambiguity in favour 
of “scientific fact.”  It is this determination to find necessary and sufficient conditions 
to define a term that overrides the capacity to see terms as they are in relation to 
other terms. 
 
Following from Language Games, Wittgenstein went on to develop his theory of 
Family Resemblances.  Family Resemblances is first mentioned in The Blue and 
Brown Books (first published in English in 1958) after a discussion of the concept of 
Language Games (Wittgenstein, 1969, p 19).  It has been suggested that 
Wittgenstein may have been influenced either by Nietsche and/or Nicod who both 
employ the term (Glock, 1996, p 120) but regardless, the notion of “family 
resemblance” is an important element of his later linguistic philosophy.10 11
 
Wittgenstein introduced the theory of Family Resemblances in an effort to clarify how 
to conceive of multiple senses and meanings of everyday words.  As discussed, 
attempts to analyse a particular word seldom produce one definitive meaning, but 
rather a plethora of meanings.  Wittgenstein observed that each of these multiple 
interpretations does not stand alone, but may in fact share a number of common 
traits and similarities.  Wittgenstein chose to think of these common traits as 
analogous to resemblances between members of the same family. 
 
The doctrine of Family Resemblances states that general terms, “do not possess 
necessary and sufficient conditions to define them.  Instead, items placed under the 
heading of a general term are related to one another by characteristics they possess” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, §65, 31).  Returning to the earlier examples of Flow/flow and 
trance, each could be construed as a general term under which multiple definitions or 
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associations may be grouped.  In turn, the multiple associations are related to each 
other by some of the common elements they share such as the metaphor for 
movement and the presence of energy in the case of Flow, and the presence or 
absence of drugs or other stimulation as a source of influence as in the case of 
trance.  These common features are like traits shared by individual members of the 
same family.  Resemblances exist between family members because of the traits 
they share in common such as hair colour, eye colour, build and mannerisms.  At the 
same time that these resemblances exist and are acknowledged, family members 
may still be distinguished as individuals.  Members of a family may be simultaneously 
regarded as related and separate. 
 
Wittgenstein’s argument for the existence of general terms is worthy of closer 
inspection. In the present example, objections could be raised that both Flow/flow 
and trance – which have been shown to be related terms – are already too specific, 
and a more general term is required.  Support for this interpretation may be found in 
psychiatric anthropologist Erika Bourguignon’s introduction to Religion, Altered 
States of Consciousness, and Social Change: 
 
in the ethnographic literature, altered states of consciousness are 
often referred to by words such as “trance” or “spirit possession.”  
These words are used interchangeably.  We may also read of fugue 
states, hysteria, hallucinations, catalepsy, epilepsy, hypnosis, 
somnambulism, and so on.  … All these psychiatric terms may be 
subsumed under the broad heading of “altered states of 
consciousness.”  We may do so without committing ourselves here to 
any particular explanatory theory, to the exactness of what is often 
amateur diagnosis in any particular case or, indeed, to the 
appropriateness of a language of psychopathology in general to a 
discussion of the behaviours in question.  Let us merely note that the 
words “altered states of consciousness,” as well as “trance” and 
“dissociation” – broad terms that we have also found it convenient to 
use – refer to a category of psychobiological states and types of 
behaviour amenable to objective observation and study.  
 
Bourguignon 1973, p 4-5. 
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Bourguignon’s interpretation suggests that “altered states of consciousness,” “trance” 
and “dissociation” are general terms to which a number of states including different 
kinds of trance and Flow/flow, as have been defined here, belong.  Such reasoning 
begs a Socratic exchange such as:  
 “What is trance?”  
“Well, trance is an example of an altered state of consciousness.”  
“What is an altered state of consciousness?”   
In and of itself, “altered states of consciousness” does not possess Wittgenstein’s 
“necessary and sufficient conditions to define” itself.  To help explain what an altered 
state of consciousness is, other terms are employed to add clarification but are 
themselves unable to stand alone.  And in turn, these terms are not “things in 
themselves” either and thus require further explication.  According to Bourguignon, 
the concepts that may be placed under altered states of consciousness include spirit 
possession, fugue states, hysteria, hallucinations, catalepsy, epilepsy, hypnosis, 
somnambulism, dissociation and trance.  Charting this “family” of concepts in a linear 
form produces a second crossover between trance and Flow/flow through the 
commonality of the use of trance as an element of all three terms – Flow/flow, trance 
and altered states of consciousness.   
 
Approaching meaning in this way produces a long, never-ending line of interrelated 
meaning – and this is but one interpretation.  Wittgenstein’s conception of Family 
Resemblance, however, brings into question the relevance of a linear representation.  
A linear interpretation becomes increasingly unwieldy since, within the subset of 
altered states of consciousness, terms may be further subdivided.  Trance and trance 
states, as has been shown, may be broken down into trances initiated by drugs or 
without, initiated with or without a shaman or medium, etc.  Ecstasy may be 
subdivided into religious ecstasy, secular ecstasy, sexual ecstasy, drug-induced 
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ecstasy, etc.  Following Wittgenstein’s family analogy, these multiple layers of 
meaning are better served not by a linear structure but by a structure similar to a 
family tree.  In this way – according to Bourguignon’s interpretation – either altered 
states of consciousness, trance or dissociation may be perceived as the common 
ancestor where Flow/flow, trance, ecstasy, etc. are descendent terms or offspring 
(see Figure 1e).   
 
In a family tree, each descendent is distinctive but simultaneously shares certain 
traits with the other members of the family and with the common ancestor.  The first 
generation of offspring are related to each other but they are not, and cannot stand 
for one another as one and the same.  Describing ecstasy as being very like flow or 
very like trance is practical, but ecstasy cannot be considered the same as trance 
without privileging one concept over the other or obscuring their individual traits.  
Relative terms are invoked to come closer to that which one seeks to communicate 
yet at the same time, each term draws its own allusions and meanings.  Even with a 
relatively new term like Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow, other related words like ecstasy, 
optimal experience and trance are still needed to clarify it. 
 
The family tree has been configured so that altered states of consciousness takes 
the role of the General Term, but either trance or dissociation could play the part 
equally well.  Other scholars, in tandem with or in response to Bourguignon, have 
likewise employed altered states of consciousness as a general term, but its use 
does not automatically discount further explication. 12  Wittgenstein would likely say 
that we – Bourguignon, et al., and myself – are fooling ourselves in believing that any 
“general term” could slow the watershed.  
Continued analysis of studies in altered states of consciousness indicates the 
enormous potential of Wittgenstein’s theory of Family Resemblances.  Consider this 
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passage from Judith Lynne Hanna’s Dance and Stress: Resistance, Reduction and 
Euphoria (italics mine): 
the physical activity of dance may cause emotional changes and 
altered states of consciousness, flow and secular and religious 
ecstasy. These changes are often stress related.  Dance may 
increase one’s energy and provide a feeling of invigoration.  The 
exercise of dance increases the circulation of blood carrying oxygen to 
the muscles and the brain as well as alters the level of certain brain 
chemicals, as in the stress response pattern.  Vigorous dancing 
induces the release of endorphins thought to produce analgesia and 
euphoria.  
Hanna, 1988, p 12. 
 
And Felicitas D. Goodman’s conclusions following her research into trance dancing: 
 
in addition to the ordinary state of consciousness, clinically healthy 
humans are capable of a number of non-ordinary perceptual states.  
Other states obey cultural cues such as, among others, the startle-
reaction or latah, hypnosis, the various meditative states, and the 
religious altered state of consciousness also called rapture, ecstasy, 
the mystic state or the religious trance – termed religious because it 
affords access to the alternate sacred dimension of reality.  
 
Goodman, 1990, p 102. 
 
And finally, from Rouget’s study of trance and ethnomusicology: 
 
axiomatically, trance will be considered in this book as a state of 
consciousness composed of two components, one 
psychophysiological, the other cultural.  The universality of trance 
indicates that it corresponds to a psychophysiological disposition 
innate in human nature, although, of course, developed to varying 
degrees in different individuals.   
 
       Rouget, 1985, p 3. 
 
Adding the concepts and associations italicised in these three passages to the family 
tree of altered states of consciousness alone raises a number of issues.  First, now 
included in the family tree are concepts that, though linked by a common ancestor, 
appear to have nothing in common such as epilepsy and flow as a metaphor for 
movement pertaining to electric current, water, thought or conversation; second, 
while adding more layers creates breadth of meaning, it does little to promote clarity 
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of meaning; and third, when will it end?  To answer the first issue, appearances may 
be deceiving and just as there are family members who share no obvious traits in 
common, they are still related at a “genetic” level.  In regards to the second issue, 
Wittgenstein anticipates this criticism and responds by asking “Is the blurred concept 
a concept at all?  Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all?  Is it always 
an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one?  Isn’t the indistinct one 
often what we need?” (Wittgenstein, 1963, §71, p 34).  And in response to the third 
issue, Wittgenstein proposes “We can draw a boundary – for a special purpose. [But] 
does it take that to make the concept usable?  Not at all!”  Wittgenstein, 1963, §69, p 
33). 
 
With these factors in mind, proceeding with an investigation of trance is delicate 
since imposing boundaries may disrupt or detract from the continuity of meaning.  
Support to continue in this vein, however, is offered by Bourguignon who stressed 
that although “the capacity to experience altered states of consciousness is a 
psychobiological capacity of the species, and thus universal, its utilization, 
institutionalisation, and patterning are, indeed, features of culture, and thus variable” 
(1973, p 12).  Regardless of Bourguignon’s claim of universality, her statement 
allows for cultural variability and at the same time brings to mind Wittgenstein’s 
admonition not to ask what something is but to try and see it (1963, §66, p 31).  
Seeing allows for a multiplicity of interpretation without surrendering to the singularity 
of is.  In Bourguignon’s estimation it is in the “utilization, institutionalisation, and 
patterning” of altered states of consciousness that the anthropologist discovers 
meaning, ascertains both similarities and differences and comes to appreciate the 
diversity of the subject under consideration.  Further to this she adds that:  
 
whereas the term “altered state of consciousness” refers, as already 
stressed to a psychobiological level of observation, terms such as 
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“possession trance” and “trance,” as used here, refer to categories of 
cultural interpretation.  To discover these, to find out whether a 
dissociated person is undergoing “possession trance” or “trance,” 
ethnographic rather than psychobiological methods of investigation 
are required. 
Bourguignon, 1973, p 13. 
 
Categories of interpretation refer to the range of “scripts” available to a member of a 
social group, learned through inculcation.   
 
At issue in this research is the concern that trance may not exist within the category 
of interpretation for the group under consideration.   The point is that trance has been 
excluded from the script for ballet and contemporary dancers that outline appropriate 
reactions to, and descriptions for, their performance experiences.  Trance does not 
exist as an option because of Western culture’s pervasive bias against it.  
Ascertaining trance’s appropriateness in this context entails removing it from its 
familial relationship because what is at stake is the specific use and application of 
that word.  Would Wittgenstein support such an approach?  As long as the foibles of 
the boundary are acknowledged and the points of connection and departure are 
respected, then I would argue approaching trance in this manner would still operate 
within the framework of Family Resemblances.  I am not denying trance’s connection 
to other terms on the family tree, I am merely inviting dancers to question why they 
do not use that term.   
 
The altered states of consciousness family tree is by no means exhaustive, however, 
it does establish a potential range of meaning.  Keeping this in mind, it is arguably 
permissible to focus on a particular branch of the family tree without jeopardizing or 
excluding the extended family from view.  Choosing, for example, to concentrate on 
trance as a type of euphoria induced by bodily movement and stimulation in the 
absence of drugs as a culturally bounded altered state of consciousness does not 
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contradict its familial relationships.  In the end, trance may not be the right term in 
this context, but it remains important to explore its inappropriateness.  It seems 
permissible then to conclude that as long as respondents’ potential for equivocation 
is perceived and explored, bounded exploration – and explanation – of trance within 
the aforementioned range may clarify whether trance is or is not an appropriate term 
in this context. 
 
Taken together, Wittgenstein’s theories of Language Games and Family 
Resemblances account for the polysemous nature of trance and present trance as a 
cluster of practices (Figure 1f).  Polysemy is a term that applies when a particular 
signifier has more than one meaning, where meaning is derived through difference.  
Trance is the signifier for a number of signified images and interpretations 
determined by context and influence.  Trance may bring to mind euphoria for one 
person, raving for another, and zombies and voodoo rituals for someone else.  With 
each interpretation is an unspoken acknowledgement of difference.  Each context 
may give rise to new terms that may encompass qualities of the pre-existing term yet 
simultaneously encompass new or contradictory information.  
 
Throughout this research, the word trance will primarily be used.  However, at times it 
will be necessary to apply other related words as the discussion, the subject or the 
source dictate.  Employing and applying trance where it does not natively pertain is a 
thorny issue and its appearance may at times appear misplaced or imprecise.  It is 
this sense of discomfort with using trance out of context that needs to be highlighted 
and examined.  In doing so, the application of trance and its inherent connotations 
may be addressed in order to ascertain when, where and to what degree trance has 
been narrowly and/or exclusively defined within the West. 
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Language Games in linear form 
 
Figure 1a: God 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Flow/flow 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1c: Trance 
 
 
 
God 
the head of any of the three 
major monotheistic faiths 
(Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam) 
God 
a mythological deity, such 
as Apollo, a god 
God 
A qualifier for things that 
appear super-human, 
such as the god-like 
strength of someone 
flow 
a metaphor for movement 
pertaining to electric 
current, water, thought or 
conversation 
flow 
a quality of fluidity 
discernible in the flow of 
a moving body 
Flow 
Csikszentmihalyi’s name 
for the achievement of 
the experience of 
“optimal experience” 
Flow 
Laban’s Effort factor, 
characterized by qualities 
of Bound and Free 
drug-induced 
trance 
 
trance induced by 
bodily movement / 
stimulation in the 
absence of drugs 
 
trance induced by 
the combination of 
bodily movement / 
stimulation and 
drugs 
shamanic trance
 
mediumistic 
trance 
 
trance as a 
metaphor for 
someone acting in 
a dissociative 
manner 
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Figure 1d: Flow/flow/Trance 
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Family Resemblances 
 
 
Figure 1e: The altered states of consciousness family tree 
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Figure 1f: Trance as a cluster of practices 
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1 These definitions are drawn from the following websites:  
Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Edition, 2003,  
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=dictionary&va=trance;  
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition, 2000, 
http://www.bartleby.com/61/23/T0312300.html;  
Ultralingua English Dictionary, 2002, 
http://www.ultralingua.net/results.html?lookup_actions=en/english/english&lookuple
tters=trance. 
 
2  A mania characterized by an uncontrollable impulse to dance, Tarantism was 
prevalent in southern Italy from the 15th to the 17th century, popularly attributed to 
the bite of the tarantula, however cases have been reported pre- and post-World 
War II in southern Apulia (Zito, 1996). 
 
3  On August 18th, 1634, Father Urbain Grandier was exorcised and convicted of 
sorcery that led to the demonic possession of the Ursuline nuns in Loudun, France.  
These events inspired a novel by Aldous Huxley and a film by Ken Russell. See 
Possession at Loudun by Jesuit historian Michel de Certeau (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2000). 
 
4  Between the 11th and 17th centuries, manias such as St. Vitus' dance swept across 
Europe. The name was adopted after a group of around 200 people were treated at 
the chapel dedicated to St. Vitus following a choreomanic episode (Bartholomew, 
2000).  
 
5  Sources listed for this entry include Podmore (1902), Myers (1903) and Prince 
(1911). 
Of note is an article published in the Journal of Parapsychology on the centenary of 
Myer’s book: “While the purpose of Frederic W.H. Myer’s book Human Personality 
and its Survival of Bodily Death was to argue for survival of bodily death, Myers 
also presented a unifying model of normal, abnormal, and parapsychological 
phenomena based on the workings of a subliminal or subconscious mind. Human 
Personality grew in the context of 19th century Spiritualism, psychical research, and 
psychology and psychiatry. While Myer’s book presented creative ideas, its 
association with psychic phenomena and ideas of interaction with the spiritual 
world brought many criticisms. Nonetheless, the book has been very influential and 
its content is still relevant to present concerns of psi functioning and the 
subconscious mind” (Alvarado, 2003). 
  
6 “The terms animal magnetism, electro-biology, mesmerism, clairvoyance, odylic or 
odic force, and hypnotism have been used to designate peculiar nervous conditions 
in which the body and mind of an individual were supposed to be influenced by a 
mysterious force emanating from another person. With the exception of 
mesmerism, a name given to the phenomena in honour of one of the earliest 
investigators, F.A. Mesmer, each of these terms implies a theory. Thus the 
phenomena of animal magnetism were supposed to be due to some kind of 
magnetic force or influence peculiar to living beings and analogous to the action of 
a magnet upon steel or certain metals; electro-biology, a more modern term, 
introduced in 1850 by two American lecturers, referred the phenomena to the 
action of electrical currents generated in the living body, and capable of influencing 
electrically the bodies of others; clairvoyance implied a power of mental vision or of 
mental hearing, or of a mental production of other sensations, by which the 
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individual became aware of events happening in another part the world from where 
he was, or could tell of the existence of objects which could not affect at the time 
any of his bodily senses; odylic force was a term given to a force of a mysterious 
character by which all the phenomena of animal magnetism might be accounted 
for; and hypnotism, from hypnos, sleep, was a name applied to a condition 
artificially produced in which the person was apparently asleep and yet acted in 
obedience to the will of the operator as regards both motion and sensation” 
(Magnetism, Animal in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago: Belford-Clarke Co., 
1891). 
 
7  All quotations in this section are cited from Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911 edition, 
http//:www.341911Encyclopaedia.org/T/TR/TRANCE.html  (Accessed November 
23, 2004).     
  
8  See Dance Connection 12/5, February/March 1995, p 9. 
 
9  Wittgenstein’s Tractatus “succumbed to this craving [for generality] in trying to 
delineate the essence of symbolic representation, and in particular in its doctrine of 
the General Propositional Form, according to which all propositions depict possible 
states of affairs and are of the form ‘Things are thus-and-so’” (Glock, 1996, p 120). 
 
10 See Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, §20 (2002). 
 
11 See Nicod’s Geometry in the Sensible World, 55ff (1970). 
 
12 See Drewal, 1975, p 18; Newman, 1979-80, p 2; Foley, 1985, p 29; Desmangles, 
1989, p 589; Myerhoff, 1990, p 245; Evans, 1994, p 6; and Simpson, 1997, p 3, 55. 
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CHAPTER TWO Trance and dance in the West: Manias, Shakerism, rave 
and New Age ecstatic dance rituals 
 
 
Though trance is primarily associated with non-Western cultures, incidents of trance 
or trance-like behaviours do exist within Western culture.  Often defined in opposition 
to the dominant culture, there are sects and subgroups indigenous to the West who 
exemplify and/or identify with trance.  As Lambek states, “certain subcultures” and 
“peripheral cults” exist, and their presence contributes to the absence of “positive 
cultural model for trance behaviour” (1981, p 7).  Like any subculture, they are 
distinctive because of the age of their members, their race, ethnicity, class and/or 
gender, or aesthetic, religious, political, and/or sexual inclinations.  The qualities that 
signify or constitute belonging distance them, yet simultaneously exert influence on 
the mainstream (Thornton, 1995).  Their actions and/or beliefs help to reinforce 
trance’s status as Other. 
 
This chapter surveys selected instances of trance behaviour that are enacted in and 
associated with subcultures in the West including dance manias, Shakerism, New 
Age ecstatic dance rituals and rave culture.  Discussed in chronological order, they 
have had a profound effect on popular notions of trance both individually and 
collectively.  As such, descriptions concentrate on historical events and socio-cultural 
factors that precipitated their emergence and also on the physical characteristics of 
trance behaviour associated with each form.  Manifestations are often considered 
vulgar, abhorrent and lewd according to contemporaneous beliefs – now and in the 
past – concerning propriety and comportment.  These reactions continue to sustain 
trance’s connotations of the primitive, primal and animalistic.  The examples were 
chosen for their continuing influence on cultural models for trance in the present as 
well as their clear representations in the moving body. 
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2.1 Dance manias - Tarantism and St. Vitus’ Dance 
Between the 11th and 17th centuries, choreomania, derived from the Greek for 
“dance” and “madness,” swept across Europe as tens of thousands of people 
participated in frenzied public displays of dancing lasting for days and sometimes 
weeks at a time.  The word chorea was first applied by Paracelsus in the 15th century 
to describe the frenzied movements of religious fanatics.  Much has been written 
about dance manias from historical, medical, psychiatric, religious and sociological 
perspectives wherein the two most commonly recognized forms are Tarantism and 
St. Vitus’ Dance. 
 
Defined as “a culture-bound syndrome” or “folk illness” (Horden, 2000, p 250), 
symptoms of tarantism included “nausea, vomiting, dizziness, stomach and muscular 
pain, fever, feelings of anguish, physical agitation or inertia (Ludtke, 2000, 293).  
French sociologist and philosopher Georges Lapassade has devoted much of his 
career to ascertaining the origins and meaning of tarantism and “trance rituals” 
(1987, 1990, 1997).  He argues that tarantism is not linked to Dionysian rituals but is 
derived from corybantian dances, “based on the conception of the dance as multiple 
and diverse (Lapassade in Ludtke, 2000, p 301).1
 
Tarantism was once thought to result from the bite of the tarantula spider, is 
purported to have originated in the city of Taranto in southern Italy, where the term 
"tarantism" (also called tarantismo or tarantolismo) derives.  It became a regional 
variant of dancing mania that developed into a local tradition, primarily in the south.  
From the 15th to 17th centuries, this extraordinary affliction was associated with 
melancholy, stupor, madness and an uncontrollable desire to dance.  The dancing 
was both violent and energetic, afflicting mostly women, who modern critics believe 
were defying social mores through anti-social behaviour and/or channelling that very 
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gendered of ailments, hysteria (Rosen, 1968; Smith-Rosenberg, 1972; Bartholomew, 
2000).  Small annual episodes however have persisted in southern Italy well into the 
20th century.  Hans Schadewaldt (1971) investigated an outbreak in Wardo during 
1957.  Italian religious history professor Ernesto de Martino (1966) identifies 35 
cases of tarantism near Galatina in 1959.  Current theories suggest that the 
outbreaks are connected to socio-economic stress and the disappearance of 
traditional ways of life (Gentilcore, 2000; Horden, 2000; Sanz, 2000). 
 
Dancing off the tarantula venom to specific pieces of music was considered the only 
cure, and it is a subject of debate whether the tarantella (or tarentule, tarentella, 
tarantel), a type of music in 6/8 time, was developed in response to attacks of 
tarantism or was a category of music and folk dance that preceded the appearance 
of this particular kind of dance mania (Schadewaldt, 1971).2  The 14th-century 
scholar Johannes de Grocheio touted music as a cure for the ailments of society, 
imbuing it with the power to restrain social vices.  Dancing manias were thus 
"treated" by playing music in an attempt to control the erratic spasms and gyrations 
of the dancers (Hecker, 1970).  Colour therapy was also thought to be an aid in 
curing the victim, or taranti (Zito, 1996). 
 
Unlike tarantism, St. Vitus' dance remains current in medical and psychiatric 
literature.  An acute disturbance of the central nervous system characterized by 
involuntary muscular movements of the face and extremities, St. Vitus' dance, also 
known as Sydenham's chorea, is usually, but not always, a complication of rheumatic 
fever.  The name was adopted after a group of about 200 people danced so spiritedly 
on a bridge above the Maas River in Germany during 1278 that it collapsed, killing 
many participants.  Survivors were treated in a nearby chapel dedicated to St. Vitus, 
and many were reportedly restored to full health (Bartholomew, 1998).  
 67
 Views on the causes or roots of dance manias are varied:  American psychiatrists 
Harold Kaplan and Benjamin Sadock state that they represent "collective mental 
disorder" (1985, p 127); psychologists Robert Carson, James Neal Butcher and 
Susan Mineka view St. Vitus' dance and tarantism as collective hysterical disorders 
(1998, p 37); while abnormal psychologist Ronald Comer of Princeton University 
uses the term "mass madness" (1996, p 9).  According to sociologist Robert E. 
Bartholomew, those afflicted by dance manias are best regarded “as deviant religious 
sects who gained adherents as they made pilgrimages through Europe during years 
of turmoil in order to receive divine favour.  Their symptoms (visions, fainting, tremor) 
are predictable for any large population engaging in prolonged dancing, emotional 
worship, and fasting” (2000, p 38).  Bartholomew perceives that much of the socio-
cultural research on dancing manias was written at a time when it was taken for 
granted that women were innately susceptible to hysteria and were both physically 
and emotionally frail.  Others see a connection to ergot poisoning or ergotism, also 
known in the Middle Ages as "St. Anthony's Fire.”  Ergotism is caused by eating 
cereal crops such as rye that are infected with Claviceps purpurea, a small fungus 
that contains toxic and psychoactive chemicals or alkaloids, including lysergic acid 
(used in modern times to synthesize LSD).  Symptoms of ergot poisoning include 
nervous spasms, psychotic delusions, spontaneous abortion, convulsions and 
hallucinations.  The fungus develops as a result of floods or excessive rain during the 
growing season (Donaldson et al. 1997, p 203), and can be contracted through 
consumption of food made from the flour (Sigerist, 1943).  Whether a true medical 
condition, a mechanism for releasing tension and anxiety, or the natural outcome of 
extreme emotion and exertion during worship, trance in tarantism and St. Vitus’ 
dance is regarded with a combination of fear and fascination. 
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2.2 Shakerism 
The Shakers have been referred to as the first modern American spiritualists (Skees, 
1998).  Adherents renounced material property, sexual relations and worldly goods in 
order to live together as a spiritual family. Their pacifism, celibacy, communal sharing 
of goods, ecstatic dancing and communication with the dead made the Shakers a 
target of ridicule, hatred and persecution and consequently, they have long been 
misunderstood (Henney, 1973; Skees, 1998). 
 
Derived from a small branch of English Quakers, Shakerism grew from adapted 
doctrine inspired by the “French Prophets,” as Londoners called the Camisards who 
had been driven into English exile from the provinces of Vivarais and Dauphiné in 
France in the 16th century.  Under the leadership of James and Ann Wardley, 
husband and wife, the group became known for their intense, ecstatic worship.  
During worship, the Wardleys' followers writhed and trembled, purportedly under the 
influence of the Holy Spirit.  The original and proper name of the group is the United 
Society of Believers in Christ’s Second Appearing, but followers quickly adopted the 
derogatory nickname, Shaking Quakers and eventually, Shakers, in response to their 
exultations.  Their trances and visions, their jumping and dancing, were like those of 
many other sects, such as the Low Countries dancers of the 14th and 15th centuries, 
the French Convulsionnaires of 1720–1770, or the Welsh Methodist Jumpers (Foster, 
1987). 
 
In 1758, Ann Lee, 22 year-old daughter of a Manchester blacksmith, joined the 
Wardleys and through her visionary gifts became their leader.  Lee rose to 
prominence in the movement through her dramatic urging of the believers to preach 
more publicly concerning the second coming, and to confront sin with bold and 
unconventional methods.  She was frequently imprisoned for breaking the Sabbath 
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by dancing and shouting, and for blasphemy.  After a series of revelations, Lee was 
seen as a prophet and was chosen to lead the sect, becoming known as Mother Ann.  
Following another revelation, she led a small group of followers to America where 
they settled in upper New York State and New England between 1774 and 1776 at 
the time of the American Revolution.  These early communities were ostracized and 
many Shakers were arrested as troublemakers whose pacifism undermined the 
revolutionary cause.  They were persecuted as witches who spoke in tongues and 
were accused of participating in wild orgies.  They were whipped, beaten and 
imprisoned.  After Lee died in 1784 the community attracted new converts, eventually 
prospering under her successor, Joseph Meacham.  The sect established an 
enviable reputation for hard work, excellent furniture making and community spirit 
(Brewer, 1986; Stein, 1992; Skees, 1998).  
 
Under Mother Ann, the Shakers formalized and practised a form of trance dance as a 
ceremony of worship well into the 1930s.  They danced what was called a round 
dance, with the men circling clockwise and the women circling counter-clockwise. 
They worked themselves into a religious fervour through the repetition of their 
hopping, clapping and marching movements.  Eventually a tremendous shaking and 
trembling overtook them, resulting in convulsions and glossolalia. 
 
The Shakers’ version of trance dance originated from the idea that by shaking, one 
could purge the body of lust and sin.  This practice, known as “shaking off the flesh” 
grew from a physical need to address the sect’s adherence to celibacy and strict 
segregation of the sexes.  Touching and fornication were seen as “worldly 
contaminations.”  Combined with a puritanical work ethic, the lives of the Shakers 
were characterized by sexual and psychological tensions.  The ongoing struggle to 
suppress sexual desire was sublimated in the physicality of the dancing (Sandlos, 
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2000, p 2).   Since Shakers do not marry, their numbers depend entirely on 
conversions and adoptions.  At their height, around the time of the American Civil 
War, there were 6,000 Shakers; as of 1983, there were only six surviving members.  
According to researcher Suzanne Youngerman: 
 
as Shakerism grew, the religion and the social organization it 
engendered became less ecstatic and more rigid and institutionalized. 
The dances and songs, which were the main form of worship, also 
changed from involuntary ecstatic and convulsive movements with 
glossolalia occurring during spells of altered states of consciousness 
to disciplined choreographed marches with symbolic steps, gestures, 
and floor plans.  
 
Youngerman, 1978, p 95. 
 
 
In both its earlier and later forms, the Shakers’ dance engendered feelings of 
camaraderie and fellowship, both towards fellow participants and to their interaction 
with God.  The rhythmic unison marching created a sense of power and 
purposefulness, and the circle gave the effect of a spiritual centre.  A dialogue 
between sisters on the experience of Shaker dancing states that “when the circle was 
formed and the singers faced inward” there was a “feeling of union of action and 
sentiment and an unerring spirit of truth.”  The dancing “was acceptable to God and 
refreshing to those who engaged in it” (Heim, 1970, p 32). 
 
In 1930, working from pictures and research materials but never attending a Shaker 
service, early American modern dance choreographer Doris Humphrey created a 
dance to actualize aspects of Shaker culture.  Youngerman suggests that 
Humphrey’s choreography embodies a wide range of Shaker “technique” 
incorporating both individual elements and direct references to actual Shaker dances 
(1978, p 96).  Humphrey’s piece, The Shakers, which still exists in the repertoire of 
the José Limon Dance Company in New York and is reconstructed via Labanotation 
in companies and post-secondary dance programs worldwide, begins with The 
 71
Vision, followed by a period of Temptation, characterized by rhythmic stepping.  
Lines Leading Up follows where dancers begin to bounce as they walk in strict 
formation.  The double circle emerges, called “the Star” in Humphrey’s choreography, 
and uncontrolled shaking begins in the hands of the dancers.  The dance reaches a 
climax in a section called Ecstatic Hops, distinguished by expansive reaches of the 
arms from the centre of the body outwards and upwards.  Finally, dancers become 
relatively still as they listen to the voice of the preacher reading the First Revelation 
(Sandlos, 2000, p 1). 
 
In teaching Humphrey’s dance to members of the Momenta Performing Arts 
Company in Illinois, Gail Corbin, a leading exponent and master teacher of the 
technique and dances of Doris Humphrey and her partner Charles Weidman, speaks 
of creating a sense of anticipation through the movements of the dance.  She reveals 
that the increasing bounce of the march is a sign that the spirit is entering into the 
bodies of the dancers.  The dance builds to a climax where Corbin indicates that, 
“something is going to happen, and we can’t hold on to it anymore” (Stodelle & 
Corbin, 1997).  From Corbin’s description, in a society where sexual contact was 
completely prohibited, the Shakers created a dance situation that replicated collective 
orgasm (Sandlos, 2000, p 2).  Such a reading would agree with the communal values 
of their culture, wherein the group was more important than any one individual. 
 
Criticism of the Shakers’ way of life grew from the suspicion and xenophobia that 
surrounded Shaker communities.   Censure also derived from apostates who joined 
with anti-Shaker factions in pamphlet writing and public speaking campaigns aimed 
at undermining and abolishing the sect.  Thomas Brown, Valetine Rathbun, Mary 
Marshall Dyer and Eunice Chapman emerged as strident anti-Shaker leaders in New 
England in the first half of the 19th century.  Their condemnation often centred on 
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portrayals of Shakerism as a “new branch of Catholicism” as well as “allegations of 
excessive drinking” and “accusations of lewd behaviour” amongst their membership 
(de Wolfe, 1998, p 240).  
 
Despite their decline and near extinction, the Shaker sect and their form of trance 
dance remains an intriguing aspect of early American culture.  The Shakers’ trance 
dance became a tourist attraction and similar to a circus sideshow, outsiders would 
travel to Shaker communities to view the spectacle of their services, admire and 
purchase their handicrafts and marvel at their way of life.   Though originating in the 
West, the Shakers’ form of trance retains a sense of alterity. 
 
2.3 New Age and ecstatic dance rituals 
New Age describes a broad movement of late 20th century and contemporary 
Western culture characterised by an individual eclectic approach to spiritual 
exploration and enlightenment.  Rather than a new, emerging religion it is more like a 
loose network of spiritual seekers, teachers, healers and alternative practitioners. 
Growing in popularity since the 1960s, the name "New Age" can also refer to the 
goods and services sold to the public in the form of books, music, classes, seminars 
– even candles, incense, jewellery and t-shirts. 
 
"New Agers" typically construct their own spiritual journey based on material taken as 
needed from the mystical traditions of world religions as well as theosophy, 
shamanism, neopaganism and occultism.  Participants are likely to borrow from 
diverse teachings and practices, some mainstream and some fringe, and formulate 
their own beliefs and practices that validate their life experiences.  No clear 
membership or rigid boundaries exist and the movement is most visible where its 
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ideas are traded, as in specialist bookshops, music stores, fairs and centres for New 
Age philosophy, meditation and healing. 
 
Most New Age activity may be characterized as a form of “alternative” spirituality – 
signifying an alternative to the dominant Western Judeo-Christian religious culture.  
Most New Age ideas and practices seem to contain implicit critiques of mainstream 
Christianity as the dominant religion in the West.  An emphasis on meditation 
suggests that ordinary prayer is insufficient; belief in reincarnation or past lives 
challenges familiar Christian doctrines of the life cycle and the afterlife (York, 1995; 
Hammer, 2001; Pike, 2004). 
 
New Age practices often find inspiration in the teachings and practices of other non-
Western cultures.  American postmodern dancer Steve Paxton, discussing the 
development of contact improvisation in New York in the 1960s and 1970s, notes 
that “in this century, the availability of exotic mental and physical techniques brought 
to the West new development[s] and formal perspectives which have entered 
developing modern aesthetics at a deeper level,” citing the influence of martial arts 
and Asian meditation practices on Western popular culture and aesthetics (Paxton in 
Novack, 1993, p 86-87).  Certainly the popularity of yoga in the West can likewise 
attest to this trend.  Inspiration has also been drawn from certain isolated aspects of 
native North American cultures such as sweat lodges, drum circles and communal 
dancing. 
 
The introduction of ecstatic dance rituals into North American culture can also be 
seen as a part of the New Age movement.  Ecstasy, from the Greek root ex stasis, 
meaning “to step aside of something” has become a metaphor for shedding 21st 
century concerns and burdens to discover a more grounded, “natural” and “truer” 
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self.  American artist, philosopher and healer Gabrielle Roth has devoted her career 
to exploring “primal” movement and experimental theatre.  For more than 35 years 
Roth has built a reputation for taking “people on a journey from physical and 
emotional inertia to the freedom of ecstasy, from the tyranny of the chattering ego-
mind to the blessed emptiness of stillness.”  Through labs, retreats and her patented 
5Rhythms™ technique, her self-styled form of ecstatic trance dance, she seeks “an 
electric intensity that mates contemporary currents of rock music, modern theater 
[sic] and poetry to the ancient pulse of shamanism” (Roth, website, 2005). 
Roth is in the business of recreating a past that she perceives will suit the needs of 
her clients in the present.  She places the origin of her 5Rhythms™ program in 
“shamanic societies” where dance was “a sacred act, the sine qua non of most 
rituals.”  In this imagined past of no particular geographical place or time “tribal 
people would dance for hours, churning themselves into ecstasy in order to free their 
souls and communicate with their gods.”  Roth is responding to the absence in the 
West of an institutionalized form of spiritual worship that engages the entire body.  
She perceives that “unlike our ancestors, our spiritual worship in the West has to a 
great extent become a sedentary activity, with meditation and prayer most often done 
in complete stillness.”  Roth does not simply imagine a shared collective past but also 
a shared collective present.  Her vision is one of resolute harmony regardless of 
race, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status, gender or language (website, 2005). 
 
The author of Maps to Ecstasy, Sweat Your Prayers (1995), and her latest book, 
Connections (2005), Roth is the artistic director of her own dance/theatre/music 
company, The Mirrors, in New York, and through her recording company, co-founded 
with her husband, has produced more than twenty music compilations, considered to 
be “on the cutting edge of shamanic trance dance music” (website, 2005).  In Maps to 
Ecstasy, Teachings of an Urban Shaman, Roth outlines her philosophy beginning 
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with the “first shamanic task” which is to “free the body to experience the power of 
being.”  She lists the 5Rhythms™ as Flowing, Staccato, Chaos, Lyric and Stillness, 
“five sacred rhythms that are the essence of the body in motion” (Roth, 1990, p 24, 
26).  Through guided improvisational group dancing to specifically chosen pieces of 
music that reflect the five rhythms, sessions can last up to four or five hours or build 
over a few days.  According to participants, the sessions end in euphoria from sheer 
exhaustion and the pushing of physical and emotional limits.  In her book, Travelling 
Between Worlds: Conversations with Contemporary Shamans, author Hilary Webb 
describes her involvement in one of Roth’s weekend sessions:  
 
over the course of the weekend, the boundaries between our bodies, 
our egos, and our souls became more and more diffuse. I watched 
myself and my fellow students move from self-consciousness to 
selflessness; from the agony of [being] excruciatingly uncomfortable 
[with] movement patterns we had never cultivated within ourselves – 
or worse, had been taught to repress – to the ecstasy of rhythmic 
liberation. 
Webb, 2004, p 37. 
 
 
Clearly, Roth has found and is exploiting her niche market.  In a postmodern age 
where, despite allusions to a “global village,” inhabitants of the West feel increasingly 
cut-off from their community and each other due to stress, urban dwelling, technology 
and the demise of the extended family, Roth’s 5Rhythms™ sessions offer clients 
respite and an opportunity to participate in her creative myth-making that seeks to 
simultaneously naturalize and exoticize trance experience. 
 
With similar results but based on a more scholarly approach and training, American 
anthropologist Felicitas D. Goodman, founded The Cuyamungue Institute in 1978 as 
a non-profit anthropological research and teaching institution specializing in ecstatic 
trance.  Originally from Hungary, Goodman immigrated to the United States, 
eventually earning a Master’s degree in linguistics and a doctorate in psychological 
anthropology at Ohio State University.  Since 1977, Goodman has been conducting 
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research into altered states of consciousness that emanate from “ritual body 
postures” and has published seven books including Where the Spirits Ride the Wind: 
Spirit Journeys and Ecstatic Experiences (1990) and Ecstasy, Ritual and Alternate 
Reality: Religion in a Pluralistic World (1988) and more than forty scientific and 
popular articles. 
 
In an article that appeared in The Drama Review in 1990, Goodman describes one of 
her typical research projects.  Several times a year at the Cuyemungue Institute in 
New Mexico groups of participants attend workshops with the intention of learning 
ecstatic dances.  Workshops in mask-making and structuring ritual dances draw from 
inspiration gained in exercises to alter the participant’s states of consciousness 
through the attainment of what Goodman refers to as “religious trance.”  Goodman’s 
experiments with the students use rhythmic stimulation and trance postures to induce 
trance states.  She argues that the “ability of normal subjects to enter this kind of 
changed state of perception on cue, as well as come out of it on command, is 
genetically transmitted.” (Goodman, 1990 p 105-106).  She reports that less than 2% 
of her 900 participants were unable to experience trance states under her tutelage.  
Goodman orchestrates these rituals but the specific content is determined by images 
and ideas participants “see” during trance.  The resulting ritual relies heavily on 
Southwest indigenous mythology and symbolism but Goodman borrows freely from 
all North American indigenous cultures.  These rituals are then staged out of doors 
where she has constructed a kiva, a Southwest native ceremonial structure and 
dance court.  
 
In the same article Goodman discusses laboratory experiments she undertook with 
students at the University of Munich in 1983 and the University of Vienna in 1987. 
The purpose of these experiments was to measure and determine physical and 
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chemical changes that occur in the body during trance states.  She discovered that 
changes include a “dramatic” increase in heart rate, drops in blood pressure, 
increases in adrenalin, noradrenalin and cortisol levels in the blood, the appearances 
of beta-endorphins – the brain’s “pain killer and opiate” – that would account for the 
feelings of euphoria reported by subjects, and a predominance of theta waves with 
very little activity in other bands” (Goodman, 1990, p 106). 
There is certainly no doubt that Goodman’s research is of a much more scientific and 
scholarly nature, but like Roth, she shares a fixation with non-Western, non-
European spiritual practices and the audacity to create a bricolage of disparate 
spiritual practices.  In the ecstatic dance rituals, the justification and/or context for 
entering trance states is underwritten by claims to a pastoral and exotic affiliation or 
ancestry.  Indigenous Southwestern practices provide the backdrop for Goodman’s 
work while an imagined shamanistic past provides the grounds for Roth’s systems.  It 
is interesting that the need exists to imbue these practices with an “authentic” origin, 
since there are no structures or modalities within mainstream Western culture to 
situate these activities.  Inspiration and justification must come from outside or from 
one’s imagination. 
 
2.4 Rave Culture 
Rave refers simultaneously to a genre of music, an event or happening that entails 
large groups of people, dancing, light shows and a DJ, and a resilient movement 
characterized by a largely apolitical reaction to the perceived mainstream that 
promotes harmonious, en masse socialization and spirituality (Shapiro 1997; 
Reynolds, 1998, 1999; Brewster & Broughton, 1999; Fritz, 1999; Malbon, 1999; 
Measham et al, 2001; Fatone, 2001; Regan, 2001).  There are many opinions on the 
origins and inventors of trance music and the least political and divisive interpretation 
states that trance is “the most ambiguous genre in the realm of electronic dance 
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music …[and] could be described as a melodic, more-or-less freeform style of music 
derived from techno or house.”3  To this, British journalist Ben Osborne adds that 
“education, globalism and spirituality run deep in the trance scene” and proposes that 
the genre grew out of the infamous beach party culture of Goa in the early 1990s 
(Osborne, 1999, p 295-296).  Music journalist Mark Prendergast provides a more 
detailed account arguing that “Trance [capitalized] can be traced from the Hi-NRG 
New York dance scene of the late 1970s and early 80s, through the German 
Progressive House outcrop of the early 1990s and the UK’s Goa Trance/Epic House 
offshoots in the mid-1990s to the neo-psychedelic sensation of Euro Trance in the 
late 1990s” (2000, p 461).  According to the author of the section on trance on 
Wikipedia, an international, open content, collaboratively developed on-line 
encyclopaedia, trance music can be divided in to three sub-genres of psychedelic, 
progressive and minimalist, and that “while there is no strict definition for "trance," 
songs of this genre are usually characterized as being accessible and having 
"anthemic" qualities.”4   
 
Regardless of how one defines trance music, the epithet remains significant and 
transnational, pointing simultaneously to the state that listening and dancing to the 
music invokes in a rave setting, as well as the link to rave as a subculture based in 
“tribal” values and allegiances.  Trance thus can be read as an indicator of 
homogeneity within the subculture – followers, inventors, innovators of trance music 
as a genre – and as a signifier of difference (Weil & Rosen, 1993, 2004; Saunders, 
1995, 1997; Collin, 1997).  It is irrelevant whether this past or present exists, it is 
trance’s connotations of the exotic, the natural and the Other that allow for distinction 
within a group that seeks to dissociate itself from the perceived mainstream, evoking 
the forbidden and the familiar at the same time.  
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As music historian Christopher Partridge describes: 
 
it was not just the pulse of the beat and the hallucinogens … there was 
also the sense that music was connecting the ravers to that which was 
beyond the mundane and the entertaining: a sense that the dancers 
were gathering as a spiritual community.  In the words of a Goa DJ 
“India and psychedelic trance dance is for those who want to shed their 
egos and embrace something quite numinous (spirit-reflecting) and 
potentially more psychically edifying.” 
 
                                                                            Partridge, 2004a, p 167. 
 
Partridge perceives that rave represents “the next phase” of “psychedelic spirituality” 
(2004b, p 134) where the rave itself – the meeting of bodies, music, lights, drugs, and 
the collective experience – is a “medium for transcendence” (Partridge, 2004a, p 
174). 
 
Dance anthropologist Georgiana Gore’s article “The Beat Goes On: Trance, Dance 
and Tribalism in Rave Culture” (1997) offers an analysis of the influence and 
positioning of rave culture within European and North American societies.  Gore 
paints a picture of rave as a discrete yet hardly heterogeneous subculture with its 
own codes of behaviour, practice, ethics and aesthetics articulated vis a vis the larger 
society.  Gore draws parallels between the rave movement of the 1980s and 1990s 
and hippie culture of the 1960s while also illustrating rave’s intended and 
unconscious points of departure.   
 
In the 20th century trance has maintained its ties to an “anthropologized” view of the 
world, emerging in what Gore has termed the “neo-tribalism” of hippie culture of the 
1960s and rave culture of the 1980s, and onwards.  Gore conceives of neo-tribalism 
in several interrelated ways: 
 
there is on the one hand, a discourse of nostalgia, which evokes 
cultures which are seen as ecologically and socially less exploitative 
and fragmented … Rave culture, in turn, recreates elements of 
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hippiedom, which … represents a paradisiacal past, worthy of 
emulation. Moreover, through the staging of events which bring into 
play diverse artistic/cultural elements, especially music and dance, 
both movements replicate liminal rituals in non-Western cultures, the 
aim of which is collective celebration and/or trance. 
 
                   Gore, 1997, p 54-55. 
 
 
Gore, in the parallels her analysis draws between ethnographic accounts of trance 
and rave culture, goes so far as to suggest that the role played by the DJ is akin to a 
“shamanistic figure with superstar status and ‘magical powers’ to induce trance 
through the manipulation of the musical materials” (1997, p 52).5  She argues that 
neo-tribalism also entails “relations of tactility, of body to body, and the privileging of 
collective sentiment” (Gore, 1997, p 56).  Gore’s sense of a “tribal mentality” is in 
keeping with sociologist Michel Maffesoli’s work on the decline of individualism in 
modern society where common to these “tribes” is a certain “religiosity,” to be taken 
in its etymological sense of binding together and inter-reliance (Maffesoli, 1996).  
Gore’s argument also reflects cultural theorist Sarah Thornton’s work on subcultures 
and alterity where “subculture ideologies are a means by which youth imagine their 
own and other social groups, assert their distinctive character and affirm that they are 
not anonymous members of an undifferentiated mass” (1997, p 201).  Gore 
perceives that identification with a tribal or ritualistic past and present is not 
“necessarily a conscious process of recuperation and replication” (1997, p 55), 
agreeing with Thornton’s reading of subculture, where subculture is “not [an] innocent 
[account] of the way things really are, but ideologies which fulfil the specific cultural 
agendas of their beholders” (1997, p 201).  Trance then becomes an accoutrement of 
the tribe as a subculture, a means of defining one’s adopted alterity and is another 
word or image to evoke an imagined past and collective present.  Both knowledge of 
trance and embodied experience through rave become a means of establishing 
kinship almost as a rite of passage or as a secret handshake denotes belonging.  
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The potent mix of fear and curiosity engendered by reports of “trancing ravers” in the 
media simultaneously condemns and celebrates their separate and unequal status. 
 
Gore’s entrée into the field of rave is through dance: “dancing, and especially 
continuous dancing for prolonged periods of time, is the single most important 
element, if not the raison d’être, of rave culture” (1997, p 52).  In this way, dance 
becomes the key to extrapolating and analysing rave as genre, mapping its history, 
influences and traits and deconstructing key events and figures.  And though Gore 
may possess some empirical knowledge of rave gained by attending or participating 
in a rave, she remains an outsider – a non-native within the field.  She is drawn to 
rave as a pocket of subculture within her own culture that exhibits “ethnic” or 
unfamiliar traits and behaviours.  Gore’s approach to rave dancing is in keeping with 
the one advocated by Kealiinohomoku where ethnic dance refers to a dance form of 
“a given group of people who share common genetic, linguistic and cultural ties.”   
Though Kealiinohomoku may not have envisioned ethnic as being applied to a 
subcultural group within Western culture, the definition still pertains. 
  
Gore provides the historical, socio-cultural, political and economic context for rave 
dancing and as such she is engaged in what Geertz describes as “thick description,” 
conjecturing what “doing” rave means to its participants (1973, p 6).  Gore’s socio-
cultural analysis of rave creates a meta-narrative that invokes a number of 
anthropological motifs: Gore details rave’s transformation from a “form of cultural 
nomadism to a form of settled urban tribalism” (1997, p 52).  Her analysis likewise 
relies on the postmodernist theories of “neo-tribalism” where subcultures of the 
economically and socially disadvantaged and peripheral – usually women, peoples of 
colour, gays and lesbians and in this case, ravers – form part of an unseen, 
undervalued cultural sub-stratum united in common purpose.  Gore’s use of 
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adjectives like mythical, ritual and tribal, serve to connote what Fabian terms 
“temporal distancing” where using these terms creates “the objects or referents of 
anthropological discourse” (1983, p 30). 
 
The dilemma facing Gore is that rave is difficult to characterize or define, except by 
its lack of consistency.  Gore’s overriding argument is that rave culture while clearly 
reflecting social, political and aesthetic trends and ideals of the late 20th century, 
defies quantifiable definition.  She compares rave to the mythical “many-headed 
Hydra, a creature which captivated and entranced, only to make disappear, all those 
who beheld it, and which mutated inexorably, by growing new heads when, its 
protagonists attempted to destroy it” (Gore, 1997, p 51).  Such a comparison 
accurately reflects rave’s huge multinational following, its ability to not only resist 
forces advocating its demise but to multiply in strength and numbers in the face of 
controversy, and its capacity to exist alongside the mainstream.  Rave symbiotically 
reflects and affects the larger culture while remaining whole and untouched as its 
participants revel in its proffered anonymity and release.    
 
Missing from Gore’s analysis is a description of what trance in rave culture actually 
looks like.  Morgan Gerard, in his ethnography of rave in Toronto’s underground club 
culture suggests dancers refer to themselves as having “lost it” when describing 
sensations that have been variously interpreted as “oceanic,” “immersion in the vibe,” 
and as a “loss of self” (Malbon,1999; Fikentscher, 2000; McClellan, 1991).  Dancing 
under the influence of trance-inducing music and/or drugs such as the appropriately 
named ecstasy, usually involves repetitive swaying, rocking, pulsing and marching in 
place, as well as waving and punching arms in the air.  Due to a lack of personal 
space and to a total absorption in the music and the moment, dancers’ movements 
tend to be limited spatially.  The increasing tempo, modulations of bass and 
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equalizer, anthemic qualities of the music and throbbing pulse produced by so many 
bodies dancing together produces an ecstatic response.  As McClellan describes in 
The Healing Forces of Music: 
 
the fuller our level of involvement, the less consciously aware of our 
individualized personalities we may become.  When our involvement 
approaches the stage of complete immersion, we may have reached 
the transpersonal level of the super-conscious mind during which the 
state of focussed concentration gives way to a state of expanded 
awareness.  Visual imagery may be left behind as we begin to 
experience music as waves of alternating patterns and create 
motions. 
McClellan, 1991, p 150. 
 
 
Gerard suggests that such peak experiences are generated primarily through music 
by the DJ who “is expected to decipher the needs of dancers, utilize his mixing and 
programming skills, and “make” the dancers “lose it” during liminal expressions of 
tension and release” (2004, p 204-205).  It seems unlikely, however, that trance 
could occur without the reciprocal physical responses of the body to the music and 
the raving environment.   Such responses would be difficult to characterize as lewd 
yet connotations of the primal and animalistic derive from its movement en masse 
and its quality of all-encompassing rapture. 
 
Gore argues that rave culture’s irreducibility is explained by its connection to 
postmodernism.  She conceives of rave as a “microcosm of the contemporary 
metropolis, which has itself been proposed as a metaphor for postmodernity,” and 
defines postmodernity as a “condition” which “celebrates fragmentation, 
deconstruction, dispersal, discontinuity, rupture, asubjectivity, ephemerality, 
superficiality, depthlessness, flatness, meaninglessness, hyperreality, etc.”  Viewing 
rave as a product and progenitor of postmodernity therefore legitimizes the absence 
of a coherent definition since no “totalising meta-narrative” can adequately account 
for something as “fragmented, as elusive and as dispersed, yet as apparently 
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indestructible” (Gore, 1997, p 51).   Like trance, rave is an equally contested term 
that falls under the rubric of polysemy where ambiguity does not negate 
comprehension and where explanations by reference are valuable and adequate. 
 
As intriguing and convincing as her arguments are, Gore is still reading rave from the 
outside.  As an outsider, her eye is quick to pick up on the unfamiliar and the strange.  
In appraising what is Other, she is further defining what is known.  Returning to 
Geertz, “the famous anthropological absorption with the (to us) exotic … is, thus, 
[still] essentially a device for displacing the dulling sense of familiarity” (1973, p 6).  
Rave then functions both as familiar entity and exotic subject.  Rave’s massive 
commercialization creates a sense of banality yet the subculture remains sufficiently 
Other so as to draw the attention of and repel the outsider.  Since the form remains 
at once alien and familiar, rave, and by extension the trance states it can include, can 
be construed as both ethnic and native.   
 
Combined, contemporary approaches to trance have been influenced by aspects and 
themes from each of the practices discussed in this chapter.  Tarantism, St. Vitus’ 
dance, Shakerism, New Age ecstatic dance rituals and rave culture have developed 
within and influenced European and North American culture to a significant degree.   
 
Just as each example may be perceived to comprise elements of the Self alongside 
the Other, the tension implicit in the West’s relationship to trance is characterized by 
both acceptance and anxiety.  Within scholarship and mass media there is a desire 
to expose and to encapsulate the trance practices of subculture groups but to 
simultaneously keep them at a safe distance.  Through these examples, sustaining 
the existence of the Other within one’s own culture is clearly implicated in boundary 
maintenance for the Self.  In the cases of rave culture and ecstatic dance there are 
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many adherents but as choices they are frequently associated with “alternative 
lifestyles.”  It remains to be determined how these practices and the trance states 
they engender, associated as they are with notions of the primitive and primal, may 
be discussed and contextualized in neutral, unbiased terms, and whether the Self of 
Western culture can maintain its sense of autonomy in the absence of sites of 
identifiable alterity. 
 
                                                
1  The Corybantes were “priests of the Phrygian goddess Cybele. They served the 
goddess by wild rituals that resulted in an exceptional state of ecstasy that went so 
far that they unmanned themselves. The cult spread through Greece and later also 
to Rome, where they were called Galli” Encyclopedia Mythica, (accessed August 
10th, 2007), http://www.pantheon.org/articles/c/corybantes.html. 
 
2  The treatment of possession through movement and particular types of music 
preferred by the possessing spirit is also exhibited in the zar cult practiced in the 
Sudan and other parts of East Africa and the Middle East.  Again, the practice is 
most commonly performed by women. See al Nagar in Kenyon, 1987. 
 
3  See http://wikipedia.org/wiki/trance_music for a history of trance music and 
electronic dance music. 
 
4  See above. 
 
5  Morgan Gerard, in his PhD thesis on rave and the functions of liminality in 
Toronto’s underground club culture suggests, in a chapter entitled “DJs as Ritual 
Specialists,” that the potential for “transcendence and/or transformation is encoded 
in the ambiguous play between tension and release that DJs manipulate through 
mixing and programming records” (2004, p. 17). 
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 CHAPTER THREE Trance, anthropology and post-colonial theory 
 
 
Returning to Lambek’s question as to why trance has been so rigidly excluded or 
ignored in the West, this chapter addresses under what circumstances and in what 
contexts, in addition to popular culture, trance is present in the West.  Of particular 
interest, is the degree to which trance is implicated in anthropological discourse and 
post-colonial theory.  This chapter begins with a literature review of some of the key 
theories and theorists in anthropology and post-colonial studies, drawing attention to 
the ways in which the two fields are cross-referenced, before moving on to consider 
the development and criticism of dance ethnography as a discipline with examples 
that are both key texts in the field and are pertinent to the study of trance.  The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of dancers’ testimonies and body therapies and 
how these instances of trance-like behaviour could be addressed in an ethnographic 
context. 
 
To foreground this discussion, the terms ethnology and ethnography are used in the 
following way:  as a sub-discipline of cultural anthropology, ethnology is the 
theoretical aspect of cultural anthropology and involves the identification and 
explanation of cross-cultural similarities and differences through analysis, 
comparison, generalization and hypothesis formation; ethnography involves 
extensive fieldwork and the personal, first-hand collection of data within the society 
whose culture is to be described.  The major research methods of ethnography 
include participant observation and key informant interviewing.  An ethnographer 
seeks to compose an accurate, objective picture of the culture he or she studies but 
must do so with an awareness of the sources and implications of bias. These include 
inadequate sampling, theoretical preconceptions, personal biases and ethical 
considerations (Harris, 1968; Bohannon & Glazer, 1973; Schwimmer, website, 1997). 
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 3.1 Western cultural anthropology 
At its most utopian and expansive, anthropology seeks to learn from and about other 
cultures.  Geertz states that the “aim of anthropology is the enlargement of the 
universe of human discourse” (1973, p 14).  Such magnanimity begins to break down 
when he adds that anthropology’s aims also include “instruction, amusement, 
practical counsel, moral advance, and the discovery of natural order in human 
behaviour” (Geertz, 1973, p 14).   Instruction for the benefit of whom?  Amusement at 
what cost?  Practical counsel and moral advance to what end?  These may seem like 
noble pursuits but they serve only the anthropologist and his culture – not the people 
who have become sources of amusement or repositories of practical counsel and 
moral judgement.  And to assume that a natural order in human behaviour exists can 
only lead to the assumption that an unnatural order in human behaviour exists 
alongside it.   
 
Anthropologist Edmund Leach offers a much less prescriptive view when he states 
that “social anthropologists should not see themselves as seekers after objective 
truth; their purpose is to gain insight into other people’s behaviour, or for that matter, 
into their own” (1984, p 24).  Leach’s questioning of objectivity, his reflexivity and his 
recognition that anthropological contact is not a one-way process, situates 
anthropology in a place of ethical responsibility.  Yet, he does not question 
anthropologists’ authority “to seek” such insight.  The authority to pursue 
enlargement of the universe of human discourse and to acquire insight has served to 
bring many of the world’s cultures into view of the West, but has served equally to 
aggrandize its position and to diminish the agency of the non-West.   
 
Boas perceives that in the middle of the 19th century, the beginnings of anthropology 
were laid “from three distinct points of view: the historical, the classificatory and the 
geographical” (1974, p 262).  To know and to understand another culture, one must 
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 learn of its history, ascertain its categories of belief and practice and see this in 
relation to the climate and topographical features of the land the people inhabit.  
Such a desire to classify may be seen to derive from the field of “natural” history and 
the hierarchical beliefs about human development and the animal kingdom.  Beliefs 
about a natural order, coupled with a sense of paternalistic superiority were 
reinforced in the late 19th century with the assistance of a “misreading” of the 
evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin.  This in turn led to the development of 
“social Darwinism.”  Susanna Glasser, writing on the notion of “primitive” dance, 
explains:   
 
social Darwinism held that all human societies (like biological 
organisms) evolved from simple forms to the complex.  These ideas 
were transferred to the colonial situation where the indigenous 
inhabitants were perceived as having a less developed, or less highly 
evolved, form of social life than the conquerors.  In the evolutionary 
scale, the people who now were referred to as “primitive” were on the 
side of “nature” as opposed to “culture.”   
Glasser, 1993, p 185. 
 
 
According to the prevailing attitudes of the times, “nature” embodied all things 
instinctive or biological, while culture embodied the aspects of life that are cultivated.  
As a result, Western cultures were regarded as civilized and non-Western cultures 
were regarded as primitive.   
 
Fabian, writing on the history of anthropology, is critical of pioneers like Boas and 
their sweeping, grandiose claims to a higher authority.  In aligning the history of 
anthropology with developments in natural history, Fabian argues that the “exercise 
of knowledge” was thus “projected as the filling of spaces or slots in a table, or the 
marking of points in a system of coordinates in which all possible knowledge could be 
placed” (1983, p 8).  In perceiving the world in this way, there is both a definite sense 
of authoritative control and of a limit to what knowledge exists and how it can be 
measured.  Anthropology was a means by which cultures could be assessed, graded 
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 and portrayed in such a manner as to maintain a sense of “natural” order from a 
Western perspective. The appeal to order was advocated by the anthropologist’s own 
culture, and when an other culture was deemed sufficiently understood it could be 
slotted accordingly.  
 
Beyond aligning anthropology with laws of nature, the need to imbue the field with 
authority also led to anthropology’s installation in Western universities.  Evans-
Pritchard argues that a subject of scholarship can hardly be said to have autonomy 
before it is taught in the universities.  In that sense social anthropology is a very new 
subject (Evans-Pritchard, 1973, p 358-359).  Implicit in Evans-Pritchard’s statement 
is an element of selective origins.  In establishing anthropology in universities, a link 
was made to the institutionalization of knowledge and the explicit creation of 
authority.  As established places of “higher learning,” a university confers a level of 
respect to the subjects it teaches and to the persons who teach.  A university need 
not appeal to any higher authority than itself for it is situated at a juncture of science 
and reason.  Thus anthropology could situate itself as a selective and autonomous 
subject.  Yet even in the supposed post-colonial present with the advent of self-
reflexivity, Maori scholar and anthropologist Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues that little has 
changed and to the traditional objects of anthropology, the academe is still a closed 
shop.  Through the “formal rules of individual scholarly disciplines and scientific 
paradigms,” research continues to represent one of the ways that anthropology’s 
“underlying codes” can be both normalized and realized (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p 7). 
 
Despite claims to professionalism, the formalization of Europe’s imperialist project 
was supported by anthropology’s contribution to racial profiling.  Dating back more 
than 500 years to Christopher Columbus’ historic “discovery” of America and the 
subsequent exploitation of its land, resources and indigenous peoples, imperialism 
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 was the system of control which secured the markets and capital investments for 
colonialist expansion.  Colonialism – both the creation and maintenance of colonies 
and the underlying philosophical justification for such enterprise – facilitated this 
expansion by ensuring that European powers attained control by securing and 
subjugating indigenous populations.  In tracing the history of the discipline, Fabian 
sees anthropology as a willing handmaiden to colonialism, contributing “above all to 
the intellectual justification of the colonial enterprise” (1983, p 17).  In particular, 
Fabian takes offence at the revisionist tendencies within the field to evade 
shouldering any responsibility for the harm colonialism has perpetrated in the world. 
 
Despite its desire to maintain a neutral, apolitical stance, anthropology and especially 
ethnology have been unable to escape the controversy.  The connection between 
anthropology and colonialism has been cause for considerable debate.  Political 
anthropologist Talal Asad maintains that: 
 
it is not a matter of dispute that social anthropology emerged as a 
distinctive discipline at the beginning of the colonial era, that it became 
a flourishing academic profession towards its close, or that throughout 
this period its efforts were devoted to a description and analysis – 
carried out by Europeans, for a European audience – of non-
European societies dominated by European power. And yet there is a 
strange reluctance on the part of most professional anthropologists to 
consider seriously the power structure within which their discipline has 
taken shape.  
 
Asad, 1973, p 14-15. 
 
Asad points to Victor Turner’s introduction to Volume Three of Colonialism in Africa 
1870-1960 (1971, p 1-2) as an example of how the “problem” of the relationship 
between anthropology and colonialism is “trivialized and dismissed” (1973, p 15).  
Though critical, Asad ultimately believes it is “a mistake to view social anthropology 
in the colonial era as primarily an aid to colonial administration, or as a simple 
reflection of colonial ideology” (1973, p 18).  He defends his position by stating that 
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 though he does not “subscribe to the anthropological establishment’s comfortable 
view of itself,” he perceives social anthropology has always contained within itself 
“profound contradictions and ambiguities – and therefore the potentialities for 
transcending itself” (Asad, 1973, p 18-19).  Asad sees that significant changes have 
taken place in anthropology since 1940 whereby the study of other cultures with a 
view to creating “micro-studies” instead of sweeping “macro-studies” is the result of 
the demise of colonial rule.  This process of “decolonization” – the shedding of 
colonial identity and the revisioning of the colonial encounter by the formerly 
colonized – creates a “nationalistic bourgeoisie” in the ex-colonies with their own 
claims to self-historicizing.  Such changes compel the field to be more careful, to 
acknowledge shared ownership of knowledge and to perceive that “anthropology 
does not merely apprehend the world in which it is located, but that the world also 
determines how anthropology will apprehend it[self]” (Asad, 1973, p 12-13).  These 
changes were welcomed and necessary but the imbalance implicit in the colonial 
power structure did not fade with the advent of decolonization.  
 
Anthropology’s traditional Eurocentric bias came under sharp scrutiny with the 
demise of the colonial period, the advent of post-colonialism and the process of 
decolonization.  Correcting the imbalance became part of the postmodernist 
movement when many disciplines like anthropology were regarded as “instruments of 
white European males interested only in maintaining their own hegemony [and 
resulting in] a certain homogeneity which disallowed cultural differences” (Belton, 
website, 2002).  Changes in attitude forced anthropology to re-evaluate its core 
beliefs.  A professor of anthropology and social sciences specializing in the relation 
between historicity and power, Michel-Rolph Trouillot articulates the situation facing 
the field: 
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 changes in the explicit criteria of acceptability do not automatically 
relieve the historical weight of the field of significance that the 
discipline inherited from birth.  More likely, the burden of the past is 
alleviated when the socio-historical conditions that obtained at the 
time of emergence have changed so much that practitioners face a 
choice between complete oblivion and fundamental redirection. At one 
point in time, alchemists become chemists or cease to be. 
 
Trouillot, 1991, p 18. 
 
It is into Trouillot’s “savage slot” that anthropology fell and expanded its range of 
influence to sustain the imperialist and colonialist directives of its Western masters.  
Yet as Trouillot points out, while anthropology is not blameless, academic disciplines 
“do not create their fields of significance, they only legitimise particular organizations 
of meaning” (1991, p 17).  But increasingly anthropology’s organization of meaning 
around the colonialist enterprise became something of an impediment that the field in 
the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century has been challenged to 
account for and overcome.  In the process of repositioning, the field has become 
reflexive, re-evaluating its claims to objectivity, its position of authority within the field 
and the impact that its presence has on the people being studied.  Such attempts to 
reappraise the basic tenets and assumptions upon which ethnology is premised 
began in earnest after the Second World War and rapidly expanded with the advent 
of postcolonial theory in the 1970s. 
 
3.2 Post-colonial theory 
In a literal sense, "post-colonial" is that which proceeds from colonization.  The 
second college edition of The American Heritage Dictionary defines it as "of, relating 
to, or being the time following the establishment of independence in a colony."  In 
practice, however, the term is used much more loosely.  The formation of the colony 
through various mechanisms of control and the various stages in the development of 
anti-colonial nationalism is likewise an aspect of post-colonial discourse.  Moreover, 
post-colonial sometimes includes countries that have yet to achieve independence, 
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 people in First World countries who are minorities, or independent colonies that now 
contend with "neocolonial" forms of subjugation through expanding capitalism and 
globalization.  As a result, though the definition suggests otherwise, it is not only the 
period after the departure of the imperial powers that concerns post-colonial 
scholars, but that which preceded independence as well.   
 
The list of former colonies of European powers is a long one. They are divided into 
settler (e.g. Australia, Canada) and non-settler countries (India, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sri Lanka).  Countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, which were 
partially settled by colonial populations, complicate even this simple division.  The 
widely divergent experiences of these countries also contributes to the sense that 
"post-colonial" is hardly a precise term.  The United States, for instance, might also 
be described as a post-colonial country, yet because of its position of power in world 
politics, its displacement of Native American populations, its strategic annexation of 
other parts of the world and its ubiquitous influence on global pop culture, it may also 
be viewed as a colonizing force.  For that matter, other settler countries such as 
Canada and Australia are sometimes omitted from the post-colonial category 
altogether because of their relatively shorter struggles for independence, their loyalist 
tendencies toward the mother country which colonized them, and the relative 
absence of segregation or of the imposition of a foreign language.  These two nations 
however, are among the most desirable destinations for immigrants.  Many new 
immigrants are themselves coming from former colonies and so they and their 
adopted countries are shaped by the ongoing resonances of colonization.   
 
Beginning in 1947, the formal dissolution of colonial empires and the granting of 
independence to previously colonized countries followed various campaigns of anti-
colonial resistance, frequently with an explicitly nationalistic agenda.  Ranging from 
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 legal and diplomatic manoeuvres, such as opposing the colonizers on their 
ideological high ground, to wars of independence as in Kenya and Algeria in the 
1950s, the drive towards post-colonial independence has been both violent and 
profound.  The ending of colonial rule created high hopes for the newly independent 
countries and for the inauguration of a truly post-colonial era.  But such optimism was 
short-lived as the extent to which the West still maintained control became clear.  As 
a result, many former colonies are far from free of colonial influence or domination 
and cannot be term “post-colonial” in any discrete sense.  This continuing Western 
influence, located in elastic combinations of economic, political, military and/or 
ideological control has been termed “neo-colonialism,” characterizing a period where, 
despite the absence of a colonial superstructure, imperialism still holds sway.   
 
The field of post-colonial studies has been gaining prominence since the 1970s and 
some would date its meteoric rise in Western academia to the publication of Said's 
Orientalism, his influential critique of Western constructions of the Orient, in 1978. 
Orientalism is a critique of the academic field of Oriental Studies, which has been a 
scholarly pursuit in many prestigious European universities for several centuries. 
Oriental Studies is a composite area of scholarship comprising philology, linguistics, 
ethnography and the interpretation of culture through the discovery, recovery, 
compilation and translation of Oriental texts.  Said makes it clear that he is not 
attempting to address all aspects of the field, rather his focus is on how English, 
French, and American scholars have approached the Arab societies of North Africa 
and the Middle East.  The period he covers is likewise more limited extending only 
from the late 18th century to the present, whereas European scholarship on the 
Orient dates back to the Middle Ages.  Within this time frame, however, Said extends 
his examination beyond the works of recognized Orientalist academics to literature, 
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 journalism, travel books and religious and philosophical studies to produce a broadly 
historical and anthropological perspective.  
 
Said’s book makes three major claims.  First, that Orientalism, although purporting to 
be an objective, disinterested and rather esoteric field, in fact functions to serve 
political ends.  Implicit in Orientalist scholarship is the philosophical means through 
which Europeans could take over Oriental lands.  Imperial administrators like Lord 
Curzon, a Viceroy of India, agreed that the products of this scholarship endowed 
administrators with a comfortable sense of “familiarity, not merely with the languages 
of the people of the East but with their customs, their feelings, their traditions, their 
history, and religion.”  Such knowledge provided “the sole basis upon which we are 
likely to be able to maintain in the future the position we have won” (Said, 1994, p 
118).  Second, that Orientalism helped define Europe’s self-image – “It has less to do 
with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world” (Said, 1994, p 147).   The construction of 
identity in every age and every society, Said maintains, involves establishing 
opposites and “Others.”  This occurs because “the development and maintenance of 
every culture require the existence of another different and competing alter ego” 
(Said, 1994, p 153).   Orientalism led the West to see Islamic culture as static and 
inert in both time and place, and this in turn gave Europe a sense of its own cultural 
and intellectual superiority.  Consequently the West saw itself as a dynamic, 
innovative, expanding culture, as well as “the spectator, the judge and jury of every 
facet of Oriental behavior” (Said, 1994, p 87).  Third, Said argues that Orientalism 
has produced a false description of Arabs and Islamic culture.  This happened 
primarily because of the essentialist nature of the enterprise – that is, the belief that it 
was possible to define the essential qualities of Arab peoples and Islamic culture 
and, furthermore, these qualities were seen in uniformly negative terms.  The Orient 
was defined as a place isolated from the mainstream of human progress in the 
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 sciences, arts and commerce, and was, in a sense, colonized metaphorically through 
characterizations of “its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, 
its habit of inaccuracy, its backwardness” (Said, 1994, p 203).     
 
Where this approach first goes wrong, Said believes, is in its belief that there could 
be such a thing as an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche.  No one 
today, he points out, would dare talk about blacks or Jews using such essentialist 
clichés.  Where Orientalism goes even further astray, he claims, is its anachronistic 
assumption that Islam has possessed a unity since the 7th century, which can be 
read, via the Koran, into every facet of, for instance, modern Egyptian or Algerian 
society.  In addition the notion that Muslims suffer a form of arrested development is 
not only false and infantilizing, but also ignores more recent and important influences 
such as the experience of colonialism, imperialism and fundamentalist regimes.  
 
The faults of Orientalism, moreover, have not been confined to analyses of the 
Orient. Said claims there have been counterparts in “similar knowledges” constructed 
about Native Americans and Africans where there is a chronic tendency to deny, 
suppress, or distort their systems of thought in order to maintain the fiction of 
scholarly disinterest.  In other words, Said presents his work not only as an 
examination of European attitudes to Islam and the Arabs but also as a model for 
analysis of all Western discourses on the “Other.”  
 
Said himself acknowledges that his critique is a synthesis and elaboration of two 
separate theses.  One was an analysis that emerged among a number of Muslim 
academics working in Europe in the 1960s.  Said cites the Coptic socialist author 
Anwar Abdel Malek, who developed his ideas in France using the then-latest Parisian 
translations of Freudian and Marxist theory.  Malek accuses the Orientalists of being 
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 “Europocentric,” of failing to pay enough attention to Arab scholars like himself, of 
being obsessed with the past, and of stamping all Orientals with “a constitutive 
otherness, of an essentialist character.”  This essentialist conception of the peoples 
of the Orient, Malek wrote, expresses itself through an “ethnist typology” that will 
soon proceed “towards racism.”  The other source of Said’s inspiration derived from 
the writing of Michel Foucault, especially his notion that academic disciplines do not 
simply produce knowledge but also generate power.  Said uses Foucault to argue 
that Orientalism helped produce European imperialism:  “No more glaring parallel 
exists,” Said argues, “between power and knowledge in the modern history of 
philology than in the case of Orientalism” (1994, p 23).  He also borrowed from 
Foucault the notion of a “discourse,” the ideological framework within which 
scholarship takes place.  Within a discourse, all representations are tainted by the 
language, culture, institutions, and political qualities of the represented.  Hence, Said 
argues, there can be no “truths,” only formations or deformations, yet a “correct” or 
“true” position exists.  No scholar or writer can rise above these limitations, and Said 
cites the “towering figure” of Louis Massignon who dominated French Orientalism 
until the 1960s, advocating “a kind of system for producing certain kinds of 
statements, disseminated into the large mass of discursive formations that together 
make up the archive, or cultural material of his time” (1994, p 127).     
 
Today, twenty-five years after his work was first published, Said is still widely 
regarded within cultural studies not only as one of the founders of the post-colonial 
movement in criticism, but as one of its chief authorities.  Other works such as Peter 
Hulme’s Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1979 (1986), 
Tzvetan Todorov’s The Conquest of America (1988), Y. Mudimbe’s The Invention of 
Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge, and Peter Mason’s 
Deconstruction of America: Representation of the Other (1990) have followed in 
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 Said’s stead yet have not had as powerful an impact on the field.  This is not to 
suggest that Said’s work has gone unchallenged.  Writing which was inspired by, but 
also critical of, Said has drawn on psychoanalysis in the case of Homi Bhahba and 
feminist deconstruction in the case of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.   
 
In The Location of Culture (1994), Bhahba contributes to the critical discussion of the 
post-colonial by contesting the underlying presupposition of Orientalism that all 
power and knowledge function ambivalently and that a variously positioned colonial 
object mimics the terms of the dominant ideology and uses them to offer resistance.  
Bhabha’s theory has, at face value, double attraction.  He liberates the colonized 
from their “inscription as Europe’s shackled other” and recognizes that the colonized 
subject can, indeed, speak for him- or herself.  Bhabha sets some limits on critical 
discursive power and problematizes the position of the scholar or post-colonial critic 
vis-à-vis the formerly colonized.  He argues for the irreducibility of the analysis of 
colonial subjectivity to any single theoretical paradigm.  At fault, according to Bhabha, 
is Said’s construction of a delimiting binarial opposite of colonizer and colonized 
about which normalizing theories can be produced without concern for even a 
modicum of differentiation.  As a result, Bhahba argues, Said’s reading of Orientalism 
is no less monolithic than the Eurocentric West that created and internalized it. 
 
Indian-born, United States-based Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak provides an anti-
foundationalist critique of the concept of the colonial “subaltern” subject.  Originally a 
term for subordinates in military hierarchies, the term subaltern is elaborated in the 
work of socialist theorist Antonio Gramsci to refer to groups who are outside the 
established structures of political representation.  In "Can the Subaltern Speak?” 
(1988), Spivak suggests that the subaltern is denied access to both mimetic and 
political forms of representation.  The title of her article was intended to encourage 
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 but also criticize the efforts of the subaltern studies group, a project led by Ranajit 
Guha that expropriated Gramsci's term subaltern in order to locate and re-establish a 
"voice" or collective locus of agency in post-colonial India.  Although Spivak 
acknowledges the "epistemic violence" done upon Indian subalterns, she suggests 
that any attempt from the outside to ameliorate their condition by granting them 
collective speech invariably will encounter the following problems.  First, that it will 
create a logocentric assumption of cultural solidarity among a heterogeneous people, 
and second, that such endeavours only serve to foster dependence upon Western 
intellectuals to "speak for" the subaltern condition rather than allowing them to speak 
for themselves.  Spivak focuses on the figure of the subaltern South Asian woman, 
whose contradictory situation, characterized by native patriarchal authority and 
British colonialism, instanced in the history of sati (widow-burning), exists in a 
shadowy grey area between Self and Other of post-colonial discourse.  By speaking 
out and reclaiming a collective cultural identity from within, Spivak argues that 
subalterns have the potential to re-inscribe their subordinate position in society and 
redefine those boundaries without the help of self-interested representatives from the 
outside. 
 
Spivak’s nativist perspective was influenced by the works of Léopold Sédar Senghor, 
Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral.  Senghor’s philosophies of negritude stand as a 
highly influential example of black essentialist or nativist theory.  His beliefs are 
clearly articulated in a speech he gave to the first Festival of African Arts in Dakar in 
1966.  At the time, he had been president of Senegal for the first six years of its 
independence from France.  In his speech he outlines the distinctiveness and value 
of a racialised black African culture, believing that Africa has much in common with 
the philosophical, scientific and modernist aesthetic innovations of modern Europe 
and so does not exist in opposition.  At the same time, Senghor venerated the 
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 “essential” values of African culture, such as collectivity, dialogue and humanism, for 
their potential to solve global conflict and introduce an alternative and compassionate 
world view (Senghor, 1994, p 37-42).   
 
Frantz Fanon, the Martiniquan-born psychiatrist and activist for the Algerian National 
Liberation Front, composed his influential essay “On national culture” in 1959.  It was 
originally delivered to the Second Congress of Black Artists and Writers in Rome and 
later published in his book The Wretched of the Earth in 1961.  Among Fanon’s most 
salient points is his attack on negritude as a concept for its internalization of 
racialised and colonialist propaganda disguised as affirmation of the African people.  
Though keen to seek the growth of a “national” consciousness and to reclaim 
“culture,” Fanon is critical of the normalizing effect of referring to an indivisible Africa 
(1994, p 22-29).  Fanon's longer collection of essays Black Skin White Masks (1967) 
situates language and the body at the centre of the black predicament of 
marginalization, pathologization and servitude.  “A man who has a language,” Fanon 
suggests, “consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by that 
language” (1967, p 17).  In the context of the French-Algerian war, Fanon laments 
the fact that the French language assumed a certain privilege over the “jabber” of 
native dialects.  The native bourgeoisie, as Fanon argues, undermines the workings 
of revolution by coveting the agency ensured by the ability to speak the language of 
the colonial bourgeoisie.  To Fanon, the assimilation and valorization of the French 
language underscores the native intellectual's complicity with the “mother” country 
that uses language as an instrument to subordinate colonized subjects and legitimate 
its comparative privilege. 
 
Amilcar Cabral, agronomist and Secretary-General of the African Party for the 
Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, presents an interestingly 
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 contrasting theory of culture’s role in national liberation movements.  Cabral was 
particularly interested in the differences between French and Portuguese forms of 
colonialism, as well as historical and political differences between resistance 
movements of Algeria and Guinea-Bissau.  His observations formed the basis of a 
paper originally delivered in 1970 at Syracuse University in New York.  Whereas 
Fanon argues that it is “the people,” Cabral argues that it is “popular culture” that 
forms the basis of the anti-colonial movement.  In Cabral’s view, culture continues 
throughout the period of domination where colonialism is never absolute and 
colonialism’s cultural hegemony does not extend to the subaltern classes beyond the 
metropole (1994, p 41-52). 
 
As evidenced in the writings of Bhabha, Spivak, Senghor, Fanon and Cabral, the field 
of post-colonial studies encompasses a large range of opinions and perspectives, 
shaped by colonial and neo-colonial experience at the hands of French, British or 
Portuguese colonizers, in continental Asia, Africa, the Middle East or the Caribbean.  
As a result, the field, though hardly heterogeneous is perhaps united by the force of 
its multiple and contradictory views.  Yet whether speaking of the subaltern, the 
African or the Oriental, from the position of colonial privilege or of impoverishment, 
and viewing the impact of colonialism as either absolute or stratified according to 
socio-economic and/or geo-political factors, the stage remains set with the dialectics 
of Self and Other.  Post-colonial critique is, by its very nature, contained within the 
confines of colonial opposites even if its purpose is to confront and deconstruct those 
paradigms.  To speak for, against or from the position of the Other is complicated by 
the specificities of culture, class, geography, language, literacy, economics, gender 
and empowerment and by one’s ability to dissociate one’s native knowledge and 
experience from that of the colonizer.  The process of unlearning and learning one’s 
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 voice is forever in flux, yet being heard so often demands that one be absolute and 
unchanging in one’s views. 
 
Post-colonialist critique has not always been easily absorbed or accommodated by 
all disciplines. Said despairs of “the norm in all cultural and scientific disciplines” to 
regard the colonial experience as “quite irrelevant” (Said, 1983, p 62).   Asad 
counters that this irrelevance stems from a power imbalance of which colonialism is 
merely “one historical moment” (1973, p 16).   This imbalance does not simply refer 
to the West’s imagined unrestricted access to the non-West but also refers to those 
who control the dissemination of information.  The West did not simply occupy the 
countries it colonized, but influenced how the colonies viewed themselves and were 
received by the outside.  Such control over a people and the mechanisms for 
broadcasting their existence to the rest of the world not only generates a certain kind 
of essentialized understanding, but also re-enforces perceived inequalities between 
the European and non-European worlds.  In objectifying its subject, anthropology 
existed in a reciprocal relationship with colonialism.  Colonialism made the “object of 
anthropological study safe – because it sustained physical proximity between the 
observing European and the living non-European” (Asad, 1973, p 17).  
Simultaneously, anthropology supported colonial imperatives by presenting the 
colonized as “simple,” “backward,” “primitive” and “savage” peoples living without the 
benefits of civilization, inscribing these perceived inequalities through language, 
ideology and doctrine, and using these inequalities systematically to justify the upper 
hand.   
 
3.3 Dance Anthropology and Ethnology 
In October 1975, the fourth Congress on Research in Dance (CORD) conference 
was held in San Francisco.  The focus of the conference was a new discipline, dance 
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 anthropology.  In an article on the conference proceedings published in Current 
Anthropology, Hanna reports that the event, attended by the largest number of dance 
anthropologists in the history of the organization, “symbolized the emergence of a 
new field.”  Furthermore, clearly enthused by the meeting of minds, she reflects that 
the discipline was “grappling with the crucial epistemological and methodological 
issues” related to the “growing pains of a relatively new area of concentration” 
(Hanna, 1975, p 446).  Though Hanna does not provide details of these 
epistemological and methodological issues, one can only assume that they were in 
part related to the issues affecting social and cultural anthropology at the time.  The 
advent of post-colonial as well as feminist theory heralded systematic repositioning. 
The ethics of studying Other cultures as well as one’s own without regard for issues 
of class, socio-economic factors and gender became problematic throughout 
Western academia.  At the same time, dance studies was fighting for recognition and 
its rightful place alongside other more established disciplines.  In this sense the move 
towards hybridization or the creation of a sub-field could only invite questions about 
standards and rigour from critics.  As it turned out, critics existed within and without 
the field. 
 
Fifteen years later, dance anthropology and dance anthropologists were gaining 
entrance to North American and European university dance departments – an 
indication of its professional status, according to Evans-Pritchard.  Writing at the 
time, American dance anthropologist Adrienne Kaeppler summarizes ongoing 
developments in the field.  She notes the “gulf” that separates the American and 
European schools of dance anthropology with regard to questions of approach that 
are folklorist on one side of the Atlantic and anthropological on the other.   She also 
discusses the debate about dance anthropology or dance ethnology, stating that 
“American anthropologists of human movement are by definition also dance 
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 ethnologists, but not vice versa” (Kaeppler, 1991 p 16).  She disagrees that the 
contributions of dance studies pioneer Gertrude Prokosch Kurath to the field from the 
1930s onwards influenced the generation of dance anthropologists (those with 
training in the four fields of anthropology who are engaged at macro and micro levels 
of analysis) and ethnologists (those without such training who are focussed on the 
movement and are less inclined or less prepared to confront the larger socio-cultural 
dimensions) who rose to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in North America.  
Instead she looks to the development of anthropology in America from Boasian and 
Herskovitzian roots that emphasize cultural relativism and a system that values 
“socially constructed movement systems, the activities that generate them, how and 
by whom they are judged, and how they can assist in understanding society” 
(Kaeppler, 1991, p 16).   
 
A decade later, issues of derivation are perhaps less explicit, but concerns about 
approach and rigour still characterize much of the criticism within the field.  Despite 
the differences of approach that have traditionally divided the field between North 
America and Europe, Buckland and American anthropologist Drid Williams, lecturer 
and founder of the Journal for the Anthropological Study of Human Movement, are in 
agreement with regard to the lack of academic rigour and careful use of 
anthropological theory in dance anthropology.  In recent contributions to the field, 
Buckland sees a trend towards borrowing from other disciplines with little or no 
regard for the provenance of the theories in their native disciplines and in particular, a 
tendency towards employing ethnographic tools without actually performing 
ethnography in its strictest sense.1  Buckland praises Keallinihomoku’s seminal 
essay “An Anthropologist Looks at Ballet as a Form of Ethnic Dance” (1969) for 
establishing that dance as a cultural practice “should be valued according to the 
aesthetics of indigenous communities” and Kaeppler, for her foresight to distinguish 
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 that the necessary purpose of dance anthropology was not the application of cultural 
theory to dance but the acquisition of knowledge of society through its movement 
systems (Buckland, 1999, p 4-5, 8).  Williams, in her criticism of the field, speaks 
more plainly: 
  
I also point out that “dance anthropology” or “dance ethnology” … is 
little more than a convenient excuse for field studies carried out by 
students who, although they have received degrees in dance 
education, performance studies, or whatever, are innocent of 
anthropological or ethnological training. 
Williams, 2004, p 14. 
 
 
It is certainly true that in American and Canadian academia such transgressions 
have occurred and that recent examples such as those cited by Buckland, including 
Helena Wulff’s ethnographic monograph Ballet Across Borders: Career and Culture 
in the World of Ballet (1998) do little to alleviate concern.  The sense that in 
combining two disciplines the resulting field could only be strengthened by its joint 
inheritance has proved, for Buckland and Williams at least, to be frustratingly 
inaccurate. 
 
With these issues in mind, I turn to five works within dance anthropology and dance 
ethnology that employ ethnographic techniques with varying success but have 
bearing on the present discussion of trance.  Discussed in order of publication, they 
are Jane Cowan’s Dance and the Body Politic in Northern Greece (1990), Marcia B. 
Siegel’s “Liminality in Balinese Dance” (1991), Sally Ann Ness’ Body, Movement and 
Culture: Kinesthetic and Visual Symbolism in a Philippine Community (1992) and 
Judy Van Zile’s Perspectives on Korean Dance (2001).  All examples take as their 
subject matter, dance and movement genres outside of the West.  The final dance 
ethnography to be considered is Cynthia Novack’s Sharing the Dance: Contact 
Improvisation and American Culture (1990).   
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 In Dance and the Body Politic in Northern Greece, Cowan focuses on how gender 
politics are articulated through the social dance practices and life events of the 
inhabitants of the mid-sized town of Sohos in northern Greece.  Following the 
Boasian model, Cowan describes the community’s history, its geographic, 
commercial, political and class-based characteristics before turning to issues related 
to social interaction within the community.  Through the organization of public and 
private spaces and the social practices of eating, drinking, talking, gifting [sic] and 
dancing, Cowan is able to project the codes of gender ideology that dominate Sohos’ 
sphere of influence.   
 
Cowan explores how gender politics play out in three occasions for social interaction 
through dance:  the traditional wedding procession, the “Europeanized” formal 
evening dances hosted by local civic associations and private parties.  The goal in all 
three situations is the arousal of kefi.  Deriving from the Turkish, keyif or keyfi, kefi in 
Cowan’s work is translated simply as “high spirits” (1990, p 249) that are attained 
through collective celebration and communal well-being.  Further research would 
suggest, however, that this term might not be so easily defined.  Journalist Nick 
Mamatas in his review of Charles and Angeliki Vellou Kiel’s book Bright Balkan 
Morning: Romani Lives and the Power of Music in Greek Macedonia (2002), is less 
certain that kefi can be translated: 
 
kefi is a virtually untranslatable term, though the authors make a game 
but unsatisfactory attempt with "deep satisfaction." Too communal and 
internal to be ecstasy (which requires getting "out" of something), too 
self-conscious to be bliss, and too transcendent to be simple 
enjoyment, kefi is the shedding of … worries that consume the people 
of the rural Balkans ... The deep pain of being refugees, victims of 
ancient empires and modern wars, is all subsumed into the group 
dance. In the state of kefi, personal and collective pleasures are 
identical. 
 
Mamatas, website, 2003. 
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 Like the concept of duende2 within flamenco culture, in Greek social dance and 
interaction the idea of kefi summarizes intangible qualities and feelings that 
accompany the dance and that are acknowledged by the community as being part of 
its intended purpose.  The difficulty in defining the term does not deny its existence, 
which might lead to speculation that its existence and manifestation has been 
naturalized.  Yet such arguments would be unlikely to sway the inhabitants of Sohos 
for whom kefi is real.  In this way, it is, as will be discussed in a later chapter, no 
different than Csikszentmihalyi’s argument that Flow is as real as the experience of 
hunger.  If the purpose of ethnographic research is to gain insight as to how the 
indigenous population assigns and negotiates its own systems of meaning and belief, 
then kefi must be acknowledged. 
 
Cowan’s work has been criticized by dance scholar Susan Foster for its lack of any 
comprehensive description or analysis of movement patterns, steps or choreographic 
structures in Sohoian dance.  Foster also sees that one of the work’s strengths is the 
emphasis Cowan places on inherent conflict and contradictions that accompany 
social interaction through dance, preventing the accounts from becoming static and 
invariable (Foster, 1992, p 364-365).  The impression Cowan provides is that, while 
the dance remains physically undefined, it is a living, changing entity that brings both 
cohesion and discord.  The fact that the movement is not defined and that the notion 
of kefi is intangible neither alters the significance of the dancing nor diminishes the 
participants’ experience of the movement, themselves or their community.  Recalling 
Wittgenstein, even an indefinite impression is still an impression and, in this case, 
one that is appropriate to the sociocultural factors at play. 
 
Siegel is not an anthropologist but is engaged in ethnology through her analysis of 
the cultural dimensions of Balinese dance, in particular the legong form, and its basis 
 108
 for discussions of liminality.  Siegel draws from the work of British anthropologist 
Victor Turner and his treatment of liminality and its properties as described in A Ritual 
Process (1969), “Liminal to Liminoid in Play, Flow, Ritual” in From Ritual to Theatre 
(1982, p 20-60), “Are there universals of performance in myth, ritual and drama?” in 
By means of Performance (1990, p 8-18) and elsewhere.  According to Siegel’s 
reading of Turner, liminality is the “state of being or the boundary between two 
worlds, where change can happen or magic forces can penetrate the normal 
defences we erect against them” (1991, p 85).  Liminality plays a role in Balinese 
trance dances and masked performances where, through the medium of the dance 
and the ritualized setting, dancers enter into a psychosocial realm between the 
earthly and spirit worlds.  Once attained, the dancer is acknowledged to have been 
possessed by spirits and through possession acquires special physical and psychic 
powers as well as certain privileges that would be neither accessible nor permissible 
were he or she not in this liminal space.  Through liminality, dancers are permitted to 
experiment, criticize, “make mischief,” take on other personalities and to prophesy 
and heal (Siegel, 1991, p 85). 
 
In focussing on such an aspect of legong performance Siegel argues that it is 
possible for non-Balinese observers to gain a deeper understanding of the culture, 
including the function that such ritualized behaviour serves and the values attributed 
to the performers and the performances by the indigenous participants.  Siegel does 
not make culturally relativist statements per se, but she is critical of a tendency in 
dance writing to create a sense that dance forms are fixed and/or canonical.  In so 
doing, the treatment fails to convey a diversity of approach or grounds for 
differentiation.  She argues that “for the sake of clarifying general concepts and 
categories, many performances are synthesized into a typical One.”  Instead, it may 
be those “idiosyncratic particulars” that are glossed over for purposes of being 
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 definitive, that if carefully examined and deconstructed could provide significant 
insight as to how dance and movement figure in the larger cultural context (Siegel, 
1991 p 86). 
 
Siegel emphasizes that there is value in the minutiae of dance performance and that 
the psychosocial dimension of the performance from both the perspective of the 
dancer and the audience is critical to building a cohesive analysis of any 
performance.   Her use of Turner’s theory of liminality brings into focus the changing 
nature of the dancer’s relationship to herself, to her performance space and to her 
observers.  Liminality, though it has figured in other treatments of non-Western dance 
forms (for example, in Scheer on Butoh, 2001; Dandekar on Odissi, 1998; and 
Dobbin on Jombee dance, 1987) has seen infrequent application in Western dance 
forms.  However, liminality has been explored extensively in Western theatre and 
performance studies both in terms of genre and individual texts (for example, in 
Bruster on early modern drama, 2004; Fann Bouteneff on Greek theatre, 1992; and 
Schechter in Shakespeare’s King Lear, 1997).  The potential exists to explore the 
concept of liminality through both Western dance practices and specific 
performances. 
 
Ness’ Movement and Culture: Kinesthetic and Visual Symbolism in a Philippine 
Community focuses on three forms of sinulog dancing as practiced in Cebu City in 
the Philippines: tindera sinulog, a healing ritual performed primarily by candle sellers; 
sinulog in troupe form, performed as a dance drama; and sinulog in parade form, 
performed as a exhibition to celebrate cultural affinity and identity.  A professor of 
anthropology at the University of California, Riverside, Ness’ work was received as a 
“major addition to ethnographic writing about the body, movement and dance, 
successfully treating them not as abstractions but as centrally important creative 
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 vehicles through which many levels of cultural life can be perceived and understood” 
(Novack, 1993, p 95).  Ness analyzes patterns of movement, use of the body and the 
shaping of space common to each sinulog form.   
 
Her analysis focuses on the kinaesthetic and visual elements present in the dances 
that both contribute to and draw from an individual’s sense of self, religious beliefs 
and practices and the complex post-colonial influences that define relationships of 
power.  In her work, Ness sees herself as a “choreographic ethnographer,” 
combining her training as a dancer with her schooling as an anthropologist.  The act 
of learning another culture’s dance forms, its physical meanings and socio-cultural 
resonances, is for Ness a process of embodiment – in the same way that she might 
learn or create a piece of choreography that asks her body to move in new and 
unfamiliar ways (1992, p 10-11). 
 
The ritual sinulog in particular is an expression of interior feelings and a personal 
dialogue with Santo Ninõ, the Holy Child King to whom the tindera’s (“candle seller”) 
prayers are directed.  As Ness describes, this form of sinulog was not intended for 
visual impact from the point of view of an observer – since in fact, no observer was 
required to complete the ritual.  It is a dance that is “meant to be felt, not observed.  
Its symbolism was internally oriented, concerned with the dynamics of an interior 
landscape only vaguely manifest.  It was not about making the invisible visible” 
(Ness, 1992, p 92).  Ness gleans this information through detailed observation of the 
tinderas “at work” who otherwise go unnoticed since they are so much a part of the 
landscape of Cebu City.  Her observations were then extended by interviews with the 
tindera clients seeking intercession and with the dancers themselves.  Together 
these two methods formed an impression of the meaning and significance of the 
tindera practice to the dancers and to their community.  Perhaps then Ness’ most 
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 noteworthy contribution to dance ethnography is the articulation and analysis of an 
interior phenomenon that, while not intended for show, is both discernible and 
culturally significant. 
 
Van Zile’s Perspectives on Korean Dance represents the first comprehensive 
English-language study of Korean dance.  Explorations of specific dances and 
dancers illustrate how Korean dance functions as an expression of cultural identity.  
Van Zile explores how specific forms of Korean dance have been modified and 
reinvented as a result of cross-cultural influence‚ colonialism, governmental 
sponsorship and intervention, and the need to retain cultural identity through dance 
among the diasporic Korean community.   
 
One of Van Zile’s subjects is the shamanistic or kut form of Korean dance.  
Shamanism has been a part of Korean culture for centuries and despite the influence 
and absorption of foreign belief systems, remains central to Korean spiritualism to the 
present day.  Traditional kut rituals are still performed in private in both modern 
metropolises and rural villages.  Like the tindera sinulog, kut is performed when 
contact is needed with the spirits to pay respects, appease ancestors, heal the sick 
or to gain favour.  The shaman or manshin is paid to perform the ritual that will 
accomplish the intended goal.   
 
In recent years, kut choreography and rituals have been performed in formal 
theatrical settings as forms of entertainment without need for communication with the 
spirits.  From a government perspective, such performances pay homage to 
traditional culture without jeopardizing Korea’s status as a modern, progressive 
nation.  Regardless of context, the shaman/dancer is expected to perform with a view 
to authenticity of feeling and intention.  Even when communication with the spirit 
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 world on behalf of a client is not the goal, the structured movement of the ritual is a 
kind of “balancing pole to enter into a particular state of being as well as to reflect 
that a particular state of being has been achieved.”  As such, Van Zile observes that 
in this non-traditional setting both “correct feelings lead to correct movements” and 
“correct movements lead to correct feelings” (2001, p 150).  Even in the absence of a 
direct spiritual rationale for the ritualized movements, in these performances the 
shaman may still attain or exhibit signs of an altered state of consciousness.  
 
Finally, unlike the four preceding examples, Novack’s Sharing the Dance 
demonstrates how a dance practice within Western culture can form the basis of 
ethnographic study.  Novack considers the development of contact improvisation 
from its roots in 1960s New York to cities across America and Canada in the 
following decade.  She examines the historical, social and cultural contexts that gave 
rise to the form as well as the impact that contact improvisation has had within 
society and its connections to trends in popular music, art and social dance.  
Originated by postmodern choreographers such as Steve Paxton, contact 
improvisation became both a movement form and socio-cultural movement rooted in 
experimentation, collective rapport, egalitarianism of genders and abilities, and 
freedom of expression.  
 
Alongside these key aspects that combine to create a “picture” of a group and its web 
of influence, Novack is equally concerned with the movements and what they 
themselves convey.  She discusses the politics and ethics of touch, sensuality, 
sexuality, spontaneity and authority as they are actualized by the dancers and 
revealed to those watching and/or waiting to join in.  Like Ness, Novack uses her own 
experience of embodiment to guide and ground her observations about the 
movement.  In her “Summary of Movement Style,” Novack articulates the range of 
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 colouring and dynamic images that contribute to contact improvisation’s distinctive 
movement style and “core movement values” (Lepczyk in Novack, 1990, p 115).  
These values include generating movement through changing points of contact 
between bodies, moving sequentially and in different directions simultaneously, 
“sensing through the skin,” making use of the full kinesphere, informality of 
presentation, a natural approach to performance where the dancer is a just a person 
and a sense of just “letting the dance happen.”  In addition, Novack discusses 
“experiencing movement from the inside” where the dancer’s inward focus takes 
precedence over shaping the body in space (Novack, 1990, p 115-124).  In her own 
experience learning contact improvisation, this self-reflexive gaze led her to lose 
track of time, to experience an “internalised sensation of moving,” to not pay attention 
to what her movement looked like, but to be concentrated on what her body was 
feeling (Novack, 1990, p 152).  Though these feelings are not corroborated by 
testimony from other contact improvisers, Novack suggests that this is one of the 
goals of the form. 
 
 
3.4 Dancers’ testimonies & body therapies 
 
Once I get on stage it's like I go into a different place.  I don't feel my 
body, I don't feel my legs, my arms - I don't feel anything.  I totally 
erase my mind; I'm not thinking about anything.  I do things that I 
would never believe that I could do but I do them ... It’s just like your 
heart and your soul is [sic] completely open and you're just 
communicating with the audience somehow and you're talking to them 
through the dancing.  It’s like someone from up here [gestures 
upwards] is using me as a puppet and I don't really have… [trails off] 
Sometimes I finish the performance and I say [to myself] what the hell 
have I done? 
 
Corella in Kinberg & Nimerichter, 2002. 
 
 
There have been certain moments on the stage where I suddenly had 
a feeling of completeness … I felt like a total being …it was a feeling 
of I am. At those moments I had the sense of being universal…but not 
in any specific form. 
Bruhn in Gruen, 1986, p 33. 
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When I'm in the studio, when I'm warm, when I'm what people call 
improvising… That’s when I'm in a certain state where the cerebral 
powers are turned off, and the body just goes according to directive … 
it's at those times that I feel a very special connection to... [trails off] I 
feel the most right. I don't want to become too mystic about this, but 
things feel as though they're in the best order at that particular 
moment.  
 
It's a short period. It lasts, at maximum, an hour. I pay a very great 
price to be able to maintain that. But – I use the same phrase over and 
over again – it is that hour that tells me who I am. 
 
Tharp, website, 1993. 
 
 
Descriptions of trance-like experiences are shared between dancers post-
performance, appear in interviews and autobiographical material and inform the 
goals for image-driven bodywork techniques aimed at performance enhancement.   
For professional ballet and contemporary dancers these moments stand out from the 
regular routine of training, rehearsing and performing so much that the feelings and 
qualities they evoke warrant discussion.  There are dancers who count on them as 
part of their performance process while for others they remain elusive.  Some 
dancers claim never to have had these “magical” moments while simultaneously 
acknowledging their existence.    
 
First-person descriptions of ballet and contemporary dancers’ performance 
experiences onstage are frequently presented as evidence of dancers’ “special” 
status as performing artists.  As related in interview transcripts or biographies, 
accounts appear in the absence of objective commentary.  In this way, accounts can 
too easily be perceived as indicative of society’s perception that dancers – like 
thoroughbred racehorses – are highly attuned, highly strung individuals who practice 
a respected but rarefied art form.  Little thought is given to how these liminal 
experiences punctuate a dancer’s career, how or when they manifest themselves 
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 and how they might compare to similarly described events in other settings or other 
cultures.   
 
Recognition of trance-like experience in this setting and its significance to dancers is 
acknowledged, however, within the field of dance pedagogy.  Director of the Institute 
for Imaginative Movement Pedagogy in Wetzikon, Switzerland and a former ballet 
dancer, Eric Franklin has written several books and papers aimed at achieving the 
highest levels of dance performance through the use of imagery or ideokinesiology.  
In Franklin’s experience, “sometimes a dancer has the perfect experience in a dance 
class.  He may describe it as effortless motion, kinetic flow, physicality, total body 
awareness, wholeness, oneness, connectedness, inspiration, a feeling of beauty, 
fluid breath, luminosity, clarity, joy in motion, or total freedom” (Franklin, 1996a, p.3).  
Franklin encourages the use of mental imagery to enhance performance and counts 
Mabel Todd, Barbara Clark, Lulu Sweigard, Irene Dowd, Andre Bernard, Joan 
Skinner, Glenna Batson, Martha Eddy, and Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, among his 
colleagues and predecessors who have developed the practice and extended its 
principles (Myers in Franklin, 1996a, p vi).   
 
Though she does not offer any theories on how one might achieve heightened 
experience, Sherry Shapiro in her 1999 book Pedagogy and the Politics of the Body: 
A Critical Praxis, acknowledges the existence of trance-like experience in 
contemporary dance.  In an effort to understand how “dancers make sense of their 
own existence” (Shapiro, 1999, p 106), Shapiro conducted a series of interviews with 
three young women in a graduate modern dance program.  In the course of her 
research she discovered that for these dancers, “the body [does] not merely mediate 
the world, it “takes flight” as the vehicle through which transcendence, freedom and 
meaning become experienced.  In short, [the body] grounds an ecstatic mode of 
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 being” (Shapiro, 1999, p 107).  While neither Franklin nor Shapiro use the word 
trance they are nevertheless, in their capacity as teachers, concerned with 
performance potential and the role of the artist in society respectively so that their 
work does situate trance-like experiences within a larger cultural framework. 
Buckland’s praise for Keallinihomoku and for Kaeppler mentioned earlier, needs to 
be revisited.  Establishing that dance as a cultural practice “should be valued 
according to the aesthetics of indigenous communities” (Kealiinohomoku, 1984), and 
that the necessary purpose of dance anthropology is the acquisition of knowledge 
about society through its movement systems (Kaeppler, 1991), provides a means of 
situating dancers’ testimonies in regards to trance-like behaviour, and thus a 
foundation for this research, emerges.  While trance is not indigenous to 
contemporary dance or the larger social sphere, knowledge can be gleaned through 
its absence in these movement systems.  It is in this way akin to an analysis of 
positive and negative space where the positive space is that which is occupied by 
contemporary dancers, their culture, community and codes of behaviour reinforced 
from within but also from the greater society that defines and reveres their place.  
The negative space within this constellation of stakeholders and participants is that 
which is absent, in this case, the attribution of trance behaviour.  Again, this entails 
paying attention to what is not said as much as what is said.   
 
From the five examples of dance ethnography discussed earlier, precedents for 
grounding and framing a study of trance-like experience in ballet and contemporary 
dance based in ethnologic principles emerge.  From Cowan, the importance of 
thoroughly comprehending the historical, geographical, commercial, political and 
class- and gender-based issues that contextualizes the group under study, as well as 
acknowledging and exploring that which cannot be comprehensively defined but 
nonetheless forms a palpable subtext for the community being studied.  From Siegel, 
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 both the need to pay attention to “idiosyncratic particulars” and to value the role 
liminality plays in the performance.  From Ness and Novack, recognition that what is 
projected by or realized through the body in certain contexts and for particular 
movement forms is secondary to interior experience and kinaesthetic embodiment.  
From Ness, her role as a “choreographic ethnographer,” where her training as a 
dancer and her schooling as an anthropologist allow her to respond to a dance form’s 
physicality in order to ascertain its socio-cultural resonances, and the distinction that 
something experienced as real and important by the dancer need not happen in the 
presence of an audience.  From Van Zile, the possibility that a dance form, 
transferred to a secular setting where its intended spiritual function is removed, can 
still engender changes in states of consciousness through the movement alone.  And 
from Novack, that a dance form created and practiced within the West can offer such 
rich possibilities for ethnographic study including the recognition of core movement 
values that emphasize interior experience.  These examples also demonstrate the 
need to situate dance research with regard to a colonialist inheritance wherein issues 
of race, ethnicity, class and power are consistently recognized and explored. 
 
                                                
1  American historian Carolyn Steedman has deplored similar trends in working cross-
disciplinarily in history and cultural studies (Steedman, 1991/1993). 
 
2  The poet and playwright Garcia Lorca, from whom much inspiration has been taken 
for flamenco choreography, defines duende in this way:  “Duende is a power.  The 
duende is of the earth ... the dark sounds a struggle not a concept. The duende is 
not in the throat, it surges up from the soles of the feet. It is of blood, of ancient 
culture, of creative action. It calls one out” (Mainer, 1991, p 143). Additionally Lorca 
adds that “All over Andalusia the people speak constantly of Duende ... This 
mysterious power which everyone senses and no philosopher explains is, in sum, 
the spirit of the earth.”  To this, Spanish poet and philosopher Simone adds: 
“duende is silent, near-by, a pregnant overwhelming power ....  It is death, life and 
fate ....  Made visible it is huge, potent, patient, but less tolerant than anything the 
human will can grasp.  Duende is sweet bliss that will infiltrate the bloodstream like 
toxin (Mainer, 1991, p 56).  Duende is ultimately what flamenco dancers strive to 
educe and convey.  Writing on the emergence of flamenco in Andalusia, Bernard 
Leblon argues that duende is the ultimate goal: “The strings may be squeaky and 
worn, the voice cracked and hoarse — what counts here is not the pure and 
polished sound ... but outrageous expressivity, a sound too human to be heard 
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without total upheaval of one’s being, a heartrending cry that rips through the guts 
and transposes the listener to the sacred ecstasy of the duende” (Leblon, 1995, p 
21). 
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 INTRODUCTION Mapping the Field: A brief overview of the development of 
modern dance in Canada 
 
By the mid-1960s, the Canadian dance scene had expanded beyond the four major 
professional ballet companies – the National Ballet of Canada, Les Grands Ballets 
Canadiens, the Royal Winnipeg Ballet and Alberta Ballet – to include a number of 
modern troupes based in the country’s urban centres.  Three companies that 
appeared at this time and were to have a long-lasting impact were Winnipeg's 
Contemporary Dancers founded by Rachel Browne in 1964, Le Groupe de la Place 
Royale which emerged in Montréal under the co-direction of Jeanne Renaud and 
Peter Boneham in 1968, and Toronto Dance Theatre, created by Patricia Beatty, 
David Earle and Peter Randazzo also in 1968 (Wyman, 1978; Crabb, 2007a, 2007b; 
Bishop, 2007).  Like the established ballet companies, these new modern companies 
were intent on expanding their influence by creating schools and professional training 
programs alongside the nascent institutions (Tembeck, Odom & Fisher Stitt, 1997).  
Together the three companies contributed to a new wave of professional modern 
dance activity in Canada, coinciding with an intense period of international interest in 
dance as a form of abstract expression within a new social climate (Wyman, 1989; 
Crabb, 2003).1
 
The 1960s were a time of cultural and intellectual liberalization in much of the West, 
and Canada succeeded in shedding much of its prim, traditionalist reputation (Crabb 
& Jackson, 2007).  Contemporary dance began to attract more receptive audiences, 
new practitioners and new voices. The availability of public funding at the federal and 
increasingly at the provincial and regional levels also created opportunities and 
helped foster growth in the sector. Choreographers discovered the freedom to create 
works in which form surpassed narrative and where the non-literal and the abstract 
gradually garnered respect.  As in the case of ballet, Canadians initially looked to 
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 external influences – European and American – for modernist principles and 
inspiration (Oxenham & Crabb, 1977; Crabb & Jackson, 2007).  
 
Elizabeth Leese and Ruth Sorel, both exponents of the German school of 
ausdrucktanz (“dance of expression”), opened studios in Montréal in the early 1940s. 
Their work paved the way for Montréal dance artists who emerged during the cultural 
revitalization triggered by the publication of Le Refus Global (“Total Refusal”).  Le 
Refus Global was an anti-establishment and anti-religious manifesto released on 
August 9, 1948 by a group of sixteen young Québécois artists and intellectuals that 
called themselves Les Automatistes.2  The manifesto was instrumental in changing 
the artistic conditions in the city, making it more receptive to innovations in dance 
(Crabb & Jackson, 2007). 
 
Three of Montréal's modern dance pioneers, Renaud, Françoise Sullivan and 
Françoise Riopelle, were associated with the Refus Global movement.  Sullivan 
spent several years as a choreographer in the late 1940s and early 1950s, before 
turning to sculpture and painting, and then returning to choreography in the late 
1970s when she established a company of her own.3  In 1962, Renaud and Riopelle, 
after spending several years in Paris, founded a Montréal-based modern dance 
group which, in 1966, under Renaud and Boneham, a dancer from New York, 
became Le Groupe de la Place Royale.  The troupe developed a reputation as one of 
the country's most provocative dance experimenters and, since its move to Ottawa in 
1977, has continued as an incubator of innovative choreographic talent in Canada 
(Bishop, 2007).  
 
In Toronto, Bianca Rogge and Yone Kvietys, both from Eastern Europe, were 
pioneering exponents of modern dance.  In the early 1960s, one of Leese's former 
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 students, Nancy Lima Dent, joined with Rogge and Kvietys to produce Canada's first 
modern-dance festivals.  Later, Judy Jarvis, a Canadian student of Rogge’s, studied 
in Germany with ausdrucktanz specialist Mary Wigman.  On her return to Toronto 
Jarvis opened her own company which, through the 1970s, passed on the principles 
of the European school (Crabb & Jackson, 2007).  
 
American modern dance began to exert its influence in the mid-1960s when Patricia 
Beatty, who had studied in New York with Martha Graham and danced with Pearl 
Lang, returned to Toronto and founded the New Dance Group of Canada.  In 1968 
Beatty collapsed her company into the newly formed Toronto Dance Theatre, co-
directed with David Earle, a Canadian student of Graham and Peter Randazzo, an 
American who had danced in Graham's company.  Meanwhile, Rachel Browne, an 
American-born dancer who performed for several seasons with the Royal Winnipeg 
Ballet, recreated herself as a modern dancer and in 1965 founded Winnipeg's 
Contemporary Dancers as a modern dance repertory troupe, performing her own 
works as well as those of a variety of prominent American choreographers 
(Anderson, 1997; Jackson, 1997a, 1997b; Saxton & Cornell, 1998; Cauthery 2000).  
 
From 1970 onwards, dance departments began to emerge in a number of Canadian 
universities, bolstering performance training with studies in dance composition, 
history, theory, criticism, therapy and anthropology.  The first of these, founded by 
Grant Strate at York University in Toronto, was influential in shaping the future 
development of Canadian dance.  Many of its graduates, among them Christopher 
House, Carol Anderson, Holly Small, Jennifer Mascall, Tedd Senmon Robinson and 
Conrad Alexandrowicz, have moved on to important careers in contemporary 
creation and performance.  Other departments followed in Montréal, Vancouver and 
Calgary (Tembeck, Odom & Fisher Stitt, 1997; Crabb & Jackson, 2007). 
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In Toronto, popular contemporary troupes like the Danny Grossman Dance Company 
founded by a former Paul Taylor dancer and Desrosiers Dance Theatre led by former 
National Ballet of Canada dancer Robert Desrosiers, emerged in 1977 and 1980 
respectively.  Alongside these more theatrical companies, underground experimental 
groups such 15 Dance Lab – formed by “defectors” from the National Ballet, and 
Dancemakers – founded by the first graduating class from York University’s dance 
department in 1974 – challenged Toronto’s conservative image (Crabb 1997c, 
1997d, 1997e; Bowring, 1998). 
  
Meanwhile in Montréal, a definitive “scene” began to emerge led by Le Groupe de 
Nouvelle Aire.  Many of its former members, most notably Edouard Locke (now 
artistic director of LaLaLa Human Steps), Ginette Laurin (now artistic director of O 
Vertigo Danse), and Paul-André Fortier (now artistic director of Fortier Danse 
Créations) went on to gain prominence as renowned independent choreographers on 
the world stage.  Montréal's importance in the world of European-derived 
contemporary dance was symbolized by the launching of the ambitious Festival 
International de Nouvelle Danse in 1985 (Crabb & Jackson 2007).  
 
In 1973, the Dance in Canada Association (DICA) was established as an all-
embracing national service organization to create a sense of community and bring 
some focus to the variety of dance endeavours occurring across the country. 
Through its newsletters, magazine and annual conferences, which included an 
eclectic festival of performances, DICA sought to unite the community (Crabb, 2003).     
 
In the mid-1970s, The Canada Council for the Arts and similar provincial public 
funding bodies found their resources squeezed by a slumping economy and ever-
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 increasing demand for support.  The dance community that arguably could not have 
come into being without Canada Council funding now turned on its public patron, 
accusing it of favouritism, elitism, and trying to engineer the regional and aesthetic 
evolution of the art form (Smith, 2000, 2001).  DICA led the charge and became seen 
as the lobby group of the excluded and underprivileged.  In response, the eight 
"senior" institutions who receive organizational funding from the Council – the 
National Ballet of Canada, the Royal Winnipeg Ballet, Les Grands Ballets Canadiens, 
Alberta Ballet, Ballet British Columbia, Toronto Dance Theatre, the Danny Grossman 
Dance Company and Dancemakers – broke away to protect their own interest in a 
new service organization, the Canadian Association of Professional Dance 
Organizations (CAPDO).  The rifts in the Canadian dance community, which 
exploded in a shouting match at the 1977 DICA conference in Winnipeg, took years 
to heal.  When they did, it was because the expansive and turbulent era had passed 
and the contemporary dance community could not afford the ongoing disharmony.  
DICA struggled on, with diminishing effectiveness, to the early 1990s.  Its enduring 
legacy is the Canada Dance Festival, launched in 1987 as a more cautiously curated 
successor to the performances formerly accompanying the annual DICA 
conferences.  The festival continues biennially under the auspices of the National 
Arts Centre in Ottawa.  CAPDO survived a while longer but, as the funding for arts 
service organizations withered, it too faded from the scene, eventually reinventing 
itself as the Canadian Dance Assembly in 2002 (Andrews, 2001; Cornell, 2001a; 
Bowring, 2002). 
 
Despite the disappearance of a number of smaller Canadian companies such as 
Regina Modern Dance Works, Toronto Independent Dance Enterprise (TIDE) and, in 
Vancouver, Paula Ross Dancers and The Anna Wyman Dance Theatre, 
contemporary dance in Canada has continued to evolve and diversify.  Solo artists 
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 such as Montréal's Marie Chouinard and Margie Gillis and, more recently, Toronto's 
Peggy Baker, have won international acclaim and have carved a relatively secure 
niche for themselves.  Ambitious dancer/choreographers have survived and 
prospered artistically by working independently, outside the costly, often 
cumbersome bounds of a formal company infrastructure (Crabb & Jackson 2007).   
 
The ranks of the Canadian independent scene have grown significantly since the 
1970s with the influx of African, Caribbean, Asian and South Asian immigrants whose 
“ethnic” dance forms are supported and encouraged under the auspices of 
multiculturalism.  The independents explore collaborations across genres and 
disciplines, working with experimental musicians, filmmakers, visual artists and 
designers, as well as with dance artists from a variety of cultural backgrounds.  Since 
1991, the work of these enterprising creators has been celebrated in Toronto's 
annual Fringe Festival of Independent Dance Artists (fFIDA) and similar smaller 
events in other cities (Wyman, 1989). 
 
Although I was able to find a number of examples in the literature of ballet dancers 
describing transformative, flow or ecstatic experiences, my interest remained in 
exploring the concept of trance in contemporary dance performance because of its 
connection to current affairs and practice and where the issues of ethnicity, 
migration, neo-colonialism and the diaspora are constantly being redefined and 
reinscribed.  Independent solo artists who are largely solely responsible for shaping 
their own craft and vision were of particular interest.  Reading trance through the 
work of contemporary artists offers the potential for understanding trance’s relevance 
to the making of dances in the present. 
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 While there is a vibrant South Asian presence in eastern and western Canada with 
many accomplished, well-trained dancers and teachers, the majority are only semi-
professional and the forms themselves – Odissi, Bharata Natyam and Kathak – retain 
overt connections to formalism and tradition that have impeded the community’s 
capacity to contemporize their practice.  This is not to suggest that there are no 
South Asian artists in Canada engaged in creating new and/or fusion work, but to 
reflect the impression that the choreographic output is not, as yet, of a sophisticated 
calibre.  Likewise, my decision to not choose an Aboriginal Canadian artist was 
predicated on the fact that this would entail support from a vast and increasingly 
charged area for which I do not possess sufficient expertise.  Additionally, despite 
efforts to integrate the aboriginal community into mainstream culture, for reasons of 
internal solidarity and external ostracism, coupled with rampant hostility and 
oppression from the white majority, the native Canadian population remains insolubly 
Other.4
 
The four case studies in Part II – Montréal’s Zab Maboungou and Margie Gillis, 
Edmonton’s Brian Webb, and South Africa’s Vincent Sekwati Mantsoe, whose recent 
commissions have brought him to Toronto and Ottawa – were selected for the 
commentary they could provide on trance experience and contemporary practice in 
Canada.  The case studies provide a rich source from which to extract and 
interpolate the influence of colonialism, post-colonialism and neo-colonialism on 
artistic production, exchange and performance in a multicultural society and 
globalized economy, the concepts of creativity, liminality, spirituality, expressionism, 
feminism and psychoanalysis, the impacts of decolonization, transnationalism and 
migration, as well as the polysemous and contentious nature of trance itself.   
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 The order of case studies was determined by the progression of ideas and concepts 
that each example illustrates.  Through Maboungou, the complex narrative of 
immigration, multiculturalism, and francophone/anglophone tension that 
characterizes artistic production in the province of Québec and elsewhere is 
introduced.  Gillis, who also resides in Montréal, is a sizeable and far-reaching 
presence on the Canadian contemporary dance scene and as an artistic “import,” 
has increased the visibility of Canadian dance across the country and overseas in 
spite of – or perhaps because of – her modernist tendencies.  Webb, based in 
Western Canada but influenced by the American scene of the 1960s and 1970s, 
offers an interesting perspective on feminist and queer theory in art-making and 
dance as therapy.  Finally, Mantsoe epitomizes the movement towards a globalized, 
transnational economy wherein his attempts to balance the sacred and traditional 
with the secular and postmodern have garnered international acclaim. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Dance historian Katherine Cornell has published two interesting papers on the 
development of the “big three” ballet companies in Canada.  In “The Ballet 
Problem: The Kirstein-Buckle Ballet Survey for the Canada Council” (2002), Cornell 
examines the Canada Council report known as the Kirstein/Buckle Ballet Survey 
submitted in 1962, authored by Lincoln Kirstein of the New York City Ballet and 
Richard Buckle of the London Sunday Times. These “two foreign experts” 
assessed the artistic quality of the National Ballet of Canada, Les Grands Ballets 
Canadiens, the Royal Winnipeg Ballet and recommended that the National Ballet 
be funded exclusively.  In “The Dance Community Revolts: The Reaction to the 
Brinson Report of 1974” (2001a) Cornell discusses how in 1974, the Canada 
Council for the Arts hired British ballet historian Peter Brinson to examine Canada’s 
three professional ballet schools to justify the Canada Council’s new funding of all 
three schools. According to Cornell, “Brinson’s findings were predictable but the 
reaction of the community to the report and subsequent funding was not. The 
community was enraged over the token $10,000 grants given to the Royal 
Winnipeg Ballet School and L’École supérieure de la danse (the school of Les 
Grands Ballets Canadiens) in light of the increase to the National Ballet School’s 
funding from $320,000 to a staggering $600,000” (abstract).
2  Les Automatistes were a group of Québécois artistic dissidents based in Montréal 
who originated an artistic and aesthetic movement in the early 1940s under the 
direction of painter Paul-Émile Borduas. “Les Automatistes” were so called 
because they were influenced by Surrealism and its theory of automatism.  
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Members included Marcel Barbeau, Roger Fauteux, Claude Gauvreau, Jean-Paul 
Riopelle, Pierre Gauvreau, Fernand Leduc, Jean-Paul Mousseau, Marcelle Ferron 
and Françoise Sullivan. 
   
3  For an in-depth examination of the influence of Sullivan on Quebecois culture, see 
Allana Lindgren’s From Automatism to Modern Dance: Francoise Sullivan with 
Franziska Boas in New York (2003). 
 
4  In “The Legacy of Colonialism” Julie Cassidy, an associate professor of law, states 
that “an examination of the history of race relations in Australia, Canada, the United 
States of America and New Zealand reveals some striking similarities.  
Governmental policies … officially sanctioned slaughter of indigenous communities, 
the promotion of segregation through reserves and restrictive legislation, the 
implementation of policies of assimilation and integration and the ultimate 
acceptance, at least to some extent, of the right of such people of the right of such 
peoples to land and/or self-determination.  Unfortunately the long-term 
consequences of this checkered history can also be found in each of these 
countries today.  In each, centuries of oppression have left many aboriginal 
peoples second-class citizens.  The social, economic, educational and health 
conditions of these indigenous minorities are poor and there is little hope of 
breaking free of this status” (2003. p 409).  In The Burden of History: Colonialism 
and the frontier myth in a rural community (1999), Canadian historian Elizabeth 
Furniss offers an interesting corollary to Cassidy’s vision of hopelessness.  In her 
“ethnography of the cultural politics of Aboriginal/Euro-Canadians relations” Furniss 
argues that that despite evidence that Aboriginals are fully integrated into the 
broader non-Aboriginal community, the historical system of social segregation has 
come to be naturalized.  She concludes that it is the extant traces of colonial power 
that reinforce and maintain the subordinate position of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada.  Other works that substantiate Native Canadians’ “othered” status in the 
present with regard to rights and freedoms, land claims and access to education 
and health care include Weaver, 1981; Asch, 1984; Little Bear, Boldt & Long, 1984; 
Boldt & Long, 1985; Raunet 1984; Brody, 1981; Berger, 1985; Churchill 2002; and 
DePasquale 2006. 
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PART II Trance as Artefact 
 
CHAPTER FOUR Trance as Artefact: Zab Maboungou and Performing 
Difference 
 
Standing before the N'tchak, a metal and raffia sculpture inspired by traditional textile 
art of the Congolese Kuba region, the dancer begins to move.  Keeping her feet 
firmly planted on the floor, her gaze never leaving the sculpture, she twists her body 
from side to side, the torque of her motion visible in the strain it places on her calves 
and ankles.  Lifting one leg as though to march in place, she steps away from the 
N’tchak and pauses.  On cue, the drums begin, and the sound they make is hollow 
and ringing.  She pivots on one foot then the other, shoulders square, head erect, 
feet flexed, arms at her sides, fingers closed.  Her body held, she does not stop 
twisting, her steps sure, eyes staring straight ahead, left and then right, then doubling 
back.  Like an automaton she traverses the stage in tight rectangular patterns, 
stepping-turning-twisting never stopping.  Each time she turns she brings her whole 
focus and attention to the direction in which she is travelling, moving without pause 
as though there is an axis running through the core of her body or a compass that 
reorients her in space.  The drums double their phrasing and she begins to step with 
bended knees, left and then right, now moving backwards, making quarter turns on 
her heels.  She tips forward, upper body parallel to the floor, right leg raised at a 90- 
degree angle behind her.  When she rights herself, she moves forward towards the 
audience, head switching from one side to the other, and then works her way 
backwards, stepping-turning-twisting right then left never stopping until she is 
standing once again in front of the N’tchak.  The drums pause and she turns 360 
degrees on her heels and moves immediately into a series of intricate pivoting 
interlocking steps, working on diagonals, turning, changing direction, and turning 
again.  She progresses across the stage towards the drummers, in measured steps, 
marching, goose-stepping, now shifting with knees bent, facing front again and 
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tipping forward, then continuing downstage.  Stepping-turning-twisting, pivoting, right 
then left, knees lifting, never stopping. 
 
Zab Maboungou's performances are characterized by a level of commitment that is 
severe and unrelenting.  When she enters the stage, one cannot look away.  Even in 
softer, quieter moments she bristles with intense energy and purpose.   The 
Montréal-based performer’s presence is undeniably commanding: she is centred; she 
is here.  
 
Nsamu, a work of abstract movement, plays with the themes of time and place. 
“Nsamu” means “the subject of debate” in Maboungou's father's native Kikongo and, 
true to her other vocation as a feminist philosopher, Maboungou plays interlocutor to 
her fellow performers.1 The work is a sparsely crafted but dense performance for a 
solo dancer, two musicians and art installation.  
 
This chapter begins by briefly reintroducing James Clifford’s notions of collecting 
before continuing with a detailed exploration of the role trance plays in the life and 
practice of Canadian Franco-Congolese dance artist Zab Maboungou.  Following 
biographical information about Maboungou, the history of colonization in Congo-
Brazzaville and Québec, and a deconstruction of Canadian multiculturalist policy, 
analysis of Maboungou’s particular relationship to trance is problematized through 
the work of dance scholar Anne Cooper Albright.  In particular, Cooper Albright’s 
theories of slippages and double representations in performing difference are 
addressed.  Continuing with the theme of difference, Maboungou’s relationship to 
trance is explored through the work of feminist and cultural theorists Ien Ang and Rita 
Felski and their complementary analyses of difference, incommensurability and 
hybridity.  Ang and Felski introduce important themes concerning Maboungou’s 
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positionality and the construction and implication of difference in her work.   
Additionally, Ang’s work serves both to situate and critique my own place as 
researcher in relation to Maboungou.  Finally, the ways in which trance as an artefact 
increases and decreases in value are revisited.   
 
In “On Collecting Art and Culture” (1988), anthropologist James Clifford analyses the 
West’s preoccupation with collecting and how the value of collections or items within 
a collection either ameliorate or decrease in value according to shifts in aesthetic 
taste, political trends or beliefs about authenticity.  The act of collecting, Clifford 
argues, plays an integral role in “Western identity formation” and as such is 
simultaneously a means of validating the West’s revered image of Self as owner, and 
of distinguishing in geopolitical terms, “us” from “them” and in historical terms, “now” 
from “then.”   While Clifford speaks mainly of physical artefacts – works of art, 
indigenous crafts and tourist knick-knacks – his theorization of collecting may be 
applied to intangible objects, as well (1998, p 59-60, 66).  With this in mind I argue 
that trance functions as an artefact in the work of Maboungou and that her 
relationship to trance effectively maintains the Self/Other dichotomy that informs 
funding and reception of her work.    
 
A year ago, I was invited to moderate a panel discussion with Maboungou and her 
collaborators following a performance of Maboungou’s work Nsamu at the Canada 
Dance Festival in Ottawa in June 2004.  During a lull in the exchange between artists 
and audience, I inserted my own voice and asked Maboungou about a quote that 
appears in the press package I had received in anticipation of my role as moderator.  
The quote was excerpted from a review of one of her performances by Montréal-
based critic Philip Szporer.  Szporer writes that “Zab Maboungou performed in a 
trance-like altered state of consciousness that was mesmerizing to watch” (2001, p 
27).  Although the quote was attributed to a review written by Szporer for a Montréal 
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weekly, the particular piece that he was reviewing, the performance or the date were 
not specified.  The quote is on a page titled “Press Quotes” that includes extracts 
from Canadian and international press variously summarizing, highlighting and 
praising Maboungou’s performances and artistry.  Szporer was not the only critic on 
the page of press quotes to mention trance:  Donald Hutera from Dance Magazine 
described Maboungou’s drumming accompaniment as “trance inducing” (2000, p 70).  
Interestingly and contradictorily, another quote from a review published by Dance 
Connection, Szporer states that what “is most striking” about Maboungou’s 
performance is her “sense of groundedness” (1995, p 27). 
 
At issue here is not whether a single critic can express multiple, or in this case, 
potentially conflicting, opinions of the same artist (albeit in different performances) 
but to problematize both the choice Szporer made in describing Maboungou’s 
performance as trance-like, and Maboungou’s choice to include that particular quote 
in her press kit.  The reality that a single sentence or phrase, isolated from both the 
much larger piece of writing and from the work itself, can stand for the artist and the 
artist’s oeuvre is interesting in and of itself.  However, in this instance, the use of the 
quote resonates at a deeper level when one considers the incongruities and 
competing agendas at play in Maboungou’s practice in relation to trance. 
 
When I brought the quote to Maboungou’s attention during the panel, I asked her 
whether Szporer’s response to her performance was accurate, whether she in fact 
performs in a “trance-like” state or attained an altered state of consciousness 
onstage.  Her response was quick and emphatic.  She will not allow herself to enter a 
trance in performance because in her view she would be disingenuous in relation to 
her on-stage collaborators and to her audience.  She describes her work as so 
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“tightly choreographed” that to allow herself to enter such an altered state could 
jeopardize the integrity of her performance (Maboungou, public panel, 2004). 
In May 2005, I met with Maboungou in her studio in Montréal and in a one-on-one 
interview reminded her of our exchange.  I asked if she still stood by her answer.  
She restated her position and did not waver from the answer she gave eleven 
months before.  She added that she had “allowed” herself to enter a trance only once 
in her performance career and was “shamed” by an African elder for forgetting “her 
place” (Maboungou, personal interview, 2005).  It had never happened again.  So I 
asked, “Why use the quote? Why endorse through the medium of your press kit a 
description that is in sharp contrast to the tenets of your practice and to the respect 
you embody for your art form?”  In response, Maboungou told me the story of her life.  
 
Maboungou describes herself as a “child of colonialism” (Maboungou, personal 
interview, 2005).  The daughter of a Congolese mother and French father, she was 
born in Brazzaville, the capital of what is today Congo-Brazzaville, the former French 
colony of the Moyen (Middle) Congo straddling the equator in sub-Saharan West 
Africa.  French, Portuguese and Dutch traders began visiting the lands between the 
lower Congo River and the Atlantic Ocean as early as the 14th century.  The 
Portuguese were the first to call it the Congo.  Over the next four centuries links with 
Europe steadily increased as missionaries and traders penetrated ever further into 
Central Africa.  France’s claim to the Congo was instigated by Pierre Savorgnan de 
Brazza, an Italian adventurer and entrepreneur, who led an expedition to the area in 
1875.  In 1880, Brazza proposed to King Makoko of the Bateke people that he place 
his kingdom under the protection of the French flag.  Makoko, interested in trade 
possibilities and in gaining an edge over his rivals, signed a treaty and the French 
established a post at what was to become Brazzaville.  France’s claim to the territory 
was recognized by the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 which ratified the Congo Act 
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that divided the region between France, Portugal and King Leopold II of Belgium.  
Within the protectorate of the Moyen Congo, tracts of land were assigned to French 
colonial companies called “concessionaires,” who exploited the area's resources of 
rubber and ivory and exacted a quota from the native population.  By 1906, fears that 
the scandal brewing in Europe over the brutal mistreatment of the native population 
in the Belgian Congo might result in the cancellation of the Congo Act and the loss of 
France’s investment, led France to establish the French Equatorial African 
Federation amalgamating the Moyen Congo, Gabon, Oubangi-Chari and Chad.  The 
French government also passed restrictions on concessionaires’ activities and in 
1910 incorporated the Moyen Congo into the Colony of French Equatorial Africa.  In 
1928, the Congolese led a revolt over renewed forced labour policies and other 
abuses carried out in the course of the building of the Congo-Ocean railway.  In 
1946, after increasing civil agitation, the Congo was granted a territorial assembly 
and representation in the French parliament.  Twelve years later in 1958, the 
Congolese voted for autonomy within the French Community leading to secession 
from France in 1960.2   
 
Born prior to its independence from France, Maboungou came of age in Congo-
Brazzaville during a period when “post-colonial unrest led to an artistic and cultural 
renaissance that placed an emphasis on African identity” (Cauthery, 2003).  She 
believes that she was drawn to dance and by the age of thirteen understood that 
dance would be her vocation.  Despite secession, Congo-Brazzaville like many 
former colonies was still influenced by France’s education policies with regard to 
assimilation and, being a bright student, Maboungou was encouraged to study in the 
“mother” country.  In 1969, she went to Paris to study philosophy.  There she met 
other children of African colonization and together they began sharing their 
knowledge of traditional African music and dance.  Social gatherings formalized into 
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dance clubs hosted by African student associations that sponsored the students’ 
endeavours to recreate their lost heritage.  
 
It would perhaps be useful to take a moment to discuss the term “African dance.”  It 
is not a term that I am particularly comfortable with – is it not too generalist?  Too 
impersonal?  Maboungou is firm in her claim to be a practitioner of African dance.  
When questioned – usually by Europeans keen to fix her to a certain place and time 
– she complies and describes herself as a practitioner of Congolese dance.  But this, 
she explains, is a fabrication.  The indigenous peoples living in what is today’s 
Congo-Brazzaville did not always live there – it is not their traditional homeland.  By 
virtue of forced settlement or displacement by European colonization, the people 
living within the borders imposed by the Congo Act that gave France control of the 
region, became “Congolese.”  Thus to speak of Congolese dance is meaningless; 
there are dances performed by the Kongo people but these dances are not 
performed strictly within the geographical territory defined as the Congo.  So African 
dance, encompassing a range of regional traditional dances within a global diaspora, 
shared between generations within the Congo, but also recreated in the colonial 
mother countries and in other former colonies, conveys a richness of solidarity within 
the fractured African identity.  In Paris and later in Canada, Maboungou studied 
traditional music and dance of the region but also undertook studies in the traditional 
dances of Mali, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.  
 
In 1973, Maboungou emigrated from Paris to the city of Montréal in Canada’s 
French-speaking province of Québec.  Like the Congo, the history of Québec is 
rooted in colonization: Québec's first inhabitants were Indians and Inuit but the 
paradise of the New World was soon transgressed by Norse explorers, Basque 
whalers and cod fishermen.  Commissioned by France’s François I, the French 
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explorer Jacques Cartier landed in the Gaspé in 1534.  Cartier claimed possession of 
the immense territory for France, establishing a European presence and the creation 
of New France.  The territory remained in the hands of the French for more than 200 
years eventually being annexed by the British following France’s defeat at the Battle 
of the Plains of Abraham in 1759.  Four years later, under the Treaty of Paris, the 
King of France granted to “His Royal Majesty, the sole ownership of Canada and all 
its dependencies.”  This transfer of power and territory from France to England 
sparked a flood of new colonists from England, Ireland and Scotland.  
  
The Canadian Constitution Act of 1791 established two provinces: Upper Canada 
(primarily English-speaking Ontario), and Lower Canada (primarily French-speaking 
Québec), with Québec City as its capital.  By 1830, Montréal – the “Paris of the 
North” – had become Canada's major industrial centre, welcoming waves of 
European immigrants fleeing war and hardship in their homelands.  But the original 
French colonists of Québec resisted British rule leading to the Québec Patriot 
Rebellion of 1837-1838.  The rebellion was crushed and, fearing further reprisals, the 
British united Upper and Lower Canada in the Act of Union in 1841 to solidify its 
authority.  In 1867, the signing of the British North America Act established the 
Confederation of Canadian Provinces including Québec, Ontario, New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia.3
 
At the time of Maboungou’s immigration, shortly after the “Quiet Revolution,”4 
debates over the supremacy of the French language were crystallizing in Québec.  
Issues such as sovereignty and Québec independence from the rest of English-
speaking Canada were current.  Although two referendums to secede from Canada 
were narrowly defeated, the preservation of French as the official language of 
schools and of commerce, autonomy in regards to immigration policy, and the 
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recognition of a separate and distinct, Québécois culture were established.  
Cultivating a separate and unique Québécois identity was also expressed in terms of 
support for the arts.  Aligning themselves with a “European model,” the province of 
Québec provides more arts funding than any other province in Canada and the 
thriving dance scene is perceived by the rest of the country to be more “European,” 
with strong ties to the French and Belgian dance scenes (Crabb, 2005). 
 
Yet despite generous support for the arts in Québec, Maboungou’s career stalled. 
Though increasing numbers of French-speaking Africans had been immigrating to 
Québec since the demise of colonial rule in the decades following the Second World 
War, Maboungou was something of an oddity (Jadotte, 1977).  Two years prior, in 
1971, the federal government of Canada had drafted its official policy of 
multiculturalism and cultural groups performing traditional African dance as part of 
cultural arts festivals and nationalist celebrations such as Canada Day were common 
and encouraged under the new policies.5  But a woman of African descent purporting 
to create modern African dance was incomprehensible to the funding bodies and arts 
councils of the 1970s and 1980s.  It was not until 1988/89 when the Canada Council 
for the Arts, established in 1957 to “strengthen, encourage and promote the arts 
through the administration of grants,” undertook consultations on cultural diversity 
and established the Racial Equity Committee (Litzenberger, 2007, p 20, 22).  Until 
that point, the Council had limited its definition of dance to ballet and modern.  Joyce 
Zemans, a former director of the Canada Council and lecturer in arts policy and 
administration, states that Canadian multicultural policy is 
 
admired internationally and considered a model by UNESCO, critics 
blame the policy for devaluing what it purports to promote, fracturing 
Canadian society by its insistence on hyphenated Canadians and the 
creation of “identity communities.” 
      Zemans, 1996, p 19. 
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For many years, the funding bodies favoured the province’s ballet and contemporary 
dance companies over the independents, and Maboungou was excluded from 
receiving public arts support.   
 
Outspoken to the point of being considered radical, (Szporer, personal interview, 
2005) Maboungou continued to create and advocate for her work.  Despite the arts 
councils’ cool reception, she self-produced and steadfastly cultivated her own 
community through performances and workshops within Canada and abroad.  In 
1991, she was invited as a consultant, along with Maria O’Dole, a Ukrainian dance 
specialist from Alberta, to participate in the Council’s Dance Advisory Committee 
review of a report entitled Inventory of Dance: Other Forms.  As representatives of 
the “other,” Maboungou and O’Dole’s contributions are described as “pivotal” since 
“they embodied the voices of the unheard dancers” (Cornell, 2001b, p 102).  
Maboungou’s perseverance and advocacy for the rights of “other dancers” was 
eventually rewarded.  She has the distinction of being the first African-Canadian 
choreographer to receive funding from the Council and the Conseil des Arts et des 
Lettres du Québec.  Today, on the Foreign Affairs Canada website, whose mandate 
is to “support Canadians abroad, work towards a more peaceful and secure world, 
and promote [Canadian] culture and values internationally,” Maboungou is a 
highlighted artist on the “African-Canadian Sights and Sounds” page.  There, she is 
described as “one of the many talented African artists who have come to Canada in 
search of a new life and made outstanding contributions to Canadian culture” 
(Foreign Affairs Canada, website, 2002).  
 
Clifford’s adaptation of Fredric Jameson’s semiotic square (Figure 4a) illustrates how 
cultural artefacts and works of art change in value according to aesthetic trends or 
socio-political precedents (1988, p 65).   The change in perception of Maboungou’s 
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creative output and her rise to multicultural poster child parallels the journey that, 
according to Clifford, certain artefacts take when their relative value changes.  A 
reputed masterpiece falls out of favour when it is revealed to be a fake; a piece of 
roadside pottery purchased on a holiday is revealed to be priceless Etruscan 
earthenware.  Yet, Clifford is not only concerned with changes in value according to 
perceived authenticity.   
 
Figure 4a  (Clifford, 1988, p 65) 
 
What is also of interest is the occurrence of cultural artefacts becoming high art as a 
result of shifts in societal views.  In Canada, the paintings and soapstone carvings of 
the Inuit are one such example of formerly devalued tourist tchotkes transformed to 
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priceless artwork as perception of the cultural worth of the Inuit people and their 
threatened way of life has changed.   
 
But again, artefacts need not be tangible.  Maboungou’s work has likewise 
experienced an increase in its aesthetic value.  Initially, Maboungou’s creative output 
was regarded as traditional and folkloric and when Maboungou resisted these 
classifications, the councils were dumbfounded.  Her work became valuable to the 
establishment when it was perceived to reinforce both Canadian (pluralist, 
multicultural) and Québécois (distinct, French) identity.  As the policy of 
multiculturalism gradually became practice, the creative output of multicultural artists 
expanded to include innovation within a traditional framework – immigrants could be 
more than transported vessels of their cultural heritage, they could also be modern 
Canadians.  In this context, their creative output became regarded as “high art” and 
eligible for governmental support. 
 
It was during this latter phase of Maboungou’s career that she came to the attention 
of dance scholar Ann Cooper Albright.  Cooper Albright was moved to write about 
Maboungou after seeing her perform as part of Off-FIND, an extension of the Festival 
International de Nouvelle Danse in Montréal (FIND) in 1995.6  Her treatment of the 
artist appeared in her 1997 work Choreographing Difference.  In the first chapter 
titled “Mining the Dancefield,” Cooper Albright describes what she calls slippages and 
double representation.  In the act of witnessing (active engagement as opposed to 
passive consuming) the viewer is aware of and/or engaging with double 
representations of the dancer.  The viewer is aware of both the dancer’s cultural and 
somatic identities (“how one’s body renders meaning in society” and “the experience 
of one’s physicality,” respectively).  These identities are constantly in a state of 
relational flux – converging and diverging at different points in the performance 
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moment.  The viewer is engaged in contending with these modes of representation 
and, within that construction, Cooper Albright perceives slippages – moments where, 
for the viewer, the dancer is neither wholly fused with either identity but slips between 
them.  In slipping between, a viewer perceives and creates new or tangential 
identities.  As Cooper Albright describes in Nsamu, the viewer is aware of 
Maboungou as a petite woman of African descent, with a short afro, dancing barefoot 
and dressed in a costume reminiscent of Africanist elements.  These characteristics 
combine to form Maboungou’s cultural identity in the eyes of the viewer and her 
appearance on stage.  Dancing to African drums, an image of Maboungou as a 
“traditional” African dancer emerges.  Yet with regard to her somatic identity, 
Maboungou’s presence on stage, how she dances, how she responds to the music, 
how she constructs her performance, contrasts with what Western audiences have 
typically come to associate with “traditional” African dance.  Witnessing and 
reconciling the double representation allows for slippages that exempt Maboungou 
from being categorized solely on her appearance and the associations which her 
appearance engenders (Cooper Albright, 1997, p 21-27). 
 
Within Cooper Albright’s analysis of the negotiation of identities, I would add the 
caveat that the act of witnessing and recognizing slippages changes according to the 
audience member’s degree of engagement with the work, and that the degree of 
engagement depends on the viewer’s relative familiarity and knowledge.  The more 
informed the viewer is of the work and the performer, the more aware s/he will be of 
these slippages.  This seems perhaps an obvious point, but I believe it is important to 
distinguish between Cooper Albright’s capacity to witness and the capacity of another 
viewer who is less informed.  Likewise, it is important to recognize that a learning 
curve pertains when a viewer progresses from a novice witness to an informed 
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witness, and how that process of education alters the depth of metanarrative that is 
enacted or the frequency with which slippages are acknowledged. 
 
This point becomes slightly more complex when the viewer is a critic and that critic 
has enacted his/her own learning curve, moving from a novice to an informed viewer 
as he or she becomes more familiar with the artist’s body of work.  Yet at the same 
time, the critic must still mediate that performance for a diverse readership.  The critic 
as mediator must reconcile his or her own response to the work with what his 
audience may or may not know about the work and/or the performer.  The critic aims 
to provide a description that appeals to a range of readers taking into consideration 
both the lowest and the highest degrees of knowledge of the work and performer 
under review. 
 
I would argue that such a learning curve and sense of responsibility to one’s 
audience played a part in Szporer’s decision to invoke trance in describing 
Maboungou’s performance.  At the time the review was written, more than a decade 
ago, Szporer was an experienced dance critic but was new to Maboungou’s work.  
He remembers being impressed by Maboungou’s presence on stage, by her integrity 
and by her state of both total engagement and total disengagement or transcendence 
in her performance.  To convey this unusual but highly compelling quality to his 
readers, Szporer described Maboungou as performing in a trance-like altered state of 
consciousness.  In retrospect, Szporer maintains that his statement accurately 
reflects the performance he saw but adds that, at the time, it was the only turn of 
phrase he could come up with to describe what he had seen that would also be 
intelligible to his readers.  Szporer acknowledges that the use of trance was 
predictable, but believes that it was not entirely inappropriate.  Was he reacting to 
Maboungou’s intensity or to the colour of her skin?  Or was he himself entranced by 
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her performance?  Szporer is unsure.  Today he continues to review Maboungou’s 
work and in the intervening years has acquired a more discerning eye and more 
subtle vocabulary with which to describe her performances to his readership.  His 
capacity to witness has expanded with continued exposure to Maboungou’s work and 
that of other African-Canadian performers, and he admits that today he is more 
aware of the Eurocentric bias with which the majority of North American audiences 
view non-Western derived dance (Szporer, private conversation, 2005). 
 
But if Szporer is guilty of Eurocentrism, Cooper Albright argues that in performance 
Maboungou resists the “colonial gaze.”  Maboungou does this by: a) not presenting 
her work in a “recreated” manner in contrast to other performers of African-derived 
dance such as the Chuck Davis African Dance Ensemble who perform in a 
“celebratory” manner in a “traditional village” setting; b) by neither denying her 
ethnicity nor suggesting that she or her work is representative – hers is a very 
personal performance; c) by actively engaging in double representation through 
movement, minimalist choreography, lighting and staging conventions that do not 
allow her to be fixed but in a state of actively performing her identities; d) by being 
engaged in her own experience; e) by emphasizing/engaging a process of 
“becoming” from Butler; and f) “by fracturing the power dynamic in traditional gazes 
where the object of sight is there for the viewer’s pleasure, not the dancer’s” (Cooper 
Albright, 1997, p. 25-27).  
 
The work on which Cooper Albright based her observations was Maboungou’s 
Incantation that premiered at FIND in 1995.  The same observations, however, could 
easily be drawn from Nsamu.  With only the conceptual set piece N’tchak, the setting 
for the piece is abstract.  Maboungou’s musicians are dressed in everyday 21st-
century clothing playing instruments that were likely manufactured in Japan and 
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selected for their professional quality and dynamics as opposed to their adherence to 
traditional drum-making techniques or materials.  Maboungou’s costume is made of 
modern fabrics, is close-fitting and provides a clean silhouette that does not interfere 
with her sharp movements and sudden changes of direction.  In watching her 
performance, I am aware that she is black and that her movements and musical 
choices are influenced by an Africanist aesthetic but neither her presentation nor her 
program notes lead me to perceive that this is “African” or “Congolese” dance.  What 
is central to the work is her performance – the immediacy of her presence and the 
visceral relationship she creates with her musicians.  The production is spare with 
little artifice or pretence and no one element dominates the action of the work.  
Maboungou is likewise invested in a process of becoming, never allowing herself to 
be fixed or implicated in any one idiom through choreographic choices that iterate 
and reiterate versions of her moving body.  Finally, in the absence of an overtly 
presentational mode, Nsamu is about process.  The work does not require a stage or 
lights to be effective and could be performed anywhere, with or without a dedicated 
audience.  
 
If it was assumed by an audience member that Maboungou entered a trance during 
Nsamu, how would this alter reception of the work?  If trance is a trait, an element, 
and/or a product of the colonial encounter, then the attribution of trance to her 
performance would place Maboungou firmly within the colonialist gaze.  But if 
Maboungou is aware of this potential, is she resisting or inviting the gaze? 
 
Maboungou is acutely aware of the dichotomy with which she is engaging in 
accepting and channelling the attribution of trance.  She is consciously manipulating 
“the trance equals Other equation” – playing the colonizer’s game by his rules – 
because she seeks to capitalize on the West’s fascination with trance.  In marketing 
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her performances as opportunities to witness trance, she invites the public to add her 
to their collection. In a political climate where even in Québec funding for the arts is 
decreasing, full houses ensure continued success.  Maboungou perceives that as a 
black African artist working within a European-dominated culture, trance is both 
unavoidable and potentially profitable.  Maboungou seeks to lure her audience with 
trance but with the intention of initiating them in an alternative construction of African 
dance – one that eludes the colonialist gaze and attendant stereotypes.  But it leads 
one to question both the degree to which a viewer anticipating trance can shed their 
pre-conceived notions upon entering the performance space – especially given 
Maboungou’s intensity on stage – and the degree to which Maboungou herself is 
likewise invested in trance for its exotic appeal.  In a reactionary move, Maboungou 
engages in self-exoticization, appropriating the means by which she has been 
exoticized by the colonizers and in doing so, attempts to take control of the colonial 
gaze. 
 
Here too then, Cooper Albright’s slippages between double representations come 
into play.  The artist as a trance-producing artefact to be consumed merges with the 
free agent actively seeking to contradict and/or sustain that impression in 
performance.   Maboungou is a practitioner of African dance, so named in response 
to the defacing effects of colonialism, and within that, an exponent of modern African 
dance, a necessary modifier to deny those who wish to keep the formerly colonized 
in the past.  Maboungou’s work is an artefact that has been elevated to the rank of 
high art by the arts councils.  As a favoured artist, the Canadian government collects 
and exhibits her as a model of multiculturalism.  As a purveyor of trance, Maboungou 
responds by offering her work to be collected, then withdraws that offer by projecting 
alternate identities in performance.  In addition, Maboungou’s personal history has 
conspired to create multiple double representations where she is simultaneously from 
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the West (i.e. Canadian) and from the non-West (i.e. Congolese), a practitioner of 
modern dance (Western) and of African dance (non-Western), and of Caucasian 
European and Black African descent.   Who Maboungou is and what she does, as 
well as the construction and implication of difference within each conflation of 
opposites, is constantly being negotiated according to which audience she is 
addressing.   
 
The writings of cultural studies theorist Ien Ang lend theoretical support to the 
elaboration of Maboungou’s positionality and the construction and implication of 
difference in her work.   In 1995, Ang published an article entitled “I’m a Feminist but 
… ‘Other’ Women and Postnational Feminism.”   Ang offers an astute analysis of the 
predicament that traditionally “othered” women find themselves in when identifying 
themselves as feminists, later developing her line of argument to include the 
application of incommensurability.  A woman of Chinese descent living and working 
in academia in Australia, Ang is very conscious of how the “all for one and one for all” 
mentality of first-wave feminism is at odds with the reality of being a non-Western, 
non-white female in a predominantly white, Western context.  The title of the article 
reflects Ang’s position as a feminist who feels obliged to point out where the politics 
of feminism – defined somewhat simplistically as an inclusive “sisterhood” grounded 
in whiteness and Eurocentrism – are at odds with her own personal politics as they 
have developed through interaction with an at-times hostile home environment.     
 
Australia, like Canada, is a former British colony with an ugly history of persecution of 
its indigenous population and where current policy towards immigration has shifted 
from an official doctrine of assimilation to multiculturalism.  Ang, like Maboungou, is a 
non-white woman who identifies herself as a feminist living in a Western country, 
keenly aware of “her place” within her chosen culture and how both her daily life and 
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career choices have been shaped and at times circumscribed by the neo-colonial 
environment.  And though Maboungou does not make any overt statement in this 
regard, I would argue that, like Ang, she perceives that as a woman of colour she is 
both disadvantaged and advantaged – especially when her acknowledged 
“difference” can become “intellectual and political capital” (Ang, 1995, p 57).   Ang’s 
work serves both to situate and critique Maboungou’s relationship with trance and to 
problematize my own place vis-à-vis Maboungou. 
 
Ang begins by explaining that, though she has been asked, she is not interested in 
articulating her particular “Chinese” or “Asian” contribution to Australian feminism 
since such attempts at representation only serve to objectify and fetishize 
“Chineseness” or “Asianness.”  To attempt such a position or in fact to view such a 
statement as necessary contradicts feminism’s self-professed image as a 
simultaneously inclusive and exclusive “political destination for all women” (Ang, 
1995, p 57).  Ang’s argument that a subaltern subject (from Spivak) is fetishized by 
the process of articulating her position vis-à-vis the status quo – whether feminism, 
white/Western academia, or in fact a policy of support and recognition of multicultural 
arts programming – is interesting.  Bhabha argues that fetishism, situated in cultural 
studies via Lacan’s reading of Freud’s Oedipal Complex, is pertinent to 
deconstructing racial stereotyping.  Bhabha argues that the racial or ethnic “other’s” 
lack of the same skin colour is a source of anxiety.  Contained in this recognition of 
absence are both the acknowledgement of difference and its rejection (Bhabha, 
1994, p 73-75).  In Szporer’s treatment of Maboungou, and in the attribution of 
trance, she is clearly fetishized.  That Maboungou can benefit from such recognition 
from the media is a testament both to multicultural arts programming in practice, to 
her undeniable artistry and to her appeal to white and non-white audiences alike.  Yet 
Maboungou is not indiscriminately multicultural, she is African and/or Franco-
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Congolese – her ethnicity thus acknowledged to place her performance.  This label 
distinguishes her from Afro-Caribbean or West Indian artists who share her skin 
colour but not necessarily her cultural background.  And Canadians are obsessed 
with where a person came from – it is often the first question that Canadians ask one 
another.  The question is asked proudly and sincerely as though it is a duty of 
Canadians (white) to ascertain a fellow Canadian’s (often non-white) roots.  “I’m from 
here” is not enough and plainly, to the person asking, untrue.  Canada’s 
multiculturalism is performed as a collage; each piece with distinct and identifiable 
borders, simultaneously connected and detachable from the whole.  Yet both Bhabha 
and Ang question whether in the end, this is just another form of assimilation where 
difference is a criterion of hegemony (Bhabha, 1991, p 137; Ang, 1995, p 60). 
 
Maboungou becomes a fetish not only through skin colour but also through her 
affinity with modern dance.  She is compelled to contextualize her practice vis a vis 
(white) contemporary dance.  Maboungou, as has been discussed earlier, is a 
practitioner of modern African dance – modern as opposed to traditional but also 
African as a modifier to modern, i.e. European-derived, dance.  She is a black 
woman dancing a white idiom.  The list of descriptors is employed to differentiate her 
practice and her dancing body from the mainstream so as to ensure that no audience 
member, funder or newspaper reader could neither misconstrue that she is 
performing Modern dance (though she is influenced by European-derived modern 
dance – how could she not be? – and compared to white practitioners of the form) 
nor mistake her for a white modern dancer. 
 
I do not wish to suggest that contemporary dance in North America has not made 
substantial progress as regards the promotion of non-European dance and dancers – 
the recent success of the 2007 International Association of Blacks in Dance 
 148
conference, held outside the United States in Toronto for the first time in the 
organization’s history, attracted more than 1,300 delegates, dance artists and dance 
students from around the world, demonstrates that progress is being made through 
internal pressure for change, advocacy and exposure.  However, it remains that 
modern dance, in how it is funded, watched, described and performed, is predicated 
to some degree on race.  The mere mention of colour, race or ethnic origin 
immediately suggests that there is something to which the person in question is 
being compared, and/or that he or she lacks.  Even in a multicultural society where 
difference is supposed to be a basis for celebration, tolerance the norm and pluralism 
the goal, the acknowledgement of difference in and of itself creates absence and 
censure. 
 
Ang’s response to this feminist polemic of difference is not, as has been suggested 
elsewhere, to “ignore” race or ethnicity, to compensate by emphasizing “whiteness,” 
or to counsel recognition, dialogue or empathy (as such approaches presume 
successful outcomes), but simply to stress the difficulties inherent in “dealing with 
difference.”  Feminism, she argues, must imagine itself as a “limited political home, 
which does not absorb [or nullify] difference within a pre-given or pre-defined space 
but leaves room for ambivalence and ambiguity” (Ang, 1995, p 57-58, 59).  Ang’s 
argument suggests that there are feminist positions on all topics and sites of debate 
and that one may subscribe to one, many, all, parts of or none at all, so that to be 
feminist is dependent upon sociopolitical, geopolitical, institutional, cultural and 
economic factors as well as personal choices that are governed by specific 
circumstance.  In this way, she advocates a (post?) postmodern approach to 
feminism that is detotalizing and detached from any one mitigating factor.  This 
process of de-essentializing, Ang argues, requires a focus on how the gulf that exists 
between meta-narrative feminism and “other” women “is constructed and 
 149
reproduced, paying attention to, rather than turning our gaze away from, those 
painful moments at which communications seems unavoidably to fail” (1995, p 60).    
 
This detailed summary of Ang’s argument is necessitated by the need to 
problematize my own interaction with Maboungou.  I was drawn to question 
Maboungou‘s position with regard to trance because I believed that I had “caught her 
out” – exposed how her relationship to trance was mired in slippages between post, 
neo-colonialist and multicultural rhetoric.  My repeated requests for an interview were 
met with resistance and skepticism because the preamble to my research that I 
provided – my background, the origins, purpose and application of my research – 
were Otherizing.  Though I was sincere in both my interest in Maboungou’s use of 
trance and my aim to situate the findings from the interview within the postcolonial 
critique of the Other, I had, a priori, constructed Maboungou as Other.  Though we 
are of the same gender, are both immigrants to Canada, share a common language, 
equivalent levels of education, experiential knowledge of Canadian and specifically 
eastern Canadian culture, and a life-shaping interest in and familiarity with dance, 
there are just as many – if not more – points of departure between us.   
 
When finally we did meet, Maboungou stated that she heard “alarm bells” when she 
read my précis (personal interview, 2005).  Maboungou did agree in the end to be 
interviewed but whether this was due to a sense of scholarly duty, curiosity, a desire 
for exposure, to address her own dis-ease, or to simply put me in my place, I do not 
know.  Reflecting here on what I have written earlier about the press conference 
where we first interacted and how “I inserted my own voice” seems both glibly high-
handed and high-minded.  My role was to facilitate Maboungou’s panel but perhaps I 
followed my encultured (white) imperative and directed the dialogue to a topic 
relevant to my own interests.  What I do know is that, firstly, in her presence I 
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responded to her as a student would a teacher on the basis of our age difference, her 
commanding presence, and out of respect for her acknowledged artistry, and 
secondly, that together we created a “painful moment” at which communication 
seemed “unavoidably to fail.”  But she persevered with me and together we 
uncovered some very interesting and provocative ground.   Those positive results 
however do not change the fact that I entered into all my correspondence with 
Maboungou with a sense of entitlement.  If she had refused to be interviewed, I 
would have gone ahead and theorized her relationship to trance based on what I 
surmised from the Szporer’s review, authorized material published on Maboungou’s 
website, unauthorized data published elsewhere on the web, from reviews, 
programs, posters, photos and other published sources.   From this standpoint, I was 
always in a position of power. 
 
If, as Ang instructs, I pay attention to the gulf between Maboungou and me, I am 
aware of the rudiments of difference at many levels – ethnicity, race, skin colour, age, 
generation, city and culture of residence (anglophone Toronto versus francophone 
Montréal), colonial influence (British versus French), politics, motherhood, dance 
training.  But exactly how that gulf is constructed is less easy to articulate.  The 
impetus for our meeting is derived from a Eurocentric desire for higher education 
prefaced on book learning and in my particular case, on an ethnographic 
methodology that necessitates interaction with and analysis of an Other.  As such it is 
not surprising that both the purpose and the result of the experiment – to put it in 
even more painful terms – led inevitably to Maboungou being situated as Other.   
Ang argues that white/Western feminism, even in its most “straightforward” creeds, 
reveals its inherent bias to particular tendencies and orientations derived from 
white/Western culture (1995, p 62).  Maboungou, like Ang, well-schooled in the traps 
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and illusions of white/Western liberalism, knew both the origin of the gulf that 
separated us and on which side each of us stood before we ever met face to face. 
 
A second pertinent example from Ang’s article is her application of the concept of 
incommensurability.7  Derived from science, the notion of commensurability states 
that two quantities are commensurable if they can be measured by the same units.  
The idea that scientific paradigms can be incommensurable was popularized by 
American philosopher Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962). Influenced by Wittgenstein, Kuhn proposes that two theories are 
said to be incommensurable when there is no common theoretical language that can 
be used to compare them.  If two scientific theories are incommensurable, there is no 
way to reconcile one to the other in order to determine which is more appropriate, 
sound or conclusive.  In this way, incommensurability suggests that proponents of 
different paradigms see the world in different ways because of their scientific training 
and prior experience in research.   
 
As he developed his theory further, in a postscript to The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962), Kuhn adds that since competing paradigms group concepts in 
different ways, different relations of similarity exist.  As a result, this causes 
fundamental problems in communication between proponents of different paradigms.  
It is difficult to change such categories in one's mind, because the criteria for 
grouping have been conceived by means of examples rather than by definitions. This 
problem cannot be resolved by using a neutral language for communication, since 
the difference occurs prior to the application of language.8   
 
Ang prefaces her own discussion of incommensurability with the examples of 
conflicting perspectives within feminism on the legitimacy of pop singer Madonna as 
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a feminist icon.  According to Ang, many white feminists see Madonna as a “post-
modern protofeminist heroine” because of the radical and sexually rebellious 
behaviour that has resulted in her transnational fame and fortune.  The same 
protofeminist heroine is perceived by black feminists to be the antithesis of sexual 
agency since dominant myths of black females as sexually “fallen” women force them 
to be more circumspect with regard to projecting images of respectability and 
decorum (hooks in Ang, 1995, p 63).  Through the Madonna example Ang seeks not 
to suggest that either opinion is wrong, racist, or that one is “more feminist” than the 
other, but in juxtaposing the arguments, she illustrates that these are two 
incommensurable but entirely legitimate points of view.  To use Kuhn’s words, each 
perspective derives from a different paradigm where difference cannot be reconciled.  
As Ang explains, the:  
 
… voice of the other, once raised … cannot be assimilated into a new, 
more totalised feminist truth.  The otherness of ‘other’ women … 
works to disrupt the unity of ‘women’ as the foundation of feminism.  
 
Ang, 1995, p 64. 
 
 
Such a view recognizes that difference is created through context and that the 
recognition of difference creates tension between approaches to difference - 
difference as “benign diversity” or difference as “conflict, disruption [and] conflict” 
(Ang, 1995, p 60). 
 
The application of incommensurability to this research lies in the premise that trance 
is only present in Western culture when it is either situated as Other or attributed to 
an Other, thus resulting in its exoticization.  If the meaning of Madonna is dependent 
upon a culturally and racially defined context, then so too is the meaning of trance.  
There is a fundamental incommensurability with regard to what trance is, how it 
manifests and where it belongs that is evident at both macro and micro levels:  trance 
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is something that non-Western people “do”; and trance is something one dancer of 
the same ethnic, cultural and linguistic origin may attribute to her practice while 
another may not.  The plethora of words and metaphors to describe trance-like 
behaviour (as explored in Chapter One on semantics and polysemy) is likewise 
indicative of limitless sets of competing and irreconcilable paradigms about trance.  
Such paradigms, in the case of both Maboungou and me, are predicated on race, 
skin colour, ethnicity, dance form and life experience.  In the case of the modern 
dancer who reacted with such incredulity when I suggested the attribution of trance to 
her dance practice, incommensurability was based on a difference of interpretation of 
interior, bodily experience – emotional, psychological, physical, psycho-social – and 
the words used to describe such experience.  The paradigms in this case were 
individual bodies and how they have been shaped, influenced and inculcated.  In 
later writing, Ang suggests that “moments” of incommensurability often occur when 
the presumption of commonality “falls away” (Ang, 1997, p 60).  And again, the value 
of these moments is the opportunity to recognize how difference is constructed and 
to perceive that much can be grasped even in the absence of consensus. 
 
In Choreographing Difference, Cooper Albright looks at how Maboungou and others 
– including Canadians Marie Chouinard and Louise Lecavalier, as well as Americans 
Bill T. Jones and Jawole Willa Jo Zollar – perform and destabilize difference.  “These 
dancers,” Cooper Albright argues, “are asking the audience to see the body as a 
source of cultural identity – as physical presences that move with and through 
gendered, racial and social meanings” (Cooper Albright, 1997, back cover).  While 
Ang certainly presents difference as something that can be read many ways, the 
notion of difference as unstable does not come through in her writing.  The 
categories of “Chinese”, “Asian”, “Australian”, “black”, “white” or “Other ” are more or 
less static and are chosen depending upon the circumstance and the priority given to 
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difference.  While categories may be combined as in “Chinese-Australian,” they 
cannot be transformed or transcended in the way that Cooper Albright suggests.  
Ang does not speak of “performing” difference though she is certainly aware of when 
difference is emphasized or minimized.   Perhaps Cooper Albright’s slippage is a kind 
of incommensurability where in-betweenness functions to demonstrate how 
difference is constructed – such slippages certainly have the potential to challenge 
an informed audience member to rethink prior assumptions.  Another possible 
reading might suggest that a slippage is a kind of hybridity, a neither this nor that but 
a thing that contains measures of both, simultaneously new and not new. 
 
The issue of hybridity forms part of a critique of Ang’s conception of 
incommensurability by fellow Australian feminist scholar Rita Felski in her 1997 
article “The Doxa of Difference.”  Felski argues that there is a doxa, or belief system, 
based on difference that pervades theory and politics.  Like Ang, Felski believes that 
insufficient attention has been paid to an examination of the “theoretical 
inconsistencies” and political issues that arise when discussing difference within 
feminist thought.  She argues that within feminism the “conceptual primacy of 
difference remains uncontested” and that while difference may be critiqued for 
producing an “androcentric or imperialist conception of the Other,” such criticism 
invariably assumes “existence of a “real,” more authentic difference existing beyond 
… the oppressor’s language” (Felski, 1997, p 2).  In seeking to deontologize 
difference, Felski questions whether postcolonial feminism – wherein postcolonial 
theory has already deconstructed and then subverted the insidious Othering of all 
that is not white or Western – might elucidate the conceptual and political ambiguities 
of difference within feminism.   
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In re-reading feminism through postcolonial theory, Felski hopes that a positive vision 
of alterity that is not linked to hierarchy will permit equality to emerge.  To Felski 
(following Kuhn) incommensurability does not permit disagreement, debate or 
influence if there are no common terms to address difference.  To address the 
shortcomings of both a postcolonial reading of feminism and incommensurability, 
Felski suggests that the postmodern concept of hybridity wherein there are points of 
commonality and discord would serve to unseat difference from “a position of 
absolute privilege” (1997, p 9-13).   
 
Conceiving of the absence of a trance tradition in the West as either an instance of 
incommensurability or hybridity poses some interesting questions.  If I am saying, to 
put it crudely, that non-Western cultures trance and Western cultures do not, then am 
I attempting to theorize the space between these two paradigms where an impasse 
exists (Figure 4b)?  Or am I seeking to enact a state of hybridity between those who 
trance and those who do not wherein sufficient qualities and similarities exist to link 
one sphere to the other, creating common theoretical space and/or a thing in itself 
(Figure 4c)? 
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Figure 4c.
Non-West 
trance 
West
  no
   trance
A hybrid that encompasses both? 
Or exists apart? 
 
 ?
 
 
 
 
With regards to hybridity as a means of reconciling difference, where one is seeking 
“common ground,” the resulting hybrid may be perceived to dilute the differences that 
separated the two entities – theories, people, cultures – in the first place.  In forging a 
hybrid, the risk is a loss of clarity and a loss of the boundaries that were previously 
established but, as Wittgenstein suggests, a loss of clarity does not necessarily entail 
a lack of recognition.  In response to Felski, Ang argues that a “hybridised world” still 
does not preclude cultural incommensurabilities where the achievement of common 
ground will not by default dissolve difference (1995, p 58).9  Later Felski perceives 
that Ang’s incommensurability “is less about the incompatibility of frameworks or 
paradigms … than about the incomprehensibility of particular experiential 
knowledges that … may not be fully expressible in language” (Felski, 1995, p 65).  
This is an important point.   
 
Experiential knowledges and how they are expressed in language are clearly 
stumbling blocks with regard to the discussion of trance and trance-like experiences.  
Such issues however do not preclude discussion or effective communication.  As a 
result, the goal of this research is captured in both Figures 4b and 4c where the first 
step is the recognition of an incommensurability and then the creation of a forum – a 
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theoretical middle ground – where the mechanisms that dictate who may trance and 
who may not and why are explored. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of advocating a particular framework for contextualizing 
trance, I am wary of using hybridity in conceiving of where and in what form it exists 
in the West.  Hybridity becomes very attractive when one perceives the world, as 
Appadurai does, in terms of a pan-national globalization where multiple “scapes” blur 
the lines of origin, authenticity and difference to the effect that a vibrant bricolage is 
constantly being enacted and created (Appadurai, 1999).  Yet with regard to trance, 
there are such clear distinctions based on cultural, linguistic, geographical and 
political boundaries that follow colonialist divisions that I am hesitant to disregard 
them.  One acknowledges that hybridity is at work in, for example, rave culture and 
new age ecstatic dance rituals, but as a concept, hybridity does not adequately 
characterize the West’s trance discourse.  Approaching trance as bounded is due not 
to any misplaced reverence for a colonialist past but emerges from the belief that, in 
leaving certain boundaries intact, how trance is implicated in boundary formation and 
maintenance and how dancers in the West interact with those boundaries may be 
explored. 
 
Finally, Ang provides one other means of theorizing Maboungou’s relation to trance.  
In “I’m a Feminist but … ‘Other’ Women and Postnational Feminism,” Ang quotes 
American political theorist Jane Flax who states that “feminist theories, like other 
forms of post-modernism, should encourage us to tolerate and interpret ambivalence, 
ambiguity and multiplicity” (Flax in Ang, 1995, p 67).  Ang uses Flax to support her 
own argument that instead of celebrating difference as a “utopian weapon” against 
the “hegemonic structures of power,” feminism should embrace ambivalence, 
ambiguity and multiplicity without trying to assimilate [or hybridize] it (1995, p 66).  
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The resulting disorder and instability, Flax suggests, is a more accurate reflection of 
the current state of the world once again suggestive of Wittgenstein’s assertion that a 
lack of clarity does not preclude recognition.  Ang agrees, arguing that ambivalence, 
ambiguity and multiplicity are “necessary conditions of existence” for those who are 
invariably positioned as peripheral to the white, Western centre.  One could certainly 
argue that Maboungou’s relationship to trance is characterized by these qualifiers, 
necessitated by her need to function effectively and carve a niche in a world that is 
not of her making. 
 
Maboungou’s conscious choice to use trance as a means to market her work and to 
align herself with stereotypical images of black, African dancers, constructed by the 
West and sustained by Canadian multicultural arts policy is an example of such 
ambivalence and ambiguity.  The fact that she uses trance but does not trance 
herself is indicative of how she, as an Other – a position that she and the 
establishment share in sustaining – is positioned vis-à-vis her environment.  
Ambivalence to her relationship with trance is a mechanism by which she can exist 
and work without being assimilated by the West.  That she is simultaneously a 
dancer who trances and a dancer who does not trance, does not hybridize her 
position.  Each manifestation of her trance relationship is distinctly constructed and 
mobilized as the situation or audience demand. 
 
If the pursuit and recognition of difference is attained through a continuous dialogue 
that constructs and defines culture, then there will always be points of sameness and 
difference, commensurability and incommensurability depending upon how the 
Self/Other dichotomy is deployed.  Maboungou insists that it is European audiences 
that question her modern aesthetic, that insist she fix her ethnicity to a particular 
geography and attribute trance to her performances.   In the end, trance may itself be 
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a slippage, an incommensurability between states, the key to seeing the in-between 
of performance identities that function to challenge notions of resistance and 
conformity.  Recognizing the potential for trance to be a meaningful construct in the 
cultural analysis of contemporary dance does not require that dancers from either 
side of the West/non-West remain Othered or engage in self-exoticization, it requires 
that trance be de-Othered without disregarding difference, not in an attempt to 
universalize or naturalize the phenomenon or to blur the boundaries between those 
who trance and those who do not, but to move forward with the commitment made by 
dance studies to see all dances forms as ethnic. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1  Maboungou teaches feminist philosophy at Laval University's Collège 
Montmorency in Québec.   
 
2  Sources: Decalo et al, 1995; Harrison-Church, 1980; Kirk-Greene & Bach, 1995; 
Manning, 1988; and Martin, 1996.
3  Sources: Case, 2002; Dickinson, 1995; and Vachon, 1982.
4  Expo 67 World's Fair in Montréal highlighted the culmination of Québec's "Quiet 
Revolution," a period marked by a resurgence of pride in Québec's French cultural 
heritage, a lessening of the influence of the Catholic Church in state affairs and a 
determination to assert Québec's place as a modern and distinct society. 
5  Right Hon. P.E. Trudeau (Prime Minister) addressing the House of Commons in 
response to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism on October 8, 
1971 stated: “It was the view of the royal commission, shared by the government 
and, I am sure, by all Canadians, that there cannot be one cultural policy for 
Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a 
third for all others. For although there are two official languages, there is no official 
culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or 
group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly … A policy 
of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government 
as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians. Such a 
policy should help break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies. 
National unity if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be 
founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect 
for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions. A 
vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence. It can form 
the base of a society which is based on fair play for all.” 
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(http://www.canadahistory.com/sections/documents/trudeau_-
_on_multiculturalism.htm) **This site is no longer available on the web. 
6 The first FIND festival took place in 1985 after a period of renewal within the 
Canadian dance community that began in the late 1970s.  In the fifteen years that 
FIND existed, the festival earned praise, respect and support from the international 
dance community, yet within Canada, FIND has been criticized for failing to fully 
represent the Canadian dance community by seldom programming dance artists 
and companies from outside of Québec.  The 2000 festival titled Afrique - 
Aller/retour (“Africa – Going/Returning” or “Coming/Going”) was criticized for being 
tokenistic. 
 
7 There are many approaches to the issue of incommensurability and I am choosing 
to deal only with those articulated by Ang and Felski because of their relevance to 
this particular case study, situated as they are in feminism and subaltern studies 
from a similar multicultural milieu.  For a survey of the multiple debates on 
incommensurability, see Bernstein (1989). 
 
8  Similar theories were also proposed by Austrian philosopher Paul Feyerabrand 
who later became famous for his anarchic theories of knowledge. 
 
9  Felski and Ang engaged in a number of exchanges that were published alongside 
the original “Doxa of Difference” article.  
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CHAPTER FIVE Margie Gillis: Reflections of Trance and Expressionism 
 
 
Resting the back of her left hand against her cheek, the dancer pauses and looks 
forlornly to her left as though to meet another’s gaze.  Troubled by what she sees, 
her right hand comes up and pushes her left hand away.  She retreats and her arms 
sweep around her body.  She bows, right leg reaching away, hair cascading and then 
turns in upon herself, wrapping her arms around her body and lifting herself into the 
air on one foot, arms ascending.  She begins a series of soft, lilting turns, alternately 
rising and sinking, changing direction, leading with her chest, then with her hands.  
Her arms carve soaring arcs in the air, reaching out and then returning to caress her 
torso, gathering and churning.   Though she moves swiftly, at times, her upper body 
lags behind.  She allows her head to fall back in an attitude of rapture, arms 
outstretched, resisting the impulse that propels her forward, hair streaming down her 
back.  Running and turning she prepares for a sequence of shifts and suspensions, 
drawing out some movements while punctuating others.  Tossed and tormented, 
there is a sense of urgency, of upheaval, but just as quickly she composes herself, 
finding equilibrium.  Moving towards stillness, she revolves, her hands binding and 
unfolding, before presenting herself to her audience, and curling slowly forward, 
smiling to herself.  She rebounds and unfurls, springing with arms and legs apart and 
swings her left leg across her body, one arm enfolding her waist, the other pulling 
away. Changing her focus to the diagonal, she lunges and lengthens, one arm 
circling, increasing her momentum before reeling herself in and then darting away. 
The piece ends in silence with combinations of mercurial hops and flailing turns that 
become increasingly uninhibited, her skirt riding up to expose her thighs and black 
briefs.  As the lights go down, her laboured breathing and plaintive cries become 
audible, leaving the impression that she is being shut out or swallowed by the 
encroaching darkness. 
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Hailed as the “Isadora Duncan of the late 20th century,” Canadian modern dancer 
Margie Gillis is a national celebrity (Crabb, website, 1995).  Works such as A 
Complex Simplicity of Love (2003), performed to George Frederic Handel’s haunting 
aria Lascia ch’io pianga from his opera Rinaldo, captivate and mesmerize audiences 
with their “swirling, passionate, stage-filled movement” (Citron, website, 2005).   
 
Gillis’ complex and iconic image is created and enacted through a pastiche of 
information and performances - her choreography, her biography, press information 
and media coverage, reviews of her work, the way she speaks about herself in public 
forums such as her website and dance dialogues, and her interaction with members 
of her audience.  What is absent from these interpretations is acknowledgement of 
Gillis’ indebtedness to trance.   Trance – what Gillis calls “transformation” to avoid the 
“new age-y” connotations (Gillis, personal interview, 2006) – pervades her creative, 
choreographic and performance processes and is implicated in theorizing the vital 
and visceral connections she makes between herself, her work and her audience.  
Asked to contextualize the role trance plays in her creative work, it is clear that trance 
functions discursively and is rooted in a cultural and rhetorical context that is 
collaboratively constructed.  Trance becomes an-Other entry point – one that has not 
been touched upon during her lifetime – for interpreting both her role as a performer 
and her performing body.    
 
Responding to the centrality of trance in Gillis’ work, a number of possible readings 
emerge.  This chapter addresses how she, the critics and her audience portray her, 
and how these multiple viewpoints coalesce to influence her approach to and use of 
trance.  Following biographical details of Gillis’ life, the first reading introduces the 
concept of Expressionism in visual art and modern dance and argues for parallels 
between her use of trance and the tenets of the genre.  I argue that Gillis channels 
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the Expressionist tendencies typical of the early moderns – in particular, mysticism, 
primitivism and an indebtedness to Freud – while maintaining overt connections to a 
postmodern present.  Constructing Gillis as an Expressionist dancer not only 
supports her use of trance but also creates a continuum of trance activity in 
contemporary dance stretching back to the earliest years of the genre.  Additional 
readings of Gillis as a shaman and/or charismatic based in her experiences as a 
child, her capacity to enter trance states and the mesmerizing effect she can have on 
members of her audience are also explored.  Dance critic John Martin’s concept of 
metakinesis and philosopher John Dewey’s theories on the relationship between 
artist and audience, first introduced during the same era that gave rise to the 
Expressionist movement, offer anachronistic but not necessarily inappropriate 
options for contextualizing Gillis’ impact on members of her audience in the present.   
Finally, after analyzing my reflections on Gillis’ participation in a post-show dance 
dialogue, I turn to critic Wyman’s take on Gillis’s relationship to her audience that 
filters all possible readings through a potentially controversial lens. 
 
Gillis, a dancer, choreographer, teacher and artistic director of her own company, 
was born in Montréal, Quebec in 1953.  Her parents were both Olympic skiers and 
she and her three siblings inherited their parent’s athleticism: a sister pursued 
freestyle skiing, a brother became a professional hockey player, and Margie and her 
brother Christopher became modern dancers.  Gillis started dance lessons at age 
three and perceives that she consciously began to cultivate a style of her own in her 
early teens.  Gillis’ first solo performance as a professional took place in Vancouver 
in 1975.  In 1979, she became the first Western modern dancer and teacher to tour 
to China after the Cultural Revolution.  In 1981, Gillis was appointed Canadian 
Cultural Ambassador by then-Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau. The same year 
she founded Margie Gillis Dance Foundation to support her activities as a solo artist.   
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Gillis’ career as a soloist was strongly influenced by her experiences as a child.  
Investment in the primacy of bodily response, in particular the transformation of 
subjective reflection to objective reasoning, may have set Gillis on the path towards 
Expressionism.  Gillis states that throughout her childhood and adolescence, her 
parents emphasized a fully integrated kinaesthetic approach to learning and 
experiencing their bodies.  When one of the Gillis children fell or misjudged their body 
positioning while in the process of a physical act – running, jumping, throwing, 
washing dishes – one or other parent would ask them what falling felt like, what they 
saw, smelled or imagined before, during and after the fall.  The children were urged 
to verbalize their recollected sensations and analyze their responses at the time and 
then in retrospect.  In this way, from an early age, Gillis learned to value, engage and 
reflect on the information and stimuli that she derived from her moving body.  She 
learned that her body was a source of endless knowledge, complexity and nuance 
and that physical actions could not be construed as either positive or negative 
regardless of any possible repercussions (Gillis, personal interview, 2006).  If, as 
dance and performance studies theorist Mark Franko suggests, early 20th-century 
choreography “initiated claims to universal authenticity through purging subjectivism 
(emotion) and privileging the moving body’s presence (expression),” then Gillis’ early 
experiences may have prepared her to embody and espouse Expressionist principles 
(1995, p x).   
 
From 1905 to 1925, Expressionism eclipsed prevailing schools of thought in the 
visual arts.  In painting, Expressionism supplanted the subdued earth tones of placid 
realism with a palette of vividly luminescent colours, dynamic compositions and 
imaginative abstractions.  In theatre and literature, the shift was equally dramatic 
where a strong sense of intellectualism combined with expansive gestures, graphic 
visions, exuberant emotions, raw language and forceful styles of verbal expression, 
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resulting in a previously unexplored breadth of intensity.  In dance and music, 
Expressionism evolved from the juxtaposition of romanticism and modernism in the 
early years of the 20th century.  Through modernism’s emphasis on the removal of 
unnecessary or obfuscating layers of technique and artifice, the romantic notion of 
emotional expression reinvented itself so as to transcend the personal.  This new 
emotional terrain that favoured a depersonalization of subjectivity gave rise to the 
universalizing goal of Expressionist art.  Developing alongside the Expressionist 
movement in visual art, Expressionist dance became a means of communicating a 
common and inescapable reality through the immense power of the human body and 
spirit (Behr, 1993; Barron, 1997; Lasko, 2003; Welsh, 2004; Donahue, 2005; Walker, 
2005).   
 
Central to the development of Expressionism was the growing significance of 
Sigmund Freud and the advent of psychoanalysis.  Evident in the writings of Franz 
Kafka, Thomas Mann, Hermann Hesse, Ernst Bloch, and Otto Gross, as well as 
Anna Seghers and Christa Wolf in Germany, where explorations of the human 
condition are privileged over narrative, and in the powerfully emotive paintings of 
Oskar Kokoschka, Gustav Klimt, Egon Schiele and Karl Kraus of the Viennese 
school that inspired the early abstract movement of Wassily Kandinsky and Franz 
Marc (and later the Abstract Expressionists of the 1940s and 1950s), psychoanalysis 
was an important and pervasive influence on early 20th-century Expressionist 
aesthetics (Jolowicz, 1920; Mitzman, 1977; Bloch, 1998; Alfonso & Eckardt, 2005).  
Freud’s ideas, in particular the importance of “the unconscious, psychic determinism, 
the concept of primary process, the technique of free association, and the 
interpretation of dreams” (Alfonso, website, 2007), as well as the Oedipal conflict 
(from which the Self/Other dichotomy derives) and the recognition of culturally 
endorsed formalism and repression (Sharp, 1978), became integral to the articulation 
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of modernist principles.  Connecting Expressionist tendencies to ekstasis and 
powerful “out-of-body” experiences, British visual artist and lecturer in psychoanalytic 
studies Stephen James Newton argues that Expressionist art was conceived as a 
“natural medium of healing” and that modern abstract painting offered the “potential 
for a direct engagement with the peculiar phenomena of the oceanic feeling … 
[through] representations of consciousness” (website, 1997).  Freud’s findings 
provoked ferment in artistic circles that informed new directions in philosophy – 
particularly Wittgenstein – literature, and visual arts, as well as theatre, music and 
dance (Janik, 1973; Schorske, 1980; Crawford & Crawford, 1993, Cernuschi, 2002; 
Press, 2002). 
 
Exemplified perhaps most notably by Duncan in Europe and America, and by Mary 
Wigman as part of the intensely cultivated ausdrucktanz movement in Germany, 
Expressionism became an extremely influential paradigm in the evolution of modern 
dance.  The Expressionist quality of the early modern dance movement combined 
elements of romanticism, primitivism and mysticism in a modernist form.  In the 
decade following the First World War, dancers and choreographers were captivated 
with the notion of creating art that was larger than themselves and indicative of a 
universality of experience.  As American dance critic Marcia Siegel describes it, the 
goal of Expressionistic dance was to use emotion as “a conduit to … universal 
feelings” (1989, p 15).  As such, Expressionist dance did not come from a discretely 
personal point of view but was intended to be emblematic of a greater and pressing 
reality.  Key, then, to this endeavour was the notion of spirituality, an inner sense of 
something greater than oneself and recognition of existence that transcends one's 
immediate circumstances.  As a result, Siegel continues, Expressionists sought to 
“know and to dramatize their connections with nature, with archaeological time, with 
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mystery and magic, and with other human beings living in their own time and place” 
(1989, p 15). 
 
The early Expressionist dancers eschewed performing with troupes and worked 
outside the calculating reach of impresarios, preferring to forge independent careers.  
Duncan, Ruth St. Denis and Loie Fuller sought recognition in America and abroad as 
solo performers, choreographers and arbiters of their own, unique work.  Their 
relative autonomy was part of a new era that saw the visibility of women in society 
raised through the women’s movement of the 19th century and the suffrage 
movement of the early 20th century.  Duncan in particular was singled out for her 
“radical individualism” (Daly, 1995, p 163), where her career as a “self-producing 
female soloist effectively challenged the separation of public and private spheres that 
immured women in the confines of domesticity” (Franko, 1995, p 2).  These early 
modern dancers positioned themselves “at once choreographer, performer and 
manager” where dance became “an intensely personal expression of the self” 
(Manning & Benson, 1986, p 32).  Perhaps more pragmatically, the trend allowed 
dancers such as St. Denis to be regarded as “self-made” (Mester, 1997, p 9).    
 
From the beginning, Gillis fashioned herself as a soloist, preferring to choreograph 
and perform her own works.  Since 1973, Gillis has created more than seventy solo 
pieces including signature works such as Waltzing Matilda (1978), Bloom (1989) and 
What the Wind Whispers (2001).   Adding to her extensive oeuvre, Canadian 
choreographers Linda Rabin, Paul-André Fortier, Stephanie Ballard and Christopher 
Gillis (Margie’s brother) and American choreographers Pauline Koner, Irene Dowd 
and Martha Clark have also created solo works for Gillis.  Gillis has also worked with 
other choreographers in both duet and ensemble pieces, most notably with Paul 
Taylor, her brother Christopher of the Paul Taylor Dance Company and former 
National Ballet of Canada artistic director James Kudelka.  In these contexts, 
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however, Gillis remains a headline act.  For Kudelka’s Dracula (1985), commissioned 
by Les Grands Ballets Canadien de Montréal, Gillis was billed as a “guest artist.”  In 
addition to her billing, Gillis also appears to draw attention to herself when 
performing.  In a review of Icarus at Night (1991), a piece created by her brother 
Christopher for the Paul Taylor Company, critic Jack Anderson notes that  
 
some women served as comforting presences [while] one appeared to 
be both a mourner and a symbol of indomitability. The role's sculptural 
qualities were emphasized by Margie Gillis … who was a guest artist 
for this occasion. 
Anderson, website, 1993. 
 
 
It seems apt then that journalist Elizabeth Zimmer in an article for The Village Voice 
on the choreographic processes of solo artists concludes that Gillis is “basically a 
loner” (Zimmer, 2004).  Zimmer’s statement seems analogous to Franko’s iconic 
image of Duncan as the “lone figure on an empty stage dancing to music” (1995, p 
4). 
  
Along with, or perhaps as a result of, her acute kinaesthetic education and inclination 
towards solitude, Gillis was aware also from an early age of her capacity to enter 
altered states of consciousness.  She uses her capacity to experience what she 
refers to as “transformation” for creative, choreographic and expressive purposes.  
As a professional dancer and choreographer, transformation functions in all areas of 
her artistic life and output.  Her method for accessing transformative states has 
formalized over years of experimenting and improvisation to become a technique that 
she now teaches to others called “dancing from the inside.”   Gillis teaches this 
technique in workshops, residencies and master classes to novice and professional 
dancers across Canada and the United States.  She believes that all people, to a 
greater or lesser extent, share the capacity to access transformative states and that 
through awareness and self-actualization dancers can attune themselves to the 
potential of transformation as a creative tool. 
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 As a creative tool, transformation forms the basis of Gillis’ movement explorations in 
the studio.  Working from physical impulses, images, feelings or ideas, Gillis allows 
what she refers to as her subconscious to take over and guide her movement.  While 
her choice of imagery may be predetermined, the impetus to move in response to the 
idea is not.  Gillis’ method for entering a state of trance is based on the notion of 
being sensitized to 
 
the connection between thought, emotion, spirit and body. This is the 
natural kinetic process whereby our inner “landscape” translates into 
electrical impulses that move through our nervous system transmitting 
the message to the muscles and connective tissue as to how and with 
what quality to move.  
      Gillis, website, 2006. 
 
 
Gillis allows movement to evolve organically – a concept all very much a part of the 
Expressionist movement – allowing physical responses to take precedent without 
censorship or conscious direction.  Movements ebb and flow, subtle and minute or 
expansive and chaotic, allegro or adagio, staccato or legato.  Gillis does not know 
where her explorations will take her, but simply opens herself up to their potential.  
While this may sound formless, she is very clear about the intention of each 
movement exploration and goes into the studio seeking elaboration of a specific 
theme or image.  By mapping the flow of images or impulses in a journal and 
reviewing her notes before each rehearsal, she can access the same range of 
movements in successive sessions in the studio.  Altering the order of the images will 
alter the outcome.  In this way she creates a score for herself that guides her 
transformative journey, a process she perceives as akin to “peeling back layers of 
skin from an onion” (Gillis, personal interview, 2006).  Each session draws her 
deeper into her unconscious and solidifies the links between interior experience, 
kinaesthetic awareness and physical movement. 
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The creation process for a piece can take many months or even years since the 
possibilities for movement and image integration mature and change as she carries 
the ideas through time.  Gradually Gillis will bring trusted colleagues into the studio to 
watch and comment on the movement she has discovered.  For many years Gillis 
invited former dancer and choreographer Stephanie Ballard to observe her in the 
studio, but most recently Gillis has been using Daniel Jackson as her “artistic 
advisor.”  Jackson has been active as a dancer, artistic director and rehearsal 
director in Montréal since 1961.  Elizabeth Zimmer interviewed Jackson for her article 
on “co-pilots” in modern dance: 
 
“I started out coaching her dance,” says Jackson, “and realized I was 
making a huge mistake. I entered a place of silence which enabled me 
to become as much a creator as Margie is. A good coach is also the 
dancer. Both of us are the student, and both the teacher. It has 
nothing to do with how I'm going to make it better the next day. It's 
about the joy we share. We keep ourselves fresh. That's why I'm in 
this business at this age.” 
 
Jackson in Zimmer, website, 2004. 
 
 
Gillis states that Jackson’s presence in the studio and feedback helps her to “go 
deeper” and to take greater risks with the movement.  To some degree Jackson’s 
relationship with Gillis parallels that of an analyst as he works to focus, clarify and 
challenge her choreographic choices.   Although Gillis will work consistently with the 
same image score, at this stage of the process the movement becomes more 
formally choreographed through the change from a self-reflective to a more outwardly 
directed focus.  The movement is still absolutely tied to her interior ideologue but the 
work is now fashioned to address and project Gillis’ intention in order that an 
audience may apprehend it.  In effect, through her explorations, Gillis creates her 
own movement language that may be indecipherable to an outsider.  The 
introduction of an observer forces Gillis to reshape or redirect her movement, to 
sharpen or clarify it, so that the ideas she is seeking to convey are poignant and 
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intelligible.  Gillis continues to enter trance states but, with each rehearsal, the 
patterns of movement become more fixed and consistent. 
 
In the performance phase, Gillis continues to rely on transformation as an expressive 
tool.  She follows her image score as it has been developed and set, once again 
allowing herself to enter into an altered state of consciousness.  Her pieces, she 
explains, are never about steps or counts, but are visceral manifestations of her 
psychological explorations (Gillis, personal interview, 2006).  The rigour with which 
she approaches her creative process ensures that her performances are not free-
form improvisations.  While she invents and then performs her choreography through 
the medium of trance there is a coherent structure to the work she produces.  Her 
movement is constructed via “inner visions being made physical with searing 
honesty” (Greenaway, 1997, p 58) and in performance, transformation remains key.  
Even when performing the works of other choreographers with multiple dancers, 
Gillis claims to rely on transformation to inject the choreography with her own 
personal style (Gillis, personal interview, 2006).   She maintains that even when 
dancing another choreographer’s movement in a trance state, she is able to stay true 
to the choreography and has not been responsible for any missteps or mishaps on 
stage.  Presumably choreographers choose to cast Gillis for her virtuosic qualities 
and direct her accordingly. 
 
The Expressionist movement also combined aspects of occultism and mysticism.  In 
her article on the influence of occultism and mysticism in the evolution of modern art, 
art historian Linda Dalrymple Henderson defines occultism as “matters regarded as 
involving the action or influence of supernatural agencies or some secret knowledge 
of them.”  She points out that this sense of hidden or secret connects occultism to the 
19th-century concept of esotericism that was used in reference to Kabala, 
Rosicrucianism, spiritualism and theosophy.  Mysticism, she argues, has a more 
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specific meaning and application encompassing “the experience of mystical union or 
direct communion with ultimate reality.”  Henderson suggests that although mysticism 
can and has been treated as a subset of thought and practice under the umbrella of 
occultism, in terms of its effect on visual art, it deserves separate consideration 
(1987, p 5).  Certainly, Dianne S. Howe in her exploration of mysticism in the work of 
Wigman would appear to agree.  She argues that mysticism is “perhaps the most 
notable constituent” of the German Expressionist movement wherein the “desire to 
achieve spiritual union with something or someone outside oneself” was tantamount 
(Howe, 1987, p 19).  Howe’s position parallels that of Victor Miesel, a specialist in 
19th- and 20th-century art, who comments that “at all costs” the German 
Expressionists strived to “reach out beyond their individual egos and beyond their art 
to establish contact with mankind, life and even God” (1970, p 3).  This desire for 
spiritual communion led the Expressionists to embrace Eastern belief systems often 
in ambiguous terms, such as St. Denis’ depictions of “Eastern deities” (Mester, 1997, 
p 9) or more specifically as in Duncan’s interest in theosophy (Roseman, 2004, p 41).  
 
Gillis sees similarities between her practice and some of the tenets of Sufism – a 
mystic tradition within Islam based on the pursuit of a singular, spiritual truth.  
Sufism’s search for one truth, its aspiration of unity with God through the rejection of 
one’s self and its mystical tradition once again align Gillis’ practise with Expressionist 
principles.  In particular, Gillis appreciates Sufism’s focus on beliefs attained through 
mystic practices where Truth or God is based on the notion of divine love and she 
draws parallels between her understanding of the Sufi notion of divine love, and her 
own experiences of transformation.  She invokes Sufi-derived concepts to describe 
the effect that trance has on her body and on her interactions with the world beyond 
herself (Gillis, personal interview, 2006).   
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Siegel suggests that the spiritualist tendency in Expressionist dance did not take the 
form of “personal uplift or ecstasy” (1989, p 15).  Franko in Dancing 
Modernism/Performing Politics sees ecstasy in Expressionism as derived from 
romantic constructs that were transformed by modernism.  Citing literary critic M. H. 
Abrams, who has written extensively on romanticism, Franko articulates expression 
as a “phenomenon of overflow that signifies the internal made external” (Abrams in 
Franko, 1995, p x).  Abrams in turn cites literary theorist Friedrich Schlegel who 
defined the term expression as “the inner [being] pressed out as though by a force 
alien to us” (Schlegel, in Franko, 1995, p x).  Such a romantic notion of expression, 
Franko argues, privileges emotion – something that is personal and socio-culturally 
influenced – while expression in its post-romantic, modernist sense privileges a 
depersonalized or universal subjectivity.   Here then at issue is the emphasis on the 
notion of the personal.  Siegel’s claim that the spiritualist tendency of expression did 
not take the form of “personal uplift or ecstasy,” does not suggest the absence of 
ecstasy but distinguishes its purpose and/or its intention.  Susan Manning and 
Melissa Benson, in their survey of early modern dance in Germany, perceive in the 
dances of Wigman the embodiment of the “spirit of expressionism” and in particular 
its “pervasive angst and escape into ecstasy” (1986, p 34).  Manning and Benson 
draw attention to the ecstatic aspect of Wigman’s work, rather than of Wigman 
herself.  As Wigman herself expressed it, her dancers do not “dance feelings.  
Feelings are too precise, too distinct.”  Instead Wigman was concerned with the 
“change and transformation of spiritual states as variously manifested” (Wigman in 
Manning & Benson, 1986, p 34).  The key is the significance of the ecstatic state. 
Though ecstasy may be generated by the dancer, its significance exists apart from its 
physical manifestation wherein the Expressionist body is a vehicle for universalized 
ecstasy. 
 
 174
Locating the primitivist roots within Expressionism points not only to its shared 
celebration of the "unconscious," but also to its foundation in mysticism, symbology 
and occultism.  Primitivism is an artistic movement that looks to early human history 
and/or non-Western sources for inspiration, making use of themes or stylistic 
elements from prehistory and tribal cultures that would appear to exemplify both the 
sacred and the pure.  Implicit in primitivism is a sense that non-Western cultures 
were more connected or invested in the workings of the unconscious.  Hence the 
work of Duncan, St. Denis and Graham in America and Wigman, Laban and Kurt 
Joos in Europe explored sacred themes and found inspiration in Eastern texts and 
myth.  According to Janet Lynn Roseman in Dance Was Her Religion, Duncan, St. 
Denis and Graham were “following in the tradition of the mystics” and “seeking 
alignment with divine forces to achieve both ecstasy and enlightenment.”  Here 
Roseman suggests that the potential to enter ecstatic and mystical states was 
“implicit in the creation of sacred choreographies” (2004, p xx).  Roseman’s 
emphasis on the sacred seems to privilege a contemporary primitivist reading 
whereby Duncan, et al. were not simply influenced by prevailing ideologies, but were 
themselves mystics.  There is a sense in Roseman’s writing that these early modern 
dancer/choreographers, separated as they are from the present by time and space, 
were themselves more connected or invested in the workings of the unconscious.   
By Roseman’s logic, then, to work in an Expressionist style in the present is not to 
work with principles of the movement but to channel the spirit of Duncan, St. Denis or 
Graham. 
 
In contrast to Roseman’s interpretation that situates Expressionist dancers as 
mystics, Howe, in an article that predates her 1996 work Individuality and 
Expression: The Aesthetics of the New German Dance, 1908-1936, writes about the 
influence of mysticism in the philosophy and choreography of Wigman.  Howe states 
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that Wigman was critical of the “self-centred Ego-Dancer” for her inability to express 
that which lies beyond herself and to affect others.  She believed that dance could 
“give profile and shape” to spiritual and religious experience, to that which transcends 
individual subjectivity.  For Wigman, dance and ecstasy were intrinsically linked and 
her contemporaries regarded her work as visionary.  She emphasized the notion of 
ritual, employed occult and spiritual themes and derived inspiration from symbolic-
primitive sources (Howe, 1987, p 19, 21).   Howe concludes that Wigman “sought to 
make visible the invisible and to draw out the mystic orientation to life and art” (1987, 
p 20).    
 
Howe’s treatment of Wigman as a proponent of the mystical aspect of the (German) 
Expressionist movement through the purpose, process and content of her work 
would seem an equally appropriate basis for analyzing Gillis.  In 1933, Rudolph Bach 
published an interview with Wigman in which she answers the question “what is 
dance?”: 
 
Space, Symbol; finitely formed, penetrated and built with infinity. 
… 
Dance is unity of expression and function, physicality filled with light, 
giving soul to form.  Without ecstasy, no dance! 
… 
Dance exists in people as a tendency, as fateful regulation, wherever 
it breaks through and wherever it leads. 
… 
Body and soul are in dance as a polarized unity and a transformation 
of one pole which necessarily leads to a transformation of the other. 
 
Bach in Howe, 1987, p 21.  
 
 
Compare excerpts from Gillis’ “credo” published on her website: 
 
For me, simplicity or a truth arises (even if that is mystery or 
confusion).  
 
The idea, or state of being, creates architecture and method of 
creation. 
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I follow an inner story line to include an outward conclusion.  
 
I create ritual (the crystallized experience of life), for the purpose of 
sharing and holding a place for Love, transformation, compassion, 
inspiration, catharsis and experiential wisdom. 
  
I feel for nature in my creation, or re-creation.  
 
This spirit that plays through body, this great love, this wholeness of 
experiential truth.  
        
  Gillis, website, 2006. 
 
 
These statements engender a sense of timelessness, as though the authors were 
engaged in relating a prophecy.  The need to have a credo or statement of belief is in 
itself remarkable. 
 
Though more than seventy years apart Wigman and Gillis share notions of ecstasy or 
catharsis, transformation, faith in humanity, finite and infinite, birth and rebirth, fateful 
regulation and inevitable conclusion, luminous and numinous, and the simultaneous 
division and unity of body and soul or body and spirit.  To this Gillis adds the value 
she places on ritual, but this is inferred elsewhere in Wigman’s work.   
 
Similarities between Wigman and Gillis do not end there.  In creating dances 
Wigman, according to Howe, sought to “make visible the invisible” (1987, p 20).  
Gillis refers to her own method of creating movement as “dancing from the inside.”  
Wigman relied on her mystic sensibility to create choreography, often “overcome by 
visions” and “frightened” by the powerful forces outside herself that drew her towards 
certain themes or impulses (Howe, 1987, p 20).  Likewise in performance, Wigman 
spoke of releasing herself to “a higher force,” “divine consummation,” relinquishing 
any sense of conscious control and attaining “oneness with the cosmos” (Howe, 
1987, p 20).   Howe discusses Wigman’s use of death as a motif that was common in 
the Expressionist movement to signify transcendence and the potential for salvation 
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(1987, p 20).  After her brother Christopher died tragically of AIDS, Gillis found solace 
in the notion of renewal through dance’s cathartic potential:  "It is a ritualised 
expression of what our experience is as human beings” she explains in an interview 
in 1997, “We all have sorrow, we all have joy … It is the process of nature … the 
miracle of life” (Bernard, website, 1997).  Clearly the philosophical underpinnings of 
Gillis’ choreographic and performance processes mirror Wigman’s, working as she 
does with Expressionist themes as well as images, impulses and ideas drawn from 
her subconscious that shape and guide her movement and that are connected to 
trance. 
 
The similarities between Gillis and Wigman, and Gillis and Duncan would clearly 
position Gillis as an Expressionist dancer with strong mystic associations.  Yet there 
is an additional characteristic of Gillis’ life and work that would suggest a different 
interpretation – one that is still in keeping with the Expressionist form.  In her 
Notebook published in 1973, Martha Graham asks, “what are the techniques of 
ecstasy?”  Roseman interprets this question as relating to Graham’s 
acknowledgement of the potential to enter ecstatic or mystical states implicit in the 
creation of “sacred choreographies” (1996, p xx).  Yet the phrase “techniques of 
ecstasy” is also a direct reference to Romanian scholar of comparative religions 
Mircea Eliade’s seminal work Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy published 
in 1951.  One cannot know how deeply invested Graham was in shamanic lore but 
her inclusion of the role of the Shaman in her Rite of Spring (1984) would suggest a 
keen interest.   Such overt references to shamans and shamanism in Graham’s work 
can be traced not only through Expressionism’s incorporation of “primitive” concepts, 
but also through Graham’s association with Joseph Campbell, the American writer on 
mythology and comparative religion.  Campbell and Graham, were acquainted while 
on faculty at Sarah Lawrence College in New York state and also through Campbell’s 
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marriage to Jean Erdman, one Graham’s dancers.  Campbell, in his study of the 
myth of the hero, applied his theories of the Monomyth (a word he borrowed from 
James Joyce), to describe a universal pattern that is the essence of heroic tales in 
every culture and common to the initiation patterns in cultures that practice 
shamanism.1  
 
The combination of her capacity to enter trance states, her at times profound 
connection with her audience, and her Expressionist tendencies might lead one 
consider that Gillis, particularly in performance, possesses certain shamanistic 
qualities.  Such a hypothesis, though controversial, may be argued on a number of 
levels.  For example, in many cultures where shamanism is practiced, the shaman 
takes on his or her clients’ physical and mental illnesses and through dancing and 
ritualized acts and/or props, enters a trance state that allows him/her to communicate 
with the spirits.  The shaman seeks to propitiate the spirits in order that the clients 
may be cured and/or find relief from what ails them.  This is how the role of the 
shaman in the kut ceremonies of Korea (Covell, 1984; Lee, 1981; Harvey 1979), the 
zar cult in the Sudan (Deagon, 1994; al Nagar, 1987) and the Jombee rituals in 
Montserrat (Desmangles, 1989) have been interpreted by ethnographers.  While 
Gillis does not actively engage with either her trance states or members of her 
audience in this manner, there are some interesting parallels when one considers the 
following observations:  Gillis appears to have a very significant effect on members of 
her audience.  In her most coherent example, following a performance a very tall 
woman came backstage.  When she entered Gillis’ dressing room, the tall woman 
asked where she might find Margie Gillis.  Gillis replied that she was Margie Gillis 
and the woman refused to believe that Gillis, at only five foot, three inches was the 
same “tall dancer” that the woman had just seen perform.  When Gillis asked her to 
elaborate, the woman explained that she was quite certain she had just seen an 
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extremely tall woman like herself dancing proudly and assertively on stage.  To the 
tall woman’s mind, this “tall dancer” performed her tallness without apology or 
meekness and so she had come backstage to tell that dancer how inspiring and 
healing her performance was.  Though she went away clearly confused and 
disappointed, Gillis was certain that her performance was a help to the woman who 
treated her tallness as an affliction (Gillis, personal interview, 2006).  This anecdote 
suggests parallels once again between Gillis and Duncan.  In Done into Dance: 
Isadora Duncan in America, Daly explores Duncan’s “expressive body,” describing 
how Duncan’s audiences found in her dancing a “release for [their] own impulses of 
expression” and the fulfillment of “satisfied longing.”  Daly describes that from the 
beginning of her career, Duncan sought to “reveal not only her own inner stirrings, 
but her spectators’ too” (1995, p 120-121).   
 
Whether as a defence mechanism to traumatic psychological events in her childhood 
(she suffered a nervous breakdown at age eight), as a process towards self-healing 
or simply a tendency towards daydreaming and introversion, Gillis’ ability to 
“transform” herself became an intrinsic aspect of her personality.  “I was never there 
as a child,” she explains, “I was always somewhere else” (Gillis, personal interview, 
2006).  Whatever circumstances or qualities predispose Gillis to enter trance states, 
she has continued to develop and hone this particular aptitude in her creative work.  
It could be argued that Gillis’ nervous breakdown as a child was her “calling” to 
become a shaman.  In describing the difference between priests and shamans 
Campbell provides a basis for suggesting that Gillis’ nervous breakdown could be 
construed as a psychological crisis that predicted her future vocation as a shaman: 
 
the priest is the socially initiated, ceremonially inducted member of a 
recognized religious organization, where he holds a certain rank and 
functions as the tenant of an office that was held by others before him,  
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while the shaman is one who, as a consequence of a personal 
psychological crisis, has gained a certain power of his own.  
 
Campbell, 1976, p 231. 
 
 
A shaman may be initiated via a serious illness, by being struck by lightning, or by a 
near-death experience and there usually is a set of cultural images associated with 
each method of initiation. According to Eliade, such imagery often includes being 
transported to the spirit world and interacting with beings inhabiting it, meeting a 
spiritual guide, being devoured by some being and emerging transformed, and/or 
being "dismantled" and "reassembled" again, often with implanted amulets such as 
magical crystals.  The imagery of initiation generally speaks of transformation and the 
granting of special powers, and often entails themes of death and rebirth.  In some 
societies shamanic powers are considered to be inherited, whereas in others, 
shamans are considered to have been “called”.  Eliade provides the example of the 
Siberian Chukchis shamans who behave in ways that Western clinicians would 
characterize as psychotic, but which Siberian culture interprets as possession by a 
spirit who demands that one assume the shamanic vocation (2004).  Gillis, likewise, 
draws a distinction between conscious and unconscious control in trance, speaking 
of the point at which she is no longer “dancing” but “being danced.”  She also 
describes herself as a “vehicle” or “vessel” for the act of transformation (Gillis, 
personal interview, 2006).   In her ethnography of trance dance in West Java, Kathy 
Foley makes a similar distinction.  In distinguishing theatrical recreations from 
authentic trance rituals, she defines: 
 
the dancer as the performer who maintains his or her self-awareness 
while impersonating another, and the danced as those who strive for 
an altered trance state and allow themselves to become mediums for 
another presence – a phenomenon known as possession trance.  
Though the state of consciousness provides a demarcation line 
between these two types of performance, it is my hypothesis that the  
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theatrical dancers are, in some sense, “danced” by the spirit of these 
… trance forms.  
 
Foley, 1985, p 29. 
 
 
Foley also describes the positioning of the danced as of “an empty vessel in which 
another persona can manifest itself” (1985, p 36).   
 
But whether certain behaviour is construed as “possession” and certain illnesses as 
examples of shamanic calling, as psychiatric anthropologist Erika Bourguignon 
explains, is a matter of cultural context.  The cultural meaning supplied for these 
states and the institutional framework within which they operate vary from society to 
society, and thus the specific functions they fulfill vary as well (Bourguignon, 1973, p 
3).  The fact that Gillis is not seen as a shaman is because of the absence of 
“shaman” as a cultural category in Western, European-derived, Christian-influenced 
society.  Despite the similarities, including her childhood psychological illness that 
coincided with periods of withdrawal to altered states of consciousness and the deep 
and potentially healing connections she makes with members of her audience, 
casting Gillis as a shaman remains contentious.  There is nothing to be gained from 
Othering her and her performance in this way except to see that her choice to employ 
trance and how she came to discover her capacity to trance is exceptional according 
to Canadian cultural standards.  Even when such behaviour does not construct her 
as a shaman in the eyes of her culture, interpreting Gillis as a shaman figure points 
to the absence of such vocational choices.  That Canadian society does not 
recognize indigenous shamans does not preclude Canadians from possessing 
shamanic qualities.  Interpreting some of the qualities Gillis embodies as shamanic 
suggests a transgressive space that may otherwise be overlooked. 
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Even when a culture recognizes both trance and shamanism, such recognition does 
not ensure wholesale or unmitigated acceptance.  In her ethnography of shamanic 
dance in Japan, Irit Averbuch, a doctor of comparative religion and a specialist in 
Japanese spiritualism, argues that the occurrence or appearance of trance is created 
by an understanding between audience and performers.  Each knows the signals or 
actions that signify the presence of a deity and the introduction of a trance state 
(Averbuch, 1998, p 320).  Averbuch’s analysis suggests that in performances that do 
not overtly include or propose a trance state, recognition of trance cannot be 
brokered between performer and audience.  Averbuch argues that trance is not “real” 
unless the performer and audience jointly acknowledge it.  Her theory raises a 
number of issues.  Whether without the audience’s awareness or participation, a 
trance state can occur; whether a performer’s experiences of trance is authentic if 
only he or she acknowledges it; and whether without the audience’s validation the 
trance state is significant.  In Averbuch’s examples, if audience members perceive 
that a certain performance of trance is inadequate because of its failure to accord 
with certain ritualized movements or actions, then the trance state is not credible 
(1998, p 322).   
 
If a given culture does not have a framework in which to situate, let alone validate, 
the manifestation of trance then the question of how to reify a trance “act” in the 
absence of cultural convention or tradition becomes problematic.  The combination of 
the need for cultural recognition of trance as suggested by Bourguignon and the 
need for audience/performer dialogue and consensus to legitimize trance as 
suggested by Averbuch, would seem to deny Gillis’ self-acknowledged use of trance.  
Yet casting Westerners as shamans is not without precedent.  Anthropologist Harry 
Anthony Senn makes a very convincing case for viewing Carl Jung as a shaman, 
arguing that likewise he exhibits the five “classic” stages of the shamanic journey 
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(1989, p 113).  Additional evidence exists in cross-cultural analyses such as 
American psychiatric anthropologist Roger Walsh’s comparison of shamanic, 
Buddhist, yogic and schizophrenic altered states of consciousness (1993)  Gillis’ use 
of transformation, her impact on members of her audience and the similarities that 
may be seen to exist between her practice and those of some non-Western 
shamanic practices and initiation provide compelling evidence.  Despite the cultural 
implausibility of constructing Gillis as a shaman figure, it remains that Gillis’ 
acknowledgement and premeditated use of trance needs to be adequately framed 
and theorized in terms that pertain to her own culture.  
 
Walsh offers his attempt at framing shamanism adequately in terms that pertain to 
one’s own culture.  In 1987, Walsh published The Spirit of Shamanism.  Ten years 
later, the article “The Psychological Health of Shamans: A Re-evaluation” appeared 
in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion.  Though Walsh is soundly 
criticized by Daniel C. Noel for re-publishing his earlier work with scant evidence of 
re-evaluation (Noel, 1998), a more apt criticism of both the original and its derivative 
is the application of Western medical principles to non-Western subjects.  Walsh 
engages in a process of “diagnosing” shamans.  He suggests that among 
“mainstream” academics – meaning those not trained in psychiatry or psychology – 
shamans have been assessed as “psychologically disturbed individuals who have 
managed to adapt their psychopathology to social needs” (Walsh, 1997, p 101).   
 
Though he is himself critical of the trend in popular literature to equate the altered 
states of consciousness attained by shamanic practitioners with those reported by 
“yogis and Buddhists,” he seems unaware of his own exercise in cultural relativism.  
Walsh evaluates accounts of shamanic behaviour for their correlations to epilepsy, 
hysteria, schizophrenia and other “psychotic disorders.”  Though he writes of the 
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“risks” of imposing “Western cultural and diagnostic perspectives” because they may 
devalue and “pathologize” shamanic practice, the sense is that such risk-taking is 
within acceptable limits when performed by trained professionals.  With regard to 
anthropologists mistakenly labelling shamans as “epileptics,” Walsh concludes the 
“situation is exacerbated because many anthropologists have not known the correct 
questions to ask in order to allow accurate diagnosis.”  A similar lack of knowledge 
would appear to account for, in Walsh’s estimation, the dubious application of 
schizophrenia to explain the “bizarre” characteristics of shamanic experience to the 
uninitiated “Western mind” (Walsh, 1997, p 105, 111).  Walsh opposes 
anthropologists diagnosing their subjects on the basis of inadequate training.  While 
he agrees with Akë Hultkrantz, a noted scholar of comparative religions and 
specialist in northern European shamanism, that there can be no universal definition 
for shamanism, Walsh does not question the universal application of psychiatric 
diagnosis to shamans and shamanic practice (Hultkrantz, 1978).   
 
After Gillis’ nervous breakdown, her withdrawals into trance states were considered 
unhealthy and potentially psychotic.   Gillis recalls that specialists recommended that 
she be hospitalized.  Her mother refused and instead chose to let her daughter 
navigate this phase of her psychological development in an atmosphere of 
acceptance and safety without intervention – medical or otherwise.  Gradually Gillis 
learned to manage her ability to access her unconscious at will, becoming able to 
choose when, where and how deeply to enter transformative states.  It is extremely 
unlikely that Walsh, had he examined Gillis, would have postulated that her mental 
breakdown was her “calling” to become a shaman.  Though invested in evaluating 
the psychological health of shamans, his practice is predicated on the assumption 
that shamans exist outside the West.  Though he advises against confusing “clinic 
with culture,” the characteristics that comprise each sphere are impermeable and 
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Eurocentric.  He fails to recognize that the critical issues are the desire to pathologize 
shamanic practice in the first place, and the assumption that evidence of such 
pathology exists elsewhere even when cases such as Gillis’ exhibit remarkable 
similarities.  Walsh’s lack of self-reflexive, culturally flexible theories or principles to 
contextualize shamanic behaviour both within and outside the West create an 
extremely narrow and xenophobic field. 
 
Though Gillis and many of the Expressionist dancers that have preceded her have 
been clearly influenced both by informal beliefs about shamanism and the writing of 
Eliade and Hultkrantz, Alice B. Kehoe, a professor of social and cultural studies, sees 
that combined, such information has enabled and sustained a European primitivist 
tradition that amounts to cultural imperialism.  Kehoe argues that the two specialists 
in comparative religions have “fed the romantic demiurge” to view indigenous people 
as “primal survivals husbanding an archaic ecstasy that may yet save the White 
millions who suffer from … an inability to lead authentic lives.”  Eliade, in particular, 
through his widely read and highly regarded research, created a “new humanism” 
popularized by New Age adherents as “neo-shamanism” (Kehoe, 1996, p 377).  
Kehoe outlines the evolution of the notion of shamanism from its original and specific 
application to the religious and spiritual practices of Siberian and subarctic peoples, 
to religious practice in opposition to Western institutionalized religion that feature 
trance states, to contemporary “shamanism” evoked for the purposes of healing 
and/or self-expression.  Invoking anthropologists David Holmberg, Nicholas Thomas 
and Caroline Humphrey, Kehoe suggests that the continuation of “shamanism” as an 
object of formal study is an “illusion” nurtured by the “broader cultural preoccupation 
with the primordial and transgressive” (1996, p 378-379).2  It is this preoccupation 
that feeds the academic and New Age industries’ hunger for reassurance that there 
are still corners of the world that are as yet untouched and pristine.  Finally Kehoe 
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takes issue with labelling the “personal numinosity” attributed to spiritual or 
community leaders as “shamanistic” when it is merely “charisma” (1996, p 378). 
British ethnomusicologist Keith Howard offers a more balanced view by suggesting 
that while trance and/or ecstasy are “key features in most accounts of shamanism … 
it is clear that charisma often coexists” (2000, p 363).  
 
The word charisma is derived from the Greek for “gift” or “divine favour” and is most 
commonly used to describe persons who possess extreme charm and a "magnetic" 
personality.  Such traits often coincide with innate and sophisticated communication 
skills and a seemingly uncanny ability to charm and/or influence others.  A 
charismatic person easily draws attention to themselves and garners admiration from 
their milieu. They generally project unusual confidence, calmness, assertiveness, 
authenticity and focus of purpose.  Whether such qualities are "divinely” bestowed or 
are taught and/or learned is culturally relative. 
 
German sociologist Max Weber defined charismatic authority to be one of three 
forms of authority, the other two being traditional or feudal authority and legal or 
rational authority.  According to Weber, charisma is defined as: 
 
a certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which s/he is 
"set apart" from ordinary people and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers 
or qualities. These as such are not accessible to the ordinary person, 
but are regarded as divine in origin or as exemplary, and on the basis 
of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader. 
 
Weber, 1947, p 317. 
 
  
Influenced by Weber, in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste 
(1984), Bourdieu stresses that a leader has charisma only if other people accept that 
s/he has it.  Bourdieu argues that charisma usually results from an “inaugural act” 
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such as a decisive battle or moving speech after which the person will be regarded 
as charismatic. 
 
Charisma has also been studied as a set of psychological behaviours or qualities 
where charisma is an aggregative, or a conglomeration of distinct personality traits.  
According to British psychologist Richard Wiseman, who has been working with 
aspiring pop stars to improve their charismatic quotient, a charismatic person has 
certain attributes including the capacity to experience their own emotions quite 
strongly and to induce a strong emotional response in others (Geoghegan, website, 
2005).  While Gillis’ life story exhibits certain shamanistic characteristics, the 
construction of Gillis as a charismatic leader may be more plausible.     
 
Beyond charisma, the theory of metakinesis suggests another means of framing how 
Gillis and members of her audience respond to her dancing body.  Contemporary to 
the Expressionist movement, metakinesis was proposed by American dance critic 
John Martin in the early 1930s as part of four lectures on “the new modern dance” 
delivered at the New School for Social Research in New York City.  In these lectures, 
Martin discusses modern dance as a philosophic construct considering, in addition to 
metakinesis, the basic experience of physical movement, the effectiveness of beauty 
in form, vertical and horizontal rhythms and divergent approaches to art.   Martin 
uses the term “metakinesis” to describe how the physical and psychical aspects of 
bodily experience coalesce so that the body as an artistic form produces not only 
aesthetic signs and values but also communicates with and engenders a physical 
and psychical response in other subjects.  Metakinesis takes as its premise the idea 
that movement is “in and of itself a medium for the transference of an aesthetic and 
emotional concept from the unconscious of one individual to that of another.”  
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Furthermore, Martin urges that dance be seen to incorporate a relationship between 
physical movement and mental intention (1983, p 23).   
 
Martin derives his theories from a perception that the movement generated by this 
“new” idiom is not masked by the exterior formalism of classical ballet, but instead 
allows the body of the dancer to communicate its presence through purely aesthetic 
strategies.  “The prime purpose of modern dance,” he states, is not “spectacle” but 
the “communication of emotional experiences – intuitive perceptions, elusive truths – 
which cannot be communicated in reasoned terms or reduced to the mere statement 
of fact” (Martin, 1983, p 24).   In later writings from 1946, Martin credits Duncan with 
making metakinesis “the very center [sic] and source of her practices.”  Inherent to 
this approach is the idea that metakinesis is not just the transfer of emotional 
experience through watching a modern dancer perform but also the sympathetic 
response in the musculature of the spectator generated by the “contagion of bodily 
movement” (Martin, 1983, p 22).  Martin’s work appears to have evolved from 
Expressionist ideology where the body is capable of communicating something 
supremely greater than itself and is potentially transcendent.  Franko, in his article 
“Nation, Class and Ethnicities in Modern Dance of the 1930s,” likewise locates 
Martin’s notion of metakinesis within its historical context.  Franko suggests that 
Martin was attempting to articulate the public’s unprecedented response to the new 
dance, drawing on the phenomenological “expressional” essence that characterized 
the period (Franko, 1997, p 477-478).3   
 
A contemporary of Martin’s, the American philosopher John Dewey offers a different 
means of theorizing the relationship between artist and audience.  In his 1934 work 
Art as Experience, Dewey rejects the notion that the artist is the active creator and 
the audience, the passive recipient of art.  Perceiving the relationship as a polarity 
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between active and passive states, Dewey argues, has the effect of artificially 
truncating and hence devaluing the artistic process.  On the contrary, he argues that 
the process is “barren” without the implicit agency of the appreciator.  The audience 
is actively engaged in assimilating the artist's work, requiring a recapitulation of many 
of the same processes of discrimination, comparison and integration that are present 
in the artist's creative process.  In performance these same processes are enacted 
through the artist's perception and skill.  Dewey underscores this point by 
distinguishing between the “art product,” the painting, sculpture, etc., created by the 
artist, and the “work of art” proper, which is only realized through the active 
engagement of an astute audience (1934).  In other words, the act of “art-making” is 
realized equally in the act of creation as it is in its display and reception.  While 
Dewey does not attribute a pseudo-scientific or psycho-spiritual dimension to the 
relationship between performer and audience, like Martin he is interested in 
articulating the phenomena of audience response and reification.  Put more plainly, 
Dewey and Martin are intrigued by how an audience is moved by a performance – 
how it is that certain performers evoke a visceral response in members of their 
audience.  There is a sense that these were important questions at the time, 
generated by a new art form that engaged and entranced both the performers and 
the viewing public in ways that had not been previously experienced.  
 
Today, critics continue through the medium of their reviews to articulate if and how 
they were “moved” by a performance.  In relation to Gillis’ work, it would appear that 
it is her neo-Expressionist qualities to which they are drawn.  In her review, Yasmin 
Fudakowska-Gow reports that Gillis’ dances “express spirituality and the heart of the 
human condition.”  Furthermore, as a solo artist, Gillis transforms “the basics of 
dance in a truly remarkable poetic fashion that has a sincere, child-like naiveté” 
(Fudakowska-Gow, website, 2000).  In 2000, Laura Bleiburg writes in a review titled 
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“Letting her emotions take over” that Gillis’ “gift for expression is sophisticated, so 
primal.”  Aware of the parallels between Gillis and the early modern dance she 
states: 
 
her dancing recalls the melodramatic honesty and commitment of 
modern dance’s founders.  Gillis’ dancing is earthy, and she shows 
emotion directly, not self-consciously.  While irony is the stock and 
trade of today’s post-modernists, Gillis is all open nakedness. 
 
Bleiburg, website, 2000. 
 
 
Through these reviews, Gillis can be seen to exhibit “Duncanesque” qualities, 
“claiming for the body,” as American dance theorist Susan Foster argues, “an 
intrinsic freedom and merit [that transports] those for whom she dance[s] into an 
evanescent realm of feeling-filled forms” (Foster, 1997, p 245).  If Gillis is “primal,” 
“naked” and “open,” these are attributes of an anti-postmodernist form.  If Gillis and 
by extension her performances are the antithesis of fragmented, postmodern 
minimalist, existential, multi-vocal, multimedia dance theatre, then the “heart of the 
human condition” that Gillis’ dances are purported to express hails from a pre-
postmodern aesthetic.  At the same time, elements of the Expressionist movement 
are still present in the work of today’s contemporary dancers and choreographers to 
the degree that they are recognizable to informed critics. 
 
Though her body is reminiscent of Duncan’s naturalized physicality, Gillis’ dancing 
body is also athletic, influenced by postmodern mores and technology, and 
responsive to a breadth of emotional response and kinaesthesia that makes her and 
her performances extremely potent and “of the moment.”  It is unclear whether Gillis 
is reacting against what she sees as the “think body” – a postmodern body 
increasingly technologized through engagement with multiple and often competing 
levels of communication such as e-mail, mobile phones, i-Pods, etc. – by preserving 
and investing in her naturalized physicality.  More likely she is simply following and 
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then capitalizing on what she perceives to be her calling – mystical, shamanic, 
charismatic or otherwise.   
 
My most recent interaction with Gillis occurred as part of a “dance dialogue” 
convened following her performance at the National Arts Centre in Ottawa on the 
second night of the 2006 Canada Dance Festival (Gillis, public panel, 2006).  As 
moderator, I had been asked to interview Gillis about her work in general, and the 
three new pieces premiered that evening in particular.  After an unusually long wait 
for Gillis to make her way from the dressing room to the salon, she swept into the 
room breathless and blushing.  The standing-room-only crowd burst into applause as 
she made her way to the front of the room.  Her signature long auburn hair – as 
intrinsic to her stage persona as a physical dance partner – was tied in a loose 
French twist.  She wore a yellow kimono-style jacket embroidered with flowers over a 
black top and flowing black trousers.  She was radiant and gracious.  After bowing 
several times to her audience and clapping to them in return, she lowered herself 
onto the chair, uncoiled the microphone from its stand and turning to me, made it 
clear that she was ready to be interviewed. 
 
The interview did not go well.  I had not had a chance to pre-interview Gillis and so 
we began cold.  After establishing my intimacy with Gillis by referring to our most 
recent meeting in her kitchen in Montréal the previous February, I asked her about 
“supporting the soul’s visibility,” the theme that bound that evening’s program of six 
short solo works together.  I asked her whether her concept was conceived as a 
response to the way she saw that the modern world sought to obscure the soul.  I 
also wondered whether her response had something to do with her concept of the 
“think body.”  Startled by my convoluted opening gambit, she elected to talk about 
channelling the body’s capacity to move freely and without artifice, to erase the divide 
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between mind and body and to simply “be in the moment.”  The audience hung onto 
her every word as though bewitched.  It became clear with each answer she gave 
that she was there to speak to them and not to me.  I was an interloper, an 
impediment to the audience’s desire to absorb more of Gillis’ aura and to Gillis’ wish 
to feed that desire.  When I opened the floor to questions those still capable of 
speech poured forth compliments and praise.   
 
When I received the signal from the organizers to bring the proceedings to a close, I 
gladly acquiesced.  No sooner had I replaced the microphones in their stands, then a 
group of fans four or five deep formed a circle around Gillis.  There were hugs and 
kisses, photographs and introductions.  The fans – all women of varying age and 
ethnicity – were in tears telling Gillis’ how “moved” they were, how her performance 
had “touched their souls” and “healed” them.  Like a television evangelist, Gillis 
listened to each in turn, smiling beatifically, demurring in the face of their adulation 
and moving on to the next, ensuring each exchange was heartfelt but brief.  After the 
last fan was greeted and acknowledged, Gillis swept out of the room guided by a 
minder from the festival and returned to the dressing rooms in the bowels of the arts 
centre. 
 
Max Wyman, the Richard Buckle of Canadian dance criticism, published a very 
interesting piece entitled “Margie Gillis: A discussion” following a performance she 
gave at the Vancouver Playhouse in 1985.  One would suspect from the title that the 
article might include excerpts of actual interview material with Gillis herself and in 
fact, the piece takes the form of a conversation.  However, Gillis is absent as an 
active voice from the exchange. The article proceeds as a Socratic dialogue between 
two interlocutors – Wyman’s Ego cast as the “Enthusiast Going Overboard” and his 
Id in the role of “Intense Doubter.”  The text is a performance of Wyman’s internal 
struggle to situate Gillis and respond to her performance:   
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EGO: Wasn’t that marvellous?  Doesn’t she just step right out and 
touch you?  All that raw emotion, all that flamboyant dancing, all that 
human tenderness, all that abandonment of the body … 
 
ID: She’s a tease, all right.  She goes through the motions of the 
heart-on-sleeve artiste, the risk-taker in search of Truth, she flails 
herself with her crowning glory and drops her dress at will … but then 
what? 
 
EGO:  This is no tease.  This is Margie.  This is who she is. 
 
Wyman, 1985, p 133. 
 
 
In response to Ego’s claim that this is who Gillis is Id states that while that might be 
so, it appears to be a “calculation.”  The “early” pre-1985 Gillis, Id explains, might 
have appeared naïve but it was a “sincere naiveté.”  With regard to the present Gillis 
however, Id has the “uncomfortable feeling” that now it is a “calculated act” (Wyman, 
1985, p 133).  In a very pithy and creative manner, Wyman succeeds in conveying 
the tension attendant in viewing Gillis.  It is as if, Id suggests, that Gillis has “found 
the key to the audience response, and she’s content to go on turning it the same old 
way.”  When Ego counters that if the essence of performance is “doing an act,” then 
Gillis is no different than her peers, Id sets him(self) straight:   
 
ID: But there’s a difference in the methods, and it’s a difference that 
comes down to intent.  It felt a bit fraudulent, the emotions tricked, the 
willingness (because audiences are willing, that’s why they’re there) 
misused. 
Wyman, 1985, p 133. 
 
 
 
For the purposes of this study, Gillis and her use of trance is a key and fruitful 
source.  Her purported creative process and performance modes clearly indicate, 
even if she herself is not comfortable with using the word, that trance as a discourse 
exists in Western contemporary performance practice.  But my own response to Gillis 
as a performer and my various attempts to frame and deconstruct her use of trance 
has left me feeling uneasy and with very little solid ground on which to stand.  
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Engaging with her as a text to be read has yielded interesting juxtapositions between 
modern and postmodern concepts and has suggested an Expressionist reading of 
Gillis’ solo work.  She is a charismatic performer, aspects of her life and the effect 
she has on her audience could be argued to correlate to certain generalized 
shamanic practices and initiations, she channels a similar “spirit” as the 
quintessential Expressionist dancers – Duncan, Fuller, Wigman.  It is as though she 
has a slippery surface or veneer onto which ideas may be projected but will not gel 
because the persona she has created for herself is facile and without entry points.  
It’s a package – or in fact a brand – that serves her and has endeared her to 
audiences for more than three decades.  If Wyman’s reading of Gillis is to be 
believed, she is very cognizant of her audience’s capacity to suspend belief.  As a 
result she cannot fully engage with trance – it is too “new-Agey” – but prefers to work 
within the concept of transformation.  Transformation is a safer place in which to 
situate herself and to which everyone can relate – who does not seek to transform 
some aspect of his or her life?  Relinquish the base and mundane in favour of the 
eternally glorious and effervescent?  Gillis is a study in “giving the people what they 
want” and her approach is simultaneously slick and naïve. 
 
Wyman’s suspicions about Gillis and her performance at the post-show discussion 
described earlier, have led me to question whether she chose to frame her 
choreographic and performance practices so that they would agree with the 
articulated aims of this research.  With Gillis, as with all my respondents, I 
corresponded in advance of the interview by phone and e-mail.  Gillis and 
Maboungou requested explicit details of my research questions and qualifications 
before consenting to an interview.  But upon reflection, no one fits the thesis of my 
research as closely as Gillis.  The manner in which she portrays her background, 
working processes and creative philosophies positions her best to respond to my 
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assertion that Western contemporary dance performance could be a potential site for 
trance or trance-like experience.  While this may be a fortunate coincidence, it leaves 
me, in light of Wyman’s reservations and my own, thinking that she is skilled in the 
art of pleasing her audience, and therefore wondering whether she was seeking to 
please me. 
 
If the cultural model for trance includes connotations of the exotic and Other, what 
does Gillis gain in exoticizing or Othering herself?  As mentioned earlier she does not 
align herself wholeheartedly with the trance discourse – in the same way that she 
does not fully embrace Sufism.  She is careful to appropriate and then interweave 
only as much as her audience can brook.  Gillis’ packaging of herself is reminiscent 
of the underlying psychology at play in a commercial on Canadian television 
advertising new flavours of a rice side-dish.  Juxtaposed with regular varieties 
created for an unadventurous, North American palate, these new flavours evoke the 
cuisine of ambiguous Mediterranean and South Asian cultures.  But just so the 
average consumer would not be intimidated by the exotic flavours, the tag line is 
“And not too spicy, eh!”  The line suggests that the consumer can sample Other 
cultures without either immersing themselves wholly or relinquishing a connection 
with their own culture – they can feel adventurous without disturbing their sense of 
self and place.  It is an effective strategy and marketing ploy – a change from the 
everyday but one that will not take the consumer out of his or her imagined comfort 
zone.  The same kind of strategy appears to characterize Gillis’ performance of her 
Self.  Trance, like Sufism, is a step too far but transformation and an ambiguous nod 
to mysticism keeps her squarely within the purview of her audience.  In the context of 
my research and for the purposes of our interview, Gillis was comfortable conceding 
to my ideas and choice of language so that she could ostensibly ally her practice with 
my agenda.   
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 Gillis is idealized for her indefatigable expressivity, her integrity and her commitment 
to her choreographic and performance process.  Where many of Gillis’ 
contemporaries value form, her body of work is consistently founded on function and 
emotion and it is this approach that has been perceived as both pioneering and 
evidence of her greatness.  She seeks to express what is inside of her, and in doing 
so, clearly relies on a kind of trance that is “natural” to her.  Beyond these traits, what 
appears key to her practice is her capacity to be for her audience what they need her 
to be in the moment of her performance – whether that be tall, short, young, old, 
child-like, womanly, ethereal or grounded – and whether that performance be on 
stage or in her kitchen in Montréal.  With regard to my other case studies, 
respondents acknowledged where I was coming from and both the challenges and 
foibles of my research.  In response to my research questions and hypotheses they 
offered different perspectives and other ideas.  In Gillis I found a mirror that reflected 
back precisely what I was looking for. 
 
 
                                                
1  While outlining the basic stages of this mythic cycle, Campbell also explores 
common variations on the hero’s journey, which, he argues, is an operative 
metaphor, not only for an individual, but for a culture as well. The Hero would prove 
to have a major influence on generations of creative artists including the Abstract 
Expressionists (an American post-World War II art movement derived from 
Expressionism and active in the 1950s) with whom Graham was later associated. 
 
2 Kehoe references Thomas’ and Humphrey’s Shamanism, History and the State 
(1996); Holmberg’s Order in Paradox: Myth, Ritual, and Exchange Among Nepal's 
Tamang (1992); and Humphrey’s Shamans and Elders: Experience, Knowledge, 
and Power among the Daur Mongols (1996). 
3  Also within dance studies but in a contemporary context, Henry Daniel, in his article 
“Re-Cognizing Corporeality,” focuses on the interstices of modern dance, 
performativity and new technologies. Metakinesis is one of the theories to which 
Daniel turns to help elucidate how the integration of new technologies into 
contemporary dance performance may alter how the relationship between the 
dancer and the dance is reconciled (Daniel, 2000).  Outside of dance studies but 
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still relevant to exploring the application of metakinesis to the reception of Gillis’ 
use of trance, is an article by Aaron Anderson on kinaesthesia in martial art films.  
Anderson connects Martin’s theories of metakinesis with Paul Connerton’s theories 
of “memory.”  (Anderson, 1998). 
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CHAPTER SIX Brian Webb, Transformation and Authentic Movement 
 
The lights dim and the female poet seated onstage peeling an apple stops speaking.  
In the half light, the dancer begins to dance in a quiet, sultry way.  His back to the 
audience, his hips move in slow arcs, rib cage stretching up and away, testing the 
range of movement in his torso.  His shoulders and arms absorb the undulations, and 
his hands and fingers begin to ripple.  His elbow draws his arm upwards like a 
flamenco dancer’s, reorienting his body towards his audience as he pivots on his 
right leg.  At its apex he peers beneath its curve but then lets his arm fall, allowing 
the momentum to turn him away and to feed the serpentine rolls of his pelvis and 
back.  He turns to his left so he is in profile and lets his whole body release in rising 
waves.  Light on his feet he steps away on the diagonal, arms curving and fingertips 
reaching into space, then returns to centre before his weight can be fully transferred.  
His movements are languorous, and there is a sense of his being in the moment, 
where the texture and quality of his movement creates radiating spiralling patterns.  
After stepping away and returning a few more times, his arms meeting majestically 
above his head, he sways and is caught off balance but catches himself before 
advancing towards the audience in provocative, coiling steps.  He turns away again, 
giving into the expansive waves that wash through his body with deep enjoyment, 
arms outstretched, before tightening and retracting and shaking himself vigorously.  
The shaking dies away and he resumes his floating, winding dance.  He lashes out at 
the darkness, kicking with his legs and then backing away.  He drops his weight into 
the floor and throws his head back revelling in the openness of his chest, the fluidity 
of his limbs.  There is desire in his movements, an ebbing and flowing of intoxication, 
of self-infatuation.  His pace remains unhurried as his body melts and glides, hips 
winding, arms caressing the space around him.  The music – a groovy lounge 
number – grows in volume and then stops abruptly.  His reverie broken, he stands 
facing the audience, arms limp at his sides. 
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Brian Webb speaks of being pleased with the way A love story turned out.  A duet he 
choreographed for himself and dancer Tania Alvarez accompanied by poetry and a 
combination of live and recorded music, the piece is the latest culmination of his 
explorations in Authentic Movement – a therapeutic somatic practice based in 
Jungian psychoanalysis, drawing in particular from Jung’s concept of active 
imagination.  In describing the brief solo that occurs a third of the way through the 
work, Webb states he is happy with where he has succeeded in “taking” the 
movement.  He drew my attention to this particular section because he believes 
“transformation” is present.  “It’s where I wanted to get to,” he explains.  “If we think 
of transformation as the ability to access the deepest interior layer of the body, then 
this is what I have found.  It’s definitely happening for me in this section” (Webb, 
personal correspondence, 2006). 
 
Canadian choreographer and performer Brian Webb’s experience of Authentic 
Movement offers another means of examining trance in Canadian contemporary 
dance.  This chapter begins with biographical information about Webb including the 
development of his career as a choreographer and creative artist from his early 
training through his work with key mentors and theories in performance art practice.  
This leads to discussion of his interest in Authentic Movement, the particular 
influence of Robert Benedetti, Anna Halprin and Tedi Tafel, his affinity for this way of 
working and his experience of its transformative effects.  Webb’s position, that what 
he experiences during Authentic Movement sessions is not trance, offers another 
perspective on the cultural framing of transformative states.  Addressing the 
discipline of Authentic Movement, a detailed examination of its foundation in Jungian 
psychoanalysis and development as a form of dance therapy follows, based on the 
work of its American co-originators Mary Starks Whitehouse, Janet Adler and Joan 
Chodorow.   This discussion encompasses aspects of witnessing, direct experience, 
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collective consciousness and mysticism.  The chapter concludes with a critique of the 
essentializing aspects of Authentic Movement with regard to its emphasis on 
personal narrative and its interpretation of direct experience as evidence of the primal 
and sacred.  Finally, explanations for Webb’s discomfort with applying the term 
trance to his experience of transformation are discussed. 
 
Webb began dancing in 1969 when he started an undergraduate degree in theatre at 
the University of Alberta in Edmonton.  He recalls becoming “immediately addicted” 
to the movement classes and knew very quickly that he wanted to become a dancer.   
While completing his degree, Webb continued to train in dance, becoming one of the 
founding members of the Alberta Dance Theatre, the province’s first contemporary 
dance company in 1970.  Despite this early success, he perceives that he did not 
begin his formal dance training until he moved to New York in 1972.  There he 
danced with the Erick Hawkins Dance Company from 1973-1974, absorbing 
Hawkins’ signature “free flow technique” and unique collaborative process with 
contemporary composers, visual artists and designers and the Carol Conway Dance 
Company from 1973-1977 where he premiered his first choreographic works (Duke, 
website, 2006).  Webb returned to Canada in 1979 at the invitation of Grant McEwan 
College.  Realizing that in addition to teaching in the college dance program he 
needed a creative outlet, he established the Brian Webb Dance Company.   
 
Influenced by his contact with the New York dance scene of the 1970s, Webb 
describes his early choreographies as “formulaic.”  Understanding that he needed 
more training and exposure in order to move forward with his work, Webb embarked 
on an MFA at the California Institute of the Arts (CalArts) in 1984.  He perceives that 
his graduate studies represented a turning point in his career where he was no 
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longer a dancer, but became a “dance artist.”  This shift coincided with the beginning 
of a deeper and more profound creative process (Webb, personal interview, 2006).  
 
At CalArts, Webb studied under dancer/choreographer Anna Halprin, whose highly 
influential and lengthy career in modern dance yielded new methodologies for 
improvisation, collective creativity, environmental/street theatre, and community-
based performance with a focus on ritual and dance as a healing art (Worth & 
Poynor, 2004).1  It was during this time that Webb was first introduced to “feminist 
theory in art-making,” which he summarizes as acknowledging the integral value of 
individual stories and points of view that, in their telling, undermine the profoundly 
paternalistic, hegemonic character of dominant social thought.  It was also during this 
time that Webb came to value the notion of “collaboration,” which he defines as the 
“democratic exchange of ideas … through interdisciplinarity and performance” 
(Webb, personal interview, 2006).   
 
Returning once again to Canada in 1987, Webb realized that he did not want either 
the responsibility or the conventionality of a “dance company” but instead wanted to 
work on a project basis, collaborating with like-minded artists with whom he could 
develop these philosophies – and where the lines between dance, theatre and visual 
art could be blurred.  He perceives that his work during this period was regarded as 
“too visceral” by the visual arts community and “too intellectual” and “political” by the 
dance community, and was identified as existing “somewhere between conceptual 
art and dance theatre.” 2  He points to a series of pieces he created with installation 
artist Blair Brennan as typical of this phase in his career (Webb, personal interview, 
2006).3   
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In terms of its political nature, Webb’s work in the 1980s incorporated and responded 
to the emergence of “queer theory” (Webb, personal interview, 2006).4  His identity 
as a dance artist grew alongside an era of protests, legal fights and backlash.  With a 
growing sense of solidarity, gays and lesbians became more visible in Canadian 
society in the 1960s, '70s and early '80s.  Homosexuality gradually became more 
accepted as more Canadians came out of the closet to demand equality under the 
law.  As a gay man in his thirties living in Alberta – perhaps Canada’s most socially 
and politically conservative province – Webb felt that it was exceedingly important to 
infuse his creative work with relevant social meaning even if that meant positioning 
himself and his work as “radical” and in defiance of his Christian roots.  His work 
earned him recognition as a “queer performance artist” and that label suited both his 
ambitions and his politicized identity through to the 1990s (Webb, personal interview, 
2006). 
 
Increasingly, Webb chose to work with text, video and computer-generated media, 
reinvesting in the interdisciplinary potential of his dance pieces.  He dedicated 
himself to a strong conceptual, as opposed to a “pure dance,” approach to his work 
through abstract storytelling and multimedia collaborations.  He is proud that 
throughout his career he has remained a “regional artist,” maintaining his “peripheral” 
base in Alberta despite strong inclinations to relocate to more cosmopolitan dance 
centres such Toronto or Montréal (Webb, personal interview, 2006).  Now at 57, 
Webb is still actively engaged in choreographing, touring and performing his own 
work across Canada.  In 2001, he became the artistic producer of the Canada Dance 
Festival following a ten-year history of producing dance in Edmonton.  He began 
inviting and presenting other dance artists whose choreography he admired to 
provide a context for his own work and to expand the cultural sphere of his 
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community.  He regards himself as an arts advocate and believes that Alberta has 
been marginalized in terms of recognition and representation in the performing arts. 
 
Webb’s interest in Authentic Movement began during the early years of his first 
degree where many of his stage preparation courses were devoted to techniques of 
improvisation.  He recalls that this early training relied on emotional recall where a 
scene is improvised from a specific emotional event (anger, sadness, joy, love, etc.) 
drawn from one's own life.   These improvisational exercises valued interior 
experience, connecting to memory and desire.  At CalArts he took several graduate-
level survey courses in creativity including one taught by Robert Benedetti, an 
esteemed American producer, director, writer and acting coach.  Benedetti taught 
creativity from a psychoanalytical perspective, believing that people are drawn to acts 
of creativity because of a profound sense of rejection (Webb, personal interview, 
2006).  In a 2003 commencement address to the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
School of Music, Benedetti speaks of the “courage to create” a concept that he 
borrowed from a book of the same title by the American existential psychologist Rollo 
May (1975).  According to Benedetti, May believes that creativity always produces 
anxiety because it is a “confrontation with the unknown.”  Creativity therefore involves 
bringing a new form into being, whether that form is original to the creator or an 
interpretation of something conceived by another.  In training to be a creative person, 
Benedetti argues that one is learning to “let the music play itself, to let the 
choreography dance itself, to let the role live.”  Mastering this technique requires: 
 
the ability to open ourselves, to surrender our habitual way of 
experiencing the world to make room for new perceptions and forms. 
This produces anxiety, though once you are really good at it, creative 
anxiety turns into ecstasy – ex-stasis, “standing outside” ourselves.  
 
Benedetti, website, 2003. 
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Alongside Benedetti’s approach that privileges personal expression and agency, 
Webb was also strongly influenced by the teachings of Anna Halprin and her 
husband, architect Lawrence Halprin.  Together with fellow architect Jim Burns, the 
Halprins developed a formula for collective creative workshopping (sic) they called 
the “RSVP Cycles.”  The RSVP Cycles are both a theory of the workshop process 
and a technique for creativity.  In the RSVP Cycle, “R” stands for “resources,” all the 
subjective and objective material used in the creative process such as space, 
participants, funding, time and goals, and feelings, fantasies and both open and 
hidden agendas;  “S” stands for “scores” that outline or plot scenarios, instructions 
and plans.  Scores can be either “open” where a variety of options can be explored or 
“closed” where the score controls the action; “V” stands for “valuaction” where the 
group considers feedback about the ongoing creative process.  At this stage, scores 
may be revised in response to the feedback.  Halprin and Burns coined the term 
“valuaction” to emphasize the active aspect of the feedback.  Scores are revised not 
just by talking about what happened but through a process of devising or discerning 
new action; and “P” stands for “performance” where the score is enacted within the 
given circumstances or framework (Halprin, 1969). 
 
The primary objective of the RSVP Cycle is self-discovery and/or the building and 
solidifying of a creative group or team.   Performance is not intended in any formal or 
theatrical sense but reflects the ideation of concepts and context.  The notion of 
“collective” creativity does not necessarily refer to input from more than one 
individual.  The RSVP Cycle presupposes the individual as a collective of 
experiences and personality traits.  The cycle is conceived as circular, with multiple 
entry points and options for repetition (Halprin, 1969) and this process informs 
Webb’s creative output.  
 205
Working one-on-one with Anna Halprin, an experience he describes as 
“revelationary,” Webb was presented with the idea of creativity, and specifically 
dance, as modes of healing:   
 
the creative process is a valuable way for the individual to tap into 
greater inner resources that can be used for inner healing and self-
knowledge that they intuitively know already how to do.  Dance helps 
us experience life holistically and fully through the body … I think that 
dance is one of the most effective ways to live fully, to express 
yourself, to be yourself and to give your personal mythology a physical 
manifestation.  
 
Halprin in Barrett, website, 1993.  
 
 
Exposure to certain improvisational techniques and to the methods advocated by 
Benedetti and the Halprins initiated Webb into a matrix of creativity that valued 
interior and past experiences, intuitive and potentially ecstatic response, the 
individual as a “collective,” feedback and body-centred knowledge and healing.  In 
particular this sense of giving “personal mythology a physical manifestation” became 
intrinsic to Webb’s approach to sourcing and then realizing his own movement 
choices or score.   These ideas for accessing profound creativity laid the groundwork 
for Webb’s interest in Authentic Movement. 
 
In 1998, Tedi Tafel, a choreographer and movement instructor at Montréal’s National 
Theatre School, participated in the biennial Canada Dance Festival.  Webb saw her 
performance and was drawn to certain qualities of her movement.  He invited her to 
Edmonton where she performed and also gave workshops in Authentic Movement.  
Through Tafel, Webb learned that he could access knowledge from his body from a 
position of passivity.   Extended training in Authentic Movement led to the creation of 
new solo work and a significant shift in his choreographic process (Webb, personal 
interview, 2006).  
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In Webb’s experience, working with Tafel and also with Wendy Wyman-McGuinty in 
Los Angeles, an Authentic Movement workshop or group session typically unfolds in 
the following manner:  the leader or “witness” will state the ground rules for the 
session in terms of duration and the absence of any expectations or pre-conceived 
notions for either the proceedings or the outcome.  The witness announces that 
following the movement portion, an equal amount of time will be allowed for reflection 
in the form of drawing, journal-writing or storyboarding of the experience.  
Documenting is in the first person and is intended to be phenomenological in nature 
articulating what “I did” as opposed to what “I felt.”  This phase is anticipated to offer 
the participants the opportunity to recollect their movement exploration, in effect re-
experiencing the events a second time. The participants are then given a few 
minutes to prepare themselves, to choose a space from which to begin and to start to 
direct their focus inwards.  A bell is struck to indicate the beginning of the session.   
 
The witness watches the participants.  The participants move with eyes closed, 
seeking to maintain a deep level of self-focused concentration.  At the end of the 
session, a bell is struck three times and the participants then move to where they 
have placed their recording materials.  Once the self-reflection phase is completed, 
the participants are asked to form a “witnessing circle” where the leader tells his/her 
story about what s/he has seen.  The witness does not seek to impose his/her 
version of what took place but only what they saw, felt or intuited from the session.  
Participants may ask the witness questions to gain specific insights or may choose to 
share their own version of the experience.  Once again this is intended as a process 
of reiteration of the original movement experience.  The session ends at a pre-
arranged time and participants depart often with “homework” to complete before the 
next session.  Individual sessions will also adhere to a similar structure but within a 
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shorter time frame and with more emphasis on sustaining a one-on-one therapeutic 
dialogue (Webb, personal interview, 2006). 
 
As naturalized as this process is intended to appear, Webb says that, like meditation, 
Authentic Movement actually requires a great deal of discipline and practice to “tune 
out” of one’s everyday environment and to “tune in” to one’s body.  Moving without 
prejudice for certain ways of holding, posturing or displaying the body can be 
extremely challenging and requires that the participant enact a “leap of faith” to grant 
themselves permission to be in the moment.  The structure or architecture of the 
sessions is intended to assuage vulnerability and to establish the site where the 
event is taking place as a special and separate space devoid of judgment.  Where 
improvisation is goal-oriented, Authentic Movement is process and discovery driven 
(Webb, personal interview, 2006). 
 
In the course of Authentic Movement sessions, participants may experience 
heightened states of consciousness.  Webb calls these states “happenings”5 and 
attributes their attainment to the intense self-focus and self-absorption that Authentic 
Movement seeks to evoke (Webb, personal interview, 2006).  In his experience, such 
states involve a suspension or acceleration of time, changes in attunement to light 
and temperature, and feelings of dream-like suspension.  They have occurred during 
highly active as well as very passive states and have been corroborated by the 
witness who was aware he had transgressed a boundary or threshold within the 
subconscious.  Webb sees these heightened states as the opposite of trance where 
trance is “super-bodily,” a transcendence of the physical body.  Instead Webb 
perceives that in a “happening” he is going deeper into the body – an experience he 
connects to the sense in Butoh of “going back to the womb” and/or “accessing a time 
before emotion.”  Webb associates trance with a “numbing” of the senses while in 
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Authentic Movement, sensorial perception is stimulated and enhanced (Webb, 
personal interview, 2006). 
 
As a discipline, Authentic Movement was largely defined by the work of three 
movement therapists, Americans Mary Starks Whitehouse, Janet Adler and Joan 
Chodorow.  United in their belief that movement is key to unlocking the unconscious, 
each has their particular area of specialization and perspective on the value of 
Authentic Movement: Whitehouse is considered a “pioneer” in integrated movement 
therapy, developing and disseminating her “movement-in-depth” approach; Adler is 
concerned with analyzing the therapeutic relationship in the mover/witness dyad and 
exploring the connection between mystical practice and the transcendent body; and 
Chodorow, as a certified Jungian analyst, has worked to elaborate the psychoanalytic 
dimensions of the practice.  Adler, following intensive study with Whitehouse, 
resolved that “Authentic Movement” was the most appropriate term to describe the 
practice and eventually opened the Mary Starks Whitehouse Institute in 1981 to 
commemorate and extend her mentor’s teachings. 
 
Whitehouse’s “movement-in-depth” approach grew directly from her interpretation of 
Jung’s theories of active imagination and depth analysis formed through private 
practice with individuals and groups.  In depth analysis, the client or patient co-
operates with his/her analyst to explore the unconscious and to initiate the 
transcendent function.  The aim of the transcendent function is to realize the original 
potential wholeness of the psyche (Jung, 1971).  In Jungian psychoanalysis, this is 
accomplished through accessing and articulating dream imagery, identifying 
archetypes and their potential associations.  Analysis of such imagery is intended to 
initiate a process towards an emblematic understanding of habitual patterns and life 
events.  Through the exploration and analysis of subconscious material, the client 
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and analyst are working towards individuation – “the unique and conscious 
development of potential in a particular person” where the “slow unfolding” of latent 
“wholeness” of self and ego is desired (Whitehouse, [1979] 1999, p 78)6.   The actual 
business of accessing and articulating in the analyst’s office is accomplished through 
active imagination. 
 
Jung discovered active imagination through a process of “self-healing” that he 
undertook between 1913 and 1916 after his break with Sigmund Freud.  His process 
was founded on the “natural, healing function of the imagination” where inner 
impulses and images from the unconscious are activated by engaging with one’s 
imagination (Chodorow, [1990] 1999, p 301).  Allowing himself to gradually lapse or 
descend into a reverie or meditative state, he began to explore his own “inner 
landscape.”  Within his inner landscape he discovered a number of “inner figures” 
that he came to understand as archetypal.  Such periods of fantasizing seemed to 
manifest his anxieties, fears and other powerful emotions.  Over time, Jung realized 
that allowing his emotions to present themselves as images within his conscious was 
both calming and reassuring.  During each session, Jung attempted to maintain a 
self-reflective viewpoint and also used a number of techniques, such as writing, 
drawing, painting and later sandplay, to give symbolic form to his experiences.   His 
work with certain patients also evolved to include singing, dramatic enactments and 
dancing.  In his notes from a dream analysis seminar written between 1928 and 
1930, Jung provides the example of a female patient who brought to her session a 
drawing of a mandala that she had made.  Telling Jung that “it was a sketch for 
certain movements along lines in space,” the woman danced the meaning of the 
mandala.  Jung remarks that dancing is something that “most of us are too self-
conscious and not brave enough to do” (Jung in Chodorow, 1997, p 16).7  
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The combination of summoning or opening up to the contents of the unconscious 
through focused contemplation, expression in words, drawing or movement and 
analytic reflection became the basis for Jung’s psychotherapeutic practice.  Over 
many years, he gave his method a number of different names including the 
“transcendent function,” “picture method,” “active fantasy,” “active phantasying,” 
“technique of the descent,” “technique of introversion,” “introspection,” and also 
“visioning” and “trancing.”  When he delivered the Tavistock Lectures in London in 
1935, Jung used the term “active imagination” for the first time.  Through engaging 
with active imagination in a therapeutic process, Jung hoped to resolve his patients’ 
“psychological dysfunction” and ego “one-sidedness” (Chodorow, 1997, p 1-4). 
 
In the 1950s, Whitehouse began to employ Jung’s techniques in the dance studio.  
As she explains it, she “turned” to dance therapy because “no such thing existed” 
(Whitehouse [1979] 1999, p 73).  Whitehouse trained as a modern dancer, studying 
at the Wigman Schule in Dresden and with Martha Graham at Bennington College 
and in New York City.  In both the Wigman and Graham traditions, she was exposed 
to improvisation techniques that valued individual response and creativity.  Inspired 
by the work of former Denishawn dancer Marian Chace with psychiatric patients and 
her own personal Jungian analysis, Whitehouse began to approach movement in a 
new way.8  She began to work towards “releasing” as opposed to manufacturing 
movement, and discovered that in order to accomplish this, she had “to go back 
toward not moving” (Whitehouse in Frantz, [1972] 1999, p 23).  In a paper presented 
to the Analytical Psychology Club of Los Angeles in 1963, Whitehouse asks “where 
does movement come from?”  In answering her own question she connects the 
recognition of the inner impulse in active imagination with the theories of Rudolf 
Laban.  Thus movement 
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originates in what Laban calls an inner effort – that is, a specific inner 
impulse having the quality of sensation.  This impulse leads outward 
into space so that movement becomes visible as physical action.  
Following the inner sensation, allowing the impulse to take the form of 
physical action is active imagination in movement. 
 
Whitehouse, [1963] 1999, p 52. 
 
 
Whitehouse concludes that through motivating and validating inner efforts or 
impulses through movement, “dramatic psychosocial connections are made available 
to the consciousness” and it is the act of making these connections that forms the 
basis of movement-in-depth as a therapeutic tool.  For Whitehouse, her approach to 
dance therapy evolved empirically over years of working with people, taking 
workshops and seminars with colleagues as the field coalesced and asking questions 
of herself, her students and her clients.9
 
Believing that the act of “getting into your own depths is the process that makes you 
able to accompany someone else into their depths” (Whitehouse in Sherman, [1978] 
1999, p 29), Whitehouse began taking on clients.  She created a setting where 
clients – mostly students initially – could likewise engage with active imagination 
expressed through movement.  In these movement-in-depth sessions Whitehouse 
describes that while the “consciousness looks on, participating but not directing, co-
operating but not choosing, the unconscious is allowed to speak whatever and 
however it likes” ([1979] 1999, p 83).   
 
Whitehouse found the use of active imagination in movement especially illuminating.  
As in Jung’s practice, Whitehouse suggested to her clients that they come to a place 
of stillness and allow their focus to turn inwards and wait “to be moved.”  As opposed 
to “moving” – consciously contriving the body to make certain shapes, gestures or 
travel through space – Whitehouse describes that being “moved” is “when the ego 
gives up control, stops choosing, stops exerting demands, allowing the self to take 
 212
over moving the physical body as it will” ([1979] 1999, p 82).   She believes that just 
as painting is active imagination in visual terms, bodily movement in this therapeutic 
context is active imagination in sensory terms where the flow of unconscious material 
takes physical form (Whitehouse in Frantz, [1972] 1999, p 20).   Such movements 
were elicited through a deliberate, “in-depth” approach that stressed the unconscious 
over the conscious.   
  
When her clients succeeded in being moved by their unconscious, Whitehouse 
interpreted the resulting movement as simple, inevitable and unpremeditated.  She 
called this kind of movement “authentic.”  In an interview conducted by a student of 
hers in 1972, Whitehouse elaborates: 
 
an Authentic Movement is in and of the Self at the moment it is done 
… When I see someone move authentically, it is so real that it is 
undiluted by any pretence … it can be the movement of just one hand 
turning over, or it can be the whole body. 
 
Whitehouse in Frantz, [1972] 1999, p 23. 
 
 
Finding these undiluted movements, Whitehouse argues, requires an “attitude of 
inner openness,” where a capacity for “listening to one’s self” is akin to “honesty.”  In 
allowing the body to move in its own way without concerns for propriety or form, in 
letting impulses surface and produce reactions without censorship, Whitehouse 
believed that “new capacities appear, new modes of behaviour are possible” and that 
the awareness gained could spread to all areas of one’s life ([1958] 1999, p 49).  
Webb describes that in the solo he performs in A love story he accesses an honest, 
meditative state free of self-doubt and judgment.  “I am moved, I am moving, I feel, I 
am.  There is nothing else” (Webb, personal interview, 2006). 
 
Whitehouse found her movement-in-depth approach valuable for both the articulate 
and the inarticulate.  She discovered that dancers, though trained to move and to 
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respond to their bodies in space, found it challenging to resist organizing their bodies 
in concerted or technique-based ways.  When active imagination was channelled and 
Authentic Movement achieved, the dancers frequently remarked on what a revelation 
it was to be moved in this way.  Predating the advent of New Age spiritualism, 
Whitehouse argued that movement-in-depth was a means of finding equilibrium in a 
society where a tremendous emphasis on theoretical reasoning, control, and verbal 
communication displaces the wisdom of the body.  Echoing Jung’s theories of 
individuation, she believes that man’s greatest expression of his creative facility was 
the achievement of self-initiated and self-directed fulfillment through engagement 
with all his faculties and acuities (Whitehouse, [1956] 1999, p 37, 40).  Webb firmly 
believes that Authentic Movement has integrated his need for an organic and holistic 
approach to movement creation with an overarching sense of social and moral 
responsibility.  In addition, creating in this mode affirms his investment in the power 
and beauty of the human body (Webb, personal interview, 2006). 
 
Building from the foundation that Whitehouse established, Adler codified the practice 
and teaching of Authentic Movement as a discipline.  A former student of both 
Chace’s and Whitehouse’s, Adler became well known in the early part of her career 
for her work with autistic children.  Where Whitehouse had used the terms “observer” 
or “teacher” for the person overseeing an Authentic Movement session, Adler chose 
to use the term “witness” ([1987] 1999, p 142).  Through the work of the Institute, 
Adler aimed to articulate the therapeutic relationship between mover and witness, 
advocating the sharing of responsibility for witnessing with the mover.  Her interest 
expanded to specifically address both the role of witnessing and the spiritual aspects 
of Authentic Movement for the mover.   This latter focus formed the basis of her 
doctoral studies in phenomenology and mysticism, published in 1995 as Arching 
Backward: the Mystical Initiation of a Contemporary Woman. 
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Whitehouse also writes about the role of the teacher/leader/mediator vis a vis the 
student/client/patient.  Where Adler suggests a degree of therapeutic detachment, 
Whitehouse’s approach conveys a stronger sense of nurturing, intuiting and 
preserving ([1979] 1999, p 85-89).  Drawing on Whitehouse’s premise that Authentic 
Movement is concerned with the knowledge one gains through being moved, Adler 
describes that as the sense of letting go is manifested, “one begins to lose the 
illusion that one is anything other than one’s body.”  As a result, what is “affirmed is 
the body, not the knowledge of the body” (Adler, [1987] 1999, p 143).  If this is the 
fundamental objective for the mover, Adler wonders how this experience is 
moderated by the presence of the therapist as witness.  Her analysis of what 
transpires between mover and witness articulates both the dynamics of the 
relationship between each participant, as well each individual’s relationship to the 
movement.  In a paper from 1987 entitled “Who is the witness?” Adler describes what 
happens after the mover has finished moving: 
 
after the mover moves, the mover and witness usually speak together 
about the material that has emerged during the movement time, thus 
bringing formerly unconscious processes into consciousness.  Though 
the mover’s work, especially initially, is the primary focus of both the 
mover and the witness, the inner reality of the witness appears to be 
as vast, complex and as essential to the process of the inner world of 
the mover. With the movement as the catalyst, the witness and mover 
work together, over time, each refining her capacity to integrate her 
experience of formless material into form. 
 
Adler, [1987], 1999, p 142-143. 
 
 
It is interesting to note that movement is a catalyst for bridging the unconscious with 
the conscious, for giving form to formlessness, only when it is mediated by the 
presence of a witness.   
 
Adler goes on to suggest that the mover herself is also a witness.  The capacity of 
the mover to witness herself grows over time, fed by the input and validation of the 
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external witness and her increased comfort level in moving authentically.  Together 
the mover and witness collaborate in witnessing the movement and simultaneously, 
in witnessing the unconscious.  Adler explains that in the beginning of an Authentic 
Movement process the witness bears “a larger responsibility” for witnessing – 
watching, listening and bringing a certain quality of attention or presence to the 
experience of the mover.   Adler sees that the witness functions as a guide, 
suggesting when to continue, focus, exaggerate, wait for and to trust the mover’s 
impulses to move. Gradually as the witness and the mover work together and the 
mover’s capacity to self-witness evolves, the balance of responsibility shifts to 
become more equal (Adler, [1987] 1999, p 142-143).   Another shift is also apparent 
with the more advanced mover:  after years of intense therapy, the mover will not 
only be capable of accessing Authentic Movement more easily but will also enter into 
dialogues with the witness (or witnesses in group sessions) with an increased ability 
to analyze and extract meaning from their movement.  Adler describes this as the 
emergence of an “increasingly clear internal witness” ([1991/1992] 1999, p 184).  In 
terms of self-witnessing, Webb speaks of having become more attuned to his inner 
states and feelings.  The process of candid reflection has had the effect of making his 
movement more “honest” and as the years pass, Webb’s ability to go deeper into 
himself has increased (Webb, personal interview, 2006). 
 
More interested in developing a therapeutic model than Whitehouse, Adler began to 
regard her work in Authentic Movement as comprising five stages.  In the first stage, 
a relationship between a mover and a witness – or a client and a therapist – is 
established and together the “search” for Authentic Movement begins.  The second 
stage is characterized by the discovery of Authentic Movement and a period of 
learning to trust, enjoy and explore the new capacity for expression.  Through 
discussing and reflecting on the texture and content of the movement, the mover’s 
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inhibition or resistance to moving “freely” is addressed and presumably lessened.  In 
the third stage, mover and witness will begin to recognize patterns of movement or 
gesture that represent the mover’s personal “repertoire.”  Recognition of repetitive 
behaviour leads to the fourth stage where recurring somatic themes are discussed 
and dissected in order to understand something of their origins and context.  In the 
fifth and final stage resolution is found and with it, a sense of relief, clarity, incredulity 
and inner peace (Adler, [1972] 1999, p 122-124).   
 
In the second, third and fourth stages Authentic Movement forms the core of activity 
in each session.  It is at these stages, when a mover has acquired a certain degree 
of comfort with moving authentically, that what Adler refers to as a “spiritual” aspect 
can emerge in the practice.  During the years that Adler spent developing her own 
approach and methodology apart from Whitehouse, she became aware of another 
level of experience within her Authentic Movement practice.   She describes that she 
“reawakened the sacred, directly experiencing the numinous as physical sensation” 
within her body.  This sense of the sacred took the form of an “unmet longing” to be 
“whole, in union in the presence of another, as mover or as witness, with oneself, 
with another, with one’s God” (Adler in Haze & Stromsted, [1994] 1999, p 118-119).  
In other writing Adler describes this experience as “becoming one with one’s 
indwelling Deity” (Adler, [1992] 1999, p 186).    
 
Adler’s own experiences were reinforced by her observations of movers within her 
practice.  Especially in the case of multiple movers where, in addition to the therapist 
or leader, movers share some responsibility for witnessing each other, Adler has 
observed that an accumulated intensity of focus and heightened internal witnessing 
may result in the formation of a “collective consciousness” within the group.  This 
idea of a collective consciousness is drawn not from French theorist Émile 
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Durkheim’s theory (where collective consciousness embodies a culture’s 
acknowledged norms and values) but from the field of transpersonal psychology 
which concerns itself with the transcendent or spiritual dimensions of humanity.10  In 
this context, collective consciousness is the outcome of meditation and self-
realization. The circle of witnesses experiences collective consciousness as the 
presence of “an energy” within the group that is larger than themselves (Webb, 
personal interview, 2006).  Adler observed that collective consciousness could also 
take the form of a shared sense of numinosity ([1991/1992] 1999, p 184-185).    
 
Increasingly Adler became convinced that there was more to Authentic Movement 
than a traditional psychotherapeutic exchange between therapist and client.  Her 
observations led her to state that: 
 
immersion in [Authentic Movement] means immersion in a 
developmental process in which personal history, as most clearly 
understood within psychological theory, slowly becomes integrated 
into the evolution of the psyche, taking its place within a larger self …  
As we bring this developing ego consciousness toward the 
reawakening of the spirit, the discipline of Authentic Movement 
expands to include experiences that occur outside the personality and 
to include a language system within which to place these experiences. 
 
Adler, [1991/1992] 1999, p 164. 
 
Though Adler does not give examples in her writing of movers who did not 
experience an “awakening of the spirit,” her aim to validate and ground feelings of 
ineffability expressed by her clients does not appear partial.  She has witnessed 
profound changes in the psychological development of her movers that were 
frequently accompanied by feelings and images that could not be adequately 
explained, verbalized or quantified either within the existing literature on Authentic 
Movement or within the culture in which she practised.  Though Jung writes that 
there is “nothing mysterious or metaphysical about the term “transcendent function” 
(Jung in Chodorow, 1997, p 43), Adler became convinced that something more than 
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just the process towards individuation and resolution was occurring in her studio.  
Her conviction motivated her to look for parallels in mysticism. 
 
Through her studies Adler came to the conclusion that Authentic Movement shares 
some similarities with mystical practices.  In particular, Adler argues that the 
previously described sensations – energy, unity, numinosity, collective 
consciousness, etc. – are evidence of “direct experience.”  Drawing from sources 
within philosophy and studies in comparative religion of Judaism, Christianity, 
Buddhism, Shamanism and Hinduism, she suggests that direct experience refers to 
immediate, embodied experience often connected with communion with a mystical 
power, entity or god.  Direct experience is formed through the senses as perception 
of an image, light, sound and/or kinaesthetic sensation.  Such experiences stand out 
for the movers and are sources of delight and fascination.  She further explains that 
direct experience is characterized by an inability to describe the phenomena, an 
extreme effect on the body and emotions and the “evolution of such experience 
developmentally” (Adler, [1991/1992] 1999, p 165).     
 
Adler aligns the developmental stages of transformative experience in Authentic 
Movement to those purported to occur in Christian mysticism (that involves five 
stages), the Throne Mysticism of the early Jewish mystics (seven stages) and 
shamanic tradition (six stages).  With regard to Authentic Movement, Adler believes 
that three stages – descent, union and return – pertain.  Such stages correspond to a 
descent “into” the unconsciousness characterized by an intense inward focus 
reminiscent of Persephone’s mythical journey into the underworld; release of 
unconscious material through movement that is free form and impromptu, where the 
absence of conscious control of the body can be accompanied by a sense of the 
ineffable or spiritual; and in the third and final stage, where return to a conscious 
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state may be accompanied by feelings of rejuvenation, renewal and/or a newfound 
clarity (Adler, [1991/1992] 1999, p 177-182).  Adler looks for support for her reading 
of Authentic Movement in the writings of Eliade who writes of “man’s profound need 
for initiation, for regeneration, for participation in the life of the spirit (Eliade, 1958, p 
134).   These thoughts parallel Adler’s own where in “longing for direct experience of 
[a] unitive state,” Authentic Movement practitioners are yearning for “access to [their] 
souls” (Adler, [1994] 1999, p 193).  While it certainly never evolved out of or in 
relation to any established religious belief system, Adler bases much of her 
theorization of and approach to Authentic Movement on her perception of its 
attendant component of awakened, embodied spirituality. 
 
Adler suggests that in order to transform, one must descend into the body.  Webb, in 
describing a “happening” in Authentic Movement, uses similar language stating that 
in waiting for authentic movement to emerge he is “going deeper into the body.”  In 
support of this idea of a mystical journey into the body or the unconscious, Adler cites 
the writings of Satprem, the nom de plume of French author Bernard Enginger who 
writes of his spiritual enlightenment under the tutelage of his gurus, Indian poet, 
scholar and mystic Sri Aurobindo and his partner The Mother.  Such descent and its 
possibility for transformation is, according to Satprem, the phenomenon of “entasy” 
(1984, p 205).  Where ecstasy, from the Greek ekstasis, means to be outside 
oneself, entasy is ecstasy in the body.  Other definitions for entasy include “inner 
bliss” and from the Sanskrit word samadhih, a state of deep absorption attained 
through meditation.   
 
It is interesting that this concept presupposes a model of the body where what cannot 
be seen is more real and prized than what is on the surface – where the body is a 
mere and inferior vessel.  Whereas Angel Corella, a dancer with American Ballet 
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Theatre, speaks of a feeling or sensation in peak moments that draws him up and 
away from the body towards heaven, entasy is predicated on an opposite trajectory 
downwards and into the body as Webb describes.  In many of Whitehouse’s and 
Adler’s descriptions of Authentic Movement sessions, in “getting closer” to Authentic 
Movement, movers have slumped forward, their chests or upper bodies deflating, 
projecting the impression of withdrawing, closing in on themselves, and of sinking 
lower and lower.  This downward, inward metaphor is key to the characterization of 
authenticity in Authentic Movement where that which is authentic is that which is 
inside.  While Authentic Movement seeks to eliminate a sense of disconnectedness 
or duality between mind and body, it maintains a separation between inner and outer 
by privileging what is internal and hidden over what is external and seen.  With 
Authentic Movement’s capacity to unlock what is untouched and potentially sacred 
beneath the conscious (within the subconscious), there are connotations of finding 
and connecting with one’s essence. 
 
In “Does authenticity matter? The case for and against authenticity in the performing 
arts,” British dance theorist Sarah Rubidge addresses what is at stake when striving 
for and/or acknowledging authenticity in performance.  While she primarily deals with 
issues of fidelity, integrity, reconstruction and historical accuracy in realizing written 
texts or scores, Rubidge touches on a number of issues pertinent to dance and to a 
discussion of Authentic Movement.  She suggests that designating a performance as 
“authentic” is a kind of judgment where authenticity is not an intrinsic property of any 
given performance but something that is ascribed.  This view is problematized by the 
fact that a performance that is acknowledged to be authentic does not actually exist 
as a physical object.  The enormous range of dance texts, styles and modes of 
presentation makes it virtually impossible to generalize when discussing criteria for 
authentic performance so that determining the basis for authenticity will depend on 
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the work under consideration.  These difficulties are likewise compounded by the 
issue of a dance work being created anew in performance and that, even in 
recreating a role, a dancer can adhere to the steps as well as the form and intent of 
the movement but will inevitably offer variation.  In these ways the appraisal of 
authenticity can be construed as both inappropriate and of little worth (Rubidge, 
1996, p 219-223).   
 
In opposition to these concerns, Rubidge offers some useful applications for the 
notion of authenticity.   Drawing on musicologist Raymond Leppard’s writing on 
authenticity in music (1988), Rubidge argues that instead of approaching authenticity 
as a means of producing an accurate reproduction of what is believed to be the 
composer’s intentions or as the enactment of the original performance however 
captured or imagined, one should see authenticity as the clearest possible 
“revelation” of the score.  In so doing, such a revelation “serves to allow the work to 
act upon the present by revealing new possibilities within, and new understandings 
of, the work” (Rubidge, 1996, p 227).  If one imagines the inner workings of the 
subconscious as a text – one’s personal mythology – waiting to be actualized, then 
the application of, or endeavour for, authenticity in performance seems appropriate.  
The mover is seeking to act out his/her text with honesty and integrity.  Such acting 
out both occurs in and is shaped by the present.  There is no prior version or original 
text to refer to but if, as Whitehouse and Adler suggest, the process of socialization 
separates people from their “true” selves then working with authenticity as a goal 
might allow that inner text to be realized with greater accuracy.   
 
Treating the enactment of the subconscious as a process of authentic revelation that 
could yield “new possibilities” within and “new understandings of” the self would 
appear to adhere to the tenets of Authentic Movement.  Yet it raises the question of 
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whether movement is authentic before it is made.  That Whitehouse, Adler and 
Chodorow suggest that movement is either authentic or inauthentic would imply that 
authenticity is an intrinsic property as opposed to an ancillary judgment.  When 
Whitehouse, et al. propose that authentic movement exists “within,” it sounds as 
though it is a tangible entity.  Yet Rubidge offers a reading of authenticity in 
performance that situates it as a tool rather than an essence.  While it seems 
plausible to regard the pursuit of movement that is authentic as an act of revelation, 
the premise of Rubidge’s arguments do not agree with the foundations of Authentic 
Movement theory where authenticity is both a priori and essentialized. 
 
The premise that authentic movement is universally accessible and validating is 
indisputably essentialist.  In his work Against Essentialism: A Theory of Culture and 
Society, American sociologist Stephan Fuchs offers insight in to the dynamics of 
essentialism.  Fuchs argues that constants or essences exist “because they are 
being held constant by an observer.  When this happens, essences appear, along 
with things-in-themselves or natural kinds” (Fuchs, 2001, p 2).  Observers in Fuchs’ 
work can be objects, individuals, groups, movements or institutions, “anything 
equipped to apply distinction to the world” (2001, p 18).  Fuchs’ choice of language 
has some interesting parallels with the practice of Authentic Movement where the 
witness is clearly an observer.   In addition, Authentic Movement as a discipline and 
an institution – a canon of best practice and schools or studios where it is taught – 
likewise functions as observers in Fuchs’ paradigm.  Fuchs suggests that essences 
serve the needs or the goals of the observer and are compelled to exist because they 
maintain the status quo of the entity that identifies them.  Fuchs provides the 
example of a piece of art: 
 
an art, for example, establishes similarities and differences in ways 
different from or similar to those of other observers. When an object is 
recognized as part of an art, it becomes related and similar to the 
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objects that are already there, in the networks of that art. No such 
similarity existed before; it is an outcome of net-work, not its 
independent condition.  
 
Fuchs, 2001, p 55. 
 
 
In this case, the piece of art has no intrinsic quality, that makes it, for example, 
painted in an impressionist style, but rather it is the connections, similarities and 
overall distinctions attributed by an observer – an art critic, another genre of painting 
or the aesthetic philosophy that underlies a museum’s choice to exhibit the piece in a 
public gallery space as opposed to relegating it to storage.  The art is neither good, 
bad, nor impressionist in and of itself, but is distinguished as such by the names and 
descriptors that are affixed.  What assigns or diminishes value are the context that is 
constructed and its inherent criteria for assessing worth.   
 
In Authentic Movement, the witness provides the mover with instructions.  Through 
diligent effort and further coaching from the witness, the instructions lead the mover 
to attend more closely to inner thoughts and feelings – something that modern life 
does not often afford.  Once a deep level of concentration and self-focus has been 
established, the mover may manifest movements that he or she is not conscious of 
provoking.  The witness informs the mover that what s/he has just experienced is 
“authentic movement.”  The mover may describe that accompanying these 
unconscious movements were feelings or sensations unlike anything he or she has 
experienced before.  The witness asks for more details, then tells the mover that this 
is very common and is called – in Webb’s case – a “happening.”  At each stage of the 
process, the witness is guiding the mover towards implicit goals using terms and 
language that presume a specific goal and outcome.  The witness indoctrinates the 
mover in Authentic Movement and gives both the process and the outcome a critical 
value.  As both the mover’s ability to access Authentic Movement through 
subsequent sessions and his or her propensity for mapping and verbalizing their 
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experience improves, the witness tells the mover that his or her capacity to self-
witness is emerging.  At all stages of the process, the language and the context 
shape and determine certain outcomes so that each stage corroborates the previous 
stage.  In private or group sessions, the outcome appears to be the same:  in 
individual therapy isolation makes the mover receptive to the witness’ point of view; 
in group sessions, multiple movers offer collective validation.  To return to Fuchs’ 
hypothesis, the observer applies distinction and in doing so establishes constants 
that are collaboratively held in place.  As a result essences appear, and Authentic 
Movement (capital A, capital M), becomes a thing in itself.   
 
In Webb’s case, his inclination towards Authentic Movement grew jointly from an 
interest in and enjoyment of improvisation as a creative tool, and from an affinity with 
feminist theory in art-making.  Both approaches share the recognition of agency 
through an investment in personal narrative – the individual as a unique “collective” 
of experiences.  Yet as regards the application of feminist theory in learning 
environments, there can likewise be a risk of essentializing.  In Essentially Speaking, 
feminist scholar Diana Fuss discusses the precarious situation feminist pedagogy 
finds itself in with regard to validating students’ “lived” experiences.  She questions 
how educators deal with students’ daily appeals to experiential knowledge when, 
“with the advent of poststructuralist thought, experience has been placed so 
convincingly under erasure” (Fuss, 1989, p 113).  Fuss suggests that the promotion 
of personal narrative is as likely to dismantle masculinist ideologies as it is to 
essentialize feminist perspectives since the authority of experience rarely advances 
discussion and frequently provokes misunderstanding.  Yet while such issues may be 
contentious in an environment that privileges verbal communication, one would 
imagine that there would be less opportunity for the kind of distortion caused by 
absolutes in an environment where movement forms the basis for expression.   In 
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discerning and responding to the moving body, there is a greater scope for 
speculation based on images, ideas and impressions.  Yet inherent to the practice of 
Authentic Movement is the risk of naturalizing movers’ experiences.   When this 
happens, the mover’s behaviour and recollection of that behaviour can neither be 
challenged nor refuted because of the highly personal nature of the content and the 
use of language and context that are simultaneously precise and elastic.  The 
doctrine allows movers to describe their experience of Authentic Movement in 
whatever way seems appropriate – the mover is considered the “expert” on his/her 
own experience (Adler, [1994] 1999, p 194).  Yet interpretation is limited by the 
parameters of the medium – movement and the impulse to move are quite simply 
either authentic or inauthentic.  This has been established from the outset of a 
mover’s practice. 
 
In the first chapter of her book, Choreographing Difference: The Body and Identity in 
Contemporary Dance, Anne Cooper Albright praises Elizabeth Hollander’s 1986 
article “On the Pedestal: Notes on Being an Artist’s Model” for her ability to theorize 
subjectivity and perception successfully on the basis of personal experience.  In 
defending the elided agency of the painter's model, Cooper Albright is impressed that 
Hollander “is prepared to brush up alongside a well-heeled feminist polemic” and in 
doing so is willing to “risk the uncertainty of theorizing about her lived experience” 
(1997, p 16).  Furthermore, Cooper Albright explains that: 
 
while it would admittedly be simplistic to assume that the authority of 
experience is any more real or authentic than the complex cultural 
mechanisms embedded in representation, reproduction and reception, 
neither do I believe that sophisticated theoretical paradigms should 
completely erase other, perhaps more awkward, sources of 
information. 
  
Cooper Albright, 1997, p 17. 
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At issue here is not that the insight gained from Authentic Movement is going to 
politically or socially marginalize others since it is, at its roots, a one-on-one 
therapeutic process.  But the combination of a discipline that espouses authenticity 
functioning in a post-structuralist present is problematic.  Authentic Movement walks 
a fine line:  while it certainly presents a means of validating “more awkward sources 
of information” in a society that, to use Cooper Albright’s term, is notoriously 
somatophobic, the supposition that “authentic” movement exists can hardly be 
understood as anything but essentialist.  Inherent to Authentic Movement are 
“complex cultural mechanisms” and “sophisticated theoretical paradigms” that in 
practice construct a dogmatic climate for and category of appropriate response.  
While the practice hinges on the “more awkward, sources of [bodily] information,” it 
advocates a direct and coordinated methodology.  Whitehouse’s open-ended 
“movement-in-depth” was rejected in favour of Adler’s method-based “Authentic 
Movement” in part to garner respect for the practice and also to appeal to an 
American identity in crisis: “the heart of the practice,” Adler writes, “is about the 
longing, as well as the fear, to see ourselves clearly”; “the problem [is that] too many 
of us don’t feel part of anything really, except the system we create in our schedule 
books” and “at this time in the Western world, in response to our deepening need for 
authentic spiritual experience, all we can do is return to our physical selves” ([1994] 
1999, p 190, 194, 171).  If, as Adler suggests, the landscape of Western culture is 
characterized by spiritual vacuity and formlessness, then both she and the forces of 
postmodernism and post-structuralism are to some degree in agreement.  Yet for 
Webb, the search for authenticity meant revealing his personal narrative through his 
dance work, in particular, the reconciliation of his sexual orientation with a 
conservative culture.  In the absence of a supportive, gay-positive environment, 
Webb found certainty and vindication through an objectively essentializing but 
subjectively validating process.  
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The essentializing theme in Authentic Movement is also expressed in terms of the 
primal and sacred.  Chodorow, in her discussion of the transcendent function, writes 
“since the dawn of human history, dance has been a sacred language, a way of 
realizing our connection with the cosmos.”  This leads Chodorow to quote that active 
imagination has been called a “dialogue with the gods” ([1977] 1999, p 250).  In a 
later article, Chodorow also discusses movement that is derived from the “primordial 
unconscious.”  Such movements have a “different, often non-human, quality” and can 
have a “numinous effect” on both mover and witness.  The sequences can manifest 
“seizure or trance-like” qualities as if the mover is “approaching, or is in, a state of 
possession” and/or “possessed by an animal.”  Drawing from the work of L.H. 
Stewart and his theories on the anthropology of play (1981), Chodorow theorizes that 
the effects of curiosity and play, taken to their “primal depths,” manifest as “seizures 
of divine curiosity and divine love.”  She relates that in movement, these aspects 
conspire so that the mover is literally “being danced by an intensely focused energy 
that approaches manic excitement … all-embracing love, bliss and rapture” ([1984] 
1999, p 273-274).   
 
By contrast, in earlier work, Chodorow uses the more neutral language of 
Labananalysis to describe trance-like and meditative states common to Authentic 
Movement.   Certain Effort combinations of Time, Space, Weight and Flow called the 
Internalized Drives and Inner Attitudes or Incomplete Efforts can also classify such 
experiences.  Internalized Drives combine an element of Flow with two other Efforts 
suggesting Timeless, Weightless and Spaceless states.  Such states Chodorow 
suggests can be “powerfully reminiscent of many dream experiences.”  The Inner 
Attitudes, that combine only two Effort elements can “evoke a wide and dramatic 
range of internal experiences” and have an “even more elusive and transitory quality” 
(Chodorow, [1977] 1999, p 239-240).  It is not clear how effective Labananalysis was 
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in the studio when assisting clients in articulating their experiences in Authentic 
Movement.  The relative objectivity of the Laban’s system may not have suited 
Chodorow’s purposes to overstate movers’ experiences for dramatic effect and/or to 
underscore the significance of therapeutic breakthroughs.  
 
Adler’s contribution to the theorizing of Authentic Movement is, more so than either 
Whitehouse’s or Chodorow’s, invested in what she argues is a mystical element of 
the form.  Yet even in her pursuit of capturing trance-like experiences, she falls into 
essentializing norms.  For example, Adler argues that: 
 
one cannot have a mystical experience or access the soul without 
getting a glimpse of the interconnectedness of all things. Mystics from 
the beginning of time have known this, but in the history of Western 
civilization mystics have been at the fringe of society, their absence 
supporting our forgetting.  We have forgotten how a mystical 
experience comes about, that is occurs in our bodies because we are 
a microcosm of the whole. 
Adler, [1996] 1999, p 193. 
 
 
Adler presumes many things – the existence of the soul, the interconnectedness of 
all things, that mystics have existed since the beginning of time.  She addresses her 
arguments to an imagined collective “we” and establishes herself as omniscient 
narrator.  There is something about encounters with trance-like experiences and the 
ineffable that encourages these kinds of fanatical reactions.  But perhaps this is due 
in part to the absence of indigenous mystical traditions in contemporary Western 
culture.  The experiences seem exceptional because there is no appropriate context 
in which to situate or explicate them.  The solution is to seek parallels between 
Western and non-Western examples in the hope of gaining insight and building 
significance through association with established forms.  The result, as is the case 
with Adler, is an assortment of pan-national examples that offer similarities but limited 
commentary and are primarily reductionist and Orientalist in scope.  Thus, even in 
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the process of theorizing, the mystical aspect of Authentic Movement becomes 
essentialized. 
 
Where Adler’s efforts to contextualize trance-like experiences are melodramatic, 
Chodorow inadvertently offers a less contentious means of approach.  Through her 
analysis of the relationship between witness and mover Chodorow emphasizes the 
anticipation and frisson that the two participants bring to an Authentic Movement 
session.  In an interview conducted in 1986, Chodorow describes that the “presence” 
of the witness holds a “particular kind of tension.”  Ideally, the witness brings his or 
her total being and attention to bear on the relationship in any given session.  The 
quality of the witness’ attentive presence can create a “free and sheltered space” in 
which the mover can express him or herself and can also create a dynamically 
charged atmosphere.  Investing in this way can result in very powerful emotional 
resonances for both the witness and mover alike (Chodorow in Zenoff, [1986] 1999, p 
223).  The act of being so intensely watched and unconditionally accepted allows the 
mover to let go.  When this happens, on a movement level, the witness sees a 
person “who is literally being danced by an intensely focused energy that approaches 
manic excitement” (Chodorow, [1984] 1999, p 274).   That manic excitement is jointly 
created between witness and mover and need not be interpreted or aligned with any 
other practice or form other than the context in which it is manifested.  There are few 
situations where people receive this kind of unmitigated attention and permission to 
move, and perhaps as a result, it is not surprising that extraordinary things such as 
happenings can occur.  Certainly the sense of isolation that pervades Webb’s 
descriptions of his life as a young adult would suggest that the focused attention 
offered by a witness could be validating and refreshing (Webb, personal interview, 
2006). 
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While the mover is moving, Chodorow explains that the witness is engaged in a 
process of symbolic detection and recognition.  As the mover begins to move, the 
witness asks him or herself: 
 
what does this person’s movement stir up in me from a larger cultural 
perspective?  How has this attitude or movement sequence appeared 
in art, how has it appeared in literature or mythology? What paintings 
come to mind, what poetry or what music comes to mind as I watch 
the person move?   
Chodorow, [1986] 1999, p 224. 
 
 
The range of questions are inspired by what the mover’s body is doing in space, yet 
they can lead to all kinds of possible threads and suggestions that pertain to either 
the participant’s life, their present state of mind or to aspects of their culture and 
society.   The potential meaning exists in the exchange between the work itself and 
the viewer who functions to discern its resonances and allusions.  The myriad of 
ideas and images that emerge from the movement are negotiated between the two 
entities.  Neither the mover nor the movement has a privileged role in guiding the 
interpretive response.  When mover and witness are equally engaged, the 
negotiation of meaning can be particularly rich and intense.  When this happens, 
Chodorow describes that the session can take on a ritualized quality where the space 
becomes infused with kinetic energy.  It is at these times that happenings occur.  In 
this setting, the happening and its transformative, numinous properties require no 
external point of reference.  They have developed organically within the studio and 
are shaped by the intensity of focus that the mover and witness bring to bear on the 
session.  The mode of interpretation, spiritual or otherwise, lies within the intertextual 
negotiation of meaning between mover and witness (Chodorow, [1986] 1999, p 224).  
In this context then, Authentic Movement need not be a source of mystical 
awakening a priori. 
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If Jung (and Freud before him) and the originators of Authentic Movement are 
comfortable to some degree with using the term trance, why is Webb so 
uncomfortable?  An important aspect of his childhood and adolescence was his 
Christian upbringing.  Tanya Luhrmann, a professor of clinical ethnography at the 
University of Chicago investigating the social construction of psychological 
experience, engages in the theorization of trance experience among American 
evangelical Christians.  Luhrmann argues that contemporary religion in the United 
States is shaped by a “new emphasis on bodily and trance experience” (2004, p 
518).   The article describes a learning process through which new evangelical 
congregants learn to use a combination of language and embodiment to build 
intimate relationships with God.  In these “intensely experiential evangelisms,” 
Luhrmann explains, God is conceived as an intimate, visceral, companion.  It is not 
just with words, prayer and the community of fellow Christians that his presence is 
constructed, but with certain techniques that identify His presence through the body’s 
responses, “particularly in the absorbed state we call trance.”   It is the experience 
and acknowledgement of trance combined with conceptualized language that frames 
responsiveness in terms of a “close relationship” with God (Luhrmann, 2004, p 519).  
Luhrmann names the process of recognizing certain bodily responses as God’s 
presence both subjectively and idiosyncratically “metakinesis” and perceives that 
congregants are enacting all three types of learning in the process of knowing God – 
cognitive/linguistic, relational and metakinetic.  Metakinetic learning is related 
specifically to the experience of trance states that take the form of “falling in love with 
Jesus,” finding “peace with the Lord” or simply the complex notion of “prayer.”   
    
Luhrmann argues for the notion of “performing God’s presence” even if performance, 
like trance, might not fit with her respondents’ sensibilities where performing could be 
construed in some way as false or insincere.  In interacting with experienced 
 232
congregants, new congregants are learning to perform God’s presence by watching 
others perform.   At various times the new congregants are exposed to enactments of 
God’s presence and the trance states that this entails, and in turn, respond 
kinaesthetically to what they are witnessing.  Through the combination of exposure, 
guidance and validation, they manifest and articulate such states themselves.  The 
training is key:  while they may respond kinaesthetically to the performance of trance, 
it is through constructing that experience as culturally valid within the scope of 
evangelism and doing “God’s will” that they incorporate it into their own range of 
bodily knowledge within their habitus.  “Performing God’s presence” and “dancing 
from inside” are both metaphors for trance.  Though Luhrmann means something 
“relatively straightforward” when she uses the word “trance,” (2004, p 523), she 
admits that in subsequent research she now uses the phrase “absorption states” 
when interacting with Christians to avoid her respondents’ negative beliefs of trance.  
When asked in an e-mail correspondence whether her respondents ever used the 
word “trance,” Luhrmann responds:  
 
no, people did not use the word trance and were very much opposed 
to it; in fact, I now use the phrase “absorption states” when interacting 
with Christians. I think that “trance” is associated with the New Age, 
and whatever the truth of the relationship between that inspiration and 
the Christian inspiration, there are great efforts to distance the 
Christian style. And indeed, people associate trance with ecstatic near 
naked Balinese dancers, not with “respectable” folk! 
 
Luhrmann, personal correspondence, 2005. 
 
 
The notion that trance is inappropriate to the minds of “respectable folk” would seem 
applicable to Webb.  Despite positioning himself politically within the vanguard of 
contemporary dance performance and experimentation, it appears that he still 
subscribes to certain views that are characteristic of growing up in a religiously 
conservative household.   Combined with the homogenizing quality of Authentic 
Movement practice and language and his commitment to an honest and organic 
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process, Webb’s avowal that he does not trance is not surprising.  Trance is not part 
of his heritage or the heritages of his collaborators.  It does not pertain to the work of 
Benedetti or the Halprins.  In the context of Authentic Movement, mystical 
interpretations of certain aspects of the form have been the focus of Adler’s later 
work and to a lesser extent, a component of Chodorow’s writings as well, yet Webb 
does not appear to have absorbed their influence.  Where Adler and Chodorow seek 
to contextualize trance-like experience in primitive or sacred terms with its attendant 
range of inflated language and metaphor, Webb adheres to an interpretation of 
authenticity that is unembellished and conservative.   In A love story, Webb’s 
performance of Authentic Movement is set apart from the rest of the action of the 
piece.  His performance is introspective and sexualized – qualities that seem equally 
descriptive of his work in general.  As a Canadian, born and bred, Webb’s response 
to his experiences of transformation may be construed as typical of his particular 
habitus and representative of a particular indigenous cultural model for trance. 
 
 
                                                
1 “In the early 1960s Anna [Halprin] began collaborating with other artists and leaders 
in a groundbreaking movement that was to bridge the fields of dance/movement, 
art, performance, somatics, psychology and education. These collaborations 
included exchanges between Anna's dancers group and Fritz Perls (founder of 
Gestalt therapy), Moshe Feldenkrais (Awareness Through Movement), Carl Rogers 
(Person-Centered Therapy), and Thomas Gordon (confluent education). The 
dancers group also collaborated with Anna's husband, environmental designer 
Lawrence Halprin, the Fluxus group of New York, and others in the avante garde 
movement. The questions being explored were, What can the arts tell us "here and 
now" about the experience of being human? What do we know experientially, and 
what can we learn about the body/mind/spirit connection in our lives today? 
Influenced by these collaborations and by her work with the dancers and artists 
who gathered around her, emerged what Halprin called a “life-art process” – an 
approach based on working with peoples' own life experiences as the utmost 
source for artistic expression” (Anonymous a, website, 2006). 
 
2  Webb’s 1992 work Crowns, Thorns and Pillows for example, was presented as part 
of the Freedom Within the Margins/The Politics of Exclusion Conference held at the 
University of Calgary.  A reviewer describes that the piece “effectively underwrote 
the topic of the conference … proclaim[ing] that, although restricted to the margins, 
protest cannot be entirely excluded … Webb’s performance shows that, even in the 
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representation of oppressive conventions and strangulating power structures, 
physicality offers its resistance”  (Heyd in Laviolette, 1993, p 21-22).  Similarly in a 
review of “(I wanted to know) The Exact Dimensions of Heaven,” Heather Elton 
writes “At the time of the performance, The Charlottetown Agreement [an accord 
that attempted to resolve long-standing disputes around the division of powers 
between federal and provincial jurisdiction in Canada] was very much on Webb’s 
mind, as well as the aboriginal self-government component of it” (Elton in 
Laviolette, 1993, p 24).   
 
3  Blair Brennan (b. 1959, Edmonton, Canada) is a multidisciplinary visual artist who 
has been involved with various art galleries and the local arts community in 
Edmonton for over twenty years.  His sculpture, installation work, 
photographs/photo-based works, drawings, book works and other works on paper 
were featured in both the 1996 and the 1998/99 Alberta Biennial of Contemporary 
Art and in recent thematic group exhibitions including Making it Like a Man, and 
The Uncanny: Experiments in Cyborg Culture.  
 
4 “Queer theory began as a branch of philosophical investigations of what is known 
as third wave feminism and gay and lesbian studies. However, in the last 15 years, 
the term has taken shape as a new branch of thought that is suffused throughout 
the disciplines …Queer theory’s main project is exploring the contestations of the 
categorization of gender and sexuality. Queer Theory is a pairing of words coined 
by Teresa de Lauretis during a working conference on theorizing lesbian and gay 
sexualities that was held at the University of California, Santa Cruz in February 
1990." (Anonymous b, website, 2006). 
 
5  Webb’s use of the term should not be confused with the emergence of 
“happenings” as part of the nascent performance art movement of the 1950s in 
America and in Europe. It is likely, however, that the term and its connection to the 
work of Allan Kaprow, John Cage, Merce Cunningham, Robert Rauschenberg, 
Robert Whitman and others would have certain positive artistic and political 
resonances for him.  
 
6  Throughout this section on Authentic Movement, I have indicated the original dates 
of publication of referenced sources in square brackets.  While the themes 
explored in this chapter are not arranged chronologically, I felt it was important to 
allude to the evolution of the field of Authentic Movement since the 1950s by 
drawing attention to the date that the material first appeared. 
 
7  In an excerpt from Alchemical Studies published in 1929, Jung writes: “Among my 
patients I have come across cases of women who did not draw mandalas but 
danced them instead.  In India there is a special name for this: mandala nrithya.  
My patients say very little about the meaning of the symbols but are fascinated by 
them and find that they somehow express and have an effect on their subjective 
psychic states” (Jung in Chodorow, [1929] 1997, p 78). 
 
8  “Marian Chace’s reputation as a special teacher spread so that soon paediatricians 
and psychiatrists were sending her their patients for classes. It was in 1942 that 
she was invited to work at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C., a federal 
psychiatric hospital, where psychological casualties of World War II were beginning 
to fill the wards. This was the period before the advent of psychotropic drugs and 
there was openness to new methods of treatment, particularly through group 
processes. It was there that "Dance for Communication" was first offered and was 
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the start of what became a new mental health profession called dance/movement 
therapy. She was made the first full time dance therapist in 1947” (Anonymous c, 
website, 2006). 
 
9  Whitehouse found inspiration and common ground in the work of Trudi Schoop and 
Jeri Salkin’s work in Adjunctive Therapy, and Charlotte Selver’s work in Sensing.  
For more information on Schoop and Salkin, please refer to Goertzel (1965) and 
May & Wexler (1963).  Many of Selver’s original articles are available on the 
Sensory Awareness Foundation website 
(http://www.sensoryawareness.org/pagesnews/04/fall04/ashes.html) 
 
10 See for example Wilber (1980) and Daniels (2005). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  Vincent Sekwati Mantsoe: Trance as a Cultural Commodity 
 
Bent from the waist, poised on the tips of his toes, travelling on a diagonal, his weight 
thrown forward, chin jutting in time with the thundering drums, the dancer flails his 
arms, drawing cavernous circles in the air.  With his focus directed intently towards 
the floor, his energy seems barely contained as with each deftly articulated 
movement of his feet and undulating torso his body lengthens.  His arms keep up a 
steady windmill, as his body curves ever forward, his pelvis arched, knees bent.  His 
head starts to canter from left to right, his eyes wide and prominent, tracking but 
seeing nothing, and still his arms keep revolving.  Suddenly he swoops and lunges, 
leading with his head, eyes closed, he hovers, listing on one side, with his arms 
swimming gracefully behind him.  He shifts direction, still leading with his head, his 
upper body floating, his legs and feet still taut, lifting and flexing.  The tension in his 
upper body returns as he contracts and releases, his chest and upper back gradually 
open, yielding more and more towards the sky, arms, now bent at the elbows, 
expanding and condensing.  His eyes are open and wild; he takes deep inhalations 
filling his chest, stepping back with each breath before exhaling and closing in on 
himself.  His arms start to carve the air in front of him scooping and gathering the 
space, offering his arms in front of his body so the sides of his hands touch, palms 
upwards, elbows straining to meet.  His moving body is like a heart beating, drawing 
energy like blood towards him and sending it back out again.  Yet the inward flow 
appears stronger.  The intensity of his movements, their pace and breadth are 
expansive and regal.  As he begins to turn in on himself, weight forward again but 
with a flat back, he creates a centrifugal force, still moving on the balls of his feet, 
slowly increasing in speed, his head on one shoulder, eyes closed.  There is a 
moment of stillness, a meditation, before he springs up, leaping and turning on one 
foot then the other, released from the vortex.  His body is glistening, his smile wide, 
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and he is dancing with abundant pleasure, torso and hips spiralling, arms gathering 
and releasing, fingers grasping. 
 
When South African dancer and choreographer Vincent Sekwati Mantsoe dances 
there is a certain vitality to his performance that is at once contained by his body and 
radiates outward.  The sheer pleasure that he exudes and the precision of his 
movements make him a captivating performer.  Reviews of his work speak of his 
command, his virtuosity and his clear and unwavering vision. In speaking with him 
one learns that he credits the jubilant life-force that audiences attribute to his 
performances to his ability to enter trance states.  Through the vehicle of his living, 
breathing, dancing body, Mantsoe is able to open himself to the mysteries and 
healing energy of the spirit world, becoming a vessel for their knowledge and 
blessings.  In his view it is this rich interior life, based on traditional teachings and the 
pantheon of his native Zulu culture, mediated by his ability to enter altered states of 
consciousness, which forms the basis of his gift as a performer.  His role as a 
medium for the will of the gods, invests him with a certainty of purpose and presence 
that is keenly felt and admired by spectators.  
 
Engaging specifically with the work of Appadurai and his theories of commodification 
in cultural practice (1986), this chapter addresses the ways in which trance functions 
as a traded commodity in a globalized economy and how that trade impacts 
embodiment as exemplified by Mantsoe in his performance of his 2003 work NDAA.  
Both his choreographic process and performance mode incorporate and manifest 
trance.  Yet whereas, traditionally, anthropologists went to cultures such as 
Mantsoe’s own to collect trance, Mantsoe, a consummate performer and the son and 
grandson of traditional sangoma healers, has positioned himself to convey trance 
personally to the West – he and his family believe it is his calling.  Through both his 
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willingness and his estimable gifts as a choreographer and performer, organizations 
internationally – including most recently the National Arts Centre in Canada – have 
commissioned Mantsoe to create new works that frequently showcase his capacity to 
enter trance states.   
 
Building towards a discussion of trance as a commodity, this chapter begins with 
biographical details of Mantsoe’s early life and career path from his early days in 
Soweto under apartheid to his present role as an international guest artist.  Following 
preliminary descriptions of the differences between artefacts and commodities, I 
expand on what it means to speak of decolonizing and how this applies to Mantsoe 
and his work.  To this end, Maori anthropologist Linda Tuhiwai Smith, through her 
imperative to decolonize methodologies, offers a starting point for problematizing the 
trade of goods and knowledge among indigenous peoples.  In anticipation of the 
application of Appadurai’s theories of commodification, I introduce American 
anthropologist Thomas Csordas’ critique of subjectivity and embodiment that 
encompasses his theory of self-objectification.  To illustrate his argument, Csordas 
draws on Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Pierre Bourdieu, as well as fieldwork 
completed among American Christian charismatics who consider the holy ghost and 
the devil to be tangible objects that exist within their own bodies.  Using Appadurai, 
Mantsoe and the trance states he embodies are examined as items of trade within 
the scope of his work and then specifically as items of sacred trade as 
conceptualized by medieval historian Patrick Geary.  Completing this chapter is a 
discussion of embodiment first through the writings of colonial activist Frantz Fanon 
and then with regard to Mantsoe’s performance of trance in NDAA. 
 
Vincent Sekwati Mantsoe grew up in the townships of South Africa.  As a child and 
young adult he participated in youth clubs, practicing street dance and imitating the 
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moves of Michael Jackson and other pop artists from American music videos. 
Throughout his childhood, he woke everyday to the sound of his mother playing a 
drum to greet the ancestors.  A descendant of a long line of sangomas, traditional 
Zulu healers, Mantsoe began participating with his mother, grandmother, aunts and 
extended family in rituals involving song and dance.  The sangomas, Mantsoe 
explains, “work as liaisons between the living and the dead.  But it’s purely a healing 
process, using natural herbs to heal people, to enhance life in a positive manner, and 
to give guidance” (Braun, 2005).   
 
In his late teens, Mantsoe began training in earnest with Johannesburg's Moving Into 
Dance Mophatong Company (MIDM).  MIDM was founded in 1978 by Sylvia 
‘Magogo’ Glasser as a non-segregated dance ensemble and training centre during 
the height of apartheid.  Through MIDM, Glasser approached dance as a means of 
cultural resistance to the sociopolitical restrictions placed on daily life.  At the basis of 
the company’s work was the concept of integration – integration of people from 
diverse backgrounds as well as the assimilation of indigenous and foreign cultures.  
Mantsoe was deeply influenced by MIDM's signature fusion of African ritual, music 
and dance with Western contemporary dance forms.  The company is credited with 
producing an important and unprecedented style, combining a respect for African 
beliefs and values with movement innovation (Thatanelo April, 2005).  Later in his 
career, Mantsoe was the associate artistic director and resident choreographer for 
MIDM for six years.  Today Mantsoe continues to describe his work as “Afro-fusion” 
(Mantsoe, 2006) drawing on traditional African dance forms and contemporary 
approaches from modern, ballet and Asian forms such as Tai Chi, martial arts and 
traditional Balinese dance. 
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Though his family’s acknowledged trade in the community is healing, Mantsoe 
participated as a spectator in the rituals performed by members of his family and was 
discouraged from taking an active role in them.  From his family’s perspective, 
healing was the responsibility of female kin and Mantsoe was not expected to learn 
the secret lore.  Likewise, though Mantsoe had seen his grandmother, aunt and 
mother commune with the spirit world through trance states, he was not trained and 
therefore not permitted to enter them himself.  Yet it became apparent to his family 
that Mantsoe had inherited a propensity for traditional ways – that his “openness” to 
the spirits and to the sangoma ways was “strong” (Mantsoe, personal interview, 
2006).  As he grew older it became clear that Mantsoe was also a gifted dancer and 
it was through his dancing that his grandmother determined that the spirits were at 
work.  Having consulted the spirits, Mantsoe’s aunt and grandmother told him that he 
was to play a part in the family business:  through the vehicle of his dancing Mantsoe 
was to bring his family’s knowledge and message to the world.  The spirits had 
advised that he was to be a healing “ambassador” and that he was to travel to distant 
places as a teacher and performer (Mantsoe, personal interview, 2006).  His aunt 
and grandmother began training Mantsoe in earnest, instilling the sacred and 
important work he was to carry out and how he might manifest this in his dancing.  
Entering trance states became an aspect of his vocation and he began to understand 
and appreciate their power.  Through the spectacle of his dancing that bridged the 
traditional and contemporary, he could be a vehicle for enlightenment and spiritual 
communion (Mantsoe, personal interview, 2006). 
 
Since the 1990s, Mantsoe has pursued this ordained path, working steadily at the 
invitation of companies, festivals and choreographers from around the world.  He has 
performed at international venues and festivals throughout Africa, Europe, Asia and 
North America and is the recipient of numerous honours awarded within his home 
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country and abroad. These include the 1995 Standard Bank Young Artist of the Year 
Award, First Prize at Dance Encounters of Contemporary African Dance in Luanda, 
Angola, the 1996 FNB Male Choreographer of the Year, and the Fifth and Sixth 
Rencontres Choréographiques Internationales awards for Independent 
Choreographers in 1996 and 1998 in Paris, France.  In 1999, he received South 
Africa’s First National Bank VITA awards for Choreographer of the Year and Most 
Outstanding Performance by a Male Dancer as well as the Prix de Peuple at the 
Festival International de Nouvelle Danse in Montréal, Canada.  In 2001, he once 
again won the FNB Vita Choreographer of the Year as well as Best Male Dancer in 
the contemporary style (Mantsoe, website, 2006). 
 
In response to the many awards and increased exposure, Mantsoe has been 
commissioned by dance companies and choreographers worldwide to teach and set 
new work.  In 1999, he worked in Japan on the creation of Traduction Simultanée, a 
collaboration with Michel Kelemenis and Takeshi Yazaki, which was performed in 
Johannesburg, France and Tunisia.  Mantsoe also created works for Dance Theatre 
of Harlem in New York, Ballet Theatre Afrikan in South Africa, Skanes Dans Teatre in 
Sweden, Inbal Dance Company of Israel and COBA Collective of Black Artists in 
Toronto.  In addition, he spent an extended period in residence at the Fondation 
Jean-Pierre Perreault in Montréal, where he created his solo work NDAA which 
features an extended trance section (Mantsoe, website, 2006). 
 
Contextualizing trance in NDAA requires revisiting the trance as artefact paradigm.  
An artefact is something prized for its cultural significance and is very much 
associated with the imperialist anthropological agenda.  An artefact comes to signify 
something that is Other – distanced by time, space, geography, language and 
culture, it expands the boundaries of the known world to include that which exists 
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beyond the everyday – and is a reminder of what is achievable and conquerable.  
Removed from their original context, artefacts form the basis of collections. 
Simultaneously fixed and indeterminate, they beget identity and signify tenure.   One 
is reminded of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ essay “New York in 1941” (1985) where, 
according to the author, the city of New York is like a Victorian curio cabinet filled 
with masterpieces of pre-Columbian, South Asian, Oceanic, Japanese and Native 
North American art that is simultaneously prized and forgotten, admired and 
undervalued. 
 
A commodity, on the other hand, is invested with agency.  Wrested from its original 
context or purpose, a commodity is invested with a value that is jointly created, by 
buyer and seller, owner and desirer.  Even where the value – monetary or otherwise 
– is artificially inflated by scarcity, demand, or fads, the value to all stakeholders is 
acknowledged and, though vulnerable to manipulation, respected.  The traditional 
and priceless Maori wedding home removed from sacred land and put on display at a 
cultural fair in Sydney (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p 52) is divested of its original worth in 
favour of an ascribed worth based in alterity and novelty.  Even when two disparate 
socio-economic systems meet and compete there is an appreciation and restoration 
of value through the trade of commodities. 
 
Yet in this scenario, Mantsoe is not an object of ethnographic classification and 
fascination from whom trance is procured without compensation but an active agent 
in the transaction.  In working with Western dancers, companies and festivals, 
Mantsoe is participating in a process that subverts and potentially decolonizes the 
traditional flow of contact and information between West and non-West wherein 
trance may be viewed less as an artefact and more as a traded commodity. 
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In Marxist terms, commodities have a social use value, an exchange value and a 
price.  Commodification takes place when economic value is assigned to something 
that would not normally be considered in monetary terms.  Examples include 
thoughts, ideas or brands that fall under the rubric of “intellectual property,” as well 
bodies and sex.  Commodity fetishism is a state of social relations that arises where 
the social value of a commodity exceeds the use and/or production value and comes 
to be regarded as a status symbol.  Occurring in complex capitalist market systems, 
commodities are said to fetishized where relationships are defined by the social value 
placed on such items (Mandel, 1979/1994).  Appadurai’s approach to commodities is 
clearly influenced by Marxist theory yet, in his formulation, he has dispensed with 
concerns for the appropriateness or inappropriateness of relating to commodities in 
these loaded ways. 
 
In addition to commodities and commodification, the terms decolonize and 
decolonization are useful terms within this discussion and possess interesting and 
relevant derivations.  Decolonization first appears in The Crumbling of Empire, the 
work of German political scientist Moritz Julius Bonn, who in the aftermath of 
reparations from the First World War saw that “the age of empire-breaking is 
following an age of empire-making” (1938, p xi).  Beginning in earnest post-1945, the 
movement to decolonize was often heralded by the acknowledgement of the 
immense financial strain associated with administrating distant lands.  Yet in many 
cases, decolonizing was intended to keep the former colonies still tied to the mother 
economy and vulnerable to foreign investment and interference – in other words, 
there are and were degrees of decolonization.   
 
This sense of decolonization as a systematic process of dismantling the colonial 
architecture and infrastructure was either initiated from within, in the form of a 
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popular revolution or imposed from without, often by the newly benevolent colonizer, 
remained common until the 1970s when thinking shifted from a macro-structural to a 
micro-physiological or body politic focus.  Here decolonization was less often 
regarded in the traditional sense of “decolonizing Kenya” (Wasserman, 1976) or the 
“Portuguese refusal to decolonize” (Davidson, 1969) and more in “decolonizing the 
Ghanaian foreign service” (Dei Anang, 1975) and “decolonizing mission churches” 
(Berman, 1975).  Dei Anang writes that the goal of decolonizing the Ghanaian foreign 
service was the “well-managed promotion and representation of Ghanaian [first] and 
African [second] interests” rather than the “free-wheeling, cocktail-swigging, double-
dealing, fly whisk and tom-tom style” diplomacy characteristic of the current 
administration (Dei Anang, 1975, p 219).  From the 1980s onwards, the sense of 
decolonization begins to shift again towards recognition of what one might consider 
the more abstract ramifications of and reactions to colonialism.  Here historians and 
sociologists write of “decolonizing Africa” in order to provide it with a past prior to 
colonization (Robertshaw, 1990) and “decolonizing history” where the autonomous 
voice of the imperialist historian is brought into question (Howe, 1984; Delpechin, 
1992; Wilkes, 1996).  The impetus for a reflexive deconstruction of history is also 
embraced by native researchers, giving rise to attempts to “decolonize Chicana 
history” (Pérez, 1999), for example, and inevitably to calls for indigenous peoples to 
“decolonize themselves” and “ourselves” (Esedebe, 1994; Ross, 1998).  In this same 
period, it became prevalent to speak of decolonization in a figurative manner in 
relation to theory and practice – the “growing call to decolonize anthropology and 
educational research” (Rogers & Swadener, 1999), to “decolonize,” “localize” and 
“Africanize” women’s studies and feminism (Mbilinyi & Meena, 1991; Caraway, 
1999),  to decolonize theories of nationalism (Appleman Williams, 1985; Blaut, 1987) 
“to decolonize curriculum” (Ngugi, 1987), “contemporary educational practice” 
(Henry, 1998), and the “production and consumption of knowledge” (Chow, 2002).  In 
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each of these instances, decolonizing entails analyzing and exposing power 
relationships embedded in the representation of knowledge – who is being studied, 
by whom and for what purpose – and measuring those responses against imperialist 
principles that have pervaded academic research.  Finally, perhaps in its most 
existential form, decolonizing is applied to the notion of subjectivity, bringing into 
question why one “sees” the way one does.  Applied to post-coloniality, decolonizing 
subjectivity acknowledges that while the dynamics of oppression, trauma and 
resistance may manifest in similar ways for all dispossessed peoples, how one 
experiences the world and one’s history is always experienced in a profoundly 
individual way. 
 
Applied to Mantsoe, decolonizing functions in two ways: first, as the conventional 
subject of anthropological research, Mantsoe has inverted the traditional flow of 
knowledge by bringing himself and his use of trance to the attention of the West.  
Unlike the cultural fairs of the Victorian and Edwardian ages that saw the importation 
of indigenous peoples in staged exhibits of the “primitive” and “authentic” for a 
spectacle-hungry public, Mantsoe positions himself as an active and instigative agent 
in the exchange within the arena of high culture.   Acknowledging this requires 
reevaluating the ways in which trance and its practitioners have traditionally been 
acquired and analyzing the mechanisms of acquisition.  Secondly, Mantsoe is 
engaged in decolonizing his own subjectivity through his performances of trance – 
this is particularly clear in NDAA.  In performing NDAA, Mantsoe questions the 
relationship he has with his multiple audiences – the spirits, spectators, the cosmos 
and his own consciousness – challenging both how he sees and is seen. 
 
In 1999, Smith, a self-described “indigenous researcher” from New Zealand, 
published Decolonizing Methodologies, a book that aims to redress the colonial 
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framework by which post-colonial research is defined and restricted.  As an 
indigenous woman, she claims a particular viewpoint shaped by genealogical, 
cultural and political factors and certainly by her homeland’s colonial history.  She 
perceives that many indigenous intellectuals “actively resist participating in any 
discussion within the discourses of post-coloniality” because post-colonialism is 
viewed as “the convenient invention of Western intellectuals which reinscribes their 
power to define the world” (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p 14).  Tuhiwai Smith suggests that 
upon losing jurisdiction of their colonies, the colonizers invented new methods to 
extort the formerly colonized to extend their control.  Post-colonial discourse in the 
hands of the West is thus just another tool with which to divide and conquer.  Post-
colonial research and the methodology that informs it is a means by which the West 
may extract and claim ownership of indigenous ways of knowing, doing and 
producing while simultaneously rejecting the people themselves and denying them 
further opportunities to shape their own culture and nationhood.   Quoting Franke 
Wilmer, a specialist in indigenous rights, Tuhiwai Smith concludes that “indigenous 
peoples represent the unfinished business of decolonization” (Wilmer in Tuhiwai 
Smith, 1999, p 7).   
 
In a chapter entitled “Colonizing Knowledges,” Tuhiwai Smith looks at the collection 
of artefacts as an aspect of the colonialist enterprise.  “The idea that collectors were 
actually rescuing artefacts from decay and destruction,” Tuhiwai Smith explains, “and 
from the indigenous peoples themselves, legitimated practices which also included 
commercial trade and plain and simple theft” (1999, p 61).  Through her writing, it is 
clear that Tuhiwai Smith wishes to invest the colonized with agency.  Collection was 
not a unidirectional transaction yet from the ethnographic record, one might think that 
these encounters were exempt from a basic law of physics that every reaction has an 
equal and opposite reaction.  To view the anthropologists’ endeavour as one-sided 
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and limited to their own action, is to deny the colonized their involvement – however 
coerced – in the colonial enterprise and in its aftermath.  Like Homi Bhabha before 
her, Tuhiwai Smith contributes to the critical discussion of the post-colonial by 
contesting the underlying presupposition that all power and knowledge function 
ambivalently and that a variously positioned colonial object mimics the terms of the 
dominant ideology and uses them to offer resistance.  Where Bhabha liberates the 
colonized from their “inscription as Europe’s shackled Other” and recognizes that the 
colonized subject can, indeed, speak for him- or herself (Bhabha, 1994), Tuhiwai 
Smith brings the discussion to a much more prosaic level in discussing the act and 
impact of trade.  Here, trade by definition acknowledges the existence and 
contribution of two sides regardless of the issue of equality or neutrality.  The trade of 
goods – some, as Tuhiwai Smith suggests, were in fact “made to order” – imparts a 
story of meeting, a declaration of desire, appraisal, debate, resolution and potential 
exchange if all prior stages were enacted in a satisfactory manner (1999, p 61).   
 
Is it accurate to suggest that anthropologists trade in knowledge? What were they 
imparting that was of value to the colonized?  What did the other receive in return for 
subjecting itself, willingly or unwillingly, to the anthropologist’s scrutiny?  Did interest 
in their practices give the colonized pride in their culture “exports”?  And if the 
artefact desired was ephemeral, how was it traded? And for what?  Like collecting 
oral histories, there is a sense that the endeavour is justified in terms of the potential 
for ongoing preservation, but how does that process of collection interfere with the 
indigenous cycles of interaction and retention?  Is the knowledge that one’s folk song 
or tale will outlive oneself sufficient compensation?  For Mantsoe, participating in the 
trade and acquisition of his cultural and bodily knowledge is part of a moral 
responsibility he feels is incumbent upon him.  He states: 
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my purpose is to re-educate, to reintroduce [traditional] practices, to 
balance traditions with the concerns of modern times.  I want to be 
open, I want to talk about it … it is important for me to know who I am 
and where I come from.  And to believe that maybe other people can 
learn something from that.  
                                                                
Mantsoe in Braun, website, 2006. 
 
 
In his article, “Embodiment as a Paradigm for Anthropology” (1990), American 
anthropologist Thomas Csordas, through a critical examination of the work of 
phenomenologist philosopher Merleau-Ponty and sociologist Bourdieu, offers an 
interesting view of the perception where feelings or states can be perceived as 
objects within the body.  Beginning with the premise that a paradigm of embodiment 
entails an erasure of dualities of mind and body, subject and object, Csordas 
summarizes the principles of Merleau-Ponty’s and Bourdieu’s approaches based in 
the problematic of perception and the discourse of practice, respectively (1990, p 7).   
 
Understood as a critique of empiricism, the claim that all knowledge or meaningful 
discourse about the world is related to sensory experience or observation, Merleau-
Ponty suggests that the act of perceiving is characterized by both “richness and 
indeterminacy” and is culturally constituted.  Whereas theories of empiricism and also 
intellectualism epitomized by Descartes start with the objective world and cannot, to 
Merleau-Ponty’s satisfaction, account for the abstract ways in which consciousness 
constitutes objects that it perceives, Merleau-Ponty proposes that the body is a 
“setting in relation to the world” and that consciousness is the body projecting itself 
into the world (Merleau-Ponty in Csordas, 1990, p 8).  From here, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that perception begins with the body and ends with objects.  A 
phenomenological approach to the anthropology of perception therefore centres on 
the “moment of transcendence in which perception begins, and, in the midst of 
arbitrariness and indeterminacy, constitutes and is constituted by culture” (Merleau-
Ponty in Csordas, 1990, p 9).   Since the distinction of objects is the end result of 
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perception and is not acquired empirically by perception, Merleau-Ponty speaks of 
the preobjective, a concept which encompasses a descriptive process of “existential 
beginnings, not of already constituted cultural products” (Merleau-Ponty in Csordas, 
1990, p 9).   
 
With regard to Bourdieu, Csordas is interested in his concept of habitus.  First 
introduced by French sociologist Marcel Mauss, Bourdieu moved beyond Mauss’ 
sense of habitus as a collection of practices, defining it as a system of “perduring 
dispositions which is the unconscious, collectively inculcated principle for the 
generation and structuring of practices and representations.”  The habitus is thus the 
universalizing paradigm that supposes an individual’s habits, responses and 
practices, and that without explicit analysis or meditation, defines what is 
“reasonable” and “sensible” (Bourdieu, 1977, p 72, 79).   Of interest to Csordas, is 
the recognition of habitus as implicated in the creation and maintenance of a socially 
informed body.  As a result, embodied processes have only “a limited number of 
common forms because they emerge from a shared habitus” (Csordas, 1990, p 15).  
Taken together with Merleau-Ponty, Csordas argues that “the preobjective is not 
precultural” – meaning that the existential process of perception is culturally 
influenced – and that the capacity to objectify, to make objects, is culturally structured 
and bounded. 
 
Employing the notions that perception ends in objects and that embodied processes 
can take only a limited number of forms according to the directives of one’s habitus, 
Csordas proposes that even self-perception (or self-reflection) can arrive at objects 
being associated with and/or within the body.  While these objects may only be 
perceived kinaesthetically, they may still exist as objects without compromising or 
raising the question of implicit duality of body and spirit or of Self and Other.  To 
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illustrate this theory of “self-objectification” and the notion of the preobjective, 
Csordas uses the example of group healing sessions amongst adherents of 
American charismatic Christianity.  In his fieldwork, Csordas discovered that 
participants perceived crisis or conflict within themselves and/or with the values of 
their religious community as evidence of having a demon or demons within them.  
Demons were not abstract ideas but real, palpable entities that resided in the body.  
 
Informants participated in healing sessions to rid themselves of the demons that 
plagued them.  Csordas noted with interest that participants perceived these demons 
as objects within themselves and that the process of perception was one of self-
objectification where feelings, once perceived, took the form of entities or objects that 
were simultaneously contained by and distinct from themselves.  Demons were not 
unlike foreign bodies or parasites even if they had no quantifiable form.  Such 
embodied perceptions were clearly rooted “in a body in the world,” where embodied 
objects pertained to and were validated by the informants’ habitus.  For the 
informants, demons manifest in the body as objects; they may be felt, yearn, cry out, 
act out, resist, control and be cast out – they were not ephemeral spirits but were 
invested with agency and took distinctive forms.  Furthermore, the body they inhabit 
may be both transgressed and healed without either rupturing or fracturing a sense of 
self or bodily wholeness. 
 
Csordas pays particular attention to what one might consider “specialists” in self-
objectification – shamans, religious healers and leaders – who function within and 
are empowered by the habitus to validate and objectify certain embodied processes.  
These specialists help to discern and construct demons both as cultural objects and 
as “experiential manifestations.”  As a result, the demons are perceived as “concrete 
self-objectification[s] in religious participants” (Csordas, 1990, p 15).   Added to this 
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list, though not necessarily originating from the habitus of the afflicted, are 
anthropologists – they too become specialists in cultural objectification, validating the 
experiences of their informants by asking them about their demons, and contributing 
to their realization as objects.  In doing so, objects like demons or trance become 
tangible and by extension, collectible. 
 
In reference to Mantsoe, trance is an embodied object that he simultaneously brings 
with him and that moves through him.  Such a sense of the body’s permeability – 
where demons can distort the shape and quality of the body and then be cast out – is 
supported by Csordas where he describes demons as “transgressors of body 
boundaries” (1990, p 16).  When one watches Mantsoe dance, there is a sense of a 
rolling energy building and growing, that follows a transition from intense 
introspection towards release and revelation.  The capacity to enter trance states – 
like a pilot light that never goes out – resides in his body.  Mantsoe’s beliefs about 
the role trance plays in his life and the role he plays in its life are predicated and 
validated by his own culture, his habitus.  In turn, this relationship to the object he 
carries within him which also traverses the boundaries of his body into the 
performance space is validated by the witnesses – presenters, audience members 
and other dancers – who become implicated in maintaining the self-objectification.   If 
one accepts Bourdieu’s theorization of habitus as the cultural structures that exist in 
people’s bodies and minds, then habitus is something that accompanies a person 
when he or she travels through the world.  In addition to bringing trance as an object 
within him when he works in other countries, often amongst people for whom trance 
is a mystery, Mantsoe brings his sensibilities about trance with him.  Such 
sensibilities include trance’s power to heal, to communicate and imbue the person 
who trances and those who witness with a sense of the ineffable and the sacred.  
These things are part of Mantsoe’s gift and the gift of his people.  Again, this situates 
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trance as an object – a gift, a blessing – and as something that affects others through 
the medium of his/its performance. 
 
Appadurai’s work has focused primarily on issues of modernity and globalization.  His 
theories on the creation and circulation of commodities that he describes as “objects 
of economic value” grew from conversations he had with historians and fellow 
anthropologists beginning at a series of ethnohistory symposiums he attended in 
1983 and 1984.  In his introduction to the volume of essays that was subsequently 
compiled and published by participants, Appadurai presents the premise that 
commodities, like persons, have “social lives” (1986, p 3).  Through the act of 
economic exchange, Appadurai argues, things acquire value and value is thus 
something that is attributed to and projected on the things that are exchanged.   
Focussing on the things themselves rather than on the form and function that 
exchange takes can allow one to acknowledge that the relationship between 
exchange and value is determined politically.  Understanding why commodities are 
economically valuable and how they came to be regarded as such presents an 
opportunity to understand and assess the history of objects, their changes in value 
and their trajectories as components or in fact as foci of social interaction.  A 
commodity’s perceived value and the people that acknowledge and contribute to its 
evaluation and engage in its exchange are inextricably linked and one can learn as 
much about one as from the other. 
 
In seeking to establish what he means by “economic value,” Appadurai draws on the 
writings of sociologist Georg Simmel and his defining 1907 work, The Philosophy of 
Money.  In Appadurai’s reading of Simmel, value is never “an inherent property of 
objects but is a judgement made about them by subjects” (Simmel in Appadurai, 
1986, p 3).  Similar to an appraisal, value is attributed to an object by subjects within 
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its attendant milieu – or to think in Bourdieu’s terms, its habitus.  That an object can 
be highly valued by one group of people and not at all by another seems indicative of 
an object’s social being-ness.  Without anthropomorphizing, Appadurai contends that 
objects have social lives by virtue of the role they play in representing and contesting 
value both as objects-in-themselves and in their relation to their owners as properties 
or assets.  For example, The Red Violin, a Canadian film released in 1998, is the 
story of a prized violin.  When the violin goes up for auction in the present, it is 
revealed that the instrument has been travelling around the world for over 300 years 
since its creation in 1681, inciting anger, betrayal, love, and sacrifice.  The violin's 
history is depicted in locations around the world, with scenes in Cremona, Vienna, 
Oxford, Shanghai and Montréal.  How the violin came to be regarded as a commodity 
– as a thing of value – and the journey it has taken – the transactions, currencies, 
identities and motivations of its buyers and sellers, how it has been affected by 
prevailing tastes, fashions and politics as well as the impact of age and time – is 
enacted through the acquisition and surrender of the object and the value attributed 
to it.  As portrayed in the film, the story of the violin’s provenance shows how “objects 
circulate in different regimes of value in space and time,” in “specific cultural and 
historical milieus” and as a result, acquire social lives (Appadurai, 1986, p 4).   
 
To this understanding of value, Simmel adds that value is also derived by demand, 
either the scarcity of the prized object or the resistance exerted by socioeconomic 
forces that prevent the object from being possessed without the application of effort 
or exchange.  Appadurai illustrates this point by describing how a gap exists between 
a commodity and the person who seeks to acquire it.  The gap is not insurmountable 
and in fact, socioeconomic mechanisms exist to foster bridging that gap.  However, 
the gap must be first apprehended and then the appropriate (or inappropriate) steps 
taken to acquire it (Appadurai, 1986, p 5).  If one considers the actions of and 
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conditions for stealing, an object is desired, a gap exists, and that gap cannot be 
bridged through channels of fair or legal exchange, so actions are taken to acquire 
the object that may (or may not in the case, say, of Viking hordes) contravene the 
normalized codes of exchange.  Why that object is valuable and why the person 
resorts to stealing tells a particular but by no means discrete story about the 
relationship between the commodity and the greater society.  One can argue about 
the boundaries, codes and ethics that govern exchange but it is interesting to 
acknowledge that a story, a relationship, a pattern of behaviour pertains.  Even if, as 
Appadurai suggests, one ascertains that things have “no meaning apart from what is 
attributed to them within a system of value,” this fails to recognize the very real, 
“historical circulation” of things within socio- and geo-political structures (1986, p 5).   
 
Appadurai continues to call on Simmel to elucidate how the value of objects is 
determined reciprocally, where the desire for an object is fulfilled by the sacrifice of 
some other object.  “The difficulty of acquisition,” Simmel explains, “the sacrifice 
offered in exchange, is the unique constitutive element of value, of which scarcity is 
only the external manifestation, its objectification in the form of quantity” (1907, p 
100).  But in the absence of hard currency or gifts in kind where an estimation of 
exchange is inappropriate, the question of what exactly is being sacrificed may be 
raised.  When a Western anthropologist visits an Other culture for the acquisition of 
knowledge, what is he sacrificing in exchange for his observations?  He is without the 
comforts of home and of “civilized” society, shared language and customs, the 
company of colleagues and loved ones, but these “things” are potentially of little 
value or consequence to his subject.  When the object of value is ephemeral and 
situated in subjective experience, how is knowledge traded?  And what does the 
subject receive in return for the “sharing” of his knowledge?  Is trance’s value in 
Western culture connected to its scarcity and the desire for spiritual meaning? 
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 In the same volume as Appadurai’s introductory essay on commodities, American 
medieval historian Patrick Geary discusses the circulation of medieval religious relics 
as “sacred commodities” (1986, p 169).  Like slaves, Geary begins, relics are both 
persons and things and so to some degree problematize contemporary theories of 
commodification.  Historically, trafficking in humans was key to the colonialist 
enterprise and like slaves, relics were significant and highly valued commercial items 
within a specific historical era.  Relics are invested with a spiritual and ineffable 
dimension where their acquisition or their proximity intimates closeness with a higher 
power.  A relic is simultaneously a person and an idea and such arguments tend to 
confound the Western principle that common sense opposes things and ideas.  A 
relic is both a thing – a piece of bone or a remnant of shroud – and an idea – the 
presence of God, the possibility of miracles, the propinquity of divine love.   Geary 
suggests that understanding their value requires examining how commodities in 
general were produced during the medieval period – how certain things became 
valuable – and then appreciating the cultural context in which they circulated (1986, p 
170).   
 
The dichotomy of words and things embodied by relics brings the discussion back to 
Appadurai and Simmel.  Simmel, Appadurai notes, suggests that from  
 
a theoretical point of view, human actors encode things with 
significance, [but] from a methodological point of view (the doing of 
things) it is the things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social 
context.  
 
Simmel in Appadurai, 1986, p 4.   
 
 
A relic is accorded value because of how it is displayed, interpreted and exchanged.  
Appreciating that value though may only be fully realized through knowing its history, 
origins and associations. The value of a relic is understood not in name alone but in 
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the construction – and some might argue the fabrication – of its provenance 
combined with its positioning vis a vis the reverent culture.  The story of the saint, the 
list of his or her visions, miracles, acts, trials and tribulations is represented by the 
relic.  Even when there is a question of authenticity, a relic is still invested with power 
and believers will come to its defence, reinvesting its significance.  Appreciating the 
creation and circulation of religious relics presents an opportunity to understand how 
articles could be both alive and inanimate, resonant and dormant.  The relic – 
encased in its reliquary, gifted, traded, stolen, or paraded through the parish – is an 
embodiment of God’s love and/or sacrifice, a physical reminder of the vestiges of 
mortality and the promise of immortality.   In theory, believers know that it is simply a 
bone or a piece of cloth, yet methodologically it represents God’s presence on earth.  
The tension that is captured and enacted by a relic is its essential mystery.  
 
Arguing that trance might be seen as a relic presents an interesting dilemma.  The 
spiritual nature or purpose of relics seems applicable to Mantsoe’s practice, yet one 
would be unlikely to cast Mantsoe or his trance states as a kind of talisman.  
Practitioners of trance are often people of interest within a community, garnering 
respect and/or fear yet those who seek knowledge from them would be drawn to 
them in a similar way that supplicants would be drawn to seek out or acquire a relic – 
to heal themselves, to feel closer to a divine power, to derive a sense of inner peace.  
Though relics have a diminished status in the West of the present compared to that 
which they attained during the medieval period, as medical anthropologist Setha M. 
Low argues, bodies and body parts continue to be commodified.  Though divested of 
their spiritual connotations, body parts remain defined by their potential to generate 
capital through the practice of organ harvesting and donation (Low, 1994, p 476).  
Yet trance is neither associated with a particular part of Mantsoe’s body, nor is it to 
be removed or excised from him.  It resides within him and is brought out in carefully 
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constructed and choreographed performances that meet with the spirits’ approval.  
Trance in Mantsoe’s work is consciously and conscientiously manifested.   
 
Trance’s change in status from an artefact to a commodity coincides with a shift 
towards late capitalism (Jameson, 1990).  Mantsoe is an active participant in a 
globalized economy that supports an open market for cultural exports.  International 
co-productions that involve multiple countries and collaborators of various ethnicities 
and nationalities, working in shared idioms of language and form that defy 
geographical borders are becoming increasingly common.  Canada’s LaLaLa Human 
Steps, for example, is based in Québec, yet its production Amélia (2002) was a co-
production with theatres in Canada, Korea, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and 
Austria.  Amélia was rehearsed in Canada and in Europe, with dancers from two 
continents, and premiered in the Czech Republic.  While expensive, and 
compromised by tighter security and the threat of terrorism, travel remains accessible 
and communication via the pervasive internet has made contract negotiations and 
scheduling across time zones easier to manage.  It is within this milieu that Mantsoe 
is active:  He, his French wife (who is also a dancer) and their young daughter live 
and have a studio in Saint Pont, France, he speaks English, French and Zulu, he 
makes frequent trips home to Soweto, he receives funding from the South African 
and French governments, his website is hosted in South Africa, and in 2007 he will 
perform in Canada, the USA, Colombia, Sweden, France, the UK and Korea.  
Commodities in this transnational performing arts arena are not created to respond to 
basic needs of sustenance and survival but rather are created out of a desire for the 
new, the unusual and the extraordinary and within this, the authentic.  Someone like 
Mantsoe, who embodies the traditional and the contemporary, is invested with a 
divine gift yet is equally at ease in the secular, technologized, multinational economy 
and is keenly positioned to respond to and profit from the current market.  This was 
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never as clear as during our first meeting in Toronto in an international coffee shop 
chain, on an excruciatingly hot day in July (global warming?) with the air conditioning 
blasting, his iPod hanging around his neck and Mantsoe telling me that he is a 
shaman.  “You know, I really am a modern guy,” Mantsoe explains to a reviewer in 
2005, “I still believe in and am nourished by this modern world” (Braun, website, 
2005). 
 
The body itself has become something to invest in with the recent waves of body-
conscious, body-centred trends beginning with aerobics and personal trainers in the 
1980s and continuing through to its current restorative phase epitomized by the 
proliferation of meditation classes, spas, yoga and organic foods from the late 1990s 
to the present.  It does not appear, however, that this is the context in which Mantsoe 
is implicated.   First and foremost, he is linked to the international market through his 
connection to the African diaspora, which is growing exponentially both in terms of 
representation and recognition throughout the world.  Second, the interest in Africa 
by non-African nations illustrated by increased humanitarian aid, direct development, 
media coverage and exposure to pan-African arts and culture outside of Africa - 
Youssou N’dour, Ladysmith Black Mombaza, or the African “theme” chosen for the 
2000 international dance festival FIND in Montréal – would indicate that “Africa” has 
a certain caché.  Mantsoe’s Africaness is likewise marketable.  The credibility and 
authenticity that Mantsoe embodies, his strong connections to his heritage and his 
authority to enter trance states make him a valuable commodity.  The question 
remains whether the West’s interest is truly genuine or contrived to respond to the 
perceived imbalances inherent in postcoloniality. 
 
In the same way that relics as both persons and things problematize contemporary 
theories of commodification, so too does commodifying Mantsoe and his ability to 
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enter trance states.   Trance conceived first as an artefact and then through the 
example of Mantsoe as a commodity is a thing; Mantsoe is the person who conveys 
and enacts trance.  Since one cannot definitively separate trance from Mantsoe, it is 
both a person and a thing.  Mantsoe and his family believe his spiritual vocation is 
corroborated through his ability to enter altered states of consciousness.  Mantsoe 
accesses and manifests these altered states through his dancing and combined, the 
two modes of expression make him both a powerful performer and an effective 
conduit for the gods (Mantsoe, personal interview, 2006).  Trance is an intangible 
action, a mystical concept housed in his body yet in touring around the globe he is 
circulating and trading in trance.  His value as a dancer and trance practitioner is 
acknowledged equally by his own and his host cultures on either side of the residual 
West/non-West divide.   Even when the West places a monetary value on his skills 
that cannot truly compensate for their inestimable value, the gods still condescend 
through their immortal goodness to bring knowledge to the uninitiated through the 
vehicle of Mantsoe.  Mantsoe is the thing in motion, illuminating the human and 
social dimensions of his existence and gift – the globalizing forces of traditional and 
contemporary, colonial and post-colonial, a human in touch with the divine, a 
beautiful and exuberant dancer working with the blessings of the gods at the 
invitation of the white man.   
 
From Mantsoe’s perspective, despite the violence and cultural alienation that was the 
reality of living under apartheid, in place from 1948 to 1994, there has been a sense 
of uncompromised continuity in the life of his family through their vocation as 
sangomas.  Mantsoe pursued his interest in dance, finding an environment – the 
MIDM – where the training of dancers – black, white, Asians and in the language of 
apartheid, coloureds – continued despite enforced segregation and the harsh 
repercussions for intermixing.  His family continued to practice their trade despite an 
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omnipresent legal and social framework that ensured the economic and political 
dominance of the country by South Africans of European descent.   
 
Mantsoe grew up during the age of the Black Consciousness Movement which 
promoted concern for the existential struggle of the black person as a human being, 
dignified and proud of his blackness. The aim of the movement was to restore a 
black, African consciousness that had been suppressed under colonialism.  Part of 
the mission of the Black Consciousness Movement lay in understanding that black 
liberation would not only come from imagining and fighting for structural political 
changes but also from psychological transformation in the minds of black people 
themselves. This analysis suggested that in order to take power, black people had to 
believe in the value of their blackness (Brewer, 1986; Lobban, 1996; Gibson, 2005).  
There is no question that Mantsoe and his family have been adversely and 
unjustifiably affected by the colonialist regime of their homeland, yet Mantsoe gives 
the impression of having attained equilibrium within this potentially fractured identity.  
There is an absence of blame or recrimination in his descriptions of his schooling and 
adolescence in Soweto or his chosen path that places him in situations that could be 
read as tokenistic.  Despite the sweeping generalizations implicit in his statement, 
there may be some truth to historian Basil Davidson’s statement that “institutions of 
education, healing of the body and mind, of religion, faith and communion with 
ancestors, were used by African societies to protect their members against despair” 
(Davidson, 1969, p 117).  Mantsoe’s belief in his ordained purpose to serve the 
greater world at the behest of companies and cultures of all ethnic and political 
affiliations situates him as seemingly apolitical and unscathed.  Mantsoe is most 
certainly the subject and object of the “unfinished business of decolonization” but that 
business seems both genuinely and sincerely conceived and transacted according to 
terms that he accepts as fair and legitimate.   Reading his situation vis-á -vis a 
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primarily white European consumer, Mantsoe is as much a client as he is a provider 
of services.  From a distinctly spiritual perspective, his calling and his work transcend 
the day-to-day ugliness of his colonial past. 
 
Yet one cannot help but consider whether his chosen image as a goodwill 
ambassador is not problematized by what postcolonial theorist Mustapha Hamil has 
termed “self-definition in opposition to the Other” (2002, p 80).  Here the Other of 
Mantsoe’s past is the image of the marginalized and suppressed black youth, cut off 
and left to languish in an artificial homeland.  In opposition to that Other, Mantsoe is 
ambitious, purposeful and compassionate.  Whatever scars or grudges he bares are 
well-hidden and he is adamant that he has been blessed (Mantsoe, personal 
interview, 2006).  There is also the Other of the colonial past – either fierce and 
ignorant or docile and naïve.  There is certainly an element of malleability in 
Mantsoe’s demeanour, a willingness to go where he is invited, to adapt to the 
customs and working environments of his hosts, and to work diligently and graciously 
with the dancers with whom he is supplied.  Nevertheless, the standards Mantsoe 
sets for himself and his collaborators are high, based in the sense that he has been 
entrusted to act as an envoy for his family, the spirit world and his heritage which is 
doubly indebted to both traditional Zulu and capitalist South African mores.   
 
One wonders whether his interest in travelling beyond the borders of his home 
country is implicated in the prototypical colonialist agenda to which Mantsoe was 
subject, to venerate that which is not native.  If this were so, then Mantsoe’s 
dedication to uphold the beliefs and customs of the sangomas, while respecting and 
engaging with the currents of a globalized, bricolage-obsessed world, would seem 
misguided.  But such a reading falls into one of the traps of post-colonial analysis 
where revisioning the colonialist mandate keeps the formerly colonized in their 
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homelands investing in their own people and turning their backs on the outside world 
– in essence, attempting to return them to their pre-colonial state or, in a more 
mollifying tone, allowing them to repair the damage that has been wrought while the 
perpetrators look on from the outside.   Only if one were to attribute a lack of self-
awareness to Mantsoe would this reading be plausible.  There appears to be a 
genuine sense from Mantsoe that he has risen above these tortured discussions of 
where he and his people belong or how they should be portrayed.   
 
The writings of Fanon along with other colonial theorists such as Léopold Senghor 
and Aimé Césaire, were key to the development of the Black Consciousness 
Movement in South Africa.  It was Fanon who observed that the colonized subject 
cannot make meaning for himself as there is meaning already there, pre-existing, 
that makes him by definition the post-colonized subject.  Yet Fanon argues that he 
should be exempt from such predeterminations (Fanon, 1967).  Unfortunately, such 
defining positions are embedded within any discussion of coloniality past or present.  
But if one pays attention to where there were pockets of resistance or indigenous 
means of redressing the colonialist imbalance, then other avenues for meaning-
making and selfhood emerge.  In discussing the plight of the segregated Maghreb 
people in Morocco under French occupation, Hamil suggests that the Maghrebians’ 
“indigenous imagination and mysteries” were not subject to the colonizer’s authority.  
He argues that it was these “invisible powers” that defied “French systems of 
codification and pacification” (Hamil, 2002, p 80).  Perhaps it is Mantsoe’s direct 
connection to his sangoma forebears and their invisible powers that have made him 
so seemingly resilient.  Suggesting that he would be otherwise would invest the 
colonizers with even greater powers of destruction and oppression than they have 
already been accorded, yet one wonders to what degree he has been shaped by his 
and his nation’s past. 
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 In the colonial West Indies, Fanon argues that the black’s man sense of his own 
blackness is constructed vis-á-vis his white oppressors.  He argues that the 
racialized person is left in a state of seeking approval and definition from the white 
world where the black body only acquires meaning in a social space where the white 
body is presumed to be the norm (Fanon, 1967, p 154).   This sense of what 
constitutes normal is perceived internally and externally – looking both outward and 
inward from the perspective of the colonized.  How one is viewed as a black person 
in white-dominated society affects how one views oneself as a black person in black-
dominated society.  In this way, it is possible to see colonialism as a lived 
experience, something that resonates in the body. 
 
Drawing from Fanon’s views that the lived experience of colonialism can manifest as 
an embodied state, one can begin to expand this idea to include other embodied 
states that become contested and revisualized through interaction between colonizer 
and colonized, anthropologist and subject.  When the colonizer comes to associate 
trance only with the colonized, racialized Other, its meaning and/or significance to the 
practitioners may be altered.  As an attribute of the Other that was prized by 
anthropologists working alongside the colonial agenda, trance may have become 
another plane for assimilating alterity.  Trance practitioners were singled out by 
anthropologists because of their special status within their communities and/or 
because of their abilities.  When representatives of the colonizer accorded 
importance and difference to those who tranced, this must have affected the 
colonized in how they regarded their own practices and by extension their own 
bodies.  Perhaps they guarded their knowledge from the anthropologist to try to 
maintain autonomy, perhaps they wondered why something that was central to their 
own culture was received with such fascination.  They may have felt exposed, 
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honoured, confused or ambivalent.  If trance was an accepted aspect of their cultural 
practice or psychobiological functioning, then members of that culture may have 
questioned why anthropologists were so enthralled and this realization may have led 
them to question this facet of their behaviour.  Whatever the circumstances, 
assigning significance to trance would have provided another aspect by which the 
Other, while potentially venerated, was unequivocally Othered.   This process would 
likewise affect how the Other perceived himself (as Other) in relation to the colonizer.  
The situation is reminiscent of Lévi-Strauss’ re-telling of Boas’ story of Quesalid, a 
shaman and key informant the anthropologist knew from his fieldwork among the 
Kwakuitl.  Quesalid’s perspective on the theory and practice of shamanism is 
complicated by the European presence.  His identification as a shaman “responds to 
conflicting pressures” including “his desire to show the white people that he is critical 
and rational about these things in which he knows the whites do not believe” (Lewis, 
1986, p 431).  As a dimension of colonized embodiment trance could have been a 
stage for resistance or co-operation, or simply a site for the acknowledgement of 
difference.  Yet it is not simply the enactment of trance that becomes an indicator of 
difference but also its transmission, retention and reification, both historically and in 
the present. 
 
In describing his piece NDAA, Mantsoe speaks of an “awakening of the self.”  From 
the moment he enters the performance space, he begins the process towards trance.  
It is there inside him and also hovering on the edge of his kinesphere waiting to be 
summoned.  His awakening begins slowly, tentatively, then gradually his movements 
expand as the distance between inner and outer is breached.  In NDAA, as in 
Mantsoe’s habitus, the Self is neither an isolated nor bounded being.  It is his past, 
his present and his future, his ancestors, his siblings and his grandchildren.  In 
performance he seeks to ask: 
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is there anyone here, is there something around me that I cannot see 
or hear?  Do I exist between reality and the imaginary?  Do you see 
me? 
Between us, life passes us without knowing if it ever existed, we 
breathe the human flesh that we do not see. 
 
Mantsoe, website, 2004. 
 
Watching Mantsoe perform NDAA, one is aware through the attunement of his body 
and focus that he is not alone on stage.  As he enters a trance state, he is looking 
about him, whispering and talking to unseen but present entities.  The music for the 
work features a recording of the everyday chatter and conversation of Gabon’s 
Bibayak Pygmies.  In this setting, Mantsoe performs his habitus, thousands of miles 
from his homeland.  NDAA is a solo work but Mantsoe performs his place in his 
community of neighbours, spirits and ancestors.  He is made and defined by them, 
he is in their presence and they in his – as he says, he inhales the human flesh he 
cannot see and it becomes part of him.  He is not a specimen, he is an individual 
within a collective of humanity and consciousness, constantly being made and 
unmade by his relationships with others.  His ability to communicate with the spirit 
world through trance adds another layer to his beingness in the world – a collective 
beingness that is not defined by an ethnographic lens but is defined by him and his 
identity in relation to others.  Mantsoe’s trance states allow him to act as a liaison 
between a number of different selves.  These relationships are produced and 
reproduced through the trance object that is brought to the attention and into the 
presence of a consuming audience. 
 
Understanding trance as another dimension of colonialized embodiment brings 
Mantsoe’s appointed mission into sharper focus.  Participating in what Appadurai 
refers to in later work as “scapes” – ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, 
technoscapes and financescapes – that represent the cultural implications of 
transnational capital in the form of cultural practices, mass media, ideas, technology 
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and finance (Appadurai, 1996), Mantsoe, his body and his bodily knowledge become 
objects that participate in a globally integrated and responsive economy.  Understood 
as an artefact attributed to the Other, trance figures in the construction of colonial 
bodies; as a commodity purveyed by the traditional Other, it contributes to the 
deconstruction of their subjectivity and embodiment.  Through its transition from an 
artefact in the colonialist project to a commodity in the neo-colonialist present, once 
acquired wholesale and now accorded value by the cultural institutions that 
commission Mantsoe to choreograph and perform, trance and its practitioners 
reclaim their agency.  Trance’s value is reciprocally created and sustained through 
the vehicle of a living, breathing, performing body, and exists as an “object of 
economic value” – inhabiting and negotiating the same inherent tension reserved for 
religious relics.  Offered for exchange by the will of the gods and then acknowledged 
as valuable to and sought by the West, trance’s trajectory as a component of social 
interaction – its social life – becomes a means of problematizing and decoding the 
colonized, historicized body.  Its active circulation removes the impediments of time 
and space that traditionally have demarcated the Other.  Perceived as a commodity, 
where stakeholders are inextricably linked through the attribution of value and 
engagement in the mechanisms of exchange, trance is a means of evaluating the 
complex ties that bind Self and Other, former colonizer to former colonized with a 
view to discrediting unilateral contact and influence.  Through his vocation, Mantsoe 
is directly engaged in the unfinished business of decolonizing the transmission of 
trance knowledge and – at the same time – his own subjectivity. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Csikszentmihalyi & Laban’s concepts of Flow 
 
The notion of “flow” comes up in the case study on Brian Webb as part of one of the 
means by which Joan Chodorow theorizes “happenings.”  Chodorow incorporates the 
concept of flow from Labananalysis to describe the trance-like and meditative states 
that can arise during Authentic Movement sessions.  Flow is also mentioned in the 
first chapter of this thesis where it is one of the many terms that fall under the family 
tree of altered states of consciousness.  On first glance, the word seems rather 
ordinary.  Water, breezes, thoughts, ideas, conversations, electricity and fabrics are 
said to “flow.”  Inherent to the word is a metaphor for motion – a going-ness that is 
both unhindered and unencumbered.  Obstacles, whether they be physical (such as 
a rock), psychological (such as a “mental” block) or mechanical (such as an electrical 
fault) can impede flow but otherwise there is a sense that it is self-perpetuating.  Flow 
may increase and decrease in volume and/or intensity but it conveys a quality of 
being ever-present and ongoing.  
 
In relation to the body, flow pertains both to a sense of physical movement – a way of 
describing the continuance of bodily movement – and to how the body responds to 
that movement on somatic and emotional levels.  Recognizing and responding to 
“flow” in the body is the focus for two scholars of the 20th century:  Hungarian-
American psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and Austrian-British movement 
theorist Rudolf Laban.  Both Csikszentmihalyi and Laban’s theories of Flow take as a 
precept the body as the starting point for analysis.  From there, their theories and 
more specifically, the application of their theories diverge.  Despite their differences, 
there remain some interesting possibilities for extrapolation and for relating their work 
to the cultural analysis of trance in contemporary dance performance in the West.  
This chapter addresses each theorist’s work and their contribution to dance 
scholarship in depth, discusses points of comparison and departure and then 
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considers their potential applications to the case studies under discussion.   As a 
discourse, Flow illustrates how trance-like behaviours can shed their subculture and 
Othered associations in order to be intellectualized and integrated into mainstream 
Western thought. 
 
Though Laban and Csikszentmihalyi came to flow/Flow from very different academic 
fields and backgrounds, there are a number of points of intersection in their theories.  
Laban’s theory of flow in particular is quite complex and requires a thorough 
introduction to the key tenets of Laban Movement Analysis, or Labanalysis, in order 
to foreground the concept.  In contrast, while Csikszentmihalyi’s flow derives from a 
profound psychological and physiological effect, it emerges from everyday language 
and actions.  On a personal level, the Second World War profoundly affected both 
theorists.  Though leaving their native countries and relocating to Great Britain and 
the United States respectively was doubtlessly unsettling, the move increased 
opportunities for each to develop his ideas and to expand his range of influence.  
Laban’s work to assist factory workers and Csikszentmihalyi’s inspiration to discover 
the key to a fulfilling life came about because of the inescapable realities of war.  
 
Rudolf Laban (1879-1958) was a dancer, choreographer and movement theorist. 
Over the course of his career he developed a system of dance notation 
(Labanotation) as well as theories about the body’s capacity for movement that 
prioritized functional and expressive affinities and modes.  His earlier training as an 
architect is evident in the intricate geometric diagrams that accompany his writing 
and document the body’s propensities for movement.  Laban was also an initiator 
and facilitator of large-scale community dances, called Movement Choirs, which he 
created for professional and amateur dancers in Germany and later in Britain.  
Ostracized by the Nazi regime during the Second World War, Laban relocated to 
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Great Britain, where he reformed the role of dance in education and helped workers 
in munitions factories achieve efficient, ergonomic methods of working by applying 
his principles of movement analysis.  Until the end of his life, Laban worked tirelessly 
with his students to extend and clarify his ideas, collaboratively amassing a large 
body of writing that continues to be investigated and modified by second- and third -
generation Laban scholars.  His most significant legacy, Laban Movement Analysis 
(L.M.A.), was derived by Laban’s students to further codify and develop his theories 
and practices.  The possible applications of L.M.A. are extremely broad and 
consequently the system has been used by a wide range of groups and specialists 
including dancers, athletes, actors, sociologists, psychologists, therapists and 
educators.   In order to adequately characterize flow in Laban’s teachings, it is 
necessary to summarize the basic components of his system in some detail. 
 
Today, the teaching of L.M.A. frequently follows the B.E.S.S. system.  Standing for 
“Body,” “Effort,” “Shape” and “Space,” the system represents a framework for 
understanding Laban’s theories.  Body encompasses the anatomical and 
biomechanical aspects of the movement.  Shape modes reflect the body in 
relationship to itself, to others and to the environment.  Space involves the 
organization of the body in space as it relates to levels, directions and geometric 
polyhedra.  Within this framework, Effort factors and qualities are what make up the 
outer expressivity of movement.  In all aspects there is a reciprocal relationship of 
cause and effect as well as the participation of unconscious, involuntary processes 
that negotiate these factors.  Internally it is a “combination of kinaesthetic and 
thought processes that appear to be almost simultaneous at different levels of 
consciousness” (Bartenieff, 1980, p 51), and it is up to a Laban Movement Analyst to 
observe the external outcomes of these processes and decipher their meaning.  
Students of L.M.A. learn to recognize the principles that comprise B.E.S.S. by a 
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combination of observation, discussion and internalization whereby they embody the 
principles to learn what they “feel like” in the body.  This process of embodiment is 
another fundamental aspect of Laban’s teachings and his writings are full of appeals 
to the reader to get up and move in specified ways to aid comprehension.    
 
Fundamental to Laban’s theories is the belief that all movement has expressive 
connotations or repercussions.  Bodily movement signals different emotional effects 
whether or not they are registered consciously.  This belief underlies his theories of 
Effort, whereby efforts are composed of “the mechanical aspects of the movement, 
the movement sensations that accompany it and the mental attitude which instigated 
(or follows from it)” (Amighi Kestenberg, 1999, p 89-91).  The term “effort” in 
everyday language refers to the use of energy but in Laban terms, as explained by 
two of his students, it refers to “how the body concentrates its exertion” (Dell, 1977, p 
11), or more clearly, “the dynamic quality of movement – the feeling-tone [or] texture” 
(Hackney, 2002, p 219).  In his native German, attitudes toward movement factors 
were called antrieb, combining the words for “on” (an) and “drive” (trieb).  In English, 
Laban coined the term Effort.  
 
Laban identified four motion factors “towards which performers of movement can 
have different attitudes depending on temperament, situation, environment and many 
other variables” (Bartenieff, 1980, p 51).  According to Laban – as documented by 
Irmgard Bartenieff, one of his most prodigious students – the four motion factors of 
space, weight, time and flow form our “inner impulses to move” (Bartenieff, 1980, p 
51).  He elevated these four factors to the status of Effort factors and as Space, 
Weight, Time and Flow they form one of the basic components of L.M.A.  Beyond 
identifying Effort factors, Laban further distinguished elements that qualify Space, 
Time, Weight and Flow.  Effort qualities are identified within the ranges of two 
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extremes articulated by Bartenieff as “spreading out, expanding, indulging, going 
with, condensing, fighting, resisting or struggling against” (Bartenieff, 1980, p 51).  In 
this way, Space can be Indirect or Direct, Weight can be Light or Strong, Time can be 
Sustained or Sudden, and Flow can be either Bound or Free.  Bartenieff provides the 
example of a man walking down a street and being confronted by a couple of 
children running “heedlessly” towards him to illustrate Efforts and Effort qualities in 
action: 
in the case of the strolling man, the circumstances aroused him into 
definite organization of his energy impulses: he controlled his flow, 
condensed his weight, attended directly to space and suspended his 
time.  That is, in this case, his Flow, Weight and Space were in the 
resisting range and his Time in the indulging range. 
 
Bartenieff, 1980, p 51.   
 
 
Bartenieff concludes that the “organization of inner energy is part of all human 
behavior” and that “people respond to the organization of Effort with or without 
knowing its components” (Bartenieff, 1980, p 53).    
 
Beyond these qualities, Laban sought to identify each Effort factor’s modus operandi. 
Bartenieff describes that in operation, Space asks the question “In what manner do I 
approach the space?”  This action requires the investment of attention encompassing 
“thinking” and “orienting” whether specifically or generally; Weight asks the question 
“What is my impact?” requiring the investment of intention in choosing to “assert,” 
“create strong or light impact” and “sense my weight, myself;” Time asks the question 
“When do I need to complete the act?” requiring the investment of decision in 
choosing “urgency or non-urgency” and “rushing or delaying; and Flow asks “How do 
I keep going?” requiring the investment of progression which is reflected in “feeling 
alive,” “how to get started and keep going” and choosing to act “freely or carefully” 
(Bartenieff, 1980, p 53).  Attention, intention, decision and progression define the 
protocol for consciously and/or subconsciously choosing the quality and 
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manifestation of the Effort factors that are appropriate to a continuum of situations 
and changes in environment. 
 
While the intention of this discussion is to deal primarily with Laban’s concept of 
Flow, it has been necessary, up until this point, to build an understanding of the 
larger context. Flow has been described as an Effort factor, characterized by the 
qualities of Bound and Free which are discerned by the investment of progression 
that leads to choices that reflect vitality, the ongoingness of movement and 
appropriate levels of control.  It still remains however to be determined what exactly 
Laban meant by Flow – and to some extent, this question continues to be debated by 
Laban scholars.  Peggy Hackney, who studied with Bartenieff, describes Flow as “the 
baseline “goingness,” the continuity, of the movement out of which the other efforts 
emerge and return.  Often Flow becomes the major expressive statement” (Hackney, 
2002, p 220).  Bartenieff states that “Flow is the initiator of action.  Although it is not 
necessarily dominant, and may not appear identifiable as Bound or Free, its neutral 
continuity as flux will underlie all other Efforts” (1980, p 55).  In Cecily Dell’s 
estimation, the Flow factor is: 
 
sometimes viewed as the same “kind” of event on the same level with 
the factors of weight, space and time, it is more often seen in the 
slightly different light from the other Effort factors.  Changes in the 
quality of flow seem to be the most frequent kind of changes in 
movement of all the Efforts.  They seem, in fact, to provide a kind of 
substrate in movement, out of which changes in the qualities of 
weight, time and space can “crystallize,” as highlights among the 
continuing flow changes. 
 
Dell, 1977, p 15. 
 
 
Laban himself devotes significant space to clarifying Flow, though perhaps with less 
success: 
[Flow] plays an important part in all movement expression, as through 
its inward and outward streaming it establishes relationship and 
communication.  It is mainly concerned with the degree of liberation 
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produced in movement no matter whether this is considered from the 
point of view of its subjective-objective opposites or the contrasts of 
being “free in” or “free from” the flow of movement.  Descriptions of 
flow involve its complete negation which is stop or pause.  It involves 
also the motion of resistance and counter-movement, each of which is 
different in mood and meaning and is not to be taken to refer to 
direction, speed or strength … This may be a somewhat difficult 
conception.  It might help, however, if we realize that the sensation of 
fluency, the feel of being carried on, does not cease when pausing, 
but is controlled to the utmost. 
 
Laban, 1971, p 83. 
 
 
Flow’s uniqueness within L.M.A. led Laban acolyte Judith Kestenberg to separate it 
altogether from the Efforts when she developed the Kestenberg Movement Profile.  
To add further clarity, Kestenberg distinguishes between tension flow and tension 
flow attributes: 
based on long term movement observation of children, clinical 
practice, and research, Kestenberg and the original study group 
amended Laban’s description of efforts into four distinct movement 
clusters: tension flow rhythms (which reflect unconscious needs) 
tension flow attributes (which reflect temperament and affects), pre-
efforts (which reflect immature ways of coping, often used in learning 
and defensive behaviors) and efforts (used in coping with space, 
weight and time).  
 
Amighi Kestenberg, 1999, p 3. 
 
 
Kestenberg chose to structure her work in this way because she believed that 
tension flow described more specifically what it is that is flowing.  She regards that it 
is both the presence and quality of tension in the musculature that defines whether a 
movement or action is flowing freely or with boundness (Dell, 1977, p 14). 
 
From these examples, the multiple avenues for the interpretation of Flow as well as 
the contention it can foster are clear.  In comparison to other Effort factors, Flow 
plays a unique yet frequently indistinct role.  In documenting the presence of Flow, 
L.M.A. uses a chart with a horizontal line representing neutral flow where fluctuations 
in Flow from Free (above the neutral line) to Bound (below the neutral line) are 
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graphed.  Peaks and valleys indicate the levels of intensity so that, in effect, Flow is a 
wavy line (Dell, 1977, p 18). 
 
Where the interpreters agree, however, is in regards to the feelings that Flow 
engenders.  Free Flow is associated with “outpouring, fluid, released, liquid,” while 
Bound Flow is associated with “controlled, careful, contained” and “restrained” 
(Hackney, 2002 p 219).  Bound flow is frequently associated with “caution, anxiety, or 
anger whereas free flow is often associated with feelings of safe, carefree and at 
ease.  The ratio of free to bound movements used by individuals offers an indication 
of how restrained or how unrestrained they are.  Too much restraint inhibits 
functioning.  Too much free flow signals a deficiency in control.  A fairly even balance 
is the most desired ratio” (Amighi Kestenberg, 1999, p 15).  Furthermore, Free Flow 
increases “pleasant sensations when used in many recreational physical activities, 
including relaxation exercises.  The mobilization and release of tension is associated 
with freedom from anxiety and caution, i.e., it arises from feelings of safety, pleasure 
and ease and in turn creates such feelings” (Amighi Kestenberg, 1999, p 60). 
 
Where the intersection of Effort and feeling becomes more acute is when multiple 
Efforts are combined.  Laban identifies four principle Effort Combinations: Basic 
Effort Actions, wherein Flow is latent and combinations of Space, Weight and Time 
produce “inner action drives” such as Punch, Float, and their modifications Glide, 
Dab, Slash, Wring, Flick and Press; Transformations Drives, wherein Flow “becomes 
active at the expense of either Space, Weight or Time” and are subdivided into 
Spaceless or the Passion Drive, Weightless or the Vision Drive and Timeless or the 
Spell Drive; Incomplete or Inner States, where the combination of two Effort factors 
produce “mood-like qualities in movement that can metaphorically be described as 
Awake or Dreamlike, Remote or Near, and Stable or Mobile”; and Full Efforts or 
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Complete Drives, wherein combinations of all four Effort factors occur (Bartenieff, 
1980, p 58).  It is with regard to Transformation Drives, Inner States and Complete 
Drives where Flow is present that its full significance can be understood and where – 
as will be discussed later– resemblances to Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow exist. 
 
Of Transformation Drives, Laban states that with the “combination of three motion 
factors, we arrive at a basic set of new variations.  These are usually observed when 
the expression is more intense, more pronounced or more communicative than in the 
display of inner attitudes [or states]” (Laban, 1971, p 87).  Transformation Drives take 
the following forms:  
 
when Flow with either or both its qualities (bound or free) replaces 
those of Weight, the drive becomes “vision-like”, because it is now not 
supported by active weight effort and is therefore reduced in bodily 
import.  When Flow replaces Time, that means when there is no 
appreciable time quality, the expression becomes what we might call 
“spell-like”.  The inner attitude towards time rests and the movements 
radiate a quality of fascination.  When Flow replaces Space and no 
particular attitude towards shape is displayed, that means when 
spatial qualities are dormant, bodily actions are particularly expressive 
of emotions and feeling.  In this case we speak of a “Passion Drive”. 
 
Laban, 1971, p 88. 
 
 
Transformation Drives are connected to Inner States because of the two Effort 
combinations they share.  Thus the Passion Drive (Weight, Time, Flow,) also 
contains the Inner States of Weight/Time, Weight/Flow and Time/Flow.  The Passion 
Drive is therefore related to the Spell Drive (Space, Weight, Flow) that likewise 
contains the Inner State of Weight/Flow but also Space/Weight and Space/Flow.  
Changes from one Transformation Drive to another – that occur, to use Bartenieff’s 
example, “when charismatic leaders whip up a crowd into action” – are frequently 
bridged by Inner States (1980, p 62).  Transformation Drives reflect moments of 
concentrated attention, intention and/or decision that are intensified by the presence 
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of Flow.  Flow lends these drives the attribute of progression and thus a strong, 
sensuous, energized, quality (Bartenieff, 1980, p 61).   
 
Though rare, Complete or Full Effort Drives, where all four Effort factors coincide, 
appear: 
in extremes of function and expression, where they seem to produce a 
dissolution of boundaries.  The simultaneous presence of all four 
Efforts gives the movement a power of what appears to be self-
propulsion as if the mover’s volition has been usurped by the totality of 
the Effort involvement.  At its peak, the action becomes involuntary as 
if the addition of Flow to the Basic Effort took the Effort beyond 
volition. 
  
            Bartenieff, 1980, p 63. 
   
 
Bartenieff goes on to suggest that Complete Effort Drives can manifest in “highly 
skilled athletic or dramatic performances” and may also appear “fleetingly in a 
dancer’s most delicate refinement of expression appearing to take the action beyond 
its form.  She credits the addition of Flow for the “extreme character of these 
movements” (Bartenieff, 1980, p 63). 
 
The Complete Effort Drives represent the pinnacle of Flow’s influence on the other 
Efforts.  As such they exemplify Laban’s theory of Flow as possessing mercurial 
properties.  With the Complete Effort Drives, a picture emerges of how Laban’s Flow 
can be applied to the analysis of trance behaviour in performance since it is in this 
context that such extremes of behaviour and refinement of skill exist.  
 
Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (1935 – present) is a Hungarian-born psychologist, currently 
a faculty member and former chairman of the Psychology Department at the 
University of Chicago.  He is credited with being the “inventor of the now popular 
concept of Flow” (Crabb, 1999/2000, p 18) though it would be more accurate to say 
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that he coined the term Flow to describe a process that he has devoted his career to 
analyzing.  
 
Csikszentmihalyi perceives his life’s work to have originated from experiences as a 
child during and after the Second World War.  In 1945, Hungarian society was 
upturned and most of the adults Csikszentmihalyi knew were unable to cope with the 
turmoil that the loss of social status and financial stability caused in their lives.  In the 
aftermath of the war, Csikszentmihalyi turned his attention to finding the key to 
making everyday life worthwhile and meaningful.  More than four decades and 120 
books, articles and chapters later, Csikszentmihalyi’s body of work spans over 
250,000 interviews conducted worldwide and, beyond psychology, has had an impact 
on the fields of sociology, dance pedagogy and business management. 
 
Early in his career, Csikszentmihalyi directed his attention to what motivates a painter 
to move on to the next painting once he has completed a canvas.  At the time of his 
first study, Csikszentmihalyi states that 
 
psychologists assumed that [artists] expend energy in order to get a 
product that [they] use or exchange or consume.  But this is not what 
happened with these artists.  They were not painting in order to have a 
painting; in many ways the finished canvas was only an excuse so 
they could paint.  This contradicted most of the theories on what 
motivates people to act. 
             Csikszentmihalyi, 2001, p 6.  
 
 
After completing an initial study, Csikszentmihalyi started talking to other creative 
people – composers, dancers and even those outside the arts – because he realized 
that athletes, for example, experience their sport in the same way that artists 
experience their work.  His findings and those of his students and colleagues, 
demonstrated that “when a dancer described how she or he felt in the best moments 
of the dance, their account was not really different than a painter or a composer 
 278
describing how it feels to create a work of art…” (2001, p 6).  In Csikszentmihalyi’s 
research, the term “Flow” became “a metaphor to describe how creative individuals 
felt when they were fully engaged in what they were doing.  [And he used] it to 
describe the whole quality of experience” (2001, p 7).  
 
On the phenomenology of Flow, Csikszentmihalyi perceives eight characteristics that 
contribute to achieving this state.  First the experience usually occurs when a person 
confronts a task that they have the mental and physical capacity to complete.  
Second, the person must be able to concentrate on what he or she is doing.  Third 
and fourth, concentration is usually possible because the task undertaken has clear 
goals and provides immediate feedback.  Fifth, the person acts with a deep but 
effortless involvement that removes concern for the worries and frustrations of 
everyday life.  Sixth, enjoyable experiences allow people to exercise a sense of 
control over their actions.  Seventh, concern for the self disappears, yet paradoxically 
the sense of the self emerges stronger after the Flow experience is over.  Finally, the 
sense of the duration of time is altered; hours pass by in minutes, and minutes can 
stretch out to seem like hours.  The combinations of these factors causes a sense of 
deep enjoyment that is so rewarding that people feel that expending a great deal of 
energy is worthwhile simply to be able to experience it (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p 
49). 
 
Once achieved, the experience is akin to a kind of ecstasy – a feeling of complete 
and total well-being.  Flow manifests “a sense of exhilaration, a deep sense of 
enjoyment that is long cherished and that becomes a landmark in memory” 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p 3).  Csikszentmihalyi discovered that such states were not 
limited to the elite – the virtuoso violinist or the champion rock climber, but were just 
as evident in the daily chores of a dairy farmer in the Swiss Alps, in the fine 
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needlework of a person who makes quilting or weaving their hobby and in the 
fevered pitch of a salesperson closing a deal.  Neither performances in front of an 
audience nor participation in a competition are necessary ingredients; it is the 
experience of pure, undivided enjoyment in the task at hand and a self-knowledge 
that one is up to the task. 
 
The psychological process behind Flow however is more difficult to explain.  
Csikszentmihalyi’s research outlines the internal mechanisms and patterns that 
enable and sustain Flow activities. One of the primary components of the Flow 
experience is attention: 
while involved with a creative process, as a composer is when he is 
writing music, individuals cannot process information having to do with 
their bodies.  The composer, working with notations and sounds, does 
not have room in his mind to process anything else.  Dancers working 
on a different modality of experience – the physical – process 
information about their bodies and the space in which they are 
moving.  This fills their process information capacity, leaving no room 
to think about anything else such as their name, address, bank 
account (or lack thereof).  
 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p 7. 
 
 
This inability to process multiples of information is related, in the case of a dancer, to 
the process of training.  A young dancer is given only as much information – tasks, 
goals, instructions, feedback – as he or she can process.  As a dancer matures the 
tasks, goals, instructions, etc., become more complex, yet at the same time, her 
capacity to process information remains the same.  Ideally, she is able to demand 
more complex tasks of herself because she has mastered the previous task and can 
then absorb and impose other qualities such as style, musicality, poise and 
characterization.  A sense of accomplishment builds, triangulated between 
enjoyment, challenge and aptitude, but the Flow experience, when it occurs, only 
allows a certain amount of information to be consciously processed.   
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On a panel with Csikszentmihalyi, American dance critic Deborah Jowitt commented 
on the potential drawbacks to Flow’s narrowing scope for attention.  According to 
Jowitt,  
 
all dancers know the experience of being in such complete Flow that 
they come off stage and notice blood dripping from a hole in their foot: 
they were so completely focused on the moment that all secondary 
thoughts drifted away or became peripheral.  I think, as Mihalyi has 
implied, that Flow creates a sense of profound well-being; however, 
when the experience of being in Flow drowns out physical discomfort 
the addiction to Flow can be dangerous. 
Crabb et al, 2001, p 14. 
 
 
Addiction to Flow is not simply an issue for dancers but also pertains to long-distance 
runners, extreme sports athletes, racecar drivers, stunt people and thrill seekers for 
whom the challenge and the sensation of “being lost in the moment” are highly 
attractive.  
 
Csikszentmihalyi states that it is attention that determines what will or will not appear 
in consciousness – whether the dancer registers the bleeding toe or not.  
Csikszentmihalyi argues that since attention is required in the process of other 
mental activities – such as remembering, thinking, feeling and making decisions – it 
is useful to think of it as “psychic energy” (1990, p 33).  He compares attention to 
energy since without it, no work can be done, and in doing work, attention is 
dissipated.  Furthermore, Csikszentmihalyi argues that “we create ourselves by how 
we invest this energy.  Memories, thoughts, and feelings are all shaped by how we 
use it.”  Energy, under our control, is there to “do with as we please,” so that attention 
is our “most important tool in the task of improving the quality of experience” (1990, p 
33). 
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The nature of attention is tied directly to the manifestation of Self.  This relationship is 
one of circular causality but it is this symbiosis that forms the root of consciousness.  
If attention, or psychic energy, is:  
 
directed by the self, and if the self is the sum of the contents of 
consciousness and the structure of its goals, and if the contents of 
consciousness and the goals are the result of different ways of 
investing attention, then we have a system that is going round and 
round, with no clear causes or effects.  At one point we are saying that 
the self directs attention, at another, that attention determines the self.  
In fact, both statements are true: consciousness is not a strictly linear 
system, but one in which circular causality obtains.  Attention shapes 
the self, and is in turn shaped by it. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p 34. 
 
 
Growth and change within the Self is accomplished through the absorption of new 
information. New information can either undermine or contribute to a stronger sense 
of self.  When new information is perceived to be negative – the death of a loved one, 
a stock market crash, or stubbing one’s toe – the self must evaluate the bearing that 
this news has upon itself.  Whenever information disrupts consciousness and 
threatens goals it creates a condition of inner disorder or psychic entropy – a 
condition that Csikszentmihalyi witnessed in many of his fellow countrymen following 
the war.  When the new information has a positive bearing on the self, the result is 
optimal experience, the opposite of psychic entropy.  Optimal experience occurs 
when the “information that keeps coming into awareness is congruent with goals 
[and] psychic energy flows effortlessly.”  The goal then is to try to sustain a state of 
mind conducive to optimal experience.  This goal can only be accomplished through 
establishing and maintaining control of attention. 
 
Control of attention combined with the attenuation of the impact of negative 
information is very much a part of the Flow process.  When such control is attained, 
the effect is in fact that of a perceived absence of control.  As Csikszentmihalyi 
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states, “the musical composer says that his hand is devoid of himself and he doesn’t 
have to direct or force it to go in one way or another.  Its goes by itself.  I’m sure 
dancers feel this: their bodies, after years of practice, seem to dance on their own” 
(1990, p 7).  It is the mind’s inability to process unlimited amounts of information that 
leads people who have experienced Flow to suggest that they have performed in an 
absence of control.  Csikszentmihalyi argues that it is an absence of a sense of self 
that manifests in a perceived absence of control.  Absence of the self from 
consciousness does not mean that a person in flow has given up the control of his 
psychic energy, or that she is unaware of what happens in her body or in her mind.  
Csikszentmihalyi argues that the opposite is usually true.  He has discovered that 
when people first learn about the flow experience they sometimes assume that a lack 
of self-consciousness has something to do with “a passive obliteration of the self” 
when, in fact, the optimal experience involves a very active role for the self.  Loss of 
self-consciousness does not involve a loss of self, and certainly not a loss of 
consciousness, but rather, only “a loss of consciousness of the self.  What slips 
below the threshold of awareness is the concept of the self, the information we use to 
represent to ourselves who we are.”  Csikszentmihalyi believes that loss of self-
consciousness can lead to self-transcendence, to a feeling “that the boundaries of 
our being have been pushed forward” (1990, p 64).  While this loss of self-
consciousness is not always attainable, Csikszentmihalyi argues that it is possible to 
achieve it by either making external conditions match one’s goals, or by matching 
one’s goals to external conditions.  Doing so results in the creation of circumstances 
that engender optimal experience and Flow. 
 
In one of Csikszentmihalyi’s case studies, a dancer describes her Flow experience 
as follows: “Your concentration is very complete.  Your mind isn’t wandering, you are 
not thinking of something else; you are totally involved in what you are doing … Your 
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energy is flowing very smoothly.  You feel relaxed, comfortable, and energetic.” 
(1990, p 53).  To this, and many other such testimonials, Csikszentmihalyi responds:  
 
one could treat these testimonials as poetic metaphors and leave 
them at that.  But it is important to realize that they refer to 
experiences that are just as real as being hungry, or as concrete as 
bumping into a wall.  There is nothing mysterious or mystical about 
them.  
 
         Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p 65.   
 
  
When a person invests all her psychic energy into an interaction she in effect 
becomes a part of a system of action greater than what the individual self had been 
previously.  
 
At a level of basic components, both Laban and Csikszentmihalyi are concerned with 
energy.  When Effort Flow is present with Space, Weight and Time, action is imbued 
with a flow of energy, whether it is Bound or Free.  With Csikszentmihalyi, attention is 
described as psychic energy and it is the deployment of such energy through the 
focusing of attention and the diminishing of opposition that leads to Flow 
experiences.  On a physical level, Effort Flow is related to physiological processes 
and the presence and absence of tension while Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow is a 
kinaesthetic experience that transcends the physical.  An example that illustrates this 
difference is meditation.  A person who meditates may report that he or she 
experiences Flow during meditation and feels “energized.”  A Laban Movement 
Analyst observing a person who is meditating would likely perceive him or her to be 
in a state of neutral flow, displaying a low intensity energy and appearing so relaxed 
and calm as to be “detached from the environment” and “de-animated” (Amighi 
Kestenberg, 1999, p 62).  Both types of Flow could be present, and certainly energy 
is present, but manifested in different ways. 
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Both theories are underscored by the body’s subconscious feedback loop of 
information.  In Laban’s work, the body processes information based on attention, 
intention, decision and progression, subconsciously choosing how the Effort factors 
should be manifested to achieve the appropriate results.  In Csikszentmihalyi, the 
achievement of Flow is predicated on continuous adjustments to levels of attention.  
The more attention one devotes to an activity, the more one becomes absorbed and 
the more the Self as defined within consciousness begins to recede into the 
subconscious.  Both theorists are quick to point out, however, that though both 
processes are managed intuitively, in both cases, individuals can improve access to 
these faculties.  Laban believes that mastery of movement is not only of value to the 
stage artist, but to everyone, since  
 
we are all concerned, whether consciously or subconsciously, with 
perception and expression.  The person who has learnt to relate 
himself to Space, and has physical mastery of this, has Attention.  The 
person who has mastery of his relation to the Weight Factor of effort 
has Intention, and he has Decision when he is adjusted to Time. 
 
                                                                                  Laban, 1971, p 89. 
 
 
If attention is paid to these inner processes, improvements in physical well-being, 
spatial awareness and communication can be attained.  Likewise, Csikszentmihalyi 
advocates that understanding the factors involved in achieving Flow, looking for 
situations and activities that stimulate Flow response and preparing the mind and 
body to be receptive to Flow, will help individuals in its attainment.  Both theories 
detail subconscious processes that are consciously registered when internal and 
external bodily processes are attuned. 
 
Each theory is contextualized by the presence of space and time.  In Laban, Space 
and Time are, like Flow, Effort factors manifested by the body in motion that combine 
to produce Effort States and Drives that have very specific expressive connotations.  
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In Csikszentmihalyi’s work, the body’s relationship to space and time is mediated by 
attention.  In Flow, attention to space and time is frequently relegated to an 
unconscious level – so much so that it changes the person’s relationship to these 
factors.   Csikszentmihalyi reports cases where dancers have felt that time seemed 
to stretch on endlessly or conversely, where many minutes have seemed to pass by 
in seconds.  Similarly, they relate occasions where they could not “feel their body” 
nor were consciously aware of their movements through space or of being in the 
“present” (1990, p 53, 59, 66). 
 
Reports of a sense of timelessness or spacelessness following a Flow experience 
might suggest that the person may have entered either Laban’s Spell or Passion 
Drive.  In the context of theatrical dance, Bartenieff suggests that in ballet, “the 
Weightless (Vision) drive is frequently used as a theme to create the illusion of 
completely overcoming body weight.  Some of the most ethereal adagios of a 
ballerina and her male partner are built around the use of this combination” 
(Bartenieff, 1980, p 62).  Yet the difference is that L.M.A. was created for the 
objective observation and experience of movement (of which Flow is a factor) while 
Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow is derived from subjective experience.  There are instances 
however when Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow has been perceived by observers.  Canadian 
dance critic Michael Crabb explains that: 
 
as a critic, I attend many performances every year.  I think I 
understand better … that magic feeling the audience experiences 
when a dancer is having that special moment.  You feel one particular 
performance radiating – not just among the performers on stage who 
somehow become a collective part of it – but it flows into the audience 
which enters into the whole expressive and communicative 
experience. 
  
Crabb et al, 2001, p 14. 
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Crabb goes on to recall his first performance experience in London where Margot 
Fonteyn and Rudolph Nureyev danced Romeo & Juliet at Covent Gardens.  He 
experienced “a feeling of ecstasy as if I had been lifted onto a different level” and 
also “a collective energy in the audience which seemed to feed back to the stage 
creating a whole cycle.”  Crabb’s experience illustrates how Flow can be a subjective 
experience motivated by the Flow experiences of others.  It is likely that during that 
particular performance, dancers manifested the Spell, Passion and/or Vision Drives 
since, as Bartenieff suggests, the presence of the Transformation Drives make 
performances of any kind captivating to an observer. 
 
On the surface then, the difference between Laban and Csikszentmihalyi’s concepts 
of Flow would be one of application.  Laban’s Flow is as a physical, movement-based 
factor from which springs emotion and tension-based attributes that provide clues to 
a person’s inner state when used in movement profiling.  Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow is a 
kinaesthetic, emotion-based state or metaphor attributed to the combination of 
capacity, aptitude and concentration that manifests in superlative levels of 
enjoyment.  These definitions would appear to keep the two concepts quite separate 
yet the description of Laban’s Complete Effort Drives is very similar to descriptions of 
Flow experiences.  To summarize, Complete Effort Drives, “produce a dissolution of 
boundaries” and imbue movement with a power of “self-propulsion” as though the 
“mover’s volition has been usurped by the totality of the Effort involvement.”  
Complete Effort Drives manifest in “highly skilled athletic or dramatic performances” 
and in “a dancer’s most delicate refinement of expression” that appear to “take the 
action beyond its form” further confirming the similarities.  Since Bartenieff credits the 
addition of Flow for the “extreme character of these movements” the powerful natures 
of both conceptions would appear to be in agreement.  Yet Laban’s Effort Flow 
remains an ingredient that when combined with the other Efforts can act as a catalyst 
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to propel or crystallize action. Csikszentmihalyi’s Flow, on the other hand, is a total 
state that overwhelms the consciousness.  Where the two theories intersect is with 
regard to their uniqueness, since neither Complete Effort Drives nor Flow are not 
inconsequential occurrences for the majority of people. 
 
In an effort to further assess the difference between these two conceptions of Flow, it 
might be valuable to attempt a Laban Movement Analysis of a dancer experiencing 
Flow.  Such an experiment would allow the analyst to graph the intensity of Flow and 
to assess whether the Transformation and or Complete Effort Drives are present 
during Flow.  The inherent difficulty would be in predicting when such a Flow 
experience would take place, since Flow/trance is largely beyond an average North 
American’s ability to manifest at will.  Yet, as has been seen in three of the four case 
studies, some dancers are able to create situations through the use of improvisation 
scores, an intense self-directed focus and/or ritualized choreographic structures that 
produce trance states.  An analysis of a person entering a trance state would shed 
further light on the applicability of Laban’s Drives to trance behaviour in performance.  
If Csikszentmihalyi were to interview Maboungou, Gillis, Webb and/or Mantsoe, the 
resulting material would be congruent with the findings he and his affiliated 
researchers have compiled. 
 
The fact that the word “flow” is integral to the work of Laban and Csikszentmihalyi is 
indicative of the pervasiveness of the flow metaphor in describing physical and 
kinaesthetic states.  “Flow” effectively captures certain feelings and ideas that are 
very much a part of human experience and interaction.  As a result, common ground 
between the two theories exists but it is in the application of these theories to trance 
experience in the West that their potential for a transnational, cross-disciplinary 
commentary emerges. 
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 Implemented separately or in tandem, Laban’s and Csikszentmihalyi’s theories of 
flow have the potential to bridge and/or overcome the argued incommensurability 
between trance, dance studies and reflexive anthropology.  Their theories of flow 
emerged from the Western European habitus and as theories, they contextualize, 
both subjectively and objectively, kinaesthetic and psychobiological qualities that, 
when experienced by a dancer and recognized by an observer – either a novice or a 
specialist, mover or witness – may be described as trance-like.  Nevertheless, 
applying either theory of flow should not be seen to displace trance’s ambiguity either 
in language or in practice – Laban himself indicates that Flow is difficult to define, 
and Csikszentmihalyi’s research indicates that flow experiences are unique to the 
individual in how and when they manifest and the language used to describe them. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, à la Wittgenstein, uses flow as an umbrella or general term to 
contain a range of qualities that have the effect of de-essentializing flow to some 
degree.)  Since, according to Wittgenstein, ambiguity is an accurate reflection or 
state for something that is unquantifiable and in flux, where an unclear picture is still 
a picture, the lack of clarity neither denies significance nor meaning to the individual 
or to the researcher.  It just induces one to look harder. 
 
Returning to the notion of incommensurability that was raised in the chapter on Zab 
Maboungou, there is an element of discontinuity between flow and the discussions of 
trance within dance studies and reflexive anthropology.  To summarize, Ang applies 
incommensurability to her circumstances as a Chinese-Australian feminist where the 
paradigms of feminism and subalterity are, to some degree, in conflict with each 
other.  She sees that in this meeting of schools of thought, communication inevitably 
fails.  This, Ang argues, is not to be taken as a tacit rejection against either position 
but as an opportunity to recognize difference without defaulting to either compromise 
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or explication.  British sociologist Frank Furedi in his 2005 work Politics of Fear offers 
another example of incommensurability.  Ferudi suggests that Europeans and North 
Americans live in a “culture of fear” where, despite an era of relative peace at home 
and mitigating factors such as low birth mortality rates, mandatory inoculations 
against infectious diseases and government bodies that administer public health and 
safety, that the average citizen is “fearful” and believes that he/she is at imminent 
risk.  Ferudi suggests that this discrepancy between historical precedent and public 
opinion is due to the fact that the standards by which European and North American 
society measure fear versus how they measure threat is both different and largely 
incommensurable (2005). 
 
Looking at paradigms emerging from this research, I am measuring how trance as a 
discourse communicates within and between the discourses of dance studies and 
reflexive anthropology.  My research has led me to argue that within the interplay 
between these discourses, a level of incommensurability is apparent.  Represented 
in chart form, the incommensurabilities listed between the two spheres suggest the 
points at which communication fails: 
 
Figure 8a. Flow and incommensurability 
Language 
 
Conflict between 
high/low culture  
 
Interpretation and 
application of ethnicity
  
Maintenance of the 
West/non-West 
dichotomy
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discourses 
of Dance 
Studies and 
Reflexive 
Anthropology 
 
Trance as a 
discourse 
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In an effort to address the inferred incommensurabilities, Flow/flow offers a means by 
which dance studies, employing the tenets of reflexive anthropology, can address 
and contextualize trance.  Represented in chart form, trance, dance studies and 
reflexive anthropology can communicate through Flow/flow: 
 
Figure 8b. Flow as a bridging discourse  
 
 
Trance as a 
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Flow/flow as 
a discourse
Discourses 
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Reflexive 
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Flow/flow defuses the issues of language, the conflict between high/low culture, the 
interpretation and application of ethnicity, and the maintenance of the residual 
West/non-West dichotomy that is becoming increasingly problematic and antiquated 
so that trance as flow becomes a practicable concept within dance studies (inclusive 
of dance anthropology) and reflexive anthropology. 
 
Flow as a metaphor also has interesting applications to aspects of this research 
when viewed as a trope within discussions of transnationalism.  Stephen Castles and 
Mark Miller, specialists in refugee and migration studies, have constituted the 
movement of people across borders, contributing to the process of contemporary 
globalization, as “flow” (1998).  Spanish urban theorist and sociologist Manuel 
Castells states that today’s “network society” is characterized by “flows of capital, 
flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organizational interaction, flows of 
images, sounds and symbols” (2000, p 418).  Castells’ work has influenced SanSan 
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Kwan, a lecturer in dance studies at California State – Los Angeles, whose current 
book project, Kinaesthetic Ethnicity: Dance, Movement, and City Space in the 
Chinese Diaspora, draws on the notion of flow to capture the movement of ideas, 
beliefs and time as articulated through postmodern choreography in fin de siècle 
Hong Kong in 1997.   
 
In an article published by the Globalization and World Cities Studies Group, Jonathan 
Beaverstock, a professor of economic geography, takes up flow as a trope to 
describe the creation and movement of transnational elite communities in global 
cities.  In his paper, Beaverstock aims to “illustrate how the cross-border circulation 
of transnational elites constitutes ‘flow’ in Castells’ space of flows.”  To this end, he 
suggests that the 
 
existence of nomadic, highly-mobile and affluent transnational elites in 
the corporate segments of the service economy are not only a part of 
the space of flows, but their cosmopolitan working, cultural and social 
practices are highly spatialized and embedded in the network of global 
cities. 
 
Beaverstock, 2002, p 87. 
 
 
While Castells maintains that the “elites” themselves cannot become flows (2000, p 
446), Beaverstock argues that the spaces of flows are themselves constituted by the 
very “flow of elites [meaning people] between the network of global cities” (2002, p 
88).   
 
Though Beaverstock’s argument pertains to transnational investment bankers, 
information technology professionals, business analysts, consultants, and the like, 
his description could easily be applied to Mantsoe.  Mantsoe is nomadic, highly-
mobile and while not affluent by the standards multi-national corporation, he is 
endowed with a inestimable wealth of skill and charisma in addition to the blessings 
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of the gods.  His potential to travel the world, create choreography and bring his work 
to new stages is only limited by his own endurance and his hosts’ capacities to 
commission him.  His work is concentrated in urban centres with existing multicultural 
communities, ongoing public support for the arts and a cosmopolitan audience base 
who patronize his performances.  In his own way, he is very much a part of a 
transnational elite that contributes both culturally and intellectually to the proliferation 
of global cities and to the flows of images, sounds and symbols.  If Mantsoe is 
contributing to the de-othering of trance through the ascription of value and agency in 
its implied trade, then he is also participating in the transnational flow of elite artists 
and in presenting an opportunity for his trance states to be interpreted as flow. 
 
It could be argued that the growth of transnational elites was in fact created by 
colonialism.  Regimes such as the French in the Congo that invested in local 
education and in promising young scholars such as Maboungou by sending them to 
France for post-secondary education initiated a flow of people between Europe and 
Africa.  Obviously such practices had intellectual and philosophical benefits for the 
paternalistic colonizer seeking hegemonic control but there were also benefits for the 
colonized.  In travelling to Paris to attend university and in cultivating friendships with 
fellow displaced Africans, Maboungou became a citizen of the world.  She became 
part of the transnational flow of ideas, politics and people between continents that 
contributed to the growing recognition of multiculturalism and globalization. 
 
In ascertaining flow’s potential in de-othering trance in the West and thinking back 
through this research, I am struck by the correlations to my Master’s dissertation 
completed nearly ten years ago.  I am newly aware that the motivation for that 
research - the transition from one dance idiom to another, in this case from ballet to 
flamenco and the attendant effects on body image and self-awareness - was the 
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absence of flow.  In contrast to my experiences in ballet, flamenco did not involve 
appropriate levels of concentration, challenge and enjoyment so as to induce, 
according to Csikszentmihalyi, the kinds of qualities needed to create flow such as 
removal of concern for self-image, heightened enjoyment and increased self-
esteem.  On the contrary I felt very self-conscious, frustrated and somewhat 
demoralized.  So flamenco did not produce either Csikszentmihalyi’s optimal flow 
experience nor induced Laban’s sense of weightlessness, spacelessness or 
timelessness that was familiar to me from ballet.    
 
This experience – or lack of experience – precipitated my interest in understanding 
how learning a new dance technique could change how dancers related to 
themselves and viewed themselves in relation to their habitus (though I did not use 
that term at the time) and the ‘intellectual friction’ that that discussion provoked.   
 
I have often wondered what the connection was between my Master’s and doctoral 
research and I remember several people remarking with surprise that I did not 
continue with my study of flamenco.  It would appear – and it felt this way at the time 
– that it had very little to do with interest in the technique per se but more to do with 
the effect in changing techniques.  Just as with my doctoral research, where I am 
looking at the ramifications of applying trance to contemporary dance creation and 
performance, I am not as interested in contesting trance itself as I am in expanding 
its application and questioning its provenance.   
 
I am reminded of Roger Sanjek’s commentary cited on the state of anthropology in 
the postmodern present where culture is  
 
under continuous creation – fluid, interconnected, diffusing, 
interpenetrating, homogenizing, diverging, hegemonizing, resisting, 
reformulating, creolizing, open rather than closed, partial rather than 
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total, crossing its own boundaries, persisting where we don’t expect it 
to, and changing where we do. 
 
Sanjek, 1991, p 622. 
 
 
In the end, flow may be interpreted as trance stripped of the mystique with which it 
was invested by pre-reflexive anthropology.  Understanding trance as flow – and flow 
as trance – overcomes the obstacles inherent in applying and actively using trance in 
an arena or habitus where it does not natively pertain.  Laban’s and 
Csikszentmihalyi’s investment in investigating and articulating flow has the added 
benefit of creating a viable intellectual and philosophical space where trance and flow 
can co-exist and potentially function to mitigate trance’s attendant quality of 
Otherness.   
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CONCLUSION The Social Life of Trance 
 
 
The multifarious nature of trance – as an abstract idea, as an embodied experience, 
as an event, as a defining attribute of a subculture – its multiple but easily 
recognizable manifestations and associations, the inference of concepts normally 
suggestive of religion, race and ethnicity, its implication in the Self/Other dichotomy 
as well as its existence in the past and the present, in the realms of the everyday and 
the sacred, and its potential familiarity at many levels of society, is undisputed.  
 
In reference to Michael Lambek’s query that began this investigation, trance is not 
only present in the West but is an entry point for analyzing contemporary culture and 
its relationship to a colonialist past and neo-colonialist present.  Its function and 
action – what I have termed its social life – is implicated in socio-economic and geo-
political forces that shape postmodern society in North America.  From Lambek’s 
premise the research developed as an exercise in approaching and examining trance 
from multiple viewpoints – considering its compound angles, dimensions and 
surfaces.  What became apparent is that one could conceive of trance in a number of 
manifestations and that in doing so the applications and resonances become both 
more interesting, more intertwined and therefore more complex.  To think of trance 
unidimensionally, as an embodied state, was limiting and did not fully account for 
trance’s rhizomatous qualities. 
 
As a state, trance exists in examples from European and New World history, 
subculture, pop culture, folklore, New Age and ethnographic sources.  Reifying 
trance and allowing it to exist as a thing or object in addition to a state, first as an 
artefact, with support from Clifford, and then as a factor in perception and self-
objectification, with support from Csordas, expands the sphere and the significance 
of its multiple forms and extends its potential entry points.   
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If, in the 20th and 21st centuries the body can be seen as a commodity, then it 
seems logical to view embodied states also as commodities.  Taking into account the 
plethora of services available to North American and European consumers to 
confront and organize bodiliness at conscious and subconscious levels – yoga, 
pilates, meditation, Tai Chi, psychotherapy, overeaters anonymous, self-help books 
and subliminal audiotapes – that are in themselves commodities, it does not seem 
rash to commodify somatic states whether embodied or disembodied.  With this in 
mind, approaching trance as a commodity, as suggested by Appadurai, and 
perceiving that commodities have social lives just as much as the people who 
possess or relate to them, is an immensely fruitful progression of ideas. 
 
Objectifying and commodifying trance has both positive and negative outcomes.  In 
making something theoretically and linguistically tangible, the object in question is 
held in time and place – consequences that are also encountered in viewing 
something as Other.  Holding trance in place has the advantage of allowing it to be 
examined, to be handled, to be weighed and to perceive its many relationships and 
trajectories.  That trance can be both static (Other) and fluid (Self), embodied (Self) 
and traded (Other), makes for a controversial but nonetheless compelling 
proposition. 
 
Trance’s presence in the work of the four choreographers suggests a reading of 
contemporary dance in Canada that runs contrary to the assumption that trance is 
only present in forms that originate in Other cultures.  Locating trance in the work of 
all four choreographers proposes that contemporary performance of a high level is 
not as clean or as tidy as the milieu would like to imagine itself – it has rough edges, 
incongruities and elements of the grotesque, the untrained and the unrefined hidden 
beneath its immaculate façade.  Even where the body “is a temple” as Gillis would 
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likely concede or where trance is a sacred act as Mantsoe clearly believes, trance 
implies a baseness that does not fit with the image of a smooth, consummate 
performer.  Gillis, Maboungou, Mantsoe and Webb seek to be innovative and to craft 
work that is timely, intelligent and sophisticated yet trance has the potential to dis-
order and to disrupt this image and its construction.  There is Other as well as Self in 
the work of these choreographers and in their performances – as much for those who 
do not incorporate trance or choose to call it by a different name, as for those for 
whom it is overtly part of their practice and/or heritage.   
 
The categories of Self and Other become elusive in the recognition and 
characterization of trance in Canadian contemporary dance.  That there appear to be 
elements of both make the attribution and discussion of trance challenging.  In 
relation to one’s choreographic process and output, one would speak presumably 
only in terms of the Self at a personal level – my work, my intentions, my ideas – and 
at a political level – my work/intentions/ideas in a Canadian context, for a Canadian 
audience, with Canadian funding.  Yet the discernment of trance problematizes this 
since both the idea and the performance of trance is traditionally Other.  Embodying 
and/or portraying trance entails a conflict of interior and exterior, and of presence and 
absence through the perceived abdication of bodiliness and conscious control.  Such 
binaries may seem restrictive but there is an obvious discomfort in this situation 
where there is no clear choice between either/or. 
 
Continuing to reflect on issues of sameness and difference, the case studies 
presented some interesting grounds for discussion.  In my dealings with the 
respondents, there were marked differences in how each reacted to the interview 
process.  Such differences would appear to be based on gender.  In each instance, if 
I had not had the opportunity to meet the person face to face – at the Canada Dance 
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Festival for instance, as was the case with Maboungou and Webb – I contacted each 
initially by e-mail.  If the first attempt was unsuccessful, then I tried again and 
resorted to calling and/or trying to gain an introduction through mutual acquaintances 
– communication with Gillis, for instance, improved once I met an esteemed 
colleague of hers at a conference.  In the interview process the hesitation 
demonstrated by the two female respondents was more pronounced than the two 
male respondents.  Maboungou and Gillis required extensive briefing and requested 
a detailed summary of the nature of my research in advance of meeting.  They were 
more guarded in preliminary correspondence, choosing to communicate with me 
through their administrators.  Though possessing equivalent administrative 
infrastructures, Webb and Mantsoe were much more open to being interviewed and 
communicated directly with me by phone and/or e-mail, and have maintained contact 
since the project was completed.  I can only surmise that Webb and Mantsoe’s 
responses are due to a sense of ease in their roles as independent 
dancer/choreographers – certainly Mantsoe has the distinct advantage of divine 
approval.  In contrast, despite Maboungou’s clarity of opinion and positionality, and 
Gillis’ approbation from her fans, they both appear more concerned by the prospect 
of criticism and/or negative attention that makes them appear less assured of their 
security than either Webb or Mantsoe.   
 
Though since the 1960s modern dance in Canada has generated a number of 
successful female choreographers and artistic directors who have gained national 
and international recognition, including Anna Wyman, Patricia Beatty, Lola 
MacLaughlin, Peggy Baker, Marie Chouinard, Ginette Laurin and Crystal Pite, 
Maboungou and Gillis’ reactions suggest an overriding sense of vulnerability.  Each 
appears to have had to fight harder than either Webb or Mantsoe to forge their 
careers and to achieve and maintain their success.  Though one might imagine that 
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Webb as a gay man growing up in a politically conservative environment with 
aspirations of becoming a performer would be the most conflicted, this does not 
seem to be the case.  It seems trite to attribute this simply to the sense of entitlement 
and authority that characterizes the typical North American male, yet Maboungou 
and Gillis are clearly more concerned with the potential to be cast in an unflattering or 
unfavourable manner.  Despite being both well-respected and outspoken advocates 
for the status of the artist in society, one can only presume that their reticence stems 
from their engagement in a profession that still retains connotations of disreputability 
and/or unseemliness as well as economic uncertainty.  Maboungou and Gillis may be 
actively working to balance “manly” ambition with “womanly” propriety. 
 
This leads me to consider what is threatening about my research.  Clearly in the case 
of Maboungou, I am exposing her playing of the system – manufacturing the image 
of the black, African dancer performing in a state of trance to garner recognition from 
a trance-curious, white, European audience.  As a member of that white, European 
audience – and she was clearly cognizant of the metahistory that our interaction 
represented – my choice in making her a focus of my research with the express aim 
of recasting the application of trance in the West was undoubtedly a troubling 
proposition.  My sense is that Maboungou’s use of trance is a clear indication of the 
difficult situation in which she finds herself, implicated as she is in the tension that 
exists in a culture that is simultaneously tolerant and race and/or ethnicity-focussed. 
With regard to Gillis, the potential threat lay in aligning her practice with the aims of 
my research without compromising her need to be embraced and celebrated by the 
greater community.  It would appear, however, that her brand is both sufficiently 
malleable and adaptable to accommodate the needs of her audience.  In the case of 
Webb, he took obvious pleasure in discussing his beliefs about trance and viewed 
my research as a means of reflecting on his own work and the influence of Authentic 
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Movement.  With Mantsoe, my work was another avenue by which he could 
communicate his message and fulfill his duties to the gods.  Equally aware of, and 
implicated in, the West/non-West, white/black, European/African power imbalance as 
Maboungou, Mantsoe nonetheless represented himself and his work with equanimity.  
There may be a question of political empowerment that is dependent upon 
environment and access to the mechanisms of power – issues that are much more 
pronounced in Maboungou’s aims and her interaction with her larger community than 
in Mantsoe’s.  But far from being disempowered or politically unaware, Mantsoe 
appears simply to be playing with a different deck of cards or by a different set of 
rules – choosing a means and a message that is equally effective in bridging cultures 
and understanding, that is no less political but conceived from a unique point of view 
and cultural experience. 
 
Maboungou and Webb share an investment in feminist philosophies that impact their 
creative processes and their engagement with society from a place of difference.  As 
a black performer in a predominantly white industry and as a lecturer in feminist 
philosophy, Maboungou is keenly aware of the social and political forces at play in 
her positioning as a subaltern female artist.  She has worked tirelessly to promote 
equality in funding and presenting practices and to give a voice to artists of colour.  
Webb has incorporated feminist principles into his art-making to acknowledge the 
integral value of individual stories and points of view as a means of displacing 
paternalism and hegemony.  This approach informs his identity as a queer artist.   
 
As second- and third-generation Canadians, Gillis and Webb’s approaches to trance 
have developed from their own experience, mediated by choices they made as to 
how they would like to create dance and how they would like their work to be viewed.  
Without question, prevailing cultural beliefs about the applicability and 
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appropriateness of trance in the West have shaped their opinions.  When Webb 
alludes to the difference between ecstasy and entasy – transformative experience 
that transcends rather than descends into the body – he is referring to the difference 
between Self and Other.  He articulates his experience of trance as akin to being 
inside himself as opposed to being apart and detached – distinctions that are equally 
reminiscent to the Self/Other dichotomy.  One is known and therefore embodied 
while the other is unknown and disembodied.  As a culture, the West is 
uncomfortable with “out of body” experiences since they challenge beliefs about 
boundaries, autonomy and engagement with one’s immediate and/or concrete 
environment.  Transformation in Authentic Movement practice is not trance because 
it resides in the body, contained and definable by the tenets of the practice.   Trance 
in Authentic Movement has been sanitized for mass consumption – it is safe, organic 
and pliant and keeps the Other at a comfortable distance. 
 
In Gillis’ case, she is adhering to the Self/Other dichotomy implicit in trance discourse 
in a different but nevertheless classic manner.  Having felt ostracized by childhood 
events and in need of identification with practices and/or belief systems that reflect 
her own experiences, she turned to Sufism.  Her reading of trance in Other cultures 
as a means of accessing and shaping creativity confirmed her special status and 
gratified her active need for association with, and dissociation from, her native 
culture.  She set herself apart, defined that apartness and then sought to reintegrate 
herself into her chosen milieu.  Her capacity to use transformative states shaped the 
methodology of her creative process and her “dancing from the inside” technique.  
Within this is a very strong element of liminality.  In viewing Gillis, one is aware of the 
journey she takes and one chooses to participate in her performance.  In the creation 
of this meaningful in-between space, she and her audience members are able to 
create a narrative drawn from what they see, what they know and what they feel.  If, 
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as she claims, she enters a state of trance onstage, then her audience to some 
degree interacts with her altered state of consciousness vicariously.  Gillis succeeds 
in making trance acceptable and accessible.   In the absence of affirmative models 
for trance experience, Gillis and Webb have sourced and/or created modes of self-
analysis and expression that frame and validate this key aspect of their practice. 
 
While Webb’s choreographic offerings may not be spiritual – in fact, one could 
characterize his work as patently intellectual rather than spiritual – he shares in 
common with Gillis a need for his practice to offer a therapeutic dimension or subtext.   
This commonality could easily derive from the influences of expressionism on Gillis 
and of abstract expressionism on Webb where each movement’s indebtedness to 
psychoanalysis has been established.  Through movement, both Webb and Gillis 
seek healing and, in Jungian terms, individuation – the process of coming to know all 
the parts of oneself, and learning to give them harmonious expression.  If, as Jung 
believed, the process of socialization divests humans of their innate wholeness and 
involvement in a psychotherapeutic process offers the potential for psychological 
reintegration, then there are clear parallels in how Webb and Gillis approach their 
respective processes.  Each engages with contemporary dance practice as a means 
of learning about themselves, of redressing imbalances and of creating movement 
that stems from a deep, inner experience.  Their work can be expressionist, 
suggestive of catharsis or confession, developing from personal convictions that are 
politically, socially or emotionally motivated, often striving to justify their relevance in 
the here and now.   
 
To a significant degree Webb and Gillis are engaged in processes of meaning-
making that respond to the postmodern sense of dislocation that has likewise been 
the focus of New Age philosophies.  Webb’s search for authenticity derives from a 
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personal struggle with reconciling his “radical” political views and sexual orientation 
with the mores of a conservative community and upbringing.  Through Authentic 
Movement he seeks to integrate his sensuality with his intellectualism, his perceived 
deviance with his social consciousness.  In working collaboratively he hopes to push 
the boundaries of the form, but also to establish kinship and to broker acceptance.   
In Gillis’s case psychological disturbances in her childhood, the loss of her brother 
and her need to define herself as simultaneously detached and connected, as both a 
mystic or shaman and/or everywoman – again there is the issue of slippages and/or 
in-betweenness – have contributed to her goal of finding solace and identity in dance 
for herself and her audience.  Trance – even when they do not name it as such – is a 
mechanism by which Gillis and Webb interact with the world and come to value what 
they can contribute to society as artists. 
 
It is interesting to note that while Webb and Mantsoe come from very different 
religious and cultural backgrounds, they share a need to express their relationship to 
the world through the notion of collectivity.  Where Webb has absorbed the teachings 
of Halprin, et al. where the individual is perceived as a collective of experiences, 
Mantsoe positions his role in NDAA as an individual within a collective of humanity 
and consciousness, constantly being made and unmade by his relationships with 
others.  Though Maboungou speaks of her indebtedness to her collaborators, and 
Gillis is keenly aware of the importance that her artistic advisors play in her process, 
neither address their performances to any one particular community.  This is not to 
suggest that over the course of her career, Maboungou has not been instrumental in 
advocating for the rights of “other” artists in Canada, but her actions have been 
motivated largely by a political as opposed to a humanist agenda.  Webb is invested 
in creating work and working relationships that are both representative and respectful 
of personal and collective experience.  Mantsoe works within a diasporic context 
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motivated by a need to create and perform connections between the past and 
present as well as the mortal and spirit worlds. 
 
Finally, with regard to Maboungou and Mantsoe, the issue of being authorized to 
enter trance states is extremely significant.   In and of itself, this point of comparison 
– wherein Maboungou was chastised by an elder for entering a trance state while 
Mantsoe has received permission from the gods – demonstrates that trance can be 
just as Other to the anthropology’s traditional Other as Other to the Self.  This 
example illustrates that the process of de-Othering trance necessitates a 
methodological approach that promotes ethnographic particularism and that values 
similitude as much as diversity.   
 
The case studies also introduce a number of layers of colonization and immigration 
indicative of the history of contemporary dance in Canada.  Gillis represents the 
influence of Isadora Duncan and the early modern expressionist movement, as well 
as the importance of the American inheritance in the development of contemporary 
dance in Canada.  Implicit in the Webb example is the second and third waves of 
American influence on contemporary dance in Canada – the collaborations across 
disciplines characteristic of John Cage, Merce Cunningham, Robert Rauschenberg 
and Robert Whitman, as well as that between Martha Graham and Isamu Noguchi at 
the height of abstract expressionism, and the Judson Church era of Deborah Hay, 
Steve Paxton and Robert Ellis Brown that followed – which heralded a shift towards 
improvisation and anti-formalist approaches to movement invention.  Maboungou 
was part of the early wave of immigration to Canada from Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean that coincided with the political will to formalize multiculturalism.  Her role 
both as a dancer/choreographer and as an advocate for change in arts policy has 
had a significant impact on the visibility and equal treatment of multicultural artists in 
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the public sphere.  Finally, in the case study of Mantsoe is the globalization of 
contemporary practice in an age of transnational partnership and co-production, the 
creation of international dance “celebrities” such as Pina Bausch, Joaquin Cortez, 
Robert LePage, Akram Khan and Philippe Découflé, as well as the recent desire to 
redress the near decimation of the African culture and economy through the 
recognition and promotion of its artists.  Mantsoe is part of a new breed of arts 
worker who, in the absence of wholesale immigration, circumnavigates the globe as 
part of a diasporic community that creates dance across languages, borders and 
politics.  As suggested by a new granting scheme introduced by the Canada Council 
for the Arts in 2007 to fund multinational co-productions in dance, the Canadian 
contemporary dance community is very much receptive to and affected by this trend. 
 
While it can be argued that in the postmodern present, the distinction between high 
and low culture has been largely erased in favour of a mass or popular culture and 
driven by global consumerism, trance discourse in the West sustains these 
distinctions in order to retain its primal and primitive connotations.  Such connotations 
are fundamental to its collection and circulation.  In Canada, contemporary dance is 
supported by governmental agencies and funding bodies, is linked to statements of 
nationalism and is accessible primarily only to the middle and upper classes.  As a 
result, contemporary dance is only regarded as a site of trance experience where 
ethnicity challenges elitism.  In problematizing trance and reflecting on how its 
meaning is deployed and subverted, in recognizing and elucidating its social life, a 
step has been taken towards decolonizing the methodological practices and praxis 
that keep trance Other to Western culture.
 
Trance, in being reflected simultaneously in constructions of the Self and Other in 
contemporary dance practice in Canada, contradicts the discreteness and purity that 
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the form seeks to portray.  In focussing exclusively outwards, Western anthropology 
has succeeded in overlooking the immense potential for investigations of trance 
within its own dance practices.  This research demonstrates that trance’s 
contentiousness and ephemeral qualities can be brooked by paying attention to its 
polysemous nature and by expanding the range of its forms and possible 
interpretations.  In recognizing that all dances are ethnic and are sites for 
performances of both the Self and the Other, trance becomes a variable in 
articulating cultural mores and constructions of identity that overcome the West/non-
West divide. 
 
Laban and Csikszentmihalyi’s approaches to the concept of flow suggest a potential 
means of overcoming the divide.  The neutrality of the language diffuses the tension 
inherent to discussions and applications of trance in the West.  Laban’s 
conceptualization of flow as part of the Transformation Drives, Inner States and Full 
Effort Drives reflects the physicality, kinaesthesia and emotional response that 
characterizes trance in contemporary dance performance.   Its application through 
the introduction of an analyst also takes into account the relationship between dancer 
and audience – or to use terminology from Authentic Movement, the mover and the 
witness.  The movement descriptions that precede each case study illustrate a level 
of concentration and execution that might lead a certified Laban analyst to attribute 
the Passion, Vision or Spell Drive, and in certain cases, Full Effort Drives, where all 
four Effort factors coincide to produce a dissolution of boundaries and the 
appearance of self-propulsion.   
 
Presented alongside Laban’s drives or superimposed as another layer of 
commentary, Csikszentmihalyi’s triangulation of aptitude, concentration and 
challenge correlates to Maboungou, Gillis, Webb and Mantsoe’s performance 
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experiences and engagement in his/her work.  Invoking Flow points to parallels in the 
kinaesthetic response reported by contemporary dancers in this study and the 
dancers cited in Csikszentmihalyi’s research.  Both theories underscore the 
impression that like trance, flow is discernible to the performer and the spectator and 
is both profoundly physical and profoundly emotional. 
 
Certain concepts from Labanalysis such as the mapping of Efforts would be useful 
for the ethnographer studying trance behaviour and would account for the sense of 
physical transcendence and displacement that accompany altered states.  Bartenieff, 
who trained with Laban while a young dancer, went on to apply Laban Movement 
Analysis to choreography, physiotherapy, dance/movement therapy and ethnology.  
Despite concerns that the inclusion of notation scores can limit the audience for 
ethnographic research, since the 1980s there have been a number of successful 
ethnographies of Maori, Calabrian, Romanian, Malaysian, Hungarian and Taiwanese 
dance that incorporate Labanalysis (Shennan, 1984/1985; Castagna & Abramo, 
1991; Freedman, 1991; Nor, 1993; Fugedi, 1999; Wu & Huang, 1999).  Responding 
to the lack of fluency in Labanotation in the field and presumed disinclination to 
purchase publications with copious scores detailing – in this instance, Assiniboine 
and Plains Indian dances – dance ethnographers Brenda Farnell and Joan Huntley 
suggest that interactive CD-ROMs might be a suitable alternate medium for 
ethnographies of this kind (Farnell & Huntley, 1995).   
 
These examples demonstrate that there is a degree of receptivity, an awareness of 
the deficiencies, as well as the necessary skills already existing in the field to institute 
Labanalysis techniques.  They also indicate that the application of Laban’s theories 
can be self-reflexive and can function irrespective of the traditional West/non-West 
and Self/Other boundaries that have characterized trance research to the present.  
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Such techniques would be equally useful in ethnographies of rave in China as they 
would be in whirling dervish sects in European urban centres. 
 
With regard to Labanotation, there is still the issue of a specialized language and 
expertise that is acquired through access to accredited teachers and institutions that 
exist primarily in the West.  Its institutionalization therefore would not decolonize 
access to higher education which has been and continues to be an issue for the 
traditionally subaltern, indigenous, underprivileged scholar who must study outside 
his/her home country and whose qualifications and the universities that grant them 
continue to be judged against Western standards.  Of additional concern is that 
Laban’s interpretation of emotions and movement are not valid cross-culturally but 
again indigenous researchers, as advocated by Tuhiwai Smith, could author 
modifications to Laban’s principles in order to accommodate cultural difference and 
specificity.   And similarly to the example of Mantsoe, higher education, though 
certainly curtailed by socio-economic factors, has become significantly more 
transnational and accessible in recent decades.   
 
In terms of decolonizing subjectivity, Csikszentmihalyi’s work has the capacity to be 
non-denominational and neither linguistically, ethnically, racially nor gender biased, 
and is neither more nor less objective than traditional ethnographic tools of 
participant observation.  In Csikszentmihalyi’s investigations, Flow becomes the 
Wittgensteinian general term under which descriptions of trance experiences fall.  
The participants in his research determine the language and metaphors that they use 
to describe their optimal experiences.  There is the risk, as in Authentic Movement 
and in my interactions with Gillis, that paradigms and terminology once introduced by 
the ethnographer will be reproduced by the subject but this can be moderated by 
diligent efforts towards self-reflective, micro-ethnography in pursuit of thick 
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description carried out by indigenous researchers.  Csikszentmihalyi offers a means 
by which trance in Western and non-Western cultures can be accommodated with a 
level of commensurability that does not expunge difference. 
 
The application of Laban’s and Csikszentmihalyi’s theories of flow is not intended to 
insinuate that trance in Western culture should be examined against different 
constructs than trance in non-Western culture – ostensibly this research is premised 
on the notion that trance wherever it occurs should be tarred with the same 
methodological and epistemological brush.  To what degree then might the inclusion 
of flow in theorizations of trance in contemporary dance performance change and/or 
jeopardize this positioning?  
  
Clearly trance in the late 20th and early 21st centuries in Canada necessitates an 
approach that takes into account both the insights of anthropology and those of 
psychology and dance studies as illustrated by the case studies.  As has been 
demonstrated in its reification as a state or process, an artefact and a commodity, 
trance is not static, so methods that address its metaphoric and somatic movement 
through time, space and across cultures, need to be instilled.  Flow may or may not 
be appropriate to contemporary work in all settings, but it has relevance to the case 
studies under consideration where a cross-section of cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds, aesthetics, creative processes and approaches, pertain.  The case 
studies challenge the very idea of Western and non-Western culture and indicate a 
level of inter-relatedness in a variety of intriguing ways that do not merit a binary 
position.  
 
In the final summation, trance is a metaparadigm.  As such, regarding trance as flow 
neither displaces nor invalidates it.  On the contrary, reading Gillis’ quality of 
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effervescent release, Webb’s performance of sensual introspection, Maboungou’s 
indefatigable sense of control and attack and Mantsoe’s powerful acts of 
transcendence as examples of flow, allows their performances of trance to reconcile 
Self with Other and in the process, decolonizes the attribution of trance without 
exoticizing either the dance or the dancers. 
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APPENDIX  Permissions 
 
 
1) Nsamu  (2003) 
Choreography: Zab Maboungou 
Performer: Zab Maboungou 
Musicians: Diolkidi, Dominic Kofi Donkor 
Music composed by: Zab Maboungou 
Set designer: Chryso Bashonga 
Lighting: François O'Hara 
Costume for Zab Maboungou: Denis Lavoie 
Costume for the musicians: Guylaine Tolemyo 
 
Copyright © Zab Maboungou / Compagnie Nyata Nyata (2003) 
Permission to use this clip was granted by Ms. Maboungou during an interview 
completed on May 23, 2005, Montréal, Canada. 
 
 
 
2) A Complex Simplicity of Love (2003) 
Choreography: Margie Gillis 
Performer: Margie Gillis 
Music: George Frideric Handel - interpreted by Suzie LeBlanc 
Costume Designer: Denis Gagnon 
Lighting: Pierre Lavoie 
 
Copyright © Margie Gillis (2003) 
 
Permission to use this clip was granted by Ms. Gillis during an interview completed on 
February 13, 2006, Montreal, Canada. 
 
 
3) a love story (2006) 
Choreography: Brian Webb 
Performers: Tania Alvarado, Brian Webb 
Music: Richard Wagner Tristan et Isolde 
Poetry: Adriana Davies 
Lighting: David Fraser 
Copyright © Brian Webb / Brian Webb Dance Company (2006) 
 
Permission to use this clip was granted by Mr. Webb during an interview completed on 
February 13, 2006, Montreal, Canada. 
 
 
4) Phokwane (1998) 
Choreography: Vincent Sekwati Mantsoe 
Performer: Vincent Sekwati Mantsoe 
Music: Philip Hamilton, Stephen Mecus 
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Copyright © Vincent Sekwati Koko Mantsoe & DanceWorks (1998) 
Permission to use this clip was granted by Mr. Mantsoe during an interview  
completed on June 13, 2006, Toronto, Canada. 
. 
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